TELOS

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A Quarterly Journal of Critical Thought

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

Greetings to Karl August Wittfogel
on the occasion of his 90th birthday
September 6, 1986

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Introduction

With the exception of sporadic flashes of terrorist acts triggering spectacular responses and generalized paranoia, the European front appears relatively quiet — especially now that the peace movements have faded from the political scene, the Communist Parties and the Greens are in slow but irrevocable decline, and the focus seems to have shifted back to the usual banalities of everyday life. This does not mean, however, that all the old problems have suddenly disappeared. Far from it. If anything, the present lull reflects, at best, a temporary stalemate. In this respect, recent ripples flowing out of Austria may be symptomatic. Old Vienna is back in fashion — and for more than one reason.

Drawing on two longstanding discussions — the political status of Central Europe and the cultural legacy of modernism — Berman analyzes the meaning of this resurgence of interest in Austria. The various exhibits dealing with turn-of-the-century Vienna understandably tend to reflect particular local connotations, but all echo the re-emergence of an interest in *European neutrality*, and in the dismantling of the Atlantic alliance as a response to the growing encroachment of U.S. foreign policy. Both the faded imagery of the Hapsburg Empire and Austria's non-alignment suddenly turn into models for a Central European identity "between East and West." Of course, no major geopolitical changes are imminent. Some tinkering with the balance of power within NATO may be possible, but even that is unlikely, given the vacillations of present European governments. It is, however, the fantasy of European autonomy that feeds into the political process as a mechanism for mobilizing nationalist loyalties, and Austria provides the clearest case with the Waldheim campaign. In his article Berman examines the implications of the appeal to anti-semitism. Although the psychoanalytic categories he deploys may or may not be all that useful, here they attempt to explain how even a populist consensus within formal democratic procedures remains susceptible to subtle ideological manipulations. Viennese irrationalism in turn-of-the-century culture or current events or, more generally, in recrudescent nationalism, makes any sanguine account of social movements as carriers of a rational consensus and, therefore, emancipatory aspirations, highly problematic.

Social movements are, however, clearly symptomatic of the legitimacy deficits of established political mechanisms. Gransow describes the internal immobility and bureaucratization of the West German SPD, inherited from its participation in the government from 1966 to 1982, but certainly rooted in older social-democratic traditions. As an opposition party, it may have responded to the criticisms emanating from the new social movements and the Greens but, according to Gransow, this is highly unlikely, despite some minor programmatic changes that amount to little more than window dressing. The party leadership and the hard-core base trust each other, but neither will seize a political initiative. Or do they trust each other to avoid taking any political initiative? Recycling currently fashionable German jargon, Gransow describes this situation as "paradoxical communication, to which he counterposes a program for "functional democracy." The terms betray an assumption that a non-problematic communication is possible and this may provide

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a normative framework for democratic politics. But such a designation fails to supply any substantive content, and emancipatory politics is reduced to formal efficacy. In other words: Party is a guide, then a party reform is neither likely to strengthen the SPD's electoral potential nor to democratize the organization of power by improving the status of disadvantaged groups. On the contrary, the yuppie leadership of the social movements would be the likely winner. The case of Austria shows how the leftist critique of American hegemony can nurture a nationalism *à la* Waldheim. The case of Germany shows how the leftist critique of bureaucratic parties can lead to more bureaucracy.

Similarly problematic efforts to conceptualize a democratic project are vividly described in Barros' essay on recent discussions within the Latin American Left. The similarity is due to one of the many deleterious effects of the military dictatorships, i.e., the forced exile of the intelligentsia and its consequent exposure to the moribund political programs being hawked in the seminar rooms of Paris, Frankfurt, and Essex. But Barros pinpoints the specificity of the contemporary debate. During the sixties democracy was not a leftist concern when sights were set on more revolutionary goals. Only during the period of military rule, and especially in Argentina and Brazil, after considerable reforms, has the notion of democracy acquired a unique urgency. Nevertheless, at least three different versions of "democracy" compete with each other for predominance in the Left: an orthodox Marxist instrumentalist account that treats democracy as a means to proletarian dictatorship, a proceduralist democracy as a set of formal political institutions that disregards social issues, and a radical democracy of mass participation and decentralized power. While these accounts are grounded in insightful critiques of imperialist dependency and the on-going threat of the military and its civilian supporters to reintroduce authoritarian rule, the respective projects remain extraordinarily abstract, involving democracy without any compelling vision of a genuine political program that could address the continuing economic crisis. The more the Latin American Left borrows its categories from European Marxism or, more recently, post-structuralism and communication theory, the more it mortgages any chance to escape its own neo-colonial marginalization. In the meantime, it just repeats the vacuity of its metropolitan teachers, trying to deny the lack of concrete politics by waving abstract labels, flip-flopping between an anemic formalism and an equally anemic decisionism.

More concretely, Garretón tries to trace the trajectory of these dictatorships that have been in power in Latin America during the last couple of decades. To the extent that they all came to power as a result of a crisis in the sixties, they immediately unleashed an almost unprecedented wave of repression to checkmate the Left and re-launch the economy within a more solid and authoritarian capitalist framework. But with the growing world crisis in the seventies, their programs failed miserably thus necessitating their retreating from the political scene — hence the opening of new democratic possibilities. While Garretón's scientistic reconstruction successfully captures some of the general features of the history of these dictatorships, he necessarily papers over essential national differences. He also fails to pinpoint the real causes of the socio-economic failure in terms of the broader international context

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within which *any* project at that time would have failed. Thus, he ends up with an ambiguous evaluation of both the possibilities for further democratic developments — given the considerable residual power of the military and their right-wing allies — as well as for solving economic problems. As a result, the question as to whether democratization in Latin America may be an historical accident rather than an irreversible trend not only remains unanswered but, in terms of the very evidence he presents, present developments can only be seen as a permanently precarious contingency.

This focus on democracy is reflected also in Pasquinelli's analysis of power where she argues against the traditional centralized Weberian model. Taking her clues from anthropological research into social relations within primitive societies (primarily Clastre's work), Pasquinelli shows how it is possible to see power in a more positive light as a means for developing community identity and cohesion. Already partially articulated primarily in recent post-structuralist discussions of diffuse power, this account suggests new possibilities for social reorganization along more participatory and democratic lines. It remains unclear, however, the extent to which it is warranted to extrapolate idealized social and power relations in primitive societies as a model for advanced industrial societies. The project feeds too well into the frantic efforts of ex-Marxists who, politically burned by the failures of the New Left and its aftermath, now seek at all costs to find alternative paths to that ever-more elusive emancipation that remains as the only lasting heritage for the generation of '68. Coupled with the fact that in Western post-industrial societies the disintegration of any meaningful opposition has rendered the exercise of raw power unnecessary and obsolete, the present illusory feeling of diffuse power may be the result of the deployment of a more efficient new strategy to guarantee the stability of existing social relations. Rather than pointing the way to a new theory of power, this peculiar recycling of primitives may be a decoy successfully turning attention away from the sophisticated new ways through which the old centralized power now flows.

Whereas these issues of national identity, cultural unification, rationalization of inner party dynamics, and democratization all fall within the framework of modernist discourse, Christa Bürger's article shifts to more esoteric questions concerning aesthetics and post-modernity. In an overview of recent American debates on post-modernism, she describes several nuances in the leftist critique of recent cultural developments: from calls for a "post-modernism of resistance" (Huyssen) through the association of post-modernism with post-industrial capitalism (Jameson) to the critique of the aestheticization of the public sphere (Berman). Bürger locates these positions within the American intellectual and social context, and measures them against various stages of Adorno's work, especially the theory of the culture industry which is, after all, a theory of American society. Interestingly enough, it is precisely this contrast with Adorno (of all people) that allows her to highlight the impasse of the American Left. Classical critical theory, always accused of an apolitical quietism, could at least retreat into the hermetic work of art as a placeholder for emancipation. In the era of post-modernism, even this bastion appears to be subsumed fully into the logic of commodification, and cultural criticism seems to be pushed either toward a neo-existentialism or a putative conservatism. While Bürger remains dubious about the Ameri-

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can discussion, she is prepared to concede that it may well correspond to particular American forms of cultural levelling. In Western Europe, however, she insists that the "Institution of art" is still alive and well. Nevertheless, her version of the "institution" is far from her earlier work or the original account by Peter Bürger. Instead of placing the emphasis on the vitality of autonomous works, she underscores processes of commodification and the class character of taste . . .

Last year Telos Press published Timofeev's *Soviet Peasants*. One of the rare inside analyses of everyday life in the Soviet countryside, Timofeev's work was rewarded by the State with a stiff prison sentence which he is presently serving. In this issue we publish a symposium concerning this work in order to undertake the kind of public discussion it should have generated in the Soviet Union where it could have had considerable policy consequences. The contributions by the various participants in this symposium, however, do not trivialize Timofeev's contribution by perfunctorily heaping on it empty praise. Rather, in the only dignified way the book should be received, they critically examine both its intrinsic strengths as well as the weaknesses. Thus, in addition to finding it enlightening in terms of describing in a very intense and immediate way the everyday life in the USSR countryside, they judge it somewhat methodologically crude, understandably not too well informed concerning other available literature on the subject, and relatively naive in terms of the alternatives he envisages as a solution. It is unfortunate that, thanks to the zeal of Soviet authorities, Timofeev himself cannot comment or reply to these charges.

The "Notes and Commentary" and "Review" sections deal with a conference report on the reception of Nietzsche, an interesting short piece on Vienna and Budapest, and a number of recent and not-so-recent books. Most relevant of all these reviews is Murphy's account of a volume on post-analytic philosophy. The lengthy plea for proceduralism that he appends to his otherwise penetrating evaluation of some of the more interesting developments in recent philosophy, however, misses the mark and betrays a certain lingering provincialism. Only if seen from an abstract ahistorical perspective does the new relativism appear as a kind of *bellum omnia contra omnes* manageable only by means of a strictly enforced philosophical equivalent of Robert's rules of order. If anything, it is only in Europe where a residual cultural diversity still generates allegedly irreconcilable perspectives that some flat and redundant proceduralism may seem so desirable as to become the basis of an entire philosophical perspective. Given the successful homogenization in the U.S. carried out by the culture industry, mass education and the various agencies of the welfare state during the last half century, what American philosophy needs is the introjection of an intellectually invigorating conflictual dimension rather than a German-philosophical transubstantiation of the effete but genteel mannerisms of British dons.

Russell Berman
Paul Piccone

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The Vienna Fascination

Russell A. Berman

The Discovery of Central Europe

Another spectre is haunting Europe and has even made it to Manhattan. Seventy years after his assassination on a sultry afternoon in Sarajevo, his Excellency the Archduke Franz Ferdinand has returned and has brought with him a *danse macabre*, a multinational celebration of a long-gone multinational empire. First sighted in Venice in the Palazzo Grassi in the summer of 1984, he reappeared quickly in an old haunt, the Künstlerhaus in Vienna and then moved on to conquer the world: the Centre Pompidou in Paris and now the Museum of Modern Art in New York.

As the end of the century approaches, the *fin-de-siècle* is rediscovered. How can one explain this Vienna fascination? Let me leave aside the baroque confabulations and the metaphysical meditations on the imminent collapse of another empire and offer instead a more sober suggestion. After Alexander and King Tut, China, the Vatican, and the Impressionists, Vienna is another blockbuster show, one more once-in-a-lifetime chance; a strenuous effort to bedazzle a jaded public which otherwise has neither patience nor interest for the impressive but non-sensational permanent collections of the major museums. The mega-exhibit is a tourist attraction, and the expansive galleries, which, under normal circumstances, are as empty as a church on Monday morning, are abracadabra filled with the hustle and bustle of the curious, the cursory, and the culture-vulture crowds. These are hard times for high culture —beam me up Scotty, there's no art down here— so the museum administrations wax ecstatic when the attendance statistics speed off into hyperspace, justifying the hypertrophic subventions: a venal calculation no one should underestimate in a cruel age of budget cutting.

Is Vienna really only just another opportunity for the culture bureaucrats to get a quick fix? This account sounds close to a vulgar Marxism, boorishly reducing cultural complexities to penny-ante parsimony. Vulgar or not, it is indeed an economistic explanation that remains abstract, helplessly blinded in the darkness of a night where all the cats are Klimt. Despite the shared constraints of contemporary museum politics, each museum has handled the material differently. In Italy, Austria, France, and the U. S., imperial Vienna has never worn the same dress twice. Its appearance is as protean as the devil in *Doctor Faustus*, marked each time by the unique concerns of the respective beholder. The Venetians limited their retrospective to the two decades before 1918, as the subtitle of the exhibit put it: *from the Secession to the fall of the Habsburg Empire.* A barely hidden

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irredentist nostalgia recalls a former political geography that included the north Italian provinces in a Central European confederation (a similar archeology of the Dual Monarchy is evident, for different reasons, of course, in the Hungarian vision of the director Istvan Szabo, whose recent film, *Colonel Redl*, even includes an homage to Emperor Franz Joseph I). In contrast, the new Viennese representation of old Vienna casts a wider net, the period 1870 to 1930, both artificial dates, obvious stand-ins for the hidden political markings: the *Ausgleich* with Hungary in 1867 and the civil war of 1934. While the official periodization disguises the political agenda, it simultaneously describes a historical range that allows for equal time for competing political groups, so characteristic of the Austrian social partnership: the conservatives can indulge in the imperial aura of the good old days before 1918, while the socialists bask in the memories of the First Republic and the welfare-statist municipal policies of Red Vienna. But both groups could join hands at the patriotic center of the exhibit, where, in front of a bust of the Empress Elisabeth, the blood-stained uniform of the Archduke from that sultry day in Sarajevo is stretched out in full glory. Is this art?

Outside of the successor states of Austro-Hungary, the Viennese material undergoes further metamorphoses. In one of the final fortresses of autonomy aesthetics, the Museum of Modern Art, emphasis has been placed on artistic innovation, the legacy of the major painters, Klimt, Schiele, and Kokoschka, and Vienna appears as one of the crucibles of aesthetic modernism. Yet, the Parisian exhibit foregrounded Viennese irrationalism, hieratic ornament, mythic excess, and the allegories of psychoanalysis: Vienna as the birthplace of post-modernism, evidently the diametrical opposite of the New York version.[1]

These four permutations of Vienna are indicative of particular local concerns which lead to extraordinarily divergent appropriations of the cultural historical material, as if *fin-de-siècle* Vienna were objectively nothing at all, or only an empty screen onto which the various groups of empowered cultural administrators could project their own specific interests. One might even label this solution itself a Viennese account, recalling Mach, Wittgenstein, and perhaps even Freud, insofar as the perceptions of the material are reduced to just so many subjective impressions and discrete illusions, with no fundamental grounding. The variations on the Vienna of the past would then turn out to be an open catalogue of varied local cultural concerns of the present.

This pluralist model of interpretation has much to recommend it, especially its diagnostic value in the examination of the specificity of really-existing cultural groups, but it may not be the whole story. Does it not miss the Vienna forest for the trees? By shattering the material into four separate perceptions, it ignores the fact that in all four cases it is the same object, no matter how unique each disguise, that attracts the attention of the viewer. In Venice, Vienna, Paris, and New York, there is a shared concern with the legacy of turn-of-the-century Austria, and it may be worth our while to consider whether one can uncover an

1. *Le Arti a Vienna: Dalla Secessione alla Caduta dell'Impero Asburgico* (Edizioni La Biennale di Venezia, 1984); *Traum und Wirklichkeit: Wien 1870-1930* (Eigenverlag der Museen der Stadt Wien, 1985).

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agenda that is as equally common as hidden.

Let me proceed with this admittedly tenuous inquiry through a mixture of negation and free association. If not Vienna, then what? International interest in the culture and history of German-speaking Europe centered, for many decades, on monumental political questions: the causes of the WWI and, later, the rise and fall of the Third Reich, and the latter topic returned in hundreds of films and popular novels. It was Hitler and by no means the Archduke Franz Ferdinand who fascinated a collective imagination, which in turn never perceived Hitler as in any significant way Austrian. This interest, the specific phantasmagoria of the Cold War, underwent a modification when the generation of the sixties discovered an elective affinity with the cultural revolution of the twenties, the Weimar Republic, the theater of Brecht, expressionism, the radical avant-garde, and, in more popular packaging, the cachet of the cabaret.[2] The likelihood of this shift in interest is rather obvious and need not be belabored: the common denominator is a confluence of cultural experimentation and a political radicalism.

As early as March of 1968, Peter Handke pointed to things to come in an article provocatively entitled "Horvath is better than Brecht," a phrase that challenges one to discern a political impetus beneath the Vienna fascination that has displaced the Weimar Republic of the student movement.[3] Yet, the four exhibits appear to eschew any obvious political grand-standing, either excluding political material altogether or including only brief, contextualizing remarks regarding local political movements. The exhibit in Vienna mentions Karl Lueger and Viktor Adler, but the Austro-Hungarian politicians of international stature like Ferdinand Beust or Gyula Andrassy are nowhere to be found. Vienna may have been the home of aesthetic innovation and/or social modernization, but in its various representations, it remains a polis without politics, outside of international relations, cut off from global entanglements. One cannot envision early nineteenth-century Vienna, Metternich's Vienna, without considering the international diplomacy of European politics; in the images of late nineteenth-century Vienna, it is almost as if modern art and social movements displace international political concerns. This tendency is amplified by the reduction of Austro-Hungarian culture to the single municipality, the capital city, as if nothing were taking place elsewhere in the monarchy or the rest of the world. And it is precisely this foregrounded separation of the insular metropolis from the rest of the world which can help explain the current Vienna fascination and the gothic return of Franz Ferdinand.

The denial of politics, which nearly engenders an unintended provincialization of the represented metropolis, Vienna, is embedded in two related descriptions. The first, deriving from the political culture of the Empire, locates Austria at the crossroads of the European North and South, East and West,

2. Cf. Walter Z. Lacqueur, "The Tucholsky Complaint," *Encounter* October, 1969, pp. 76-80.

3. Peter Handke, "Horvath ist besser als Brecht," in: *Theater im Umbruch: Eine Dokumentation aus 'Theater Heute,'* ed. Henning Rischbeiter (Munich: Deutscher Taschenbuchverlag, 1970), pp. 62- 63.

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where Germans, Slavs, and Latins meet; it is mediator, the middle power, the neutral terrain between the surrounding cultural-political zones: it is Central Europe, ideally separate from the great powers that surround it. This tradition is then revived after 1945 and, especially in the context of the state treaty of 1955, in a second version. To use the phrase of the newly elected president, the "Austrian example" entails neutrality, a central European buffer zone pledged to retain its political autonomy from the superpower blocks in the East and the West.[4]

The current Vienna fascination is the cultural corollary to the "Austrian example." It corresponds to a reconsideration of the possibility of a specifically European or, more properly, Central European political and cultural identity, defined outside of and against the spheres of influence of NATO and the Warsaw Pact. A glance at recent political discussions confirms this suggestion. Interviewed in the West German *Tageszeitung* after the American bombing of Libya, the British journalist Fred Halliday called for a dissolution of NATO and, nearly echoing the Austrian President, invoked the model of an "Austrian solution" for Western Europe. At the same time, a conference was being held in Vienna to clarify the contemporary relevance of the concept "Mitteleuropa." Finally, to choose one text of the West German peace movement that can stand for many, the volume *Neutralität für Mitteleuropa: Das Ende der Blöcke* by Jochen Löser and Ulrike Schilling (1984) proposes the term "Austrianism" as an alternative to the pejorative labels "neutralism" or "Finlandization." The authors insist programmatically that "despite existing ideological and political differences, all Central Europeans living between France and the Soviet Union have developed stronger common interests that enable them to shape their coexistence autonomously in a confederation Mitteleuropa as a neutral community of sovereign states." They look forward to declaring Vienna the center of what they call a "peace zone Mitteleuropa," and they conclude by calling on the Soviet Union to seize the initiative, as it allegedly did during the negotiations of Austrian neutrality in 1955, and take diplomatic steps "to open up an Austrian perspective for all Central Europeans."[5]

The Vienna exhibits and the Austrian example: the place may be the same, but the geographical congruence may not be enough to make a compelling argument. What, after all, does Egon Schiele have to do with the discussion of Central European neutrality, except for the apparent accident of location? The political hypothesis just outlined seems to suffer from nearly the same reductionism pointed out in the earlier discussion of museum budgets. Yet, this political connection is crucial, although it only becomes convincing in tandem with a second, cultural hypothesis. *Fin-de-siècle* Vienna is fascinating because the cultural historical material it includes provides a rich field for exploring the an-

4. Kurt Waldheim, *The Austrian Example*, trans. Ewald Osers (New York: Macmillan Co., 1973).

5. Halliday in *Tageszeitung*, June 13, 1986; Jochen Löser and Ulrike Schilling, *Neutralität für Mitteleuropa: Das Ende der Blöcke* (Munich: Bertelsmann Verlag, 1984), pp. 9, 170, 194, 206; for an anti-Soviet version from Eastern Europe, see Braxator, *et. al.*, *Selbstbestimmung für Mitteleuropa*, Schriftenreihe Sloboda 3 (Brugg: Verlag Adria, 1979).

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omie and labile identity formation in twentieth-century modernity. It frames the tension between scientific rationality and aesthetic utopianism, and it records the disorientation of civic consciousness, the transformation of the bourgeois citizen into the modern consumer. The political move, pointing to the Austrian example in order to make the case for Central European neutrality, may entail a response to that cultural confusion, an effort to find a collective identity, or, alternatively, it may exacerbate that confusion, to the extent that neutrality implies a denial of genuine political challenges and conflicts.

In his introduction to the Vienna catalogue, Schorske summarizes his seminal account of *fin-de-siècle* culture. Two separate Austrian legacies, the rationalism of the Josephine enlightenment and the aesthetic irrationality of the baroque counter-reformation, combined briefly in the "cultural synthesis" of the middle of the nineteenth century, carried by the liberal bourgeoisie which nurtured a traditionally aristocratic aesthetic culture while pursuing its own project of capitalist modernization.[6] For Schorske, this synthesis collapsed due to the subjective after-shocks of the crash of 1873 and the rise of anti-liberal social movements on the right and the left. Viennese modernism itself turns out to be inherently anti-liberal, the revolt of a younger generation against the culture of the "founders" of the 1860's. Reason and art, Josephinism and the baroque, which had once appeared to be compatible, again polarized. Hence the antinomy of an arch-rationalist modernism in the works of Alfred Loos and Karl Kraus and, on the other hand, the subjective irrationality of the secessionist painters and the writers of Young Vienna.

Schorske's description is rich and valuable, but its most important consequences become clear only if it is thought through in terms of broader social and cultural processes. The two separate traditions he identifies, rational and aesthetic culture, certainly have specific manifestations within Austrian history, but the dichotomy is characteristic of European modernization in general and the separation of particular value spheres, i.e., the autonomization of art and science. Furthermore the crisis of mid-century liberal culture, the stock market crash and the rise of social movements, cannot be convincingly regarded as a *deus ex machina*, an inexplicable accident that befell the Austrian bourgeoisie. On the contrary, it was a consequence of the truncation of the project of modernization, the reduction of enlightenment rationality to instrumental reason and the logic of the market, the transformation of political liberalism into the economic liberalism of *laissez-faire* doctrine.

While scientific reason and autonomous art remain normatively incompatible, all the Vienna exhibits demonstrate how the modernization of late 19th-century capitalism demanded an ever increasing aesthetic stylization of everyday life: from the world's fair in 1873 through the Makart parade of 1879 to the birth of the culture industry in the Viennese operettas and the industrial aestheticization of practical objects in the *Wiener Werkstätte*. While the genres and forms of the objects of institutionalized art, the domain of high culture, were

6. Carl E. Schorske, "Österreichs ästhetische Kultur, 1870- 1914," in: *Traum und Wirklichkeit*, *op. cit.* pp. 12-25.

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undergoing the radical transformations associated with classical modernism, artistic considerations spread into other spheres of social activity, populating the world with consumer objects and replacing traditional patterns of identity formation, including political consciousness. The result includes the viability of social movements, like Christian Socialism and Austro-Marxism, organized to administer the new expanses of an aestheticized social sphere.

To the extent that turn-of-the-century Vienna includes aesthetic innovation (Klimt, Kokoschka) as well as ubiquitious aestheticization (Makart, interior design), it circumscribes both the modernist and post-modernist positions in the contemporary critical discussion. Hence part of its cultural fascination today. To the extent, however, that Vienna points to the collapse of a liberal rationality and political identity, it dovetails with the political hypothesis already described. For the various political proposals for Central Europe as an alternative to East or West or whatever always, and especially in the 20th-century, suggest that Central Europe is the carrier of a special cultural mission, contrasted with, for example, an empty rationalism or an atomistic individualism or an anti-cultural barbarism ascribed to other political units. One might even say that the very notion of culture as a discrete, venerated, and somehow redemptive domain of human activity is a specifically Central European product, a product of various Central European aspirations. It is this cultural substance, legitimating the mission of a political Central Europe, that might be under scrutiny in the exhibits of fascinating Vienna.

The Politics of Neutrality

The political attention currently being paid to the notion of Central European autonomy is largely a result of the West German peace movement and the debates over the stationing of the Cruise and Pershing missiles. Because these matters have been treated extensively in *Telos* (starting in the Spring of 1982), a short version will suffice. In a speech in London in 1977, Helmut Schmidt pointed out a growing strategic imbalance in Europe. Given the numerical superiority of the Warsaw Pact conventional forces as well as the presence of the Soviet medium-range nuclear missiles (SS-20s), the U. S. would be able to resist a hypothetical Soviet invasion of Western Europe only by relying on its intercontinental nuclear potential. In other words, the military balance would force the U. S. to escalate a local European conflict into a global nuclear war. Yet strong political pressures would make any American president reluctant to risk a Soviet retalitatory attack on American cities simply in order to defend the allies in Western Europe. Therefore, the American claim to defend Western Europe would lose its credibility unless an alternative, a model of flexible response, were instituted in the form of middle-range nuclear missiles for NATO. Such missiles would, so the argument goes, allow for a defense of Western Europe without attacking the territory of the Soviet Union from North American launching sites.

In 1979, NATO adopted the so-called "double decision," the program of de-

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ploying these middle-range missiles starting in 1983, unless the other track of the double decision, the pursuit of negotiations in Geneva, turned out to be successful. From the start, the double decision was extraordinarily controversial, especially in West Germany, where the left could argue that the new missiles implied the possibility of a nuclear conflict that would be played out solely on German territory. Flexible response appeared to be less a defense against a Soviet invasion than a temptation for American strategists to launch a first-strike attack, since, in the eyes of the West German left, the major threat to peace was not Moscow but Washington. This perception was, of course, heightened after the presidential election of 1980 and the commencement of the Reagan administration with its thinking-out-loud about winning a nuclear war, and the debate was embittered by the sense of persecution, voiced by some West German commentators, that one or the other, or both, superpowers looked forward to a limited war precisely because it could be waged in Germany. The criticism of the missiles, therefore, slid easily into a vision of encirclement, which in turn generated calls for a German national or Central European resistance to the threat from abroad, especially from the U. S.

Despite the burgeoning of the largest mass protest movement in post-war German history, the missiles have been being stationed since the end of 1983. This development has to be seen in the light of two larger factors: the decline in the doctrine of nuclear deterrence, with its critics on the left and on the right, and the thorough collapse of detente between the superpowers. As long as a peaceful coexistence seemed possible, the division of Europe inherited from the Yalta Conference had at least the virtue of keeping the European peace. Yet as real belligerence and verbal sparring increasingly marred international relations in the past half decade, the massive stationing of American and Russian troops in Central Europe came to look more and more like a tinderbox waiting to explode. This perception is strengthened by every characteristic foreign policy move of the current American administration: support for the Nicaraguan Contras, the invasion of Grenada, the insistence on SDI, the bombing of Libya, and the renunciation of SALT-II. The result is that in West Germany (and in Great Britain) the Reagan administration has successfully produced political opposition movements eager to dissolve NATO and explore various models of European neutrality.

The rejection of American foreign policy and NATO has been incorporated into the platform of the Green Party and has strongly colored the new program of the Social Democrats. Even conservative politicians have begun to complain about the imbalance in the Atlantic alliance.[7] Yet, more important than these specific examples is the reopening of a fundamental foreign policy debate in West Germany, a reexamination of the western orientation, the German national question, and the status of Germany in Europe.

Figures as diverse as the editor of the *Spiegel*, Rudolf Augstein, the filmmaker

7. Cf. the remarks by the foreign policy speaker of the CDU/CSU, Otto Rühe, in "Das Korsett der NATO wird den USA zu eng," in *Tageszeitung*, June 10, 1986.

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Werner Herzog, and the neutralists Löser and Schilling have called for a new German patriotism.[8] To some extent this is of course another case of West Germany imitating contemporary American developments, even though it is a patriotism directed primarily against American foreign policy. It is, however, not directed against the neighboring European states. On the contrary, the resurgence of the German national question is generally linked to models for a neutral sphere in Central Europe. Among the competing —and often overlapping— proposals, one can differentiate 1) an ecological-fundamentalist opposition to all state structures, a position that is susceptible to co-optation by the right-wing populism of the so-called national revolutionaries and 2) the relatively realpolitical efforts by the parliamentary faction of the Greens to promote detente and thereby indirectly to contribute to a reduction of European tensions. It is, however, a third position which is most interesting in this context: drawing on the rediscovery of the German national question by the New Left, proposals have emerged advocating a non-aligned, neutral, and demilitarized zone in Central Europe to be achieved by a process including a peace treaty between the WWII allies and Germany; this already implies the next step, the constitution of a German government, usually envisioned as a confederation of the two German states; and finally a confederation of Central European states. Thus, in 1984, Otto Schily proposed a Central European Peace Union to include the two Germanys, Austria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, the Netherlands, Belgium, and Denmark. Löser and Schilling add Rumania, Yugoslavia, and Luxemburg. Their long-term goal is an autonomous "Europe of states between the Urals and the Atlantic," recalling the peace movement's slogan of a nuclear-free zone "between Poland and Portugal."[9]

The arguments for Central European neutrality have to do with the avoidance of a superpower confrontation and the self-determination of the European peoples. The arguments against neutrality point to the long-time strategic consequence, the diminished American presence, the strengthening of the Soviet military position, and a possible "Finlandization" of Central and Western Europe. The advocates of neutrality, in turn, reject this term as a Cold War myth. Their proposed revisions of the geopolitical status of Europe generate bitter attacks on what is called "social-democratic *status quo* politics," the alleged colonization of West Germany by the U. S., and Adenauer's historical tilt to the West in the post-war period. Löser and Schilling look even further back, calling for a combination of Bismarck's accommodation with Russia and Stresemann's European perspective of Locarno. Elsewhere, a rapprochement with the East has been discussed in terms of a "new Rapallo." These competing references indicate both the fluidity of the contemporary discussion of German national identity and, perhaps more importantly, the embeddedness of this contempora-

8. Rudolf Augstein in *Der Spiegel*, November 28, 1983; Werner Herzog, "Absurde Anfälle der Ordnung," *Der Spiegel*, Nr. 21, 1982, p. 210; Löser and Schilling, *op. cit.* p. 111.

9. On Schily, see Wilfried von Bredow and Rudolf H. Brocke, "Dreimal Deutschlandpolitik: Deutschlandpolitische Ansätze der Partei der Grünen," *Deutschland Archiv*, January, 1986, pp. 59-60; Löser and Schilling, *op. cit.* p. 142.

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ry discussion in an extensive history of considerations of German territorial organization in relation to Central European politics. The point is not that the advocates of neutrality or a German confederation are simply repeating positions familiar at least since the establishment of a unified German nation-state, but that their proposals derive from a long-standing tradition and similar strategic considerations. It is, therefore, useful to recall some of their precursors.

Denouncing Adenauer's opting for a "small" West Germany rather than a neutral and reunified state and, at the same time, calling for some sort of Central European confederation between East and West, the contemporary proponents of neutrality echo similar critics of the Bismarckian small-German solution that produced the modern German nation-state by excluding the erstwhile other German country, 19th-century Austria. Some of the arguments of one of the leading *grossdeutsche* publicists of the 1870s, Constantin Frantz, sound remarkably familiar. Consider first the geopolitical claim: Bismarck's small Germany —today one would say "divided Germany"— played into the hands of a great power, Czarist Russia, whose expansionist drive could only have been blocked by a confederation of Germany and Austro-Hungary.[10] This argument is probably specious and historically untenable; it is cited only as an anticipation of contemporary claims that a German confederation could diminish superpower influence in Central Europe.

Secondly, in terms of domestic politics, Frantz asserted that the small-German solution in the form of a Prussianized Germany necessarily led to a centralized and militaristic state. His confederate alternative implied a decentralized military, since each of German principalities would have retained its own army. While the result might be a technically less effective defense system, a general demilitarization and a decline in international tensions would likely follow.[11] Again, a certain affinity to the contemporary neutrality discussion is unmistakeable: European peace through Central European confederation.

Frantz lodged his vision in the standard anti-liberalism of the 1870's (the same anti-liberalism which, according to Schorske, propelled the dynamics of Viennese modernism). This anti-liberalism included a hostility to enlightenment individuality and civil libertarian legislation (today's "human rights"); a rejection of *laissez-faire* capitalism in the name of corporativist economic structures; and, related by image and innuendo to the two other aspects, a conservative anti-semitism. Instead of Bismarck's centralized small Germany, Frantz advocated a genuine *Reich*, a term he used to indicate both an internal particularist differentiation and a tendentially expansionist dissolution of external borders. While other nations, indebted to Roman law, might culminate in statist organizations, the properly German political form included both regional autonomy and universalist claims. Such a *Reich* finally has a special historical role, as Frantz puts it: "Germany shall become the real foundation for the whole European peace sys-

10. Constantin Frantz, *Die Genesis der Bismarckschen Aera und ihre Zeit* (Munich: M. Huttler, 1874), p. 25.

11. Constantin Frantz, *Der Bankrott der herrschenden Staatsweisheit* (Munich: M. Huttler, 1874), pp. 20-22.

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tem and for the gradual establishment of a European confederation, which will find its model in the German confederation. Not for nothing does Germany lie in the middle of Europe; and it is therefore predestined to become the general mediator."[12]

Frantz clearly walks a thin line between a neutral internationalism and a chauvinist expansionism. Here the former is probably an alibi for the latter. The constellation of anti-liberalism and political confederalism reappears decades later in a somewhat different form, when Bismarck's German *Nationalpolitik* had been transformed into an imperialist Wilhelmine *Weltpolitik*. As early as the 1890s,one finds the social reformer Friedrich Naumann, for example, reproducing the same ambivalence noted in Frantz's European speculations. In the "National-Social Catechism" of 1896, Naumann defines his concept of "the national" as "the drive of the German people to spread its influence across the globe," but he soon links this sort of expansionism to a defensive strategy of "gathering the middle powers so that the world powers do not strangle everything."[13] The world powers were, of course, England and Russia.

While Frantz described his model of regional decentralization with reference to the medieval *Reich*, Naumann urges his *Reichsdeutsche* compatriots to learn from the federalism of the Austrian model. The program of an alliance of "middle powers" comes to mean a political organization of the nationalities of Central Europe, an extrapolation of the Austro-Hungarian arrangement. It must be loose enough to respect local autonomy, but cohesive enough to resist the pressure of the hostile encirclement of 1914. In Naumann's words: "This is *Weltpolitik*: participation in the emergent international system. The German people does not want to be pushed aside in this process. It does not want to leave the regulation of human organization on land and sea to the syndicate of the old colonizers; it does not want to be isolated and crushed between Romans and Slavs; it therefore must defend itself and therefore sends its sons into battle, fearing nothing, sacrificing all."[14] A fairly typical and not especially egregious example of the enthusiasm at the outbreak of WWI, the passage emphasizes the image of Germany "between Romans and Slavs," between West and East. The image will remain crucial for the reconstitutions of German national identity and for the geopolitical discussion of Germany's role in Central Europe as the defender of local particularity against superpower empires. For it is Naumann himself, in his book *Mitteleuropa* (1915), who introduces the term Central Europe as a political rather than merely geographical concept, the confederation of Central European states against the alien threat on both fronts: "After this war we will be able to move mountains. Now or never will we establish a unity of East and West, Mitteleuropa, between Russia and the western powers."[15]

Naumann's geopolitical project was intimately tied to a specific economic

12. Constantin Frantz, *Das neue Deutschland* (Leipzig: Rossberg'sche Buchhandlung, 1871), p. 402.

13. Friedrich Naumann, *Schriften zum Parteiwesen und zum Mitteleuropaproblem*, in: *Werke*, Vol. IV (Cologne and Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1964), pp. 375, 377.

14. *Ibid.*, p. 453.

15. *Ibid.*, p. 523.

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program, the moderate anti-capitalism of the Christian Social movement, and his model of a Central European confederation tended necessarily to include certain distinctive domestic features. In order to facilitate a multinational political organization, Naumann recognized the importance of conceding a good deal of local autonomy, especially in matters of culture, such as education and religion. A European mosaic of regional nationalities, however, implied a premodern resistance to secularization and cultural differentiation within any given local community. Thus, Naumann specifically rejects the notion of an international culture of modernity, the abstract "railway man."[16] Confederation apparently amounts to a collection of conservative and parochial groupings, marked by the same hostility to liberal individualism that Frantz had expressed.

This cultural conservative anti-liberalism becomes particularly problematic in the case of the Jewish population. Because they were by and large still untouched by Zionism, the Jews were the only European ethnic group (with the exception of the Gypsies) who lacked a specific territorial orientation. Thus, they were the likely carriers of a genuine Central European mentality, just as in Austro-Hungary they tended to be particularly attracted to the multi-national concept rather than to local nationalisms. Yet, precisely because Naumann envisions a *Mitteleuropa* organized around local cultural autonomy, he cannot recognize the Jews as a genuine cultural community, urging them instead to choose a host culture into which they could assimilate. He defines the Jewish question as a social rather than a national question —a position which is especially problematic, since his political program foresees an empowerment of nationalities rather than social groups, let alone individuals.[17]

The anti-liberalism and anti-semitism inherent in Naumann's Central European confederation are compounded by an anti-democratic structural feature. Given the wide range of political cultures in the Central European area, stretching from liberal aspirations in the West to nearly feudal conditions in the East, Naumann is reluctant to establish a central parliamentary organ. For that would imply a shift toward electoral democracy bound to frighten off the conservative participants. Therefore, Naumann proposed a confederation that would manage its shared economic and foreign policy concerns through non-elected commissions, that would not even be responsible to an elected legislature. Although he takes pains to apologize to the liberal-democratic constituencies, it is evident that his version of *Mitteleuropa* necessitates a reduction of political culture to the least common denominator.[18] In practice, this would have meant a step back even from the minimal parliamentarianism of the German Empire, although it would have been compatible with Naumann's own economic corporativism. Frantz, by the way, made a similar move, when he complained that Bismarckian centralism transplanted western political forms and imposed them onto the specificity of German conditions.[19] Underlying the argument is an indeed spe-

16. *Ibid.*, p. 552.
17. *Ibid.*, pp. 563-565.
18. *Ibid.*, pp. 735-736, 755.
19. Contantin Frantz, *Die Genesis der Bismarckschen Aera*, *op. cit.* p. 22; see also his *Bismarckianismus*

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cifically German ideology that democratic institutions are characteristic expressions of a West European (in other versions: Roman) culture that have no universal validity and, in particular, no organic resonance within the German context. Variants of this claim resurfaced after WWI in conservative attacks on the Weimar Republic, allegedly foisted onto the Germans by the victors at Versailles; in left-wing arguments that West Germany is a creature of western machinations; and in the relativist neutrality of the former U.N. Secretary-General, the proponent of the "Austrian Example," eager to point out that democracy is not a universal goal and that western critiques of third world dictatorships are therefore beside the point.[20]

Some of Naumann's ideas recur in the political thinking of Max Weber during WWI, recently published in the new collected works. Especially in the crucial speech, "Germany among the European World Powers," delivered in Munich on October 28, 1916, the features of a traditional discussion of German national identity and international relations become admirably clear. Like Naumann, Weber presents the German war effort as a matter of self-defense, thereby rejecting the attacks from the allied camp as well as from the emergent domestic anti-war movement. Yet, and again like Naumann, Weber devotes considerable energy to a denunciation of the expansionist fantasies of the Pan-German League, whose emotional politics, Weber fears, could ultimately harm the genuine political realities of the German national interest.

For Weber, that real national interest is, as in the arguments of Frantz and Naumann, a consequence of Germany's geographical location in the center of the continent. Flanked by major powers in the East and the West, it will always have to pursue alliance policies in both directions, which will require a maximum of flexibility. If, however, Germany were to alienate one major power thoroughly, e.g., England, through an annexation of Belgium, it would become thoroughly dependent on the other power, Russia, which is to say, fully subordinate. German national interest, therefore, implies preserving an autonomy from East and West, in order to maintain a perpetual competition between the rival powers.

In addition to this vision of Germany, in alliance with Austro-Hungary, as a neutral or third power between East and West, Weber insists on Germany's role as the defender of small nations against the hegemonic claims of a pan-slavic Russia and the colonialist empires of France and England. Only Germany, as the largest of the Central European nations, will be able to provide "a counterbalance to the superpowers" and prevent a division of the entire world between the East and the West. Otherwise, he predicts a sorry fate for humanity, destined to fall into the clutches of either "the boredom of Anglo-Saxon conventionality, or the desolation of Russian bureaucracy."[21] While Frantz packaged his account in the anti-liberalism of the 1870s and Naumann relied on the

und Friedricianismus (Munich: M. Huttler, 1873).

20. Kurt Waldheim, *The Challenge of Peace* (New York: Rawon, Wade Publishers, 1980), pp. 102-103.

21. Max Weber, *Zur Politik im Weltkrieg: Schriften und Reden 1914-1918* (Gesamtausgabe I/15), ed. Wolfgang J. Mommsen (Tübingen: Mohr, 1984), p. 192.

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corporativism of Christian Socialism, Weber characteristically insisted on a political heroism. In his eyes, fate and geography had charged Germany with the duty of defending freedom and Germany could not escape the challenge. If Germany refused its geopolitical role or if Germany had refused even to become a world power by resisting the unification of 1871, the Germans would still be trapped in the global conflict: "the states of the Rhine Confederation would be fighting for French interests, the others would have become a Russian satrapy or, as in the past, they would have provided the theater of war."[22] Thus, unless Germany could assert its autonomy in between East and West, it would become the victim of both East and West. This argument, which Weber made seventy years ago, is proof enough that the contemporary discussion in the wake of the peace movement regarding NATO and neutrality represents a continuation of a traditional German foreign policy calculation and a debate regarding the status of Germany in Europe.

In this account, East and West are treated as symmetrical evils, ciphers for imperial domination by mirror-image superpowers. Weber of course understands that their political cultures are different, but the difference is ultimately irrelevant, since he conceptualizes German foreign policy —indeed the politics of any nation— as the pursuit of a central and undifferentiated national interest. Such a bilateral foreign policy, that would address the needs of Germans of the right and the left as members of the same nation, ought not to be contaminated by heterogeneous concerns, more appropriately handled in other contexts. Hence, his insistence on an international perspective that is blind to any considerations of secondary values: "There have been times when some have been sympathetic to cooperation with England *because* they were liberal. Now that is over, once and for all. Similarly there have been parties which shamelessly flattered Russia *because* they were conservative. [...] Men who mix their domestic antipathies into our policy in war and peace *are for me not national politicians*, and a genuine coalition with them is impossible. Our specific international position and our foreign interests alone should determine our foreign policy."[23] As he does in discussions of cultural modernization, Weber here too insists on the separation of value spheres: the serious pursuit of foreign policy entails an exclusion of all other interests and concerns. Between East and West, Germany ought only to consider its international advantage and bracket any reflection on political values. The admonition presumes that an autonomous Germany could engage in shifting alliances with the flanking superpowers without gradually succumbing to either sphere of influence and without any consequences for its own domestic constitution. This assumption was probably already fallacious in 1916, and it has become more so in the intervening period.[24] The time is not at all over "once and for all" when German politicians link foreign policy to domestic considerations, and this in turn is the link between Weber's reflections and the

22. *Ibid.*, pp. 193-194.
23. *Ibid.*, pp. 162-163.
24. Cf. the dispute around the 1981 Havemann letter to Brezhnev, in Hermann Gremliza, "A German Document," in *Telos* 51 (Spring 1982), pp. 97-100.

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contemporary debate on neutrality. It remains to be seen, however, to what extent subsequent proponents of neutrality between East and West repeat Weber's decoupling foreign policy from the alternative models of political culture.

As different as the accounts of Frantz, Naumann, and Weber may be, a set of characteristics emerges that seems to adhere to their models of a neutral Central European political identity. The confederation notion appears at times to have an emancipatory character, to the extent that it promises to defend local particularity and the autonomy of weaker national communities. However, this emancipatory gesture is combined with authoritarian structures: the retreat from liberal and democratic principles tentatively established during the 19th-century. The status of ethnic minorities remains ambiguous at best, and the very discourse of a place between East and West seems to be marked by a sense of persecution that can easily be inverted into an imperialist expansionism of its own.

Some of these negative features resurfaced after WWI in the efforts of the Pan-Europa movement to revise the Treaty of Versailles on politically conservative terms.[25] To what extent do they reappear in the current neutrality discussion as well, given its efforts to revise the results of the Yalta Conference? The point is not to suggest that the contemporary positions are identical with those of Frantz, Naumann, and Weber, which are themselves very different from each other. Yet, given a similar understanding of the East-West conflict, a similar invocation of the Austrian model, and a similar call for a Central European confederation centered in Germany, the possibility of a substantive continuity cannot be rejected out of hand.

The proponents of Central European neutrality claim to be eager to escape the reciprocal recriminations of Cold War rhetoric. Yet, one cannot help but find a curious asymmetry here, a reluctance to criticize the countries of the Warsaw Pact. For, as with Naumann, an advocate of confederation will tend to refuse to measure a local political culture by external standards. The pursuit of confederation necessitates a cultural relativism that resists judging political conditions in terms of universal norms. This agnosticism turns out to be compatible with the Weberian separation of geopolitical interests from alternative value spheres: European policy becomes ideally sequestered from an internal scrutiny of the individual European states. Consequently non-democratic states cannot be criticized for a lack of democratic rights. In the contemporary literature on neutrality, one therefore finds trivializations of Western attacks on Soviet human rights violations, a position extraordinarily close to Frantz's anti-liberalism. The human rights campaigns are treated as just so much propaganda, worth avoiding if the reduction of international tensions through confederation and neutrality is given absolute priority.[26]

This proclivity to self-censorship, which may already represent a sort of Finlandization of a neutral West Germany, was evident in the response to the declaration of martial law in Poland: because it was assumed that the Soviet

25. Cf. Reinhard Frommelt, *Paneuropa oder Mitteleuropa: Einigungsstreben im Kalkül deutscher Wirtschaft und Politik 1925-1933* (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1977).

26. Cf. Löser und Schilling, *op. cit.* pp. 111-113.

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Union could not longer afford to allow Solidarity to grow, Jaruzelski's coup was greeted as a guarantor of the European peace to the extent that it forestalled a Russian invasion. A neutral peace, it seems, would tend to include a high degree of tolerance for the repression of local oppositions.[27]

A similar reluctance to criticize the Soviet Union has recently generated heated debates in the West German writers' union.[28] It is worth noting that this extraordinary moderation of public criticism may not be only a result of a tendential pro-Soviet sympathy or an inverted anti-Americanism but a consequence of the neutrality model altogether. What does it mean to ask if parts of the West German left press are already acting as if they were in a neutral state? Would a declaration of neutrality, recognized in terms of established international law, have consequences for the freedom of the press and formally guaranteed civil rights?

It turns out that precisely this question has been raised in the literature of the Austrian example, which, as has already been pointed out, is frequently cited as a model for a neutral Central European confederation. A standard interpretation, *The Permanent Neutrality of the Republic of Austria* by Alfred Verdross, insists that the legal neutrality of a state does not necessarily mean the neutrality of the press. Nor does it necessarily restrict the freedom of opinions of the citizenry. This principle was underscored in a declaration of the Austrian government of October 26, 1955. Yet, while the law of neutrality does not directly impinge on the press, it does oblige the government to protect the general policy of neutrality by taking domestic measures to ensure that the state will not be dragged into foreign conflicts. This could therefore imply a regulation of public debate, so as to prevent any possibility of the erosion of impartiality in the case of international disputes. Thus Verdross: "As a matter of principle, a permanently neutral state itself has to decide what measures are to be taken in order to lend credibility to its neutrality and to protect it against internal and external dangers. During the Second World War, Switzerland, for instance, imposed certain restrictions on the press in order not to be dragged into the war through a one-sided attitude on the part of the press."[29] One presumes, therefore, that a neutral Germany, modeled after Austria (which was explicitly modeled after Switzerland), would be eager to prevent its press from adopting a one-sided attitude on, e.g., the question of human rights in Eastern Europe. The bitter critique of the western press by the Austrian president, a strong advocate of neutrality, confirms this conjecture.[30] It is as if some Central Europeans would be prepared to adopt

27. Peter Schneider, "Warnung vor diesem Frieden," in *Kursbuch* 68 (June 1982), pp. 180-181, 185; cf. Sigrid Meuschel, "Neo-nationalism and the West German Peace Movement's Reaction to the Polish Military Coup," *Telos* 56 (Summer 1983), pp. 119-130.

28. Cf. *Berliner Begegnung zur Friedensförderung: Protokolle des Schriftstellertreffens am 13/14. Dezember 1981* (Darmstadt: Luchterhand, 1982).

29. Alfred Verdross, *The Permanent Neutrality of the Republic of Austria,* (Vienna : Österreichischer Bundesverlag, 1967), pp. 19- 20. Cf. Karl Zemanek, "Der völkerrechtliche Status der dauernden Neutralität und seine Rückwirkungen auf das int erne Recht des dauernd neutralen Staates, "*Juristische Blätter* (1967), Vol. 89, pp. 281-298.

30. Kurt Waldheim, *The Challenge of Peace, op. cit.* pp. 10-11; the full critique of the press that was

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the quip by Bismarck which Weber quotes in the speech discussed above: "Eventually every land is after all responsible for the windows broken by its press."[31]

It appears, then, that the contemporary advocates of neutrality for Germany and/or Central Europe do in fact inherit a good deal of the legacy of the Central European discourse of the past: a vacillation on liberal civil rights, a resounding silence on the question of Soviet Jews (an issue of such central importance on the French left), extremely limited support for the democratic movement in Poland, and a prophylactic self-censorship in public debate. It is as if the culture of neutrality already anticipated the likely consequences of an American retreat and the extension of Soviet hegemony into a non-aligned Central Europe. For the neutrality of Central Europe could only be effective if it were armed to the teeth —Germany is not comparable to neutral Switzerland with its natural topographical defense— something none of the advocates of confederation propose. Can a hypothetical Central Europe substitute for its absent military prowess a sort of cultural legitimacy that would guarantee the loyalty of its citizens? For Weber precisely such a cultural identity motivated the sacrificial devotion of the German soldiers to the imperial state in WWI.[32] Historically, Central Europe has often claimed to be a privileged vessel of culture, and turn-of-the-century Vienna was perhaps its center. Is there a viable culture of neutrality today —or is the discourse of neutrality itself a symptom of a cultural crisis?

Central Europe and Culture

In the introduction to the Vienna catalogue, Schorske provides a vivid example of the tensions in late 19th-century Austrian by examining the transformation of the representation of culture in some of Klimt's most famous paintings.[33] The depiction of the interior of the Burgtheater of 1888/89 is executed in the manner of a moderate historical realism, proof of the early Klimt's surprising proximity to the work of Makart. One looks into the public along a slightly diagonal line from the stage to the back of the hall. The construction of the tiers of balconies, shrinking toward the background, emphasizes the depth perspective, and the ornamental decoration of the ceiling is clearly detailed. The audience is gathering for a performance, and the formal attire as well as the stern demeanors hardly convey any particularly electric excitement. It is indisputably a rather stiff crowd, the representative public of the liberal "founding years" growing old, with none of the dionysian enthusiasm in which the young modernists, including Klimt himself, would soon begin to indulge.

However, the ultimate architectural monument of liberal 19th-century culture lay elsewhere, the new university building on the Ringstrasse, the splendid home for enlightenment rationality, scientific exactitude, and an unbroken faith

included in the earlier German version has been deleted from the English edition, therefore cf. Kurt Waldheim, *Der schwierigste Job der Welt* (Vienna: Molden, 1978), pp. 28-29.

31. Weber, *op. cit.* p. 164.
32. *Ibid.*, p. 181.
33. *Traum und Wirklichkeit*, *op. cit.* pp. 14-22.

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in human progress. Although opened in 1883, its most highly symbolic feature, the representation of the disciplines on the ceiling of the auditorium, was not completed until the new century had begun.

Schorske has provided a detailed account of the controversy that followed the unveiling of Klimt's painting of "Philosophy" in 1900. It outraged the liberal public and the rationalists on the university faculty, for it audaciously gave expression to a new culture of aesthetic irrationalism that seemed to contradict the taste and all the cultural values of the middle-class establishment. The clarity of Renaissance perspective has been abandoned, ambiguous shapes float mysteriously in and out of a glowing darkness, and mythic figures loom out of a starry sky. Here is Schorske's description: "...everything earthly has disappeared, dissolved into a dark and infinite cosmos, which seems to melt together the immeasurable expanse of the heavens and the cloudy obscurity of hell. A confusion of bodies of suffering humanity slowly passes by, aimlessly spread throughout the viscous emptiness. Out of this cosmic twilight arises an indifferent sphinx, itself a concentration of atomized space. Only at the very bottom of the picture is there a suggestion of a thinking spirit —Klimt called it 'Knowledge'."[34]

The distance between the two paintings, "the Burgtheater" of 1888 and "Philosophy" of 1900, epitomizes the transformation of Austrian culture in the period and indicates the primary connotation of the label "*fin-de-siècle* Vienna." The 19th-century tradition deriving from the enlightenment seems to come to an end, displaced by modernist inquiries into ambiguity, psychological interiority, and the irrationality of myth. Whether this rupture was indeed the end of the enlightenment *tout court* or, alternatively, a consequence of the enlightenment or even a radical reformulation and extension of the enlightenment —and arguments can be made for all of these positions— is for the moment less important than the fact that this rupture was lived as a radical break, a generational conflict in which the modernist progeny turned their backs on a rationalist legacy, denounced, emphatically enough, as the culture of the fathers.

While the secessionist painters and the writers of Young Vienna treated the culture of the turn-of-the-century as a temporal *novum*, i.e., the transition from a 19th-century of reason to a subjectivist modernity, elsewhere the same antinomy was spread across an ahistorical terrain. Vienna, or more generally, Austria, became identified as the privileged locus of aesthetic culture, a southern utopia contrasted with the dry rationality of a Prussian north. For example, Naumann eagerly invoked this topos in his argument for a *Mitteleuropa* organized around a confederation of Germany and Austro-Hungary. While Berlin can provide technical know-how and a disciplined work ethic, it must turn to Vienna for taste and aesthetic refinement. Only such a Central European combination of talents would encompass a complete culture able to produce what the practical Naumann has on his mind: attractively designed industrial goods able to compete successfully on the international market. *Mitteleuropa* will not be able to survive economically unless it incorporates Austrian art: "we have more

34. *Ibid.*, p. 20.

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horse-power and you [the Austrians] have more melody. We think more in quantities, the best of you in qualities. Let us join together both of our abilities, so that the real neo-German culture will, thanks to your help, take on the touch of gracefulness that will make it palatable abroad."[35]

An interesting variation on Naumann's wartime plea to combine German technology and Austrian art is present in the contemporary essays of Hugo von Hofmannsthal, writing as a propagandist of the Imperial War Ministry in Vienna. Like Naumann, Hofmannsthal insists on the North-South differential and the aesthetic privilege of Austria. Yet while Naumann's goal is to bolster his program for a Central European alliance with cultural arguments, Hofmannsthal is eager to insist on the specificity of the Austrian contribution to the combined war-effort. The German ability to assert military predominance on the continent will not be able to establish a stable political regime unless it is coupled with a cultural component. Thus Hofmannsthal: "Austria is the special duty of the German spirit within Europe. She is the field, appointed by history, of a purely cultural imperalism. [...] Austria must be recognized again and again as the *German duty in Europe*."[36]

Both Naumann and Hofmannsthal identify Austria as the specific carrier of Central European culture, but for the latter "culture" is much more than the cultivation of industrial design. It is rather the domain of the "spirit," the insistence on the priority of intellectual, aesthetic, and religious values, without which any political community will remain fundamentally labile. Hofmannsthal's "cultural imperialism" is, therefore, the medium with which the Austrian Empire has been able to stabilize (or so Hofmannsthal thinks) a multi-national confederation under German hegemony. It turns out that Austrian culture is not just a local variation of other national cultures. The term Austrian culture has a much more emphatic significance. It means the absolute priority of a specifically cultural dimension over the secondary concerns of politics, the economy, and the military, and such a cultural privileging appears to be the prerequisite for the establishment of a coherent Central European confederation of nations.

Interestingly enough, Weber also insists on the crucial role of cultural legitimation, which does not eclipse political considerations but certainly overshadows economic factors —an aspect he deemphasizes as much in the 1916 speech as in his earlier study of the Protestant ethic. Yet, now the geographical polarity undergoes an inversion. In Weber's eyes, Austro-Hungary is crippled by the lack of a uniform culture, a point he illustrates with reference to the situation of a German-speaking officer who shares no common language with the multinational soldiers under his command.[37] In contrast, it is now Germany that derives its strength from the vitality of its culture, in Weberian terms: the unity of the state, i.e., the political apparatus, and the na-

35. Naumann, *op. cit. p. 627.*

36. Hugo von Hofmannsthal, "Wir Österreicher und Deutschland," in: *Reden und Aufsätze II: 1914-1924,* ed. Bernd Schoeller (Frankfurt: Fischer, 1979), pp. 393-394,

37. Weber, *op. cit.* p. 181.

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tion, understood as the carrier of cultural identity.

While this unity of state and nation provided Germany, according to Weber, with a cultural consistency and a superiority over its enemies in WWI, soon after the war, Thomas Mann appropriated precisely the same argument, the unity of state and nation as the source of culture, in order to defend the young Weimar Republic against its domestic opponents. Rebutting conservative groups who insisted that democracy was a foreign system, forced onto Germany by the Treaty of Versailles, Mann attempted to outline a specifically German version of democratic government, which he labelled "the German Republic." Thus, he contrasts the republic with the Wilhelmine Empire, judged inadequate because it excluded the nation from participating in affairs of the state, and then he proceeds to contrast it as well with genuinely foreign political forms, located in the by now familiar alternatives, East and West. In the Russian East, whether Czarist or Bolshevik, he sees a penchant for mystical despotism, where the inaccessible state stands far above society, and the individual disappears into the disenfranchised mass. He locates a diametrical opposite in the democratic West, where however, the extreme atomization of capitalist self-interest ultimately prevents the individual from a genuine entry into a vital community. It is in the end only in Germany where state and nation, the individual and the collective, private values and public virtues coexist in a synthesis guaranteeing authentic humanity and culture. The Republic, Mann argues, is the political expression of this synthesis.[38]

None of these different early 20th-century conceptualizations of culture have immediate and direct significance today: too much history has intervened, and too radical metamorphoses have marked the vicissitudes of the collection of objects and practices called "culture." Nevertheless, this intellectual-historical background indicates a constellation of questions, within which the contemporary discussion of a Central European cultural identity is unfolding. Because reflections on the construction of German national identity intersect with visions of the East and the West, whenever the German question is raised, the problem of *Mitteleuropa* is likely to follow soon. Because this *Mitteleuropa* lacks both dynastic continuity and ethnic homogeneity, it cannot rely on the legitimation of a monolinear historical narrative. Central Europe is no sceptered isle. Culture becomes the substitute, the stand-in for a really-existing political confederation as well as the motivation to bring one into being. This connection partially explains the special role played by cultural intellectuals and literary developments in recent formulations of Central European identity.

Certainly, the neutrality discussion commenced as the response to a precise political event, the NATO double decision of 1979. Yet, that single event could not have led to a reaction on the scale of the West German peace movement unless it touched cultural nerves that lent a profound urgency to the de-

38. Thomas Mann, "The German Republic," in: *The Order of the Day: Political Essays and Speeches of Two Decades*, trans. T. Lowe-Porter (Freeport: Books for Librararies Press, 1969), pp. 29, 45.

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bates. This cultural prefiguration can be found in the so-called *Tendenzwende*, the cultural turn, of the mid-seventies.[39] The character of the transformation is in fact in many ways reminiscent of the experience of the new culture of *fin-de-siècle* Vienna, and it is perhaps no accident that it is precisely in this period that the West German reading public began to direct more of its attention to the Austrian literary scene, still partially embedded in the traditions of the early part of the century. One thinks of the proximity of writers like Peter Handke and Thomas Bernhard to the language games of Wittgenstein.

In a rash of articles that were written around 1974, a single paradigm appeared repeatedly in many variations. The culture of the student movement of the sixties, allegedly marked by enlightenment reason, political engagement, and aesthetic realism, was declared bankrupt. Its refusal to consider individual histories and emotional experience dessicated its literature, which was henceforth to be replaced by a different sort of text, given the label of the "new subjectivity." Whether this shift implied a retreat from politics into a quietistic privacy or, as, e.g., feminists could argue, an extension of politics into a personal sphere is not of concern here. Nor does the dubious reduction of the sixties to radical reason, a description that omits all the extravagance of the counter-culture, bear on the present argument. The issue is solely that a cultural program was launched which combined an explicit preference for irrationality with a fascination for personal identity, whereby identity implied an original substance, prior to any social or historical mediations. I have therefore written about the *Tendenzwende* in terms of a "discourse of authenticity."[40]

It is this version of identity, grounded in an unquestionable personal specificity and constantly besieged by the threatening forces of external mediation, which provided the cultural prefiguration for the political response to the NATO double decision. After nearly a decade of a narcissistic insistence on private identity, the political context induced a collectivization of the discourse of authenticity, a transition from personal subjectivity to national identity. This particular psychological predisposition explains the peculiar formulations of the West German peace movement which, when compared with the parallel development in the U.S., initially paid less attention to the natural scientific experts and their concerns regarding the ecological consequences of nuclear war than to a purported threat to the survival of German national identity. Ultimately, it was therefore the subjectivist bias in the German movement, derived from literary culture, that pushed it toward a re-examination of the German question and, from there, to neutrality and Central Europe.

This transition from individual to national subjectivity also had literary ramifications. While the private personality cult of the seventies was accompanied by a wave of private forms —personal histories, autobiogra-

39. Russell Berman, "Opposition to Rearmament and West German Culture," *Telos* 51 (Spring 1982), pp. 143-145.

40. *Ibid.*

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phical memoirs, accounts of family life— authors have more recently begun to present narratives of national history. Unlike the literature on the German past from the sixties, which focused on "uncovering" the Nazi past in order to differentiate the present from it or to denounce any unquestioned continuities (Böll's *Billiards at Half Past Ten*), more recent historical fiction insists on continuities with the German past with the goal of examining the specificity of the national culture. Thus, Grass's *Meeting at Telgte* transposes contemporary questions into the 17th-century, at the conclusion of the Thirty Years War. Similar shifts might be traced in the visual media from the still engaged political melodramas of Fassbinder in the early seventies to the repeated thematization of national history and identity in recent years, most notably in the television series *Heimat*.

The point is not that all this material is terribly nationalistic (some of it is) but that the national question has come to be addressed with increasing frequency in literature and film. Just as the recent series of international exhibits indicates how turn-of-the-century Austria has displaced an earlier interest in the Weimar Republic, within Germany the earlier literature of memory, coming to terms with the events of the Third Reich, has been pushed aside by an interest in collective identity. These two shifts in matters of public interest are, of course, just two sides of the same question which used to be formulated with dramatic brevity: "What is German?"[41] —either the particularity of small nation-states or the aspiration for European hegemony. This ambivalence recurs throughout the literature of recent years and even marks the reading habits of the West German public which has begun to turn more and more to other German-speaking countries for its texts: not only Austria, but East Germany and Switzerland as well, whose authors are read especially for their regional identity. Culture provides the Central European unity which cannot be achieved through politics.

Thus, it is not surprising to encounter authors taking a leading role in the discussion of German or Central European identity. Literary developments have determined the direction of recent debates, and many of the arguments for a revision of the Yalta Conference and the creation of a Central European confederation have to do with claims regarding the specificity of European culture. Yet, the arguments current in the political arena, the various proposals to redraw the map of Europe, are much more radical than the positions articulated by literary figures, most of whom seem relatively cautious. This difference is particularly apparent in the case of Peter Schneider, whose *Wall Jumper* was praised by Werner Herzog as a sign of a "new patriotism" —as if Schneider were the proponent of a neo-nationalism. Herzog's extraordinary misreading is paradigmatic. Schneider is certainly the case in point of the writer who moved from the new subjectivism of personal identity in *Lenz* to a discussion of German national identity, but despite Herzog's judgment, he does not conclude with an invocation of a Germanic revival. On the contrary, the

41. Richard Wagner,"*What is German?*" in: *Stories and Essays*, ed. Charles Osborne (London: Peter Owen, 1973).

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Wall Jumper locates the particularity of German identity precisely in its divided character; the brief life of the unified Bismarckian state, destroyed by Hitler, represents the exception, not the norm, in German history. It is difficult to see how the establishment of an umbrella state in Central Europe, the core of which would necessarily be a reunified Germany, would guarantee either personal freedom or cultural vitality, more likely to be crushed. A cultural discussion is all that links the two German states, but the political division remains indelible, perhaps the most salient feature of German identity. It is a legacy of history that cannot be wiped away without doing an injustice to the same national identity the advocates of neutrality purport to defend.

Like Peter Schneider, an East German author, Rolf Schneider, also views the efforts to revise the political organization of Central Europe with an adamant skepticism. Because he insists that the division of Germany was not an arbitrary imposition by foreign powers but the consequence of German history itself, Hitler's war of aggression, he criticizes the German efforts to establish a Central European confederation for ignoring the real legacy of national history as well as urgent contemporary political projects that are sacrificed to the pursuit of the mirage of neutrality. In addition, he denounces the myth of a Central European mission, proof enough that the historical material discussed above, the cult of a *Mitteleuropa*, retains some currency among the proponents of neutrality. Central Europe was never a peaceful zone of mediation between North and South, East and West; on the contrary it was the expression of the hegemonic claims of the German elite of the Wilhelmine Empire and Austro-Hungary, based on "a racial doctrine of the biological superiority of the Germanic peoples. These dreams of omnipotence were shared by the Saxon Richard Wagner and the Hohenzollern Kaiser Wilhelm II, the Austrian Knight von Schönerer and the Mayor of Vienna Karl Lueger. In the person of Adolf Hitler, born on the German-Austrian border, this doctrine turned violent and swept all of Europe into a catastrophe. We still live in its wake. Whoever is nurturing Central European phantasies continues these rotten myths. It would be better if they stopped."[42]

For Peter Schneider, German identity depends on its division, around which a cultural discussion could form. For Rolf Schneider, the division of Germany represents the defeat of National Socialism and therefore the prerequisite for any desirable cultural activity. While the political arguments for confederation are most articulate in Germany —they are barely found elsewhere, since only in Germany do international borders seem to have a provisional character— the literary elite is most skeptical. The strongest cultural argument for the notion of a Central Europe, consequently, is made by a Czech author, for whom Yalta is not a result of a national guilt. Yet, even for Milan Kundera, there is no original Central Europe, only an East and a West, heirs to the ancient division of the Roman Empire. Central Europe is, if anything, a product of Yalta, the surrender of the border territories of the West to the

42. Rolf Schneider, "Vor 'Mitteleuropa' wird gewarnt," *Tageszeitung*, June 10, 1986.

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domination of the East, the character of which owes more to the legacy of traditional Czarist despotism than it does to modern Soviet Communism. Composed of the successor states of the Habsburg Empire, Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Hungary, Central Europe tragically emerges as a specific region only at the historical moment when it is separated from the West to which it historically belonged and subjected to a foreign control bent on the eradication of the local cultures.[43]

According to Peter Schneider, the notion of an undivided Central European culture is an impossibility; for Rolf Schneider, it is an undesirable program to revive an imperialist German project; for Kundera, Central European culture only operates in the mode of reminiscence. The Soviet Union pursues a policy of destroying the culture of the small European nations, and the West, the original home of the specific sensibility he values as "culture," has abandoned its commitment and entered a post-cultural phase of post-modernity. Weber's prediction in 1916 appears to have come true: a world divided between "the boredom of Anglo-Saxon conventionality and the desolation of the Russian bureaucracy," but the quandary is felt more direly in the Czechoslovak exile than in the two Germanys, each comfortably integrated into their respective block.

If culture is incompatible with either of the superpowers, neither does Kundera locate it in a populist national identity. The plausibility of a grounding of culture in some ethno-racial identity ended with the Third Reich, if not earlier, but rejecting that sort of irrationalism does not allow for an easy return to the progressivist optimism of the 19th-century. The proponents of diamat and socialist realism have taken care of that, and in any case, it would entail a retreat behind the culture of Viennese modernism which Kundera so treasures as the final brilliance of Central Europe. The dilemma of culture in post-modernity means the impossibility of either solution: the inadequacy of any totalizing rationalism, always stifling and intolerable, as well as the evanescence of any regional specificity, that promises local identity only to disappear into the logic of domination. The oscillation between these non-positions defines the motion of Kundera's prose, his narratives of desire that are never completed, since any conclusion would imply a closure inimical to the very project of modern culture, always existing at a penultimate moment, just before destruction. Such a definition of culture holds, more than anywhere else, in the Central European realm of Austro-Hungary, the cultural legacy of which has disappeared more from neutral Austria than even from the successor states in the Soviet sphere. Where has the culture of Austria, so vaunted in the recent exhibits, disappeared to? Perhaps we should ask the Austrian President.

The Case of Kurt W.

Instead of adding to the debate on the degree of Waldheim's legal culpability

43. Milan Kundera, "The Tragedy of Central Europe," *New York Review of Books*, April 26, 1984,

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for war crimes, I want to inquire into the connection between the mobilization of anti-semitism during the presidential election and the Vienna fascination, understood as a corollary to the renewed interest in Central Europe and the question of neutrality. The manifest connections are in fact so thick that one is tempted to speak of an overdetermination, in the Freudian sense of the word. The Austro-Hungarian Jews were the primary carriers of a multi-national Central European loyalty, but precisely the effort to establish a Central European world power between East and West led to their annihilation as well as to the division of Central Europe at Yalta. While Waldheim himself has attributed his desire to pursue a diplomatic career to reminiscences of the multinational culture of the past, the National Socialist regime which he considered his patriotic duty to serve, dealt a final blow to the cultural vitality of Vienna and contributed to the final provincialization of Austria, a neutral dwarf-state between East and West.[44] The centrality of anti-semitism in Nazi ideology hardly needs to be pointed out; its virulence in the same turn-of-the-century Vienna which gave birth to the cultural wealth now making its way through the museums of the world is more significant. Waldheim is a direct heir to Lueger, both exponents of an Austrian political anti-semitism framing the Vienna fascination.[45]

If there is a deeper connection between the Waldheim affair and the Vienna of 1900, it will not be found in any particular cultural preferences on the part of the Austrian President, which are, as far as anyone can tell, fully absent.[46] It is more fruitful to approach the problem by paying close attention to Waldheim's own words and deeds within the context of the public debate in order to examine the psychological foundation for his political character. The explanation in his autobiography of the early interest in politics and diplomacy discloses a strong identification with post-imperial Austria; he underscores how he was born in 1918, the same year as the "infant republic," described in a revealing manner as hopelessly weak: "Set adrift, its mighty parent dead, its expectations crushed, the new republic could not sustain itself."[47] Thus, abandoned by its parent, the young state, onto which Waldheim projects his own psychological drama, becomes a victim of the threatening forces of a hostile world. The political content of the threat is clarified by a passage in the German text which was omitted from the English translation: "At least since my fifteenth year, I have dreamed of becoming a diplomat. I thought this would give me the chance to serve my fatherland and to contribute to repairing the injustice done to my country. Like many of my generation, I considered the fate unjust that the allied powers decided for Austria after the fall of the monarchy."[48] In political terms, Waldheim bases his career on a desire to revise the Treaty of St. Germain (the Austrian counterpart to the Treaty of Versailles for Germany), which implies a critique of the dismemberment of the Habsburg Empire and the territorial in-

44. Kurt Waldheim, *The Challenge of Peace*, *op. cit.* p. 28.
45. Cf. Gregor von Rezzori, "Viennese Style," in *Vanity Fair*, July 1986, pp. 66-73.
46. Cf. Peter Handke, "Gegenstimme," *Profil*, May 26, 1986, pp. 20-22.
47. Kurt Waldheim, *The Challenge of Peace, op. cit.* pp. 17-18.
48. Kurt Waldheim, *Der schwierigste Job der Welt*, *op. cit.* p. 38.

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tegrity of the successor states. In psychological terms, Waldheim recalls a personal and national trauma associated with the death of the "mighty parent" and the loss of the vital organs of the collective body.

In the case study of little Hans of 1909, Freud suggests that the fear of castration is the psychological root of anti-semitism, linked unconsciously by the image of circumcision.[49] Given Waldheim's explanation of his original political motives (interestingly suppressed in the English version), it is noteworthy that the anti-semitic rhetoric of the presidential campaign included a set of terms current in the right-wing stab-in-the-back propaganda against the political arrangements in Germany and Austria after the First World War: "infamous treachery" [of the World Jewish Congress], "dishonorable journeymen," etc. Thus, the current political language borrows from an earlier right-wing radicalism that was itself a response to a trauma of personal and national impotence. In other words, the language of the Waldheim campaign against the World Jewish Congress is in many ways identical to the language of the post-1918 right-wing agitation against the treaties of Versailles and St. Germain, sharing the same fascination with international machinations and Jewish treachery as threats to national cohesion.

The psychological derivation from a fear of castration is confirmed by two further pieces of evidence. The many Austrian justifications for Waldheim's participation in the war in the Balkans indulged in extensive accounts of brutal attrocities allegedly commited by the Yugoslav partisans, including the repeated claim that the partisans regularly cut off the genitals of the German soldiers.[50] The popular imagination could therefore defend any activity by the soldier Waldheim as a sort of defensive gesture against the threat of dismemberment. Waldheim himself resorted to a similarly-motivated claim, the exaggerated importance ascribed to the leg wound he received on the Russian front. In an early version, he returned to Vienna because of the wound and was therefore no longer involved in the war. Later, faced with new documents, he changed the story but still pointed to the scar: it was the wound that prevented him from participating in genuine fighting on the front and restricted him to office work.

The leg wound is an old topos: the scar of Odysseus, Jacob's struggle with the angel, many figures in Kafka. It evidently represents a displacement of circumcision, the ritual scar of the male and the sign of Jewish identity.[51] Waldheim's insistence on the wound betrays a conscious effort to exculpate himself and an unconscious admission of his fixation on a threat to his personal and national identity, a threat he associates with Jews who are so dangerous not only because of the international network of power Waldheim ascribes to them, but because he can barely separate himself from them. His lapsus in his unsuccessful 1971

49. Sigmund Freud, "Analyse der Phobie eines fünfjährigen Knaben, in *Studienausgabe* (Frankfurt: S. Fischer, 1969), Vol. VII, p. 36, n. 2.

50. Peter Michael Lingens, "Unter Partisanen," *Profil*, May 26, 1986, p. 10.

51. Cf. Erich Auerbach, *Mimesis* (Bern: Francke Verlag, 1946) and John Freccero, "Manfred's Wounds and the Poetics of the 'Purgatorio,' in *Centre and Labyrinth: Essays in Honour of Northrop Frye*, ed. Eleanor Cook, *et. al.* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1983, pp. 69-71).

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Austrian presidential campaign is symptomatic: "I must decisively reject the accusations that I am a National Socialist or even a Jew."[52] In the 1986 campaign, the same identification with international Jewry on the part of Waldheim was evident in the choice of the theme song —"New York, New York"— a symbol that mixed the boasting of the former Secretary General with cynicism, nostalgia, and resentment. Waldheim's memory functions well, but only through displacement, and he is therefore terrified of the placeless eternal wanderer, his *Doppelgänger*, his patriach, flesh of his flesh, too close for comfort for a labile psyche. The Jew appears to exercise hypertrophic strength because the political anti-semite, traumatized by a profound sense of helplessness, has been unable to construct an autonomous personality capable of independent decisions. The subjective ego-weakness is fertile ground for violent fantasies and images of persecution: it is Waldheim, and not the Jews, who is the victim. The eternal child is in constant danger. Only a "mighty parent" might protect the "infant republic," victimized by the western powers, but the parent is dead, and the son responds to this abandonment with resentment rather than with mourning.

This resentment first turned up in the rhetoric of the 1971 campaign which the supporters of Waldheim enacted as a generational conflict, the rebellion of the son against the father. Thus, Waldheim promises to be a "president of a new style" who will bring about "a modern Austria," while his opponent, the incumbent President Franz Jonas, is derided as "a representative of the old system." Waldheim is "dynamic" and has "initiative," and, above all, he is "not yet ready for retirement." In contrast, the aged Jonas is allegedly "a lover of ceremonies," "dependent on Kreisky," the socialist Chancellor, and tainted by party loyalties, unlike Waldheim, who stands above the party differences inherited from the past.[53]

The youthful challenger is therefore the agent of innovation, even though he is conservative, while the paternal incumbent defends the established status quo, even though he is a socialist. The attack on the "system" is both a repetition of the Nazi language of the twenties as well as a symptom of the weak personality structure: the son fears the all-encompassing system of the father rather than any particular policy issue. The language of the campaign displaces genuine political differences with an oedipal drama, which however was not enough to win the election for Waldheim. The 1971 rhetoric of generational conflict is nevertheless significant because it echoes the experience of cultural modernity in turn-of-the-century Vienna and, more germane, because of its permutation in the 1986 campaign which the unattractive candidate was able to win so resoundingly only by shifting public attention away from internal Austrian disputes and onto the alleged threat of international intervention in Austrian affairs. In 1971 he attacked the old socialist Jonas; in 1986 he attacked the elders of Zion, in Waldheim's words, "the World Jewish Congress, Herr Singer, Herr

52. Cited in Handke, "Gegenstimme," *op. cit.* p. 21.

53. From a pamphlet of *Freie Österreiche Studentschaft* in Hoover Library, documentation of the Austrian 1971 Campaign (Waldheim file).

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Steinberg, Herr Rosenbaum."[54] In 1971 his campaign complained that the major political offices in Austria were controlled by socialists; in 1986, the argument was changed into the allegation that the world press was controlled by a Jewish mafia, which Waldheim opposed in the name of a Christian *Weltanschauung* and a moral rearmament.[55] The vision of persecution and encirclement has undergone an extraordinary distortion and magnification, based on an Oedipal imagery of the overwhelming power of a conspiracy of Jewish patriarchs.

The unattractive candidate Waldheim probably opted for this strategic use of political anti-semitism in order to generate an otherwise unlikely emotional mass appeal. Yet, precisely this emotional success indicates a psychological predisposition to attack the Jewish patriarchs because of an ambivalence toward the father. In fact, Waldheim repeatedly invokes his own father, whose association with the clerical fascism of the Christian Socialists during the thirties led to conflicts with the Austrian Nazis; hence Waldheim's dubious anti-Nazi pedigree. Yet, in his autobiography he describes his rejection of his father, the "mighty parent," i.e., his rejection of his father's political partisanship, instead of which he chose to pursue a path of political neutrality outside of party strife: "Despite the affection and respect that I felt for my father, I had already begun to exercise a certain intellectual independence, which he was the first to encourage. He was strong in his convictions and concerned that I should be so in mine, whatever these might be. One issue on which we disagreed was political affiliation. Where he was active in the Christian Socialist party, I remained aloof. I could never bring myself to give allegiance wholly to any single party, since I was already convinced that I could better serve the interests of my country by staying free of partisan obligation."[56] Waldheim confuses "intellectual independence" with a principled refusal to engage in concrete disputes that might reguire the strength of character he never developed. Closing his eyes to real conflicts, he adopts a model of neutrality that is not conciliatory but at best vacillating, at worst solipsistic. Instead of carrying out the conflict with the father, which might have endangered the already labile identity, he opts for a strategy of conflict-avoidance and an accomodation with authority that can never be critiqued. This model of non-partisan authority determines the trajectory of his political career, including his understanding of the presidential office he pursued, described as "the father of the fatherland."[57] The ambivalence of the son toward the father points the son on the road to domestic non-partisanship as well as to his peculiar understanding of international neutrality, remaining "aloof" on principle.

The relation between this psychology and Waldheim's anti-semitism comes to the fore in another passage of the autobiography which was deleted from the English edition. Eager to underscore the importance of his own contributions to world affairs, Waldheim takes pains to describe his collaboration with Kissinger in the Middle East negotiations. Waldheim's account betrays a desire to identify

54. Kurt Waldheim in *Die Presse*, April 22, 1986.
55. Hajo Funke, "Hass auf Juden ist wahlentscheidend in Wien," *tageszeitung*, June 7, 1986.
56. Kurt Waldheim, *The Challenge of Peace*, *op. cit.* p. 21.
57. Funke, *tageszeitung*, June 7, 1986.

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with Kissinger, more so than with any other figure in the book; Kissinger represents an indisputable authority as well as proof of Waldheim's good will —one of his best friends is a Jew. Yet, Waldheim lets the cat out of the bag in the deleted passage: "After an incident in Tel Aviv, where he had been sharply attacked by demonstrators, he said to me jokingly, 'Thank God there is one thing the Israelis can't accuse me of—that I am an anti-semite."[58] The passage not only displays Waldheim's fascination with the authority Kissinger as a Jew. It also suggests the unspoken extrapolation: it is not Kissinger who could be labelled an anti-semite but rather Waldheim himself. As if eager to gloss the unconscious admission, Waldheim proceeds with a bit of family drama. Because of Kissinger's affection for his parents, he often invited them to the United Nations to hear his speeches. On these occasions, Waldheim and his wife had the opportunity to speak with them "in their mother tongue —German." Yet, for reasons that Waldheim treats as unspeakable, Kissinger himself would not speak German. Hence the following anecdote: "Kissinger prefered to speak English with me. During a dinner party with mutual friends, a Swiss lady, who was also a guest, remarked that she would get Kissinger to speak German. In fact, she addressed him in German. Without blinking an eye, Kissinger answered —in English."[59]

Aside from the banality of the story, characteristic of Waldheim's memoirs in general, one is struck by the feigned naivete: why on earth might Kissinger not want to speak German with Waldheim? The implied critique of Kissinger's intransigency is coupled, however, with a clear sexual rivalry. While Waldheim is off making small talk with Kissinger's parents, Kissinger stands his man in the encounter with the Swiss woman. Clearly the suggestion is that Waldheim, presenting himself in the role of the child, would not have the strength, i.e., potency, to meet the challenge, which he can only watch as a voyeur, whose castration anxiety leads him to envy and resent the prowess of the likeliest candidate, the international Jew. Waldheim plays the good son, sitting with the parents, whose authority he never questions, since parents are "mighty." But he wishes he could be the bad boy, who goes out into the world. Because of his timidity, the trauma of weakness, the oedipal ambivalence is never resolved. Because he speaks the "mother-tongue," he can never achieve the power of the father, which he detests and fears but can never embody. He chooses instead the role of passive vacillation, a result of his own psychopathology of neutrality.

Of course, the legal category of neutrality is not associated universally with the Waldheim model, but it is evident that Waldheim's neutrality derives from particular cultural and psychological predispositions to respond to conflicts by avoiding them. Thus, in 1968 as Austrian Foreign Minister, he refused to allow the Austrian embassy in Prague to grant asylum to Czech citizens fleeing the Russian invasion. It is this decision which probably earned him the support of the Soviet Union in his successful 1972 effort to become the Secretary General

58. Kurt Waldheim, *Der schwierigste Job der Welt*, *op. cit.*, p. 137.
59. *Ibid.*

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of the U.N. as well as Moscow's opportunist position on the 1986 controversy.[60] Waldheim's proud comment: "Since the signing of the [1955] treaty and the adoption of the Austrian constitutional law on permanent neutrality there has been no serious strain on amicable relations [with the USSR], not even under such difficult external conditions as during the Hungarian rising or the Czechoslovak crisis. The relationship of trust between Vienna and Moscow has been further strengthened by a number of official visits."[61]

The refusal to make difficult decisions "even under such difficult external conditions" is a feature of Waldheim's personality, trenchantly analyzed during the campaign in a brilliant essay by Peter Handke.[62] It is, moreover, a consequence of Waldheim's particular understanding of international politics and neutrality. The initial desire to revise the Treaty of St. Germain and retrieve the multi-national Europe lost in 1918 led him to his dissertation topic of 1944, the study of the confederation principle [*Reichsidee*] in the work of Constantin Frantz. He concludes with a glorification of "the magnificent collaboration of all the peoples of Europe under the leadership of the Reich" in the battle against the threat of external powers. Germany will become, in Waldheim's view, the vehicle for a resurrection of Europe, as if the "mighty parent" had returned to save the beleaguered son.[63]

Whether the vitriolic language in the Nazi dissertation of the student Waldheim is relevant to President Waldheim is a less urgent topic than the degree to which Waldheim's post-war political conceptions continue to display a strong indebtedness to the problematic notion of confederation inherited from Frantz. As in Frantz, one finds a political relativism that refuses to judge local political cultures in terms of some universal norms. Hence Waldheim's notorious ability to get along in a jolly manner with dictators: Syrian President Assad is "always kind and listens patiently and sympathetically to others, even when he does not share their views."[64] Marshal Tito "is basically a man of simple tastes and pleasures [who] spends his free time walking, swimming and working at various handicrafts."[65] Not a word of criticism is added regarding domestic affairs, since the multi-national model demands an agnosticism in order to respect local particularity. Thus, Waldheim's conception of the U. N. echoes Frantz's model for a European confederation: in both cases, the establishment of a supranational administration implies a tolerance for authoritarian regional powers. In particular, it leads to Waldheim's explicit apology for non-democratic regimes and human rights abuses in the Third World. Waldheim's answer is only to remind us "that violations of human rights are not restricted to the Third World," and that democracy is not "automatically valid for all peo-

60. Serge Schemann, "Moscow defends Waldheim, Denounces U.S. and Zionists," *New York Times*, June 9, 1986.

61. Kurt Waldheim, *The Austrian Exaample*, *op. cit.* pp. 97-98.

62. Handke, "Gegenstimme," *Profil*, May 5, 1986, pp. 20-22.

63. Cit. in Mark Wurm, "Waldheim's Thesis," *The Nation*, May 17, 1986, pp. 684-685. Cf. Michael Siegert, "Das deutsche Reich laut Waldheim," *Profil*, June 2, 1986, pp. 56-57.

64. Kurt Waldheim, *The Challenge of Peace*, *op. cit.*, p. 86.

65. *Ibid.*, p. 102.

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ples." It is particularly inappropriate "in a social order based on tribal principles or among groups that have not achieved even a minimum of national cohesions."[66] The implication is that political formations lacking a single cohesive national identity cannot have a democratic character: in other words, tribal peoples cannot rule themselves; more dictators for Africa. Frantz certainly would have agreed. One only wonders if it applies as well to the multi-national character of Waldheim's "grand design of a global community."[67]

This curious version of international tolerance for local intolerance recurred as well in Waldheim's definition of Austrian neutrality during his brief tenure as foreign minister. In a speech on June 12, 1968, he dismissed charges of a "tilt toward the East," a claim that was perhaps belied by his reponse to the Russian invasion in August. He equally rejected foreign-policy activism because of the need to respect all national sovereignties, a principle adhered to so rigidly that he attacked the Israeli rescue mission at Entebbe in 1976 as "a serious violation of the national sovereignty of a U. N. member state."[68]

This sort of world vision put Waldheim repeatedly at odds with the press, long before the 1986 campaign. As Secretary General, he complained that the coverage of the U.N. in the West was too critical, insensitive to the accomplishments of the organization and providing too much scrutiny of bad details. "Sometimes I feel that the trivia of international life —spy stories, so-called personnel scandals, diplomatic license plates and such— are disproportionately covered in the media to the exclusion of more important, though doubtless less newsworthy, activities. [...] But the public should also have access to the broader picture of the work we try to do here."[69] Similarly, in his autobiography, Waldheim complains of "unwarranted or reckless criticism."[70] Again, the German version includes a passage absent in the English edition that conveys a fuller sense of Waldheim's antipathy toward the press: "The western press in particular spares me no criticism. As great as my respect for the freedom of the press is —one of the most precious achievements of mankind— the newspapers and mass media do not always make my job easy. Of course, I can understand that due to financial difficulties and the struggle with competition, certain newspapers try to increase their readership with sensational reports."[71] The press appears as a perpetual threat, driven solely by insatiable greed to persecute the honest diplomat, who, despite his "respect for the freedom of the press," makes it perfectly clear that he wishes that "certain newspapers," especially in the West, would shut up. The new information order?

66. *Ibid.*, pp. 102-103.

67. Kurt Waldheim, *Building the Future Order: The Search for Peace in an Interdependent World*, ed. Robert L. Schiffer (New York: Free Press, 1980), p. 242.

68. Kurt Waldheim, "Möglichkeiten und Grenzen der Österreichischen Aussenpolitik," address to the *Akademische Vereinigung für Aussenpolitik* in Vienna, June 12, 1968; cit. in Elaine Sciolino, "Waldheim's U.N. Tenure Seems to Show No Pattern Favoring East or West," *New York Times*, June 13, 1986.

69 Kurt Waldheim, *Building the Future Order*, *op. cit.*, p. 242.

70 Kurt Waldheim, *The Challenge of Peace*, *op. cit.*, p. 10.

71 Kurt Waldheim, *Der schwierigste Job der Welt*, *op. cit.*, p. 28.

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Yet, Waldheim's hostility to the press in fact predates his activity in the U.N. In *The Austrian Example*, the German original of which appeared in 1971, the year of his first presidential campaign, he devotes considerable space to the conflict between foreign policy and public opinion. The career diplomat expresses a deep distrust of public opinion but recognizes that, given the power of the mass media, the government has to remain open: not, however, in order to encourage public discussion but as a sort of public relations campaign.[72] Nevertheless, he fears that the press might, in certain circumstances, encourage public criticism that would put pressure on the government and impinge on the policy of permanent neutrality: "wild or unbridled criticism, unfounded sensational reports and personal insults merely serve to intensify existing tension in the event of critical situations in foreign policy." Following his former dissertation advisor Verdross, the commentator on Austrian neutrality, Waldheim therefore deduces that "situations may arise [...] in which the information media should impose voluntary restrictions on themselves for the common good."[73] One presumes such situations would include events like the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, since Waldheim's decision to close the embassy doors in Prague to refugees has been severely attacked. He would obviously prefer a press that would not agitate the public to respond vigorously to any foreign event, i.e., a press ready to subordinate itself to the calculations of the government.

This illiberal readiness to modify the freedom of the press resonates with the unwillingness to criticize undemocratic practices abroad. Both echo features of Frantz's confederation, and both depend on Waldheim's construction of neutrality: if criticism thrives on partisanship, then impartiality necessitates a restriction of critical discussion. Frantz is echoed as well to the extent that Waldheim has compounded his critique of the press with an anti-semitic fantasy, his own claim that "international journalism is dominated by the World Jewish Congress."[74] In fact Waldheim is afraid of Jews for the same reason that he is afraid of the press, and, for that matter, any public debate. The weak ego surrounds itself with fantastic nightmares of alien power, international conspiracies, and blood-curdling encirclement. It responds by claiming the absolute innocence of a child. Hence, the compulsive insistence on forgetting. Like the "infant republic," the child has no memory, and therefore the leader of the conservative People's Party, Alois Mock, degraded discussions of "our so-called past." The infant is unmarked, uncircumcised and neutral, but, just as in Frantz's confederation that threatens to engulf surrounding nations, it is the infantile neutrality that knows no borders and makes limitless demands. Hence the campaign slogans "Österreich über alles" and "We Austrians do what we want to do."

The effect of Waldheim's election on the Austrian press cannot be predicted, although it is noteworthy that, with one exception, all the established newspapers supported his campaign and participated in the denunciations of foreign journalism. In any case, the model of neutrality he offers, drawing on political

72 Kurt Waldheim, *The Austrian Example*, *op. cit.*, p. 185.
73 *Ibid.*, p. 188.
74 *Le Monde*, May 3, 1986.

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traditions, a cultural heritage, and a particular social psychology, remains extraordinarily problematic. A century ago, the limitations of bourgeois liberalism gave way to a generational revolt out of which grew the culture of *fin-de-siècle* Vienna. Its mythic sensibility was not restricted to the painting Klimt provided for the ceiling of the university, in which conceptual knowledge appears as a tiny footnote to an irrational cosmos. The same sensibility recurred in a new political culture, that combined radical gestures of revolt with a new rhetoric of myth. That turn-of-the-century culture is not only being celebrated today in the great museums; it is also continued, appropriated by the Austrian conservatives and turned into nationalism.

The Austrian paradigm today means the transformation of the neutrality of 1955, a legal international standing, into a radical insistence on insularity, a hysterical fear of an imagined international intervention, a fear of the world. But the fear of the world is above all a fear of the West, and given the political history of the new President, the possibility of a rapprochement with the East is not unthinkable. That realignment would not be without irony, reminiscent of the Prussian reactionaries Weber berated in the 1916 speech for promoting a foreign-policy alliance with Russia because of their domestic conservatism. Will Waldheim's domestic illiberalism make him a friend of a contemporary Russian conservatism? Will the head of the Austrian state, now because of its neutrality, again greet Russian efforts to maintain order in the East? How ambivalent has the notion of neutrality become after all? Ambivalent, of course, between East and West, but ambivalent as well in terms of the limits of national sovereignty: the Austrians may be insisting on their freedom from international pressure in an "Osterreich über alles," but their foreign policy is in fact strictly limited by the 1955 treaty. If the neutral Austrians find their international status difficult, one can only wonder how a neutral Germany, no matter how improbable, would fare with a pledge to avoid an alliance with either East or West. The more likely result is either the gradual incorporation of a reunified Germany into the influence sphere of either the East or the West or the emergence of Germany at the head of a European confederation as a third superpower, for which the term "neutral" ceases to be appropriate.

Therefore, the Waldheim model certainly sheds a new light on the West German fascination in "the Austrian example," as a version of neutrality and Central European confederation. The connection is not at all absurd, given the fact that in the run-off election the Austrian Greens tilted more toward Waldheim than toward his socialist opponent.[75] The question is how many of its principles the left will surrender in order to achieve neutrality, reunification, and a confederation, the new version of the German question. There is an Austrian answer, and it is the spectre haunting the Vienna fascination.

75 Cf. Funke, "Hass auf Juden," *op. cit.*, and *New York Times*, June 9, p. 6.

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*German Social Democracy in the 1980s**

Volker Gransow

"Show not the goal, but also the way.
For so grown together are way and goal,
that the one is forever changing with the other
And from a different way comes also a different goal."
Ferdinand Lassalle

In the mid-1980s, German social democracy was revived like a Phoenix from the ashes. In the individual federal states, it proved its governing capability which had been lost in the final years of the Schmidt Administration: The Social Democrats not only controlled the city-states of Bremen and Hamburg with an absolute majority, but were able to win the 1985 elections so overwhelmingly, both in the largest state of North Rhine-Westphalia and also in Saarland, that they were not forced to form any coalitions. But where the Social Democrats needed a partnership, as in Hesse, they showed that they would wager a red-green coalition. In special political areas, the Opposition made dramatic changes, above all in peace and security policy. The party which, by a large majority, made the 1979 NATO double-track resolution possible had, within a few years, become a party which rejected the deployment of the Pershing and Cruise Missiles by an even greater majority. The platform orientation changed as well: By 1988 a new basic platform should replace the obsolete Godesberg Program of 1959. The old leadership, with the exception of party leader Willy Brandt, has been replaced: Hans-Jochen Vogel leads the party in the Bundestag and Johannes Rau, the victor from North Rhine-Westphalia, has become the candidate for chancellor.

But can the SPD be optimistic? Optimistic, not only in the sense of winning back government control in the '87 federal elections that they lost in 1982, but also optimistic that a new Social Democratic vision be developed, after the failure of Stalinism, Eurocommunism and Keynesianism. The answer is, unfortunately, No. The changes were only halfhearted to unsatisfactory. Above all, this political halfheartedness has structural roots which *still* have not been resolved. Therefore, the SPD can presumably only make partial use of their political options.

*Translated by Allison Brown.

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During the term of SPD governmental control from 1966-1982, specific Social Democratic policy patterns developed. Their most important elements were/are[1]:

(1) A policy of focussing on quantitive economic *growth*. Growth became a *conditio sine qua non* in all policy areas. Growth was considered a prerequisite for an independent foreign and economic policy, and a condition for an expansive and egalitarian education policy, but most importantly, it was considered the guardian of social policy. An intimate connection developed between economic growth and the welfare states: Only that which could be financed was realistic social policy. At the same time, social policy had to try to counter the undesirable consequences of industrial capitalist growth. In this way, the welfare state and economic growth strengthened each other.

(2) A neo-Keynesian economic policy of "modernizing the economy", which was no longer to have an "anti-cyclical" effect, but rather was consciously accelerated by means of crisis-like restructuring attained through markets. This policy of "active structural change" was thereby to achieve competitive advantages in the world market and also improvements for the salary-dependent local population. The big question is obviously where the structural changes in the world market come from. In other words: Is the modernized economy not structurally still ordinary *capitalism*, characterized by private ownership of the means of production, and the drive to accumulate, along with the crises that come with it?

(3) Capitalism had already fallen out of the public eye because the use of state interference meant virtually the pulling of its "poison fangs". The absolute concentration on the state, however, was not limited to economic policy. The SPD produced an *integral statism* and became, in the government, the party representing "state ownership of everything except the means of production".[2] In the tradition of the German authoritarian state arose the technocratic-oriented social welfare and surveillence state, which had likewise welfare data systems and resident information files at its command. Such statist centralization justifiably gave rise to feelings of isolation, powerlessness and dependence.

(4) *Neo-corporatism* was yet another reason for the ignorance *vis-à-vis* capitalism. Naive acceptance of the theory of the "production factors" capital and labor, in association with the conviction of the effect of the state when integrating these factors, was supposed to achieve an all-round satisfying balance of interests through "concerted actions" by government, labor and management. Not only did this literally drive the model of representation to the limit and freeze existing asymmetries, but also neglected those not already represented in the structure of corporate representation.

(5) Even the slogan "modernization of the economy" shows that the SPD considered itself the party of *modernization*. But, according to the definition of "modernization", a criterion is missing (unlike, for example, democratiza-

1. From Bodo Zeuner ed., *Genossen, was nun? Bilanz und Perspektiven sozialdemokratischer Politik*, (Hamburg, 1983), pp. 11-13.
2. Cf.: *Aesthetik und Kommunikation*, No. 33 (1978), p. 63ff.

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tion, liberalization, Christianization). This means that modernization policy itself can only be meaningful if what "modernity" means is clearly spelled out. One result of this would be that the modernization process of each part is always at the cost of the modernity of the whole. Modernization includes: specialization, functional differentiation, expansion of options.[3] Such processes, however, result in exactly the opposite: specialization hinders networking, functional differentiation increases the need for coordination, expansion of options leads to limitation of options.[4] The SPD was left standing like Goethe's "Sorcerer's Apprentice", when the consequences of modernization became apparent: New homes became residential machines; schools became learning factories; City Halls became places without citizens.

(6) Out of all this came the sixth element: the *exclusion* of larger and larger segments of the population. Whoever could not or did not want to bend to a policy of state fixation and standardized modernization was left out in the cold. Whether this had to do with not wanting to or not being able to was not taken into consideration. And so it could equally effect the ethnically, sexually or economically discriminated. The traditional Social Democatic claim to represent the underprivileged was gradually abrogated.

If one considers the rhetoric of Social Democratic speakers in the Opposiston Period after 1982 (but also the governing practices of the SPD in the federal states), one discovers that a number of changes have appeared to counter these policies. In detail, however, such changes are not as serious as they appear at first glance. They have to do with the inclusion of ecological problems, the connection between détente and military policy, the shortening of the work-week and a consciousness of classical cooperative self-help models. But the core of the Social Democratic policy "syndrome" is barely touched.

(1) The linkage to economic *growth* is downplayed, but retained nonetheless. Quantitative growth at any cost is no longer sought, but qualitative (politically selected) growth is seen as indispensable. The thought of uncoupling the interrelations between economic growth and the social welfare state has been definitively dismissed. Although by now socio-political prevention should indeed precede the later correction of damages, the "Green" proposal of a guaranteed minimum wage for everyone has been rejected.

(2) The SPD is even more resolute in terms of *capitalism* as it is on the question of growth. The only concession they have made is that now a small minority in the party which is critical of capitalism may at least be heard, above all in the SPD theoretical journal *Neue Gesellschaft/Frankfurter Hefte*, which is increasingly becoming worth reading. Other than this, however, all party leaders reject even mild critiques of capitalism. On the contrary, the democratic Left's task has been defined as one to create "reasonable" conditions for the utilization of capital.[5] In media policy, the SPD abandoned

3. Niklas Luhmann, *Soziale Systeme: Grundriss einer allgemeinen Theorie*, (Frankfurt, 1984).
4. Claus Offe, *Die Utopie der Null-Option (MS)*, (Bielefeld, 1985).
5. Peter Glotz, *Die Arbeit der Zuspitzung*, (Berlin, 1984), p. 33.

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their only resistance to the opening to private capital of previously public-legal areas.

(3) The attitude toward the State has changed in social policy, with the increasing demand for support of new businesses with alternative forms, such as cooperatives. At the same time, fixation on the State is strengthened if the Basic Values (*Grundwerte*) Commission pushes for a section on "Our State" in the new party platform.[6] But this is not merely rhetoric. The persistence of *integral statism* is clearly evident in the *Ostpolitik*, where the representative-statist insensibility to socio-cultural changes in Eastern Europe continues. Behaving like a party in power, the SPD deals with the leaders of all East European Communist parties in economic policy, ecology, the Third World and arms control. To some extent, this has already resulted in drafts of quasi-governmental agreements.

(4) Changes in the orientation toward *neo-corporatism* are not forthcoming. West German trade unions are not as well as they could be, following prolonged shrinking membership, year-long sacrificing of wages, scandals concerning the union-owned apartment building construction company "*Neue Heimat*", and reservations regarding "Green-Alternative" issues. The SPD sees itself confronted with a continuing decline of workers among its membership (and not just in the leadership). So the two groggy partners cling to one another for everything up to pleas for a new edition of the "concerted action" or a Great Coalition.

(5) The Opposition has modified the one-time motto of *modernization* of the economy with an adjective, and now speaks of ecological modernization. In 1984, the SPD presented a program "Work and Environment", containing particularly well-meaning postulates. Of course, in reality the Social Democratic state governments are deaf to environmental policy demands (as in the case in 1985 of Rau, candidate for Chancellor and North Rhine-Westphalia Prime Minister, regarding the starting up of a nuclear power plant in Ibbenbüren). Even after the Chernobyl catastrophe in 1986, the SPD leadership announced only vague slogans about the "beginning of the end" of the nuclear energy industry. More importantly, a discussion of modernity has not yet begun. The uncritical welcome of micro-electronics similarly shows that very little increases in the awareness of the problems can be expected through technological discussions.

(6) The loss of governmental control facilitated a withdrawal from trends to *segregate* minorities. The SPD opposes the federal government's efforts to limit the right of protest, or to discriminate against foreign residents. However, in the SPD-controlled federal states, the practice is not any different (or is even worse), but there is also scandalous support for immigration restrictions (included to some degree in the otherwise criticized borderchecks of East Germany).

All in all, this over-view of the core elements of Social Democratic policy

6. Erhard Eppler, ed., *Grundwerte für ein neues Godesberger Programm: Die Texte der Grundwerte-Kommission der SPD*, (Reinbek, 1984), p. 180.

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"syndrome" of the 1970s shows that changes in the SPD in Opposition did not happen nearly as fast as it seemed. They specifically had not acknowledged the already existing differences between the "party of Brandt" and the "Schmidt Administration". The causes for the basically timid changes in the SPD during the Opposition Period lie much deeper in the structure of the party itself. Blanke has appropriately called this historically-rooted structure "paradoxical communication."[7]

This term is borrowed from communicative psychology.[8] Blanke introduced it into political science while seeking an explanation for the Social Democrats' defeat by the National Socialists in 1933. In this connection he investigated two communication partners: "Organization" and "regular voters and members". According to Blanke, the Social Democratic Organization can no longer recognize the consequences of its own policy because, due to internal bureaucracy, it is far too removed from its information sources. On the other hand, regular voters and members believe that the Organization will pursue the right policy. This *is paradoxical communication. Each places hope in the other because they have already been indoctrinated not to be independent, although, at the same time, independent action is expected.*

In their earlier appeals, party and trade union leaders assumed that, at the right moment, the masses would be able to resist. On the other hand, the masses assumed that party and trade union leaders would be able and willing to determine the proper moment. After the National Socialists took power it was clear that, in terms of action based on a strict interpretation of legality, the time to resist had come. At that point, however, effective resistance was no longer possible. "In this context, the assignment of blame overlooks the structural problem of a bureaucratic organization, in which neither side can free itself from its systemic restraints."[9]

Blanke came to the notion of "paradoxical communication" through an historical analysis, but it is actually related to a structural problem (as Michels had already indicated, although he did not use the term[10]), with specific historical roots.[11] Even if "representation" was then essential, workers had neither time, money or power to devote directly to the representation of their political interests. Today, "representation" is a structure which, in the most extreme sense, is more likely to be a burden for a party made up of wage-dependent people. Representation today is not merely a "fictional identity"[12] nor an "act of collective acclamation,"[13] but, much more, it is characteristic of

7. Bernhard Blanke, "Sozialdemokratie und Gesellschaftskrise: Hypothesen zu einer sozialwissenschaftlichen Reformismustheorie", in *Sozialdemokratische Arbeiterbewegung und Weimarer Republik*, Wolfgang Luthardt, ed., Vol. 2, (Frankfurt, 1978), p. 398ff.

8. Watzlawick, *et al.*, *Menschliche Kommunikation*, quoted by Blanke, *op. cit.*, p. 407n.

9. *Ibid.*, p. 399.

10. Robert Michels, *Zur Soziologie des Parteiwesens in der modernen Demokratie*, (Stuttgart, 1957).

11. Cora Stephan, *Genossen, wir duerfen uns nicht von der Geduld hinreissen lassen*, (Frankfurt, 1977).

12. Heinz Rausch, "Repräsentation/Repräsentative Demokratie", in *Handbuch des politischen Systems der Bundesrepublik Deutschland*, (München, 1977), p. 531.

13. Jürgen Habermas, *et al.*, *Student und Politik*, (Neuvied, 1961), p. 31.

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a social relation which assumes the passivity of both partners. Paradoxical communication, as a Social Democratic form of intra-party representation, is based on most rank and file members paying dues out of a vague "social activism" (preferably by direct deposit), but leaving party policy up to the so-called "active membership" (i.e., lower functionaries). This particular Social Democratic representation distinguishes itself both from that of smaller parties (such as the Greens, the Free Democrats, and the Communists), as well as from the more direct interest orientation of the Christian Democrats.

Seeing the Social Democratic form of communication as a structural deficiency is a key to understanding today's Social Democratic policy. The party has transformed itself from a class-party to a party of employees, from a party with an outlook, to a catch-all party. Yet, the "original" form of communication has been retained. This has important consequences for the organization and the membership.

(1) A *loss of reality* is the first consequence of the organization's aloofness from the actual experiences of social conflict. It resulted in the downfall of the Schmidt Administration, until the SPD Basic Values Commission could locate some real reasons for a revision of the SPD platform — problems whose existence was already well known:[14] unemployment; rapid technological change, particularly in micro-electronics; crises in "old" industries (steel, shipbuilding, etc.); destruction of the environment, e.g., the dying of forests; Third World debt; new dimensions of the arms race; changing values, new social movements, alternative culture. The SPD has been unable to systematically deal either with the socio-economic dimensions of the arms race[15] or with indebtedness.[16] Domestically also the Opposition has become detached from reality. The evaluation of the Greens as a temporary phenomenon may well be correct. Yet, this overlooks the fact that it is a complex cultural-economic phenomenon which will remain even after its socio-political expression disappears.

(2) But when real social conflicts are not acknowledged, or their acknowledgement comes too late, the result is a failure in obtaining a normative perspective. A general *lack of principles* follows this loss of reality. The "Marxist" SPD could still operate with an objectivist determinism,[17] but the "post-Marxist" SPD could not. Yet, it acts in exactly the same way by allowing technical-industrial social retraints to displace the class struggle. The SPD no longer represents the proletariat, but rather the citizen of a welfare state undergoing universal technological change.

Although it was already a problem in "classical Marxism" whether economic

14. Eppler, *op. cit.*, p. 171ff.

15. Edward P. Thompson, "Der Exterminismus als letztes Stadium der Zivilisation," in *Das Argument*, No. 127 (1981).

16. Fidel Castro, "Die Verschuldungskrise der Weltwirtschaft und die aufhaltsame Zerstörung des Kapitalismus durch die Banken"; introduction by Elmar Altvater, in *Leviathan*, No. 4 (1985).

17. Max Adler *et al.*, *Marxismus und Ethik*, (Frankfurt, 1974); and Otto Kallscheuer, "Sozialdemokratische Theorie — am Ende des Fortschritts?", in Zeuner, *op. cit.*

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analysis and the ethical justification of socialist policy coincided, with the abandonment of Marxism the ethical-political argument for a more just social order became absolutely necessary — especially with a "declaration of loyalty" to plurality. This issue, however, is addressed neither in the 1959 "Godesberg Program," nor in subsequent policy documents. All that remained was the pale generality of basic values: "Freedom, Justice, Solidarity."[18]

(3) If there is no concrete connection with reality; if there are no normative grounds for practical politics, then what remains is only a diffuse commitment to modernization (without a critical understanding of modernity). Tied to its own *raison d'être*, power, this leads to dependence on public opinion polls. Public opinion research replaces a political project based on social struggles. How essential public opinion is for the Social Democratic organization in the 80s can be gathered by the fate of the study "Planning Data for the SPD's prospects to attain a Majority" undertaken on behalf of the SPD leadership. According to the authors, neither the CDU nor the SPD has a chance to expand their share of regular voters of roughly 30% by 1987. They have to focus, rather, on independent and occasional voters. This is not enough for a joint SPD/Green majority: the SPD has to win some votes from the Christian Democrat and the Liberal camps. In order to avoid problems with their membership, the SPD has been advised not to "talk about coalitions; rather, offer the voters more attractive and better answers and people to solve the pressing problems of the future."[19] Since 1985, the SPD has followed exactly this public opinion poll tip, apparently without even considering whether it may be better to *create* a majority through political debate rather than merely chasing after it. This has once again been confirmed in the "triumphal" June 1986 defeat in the elections in Lower Saxony when there was an almost 6% increase in SPD votes (from 38% to 44%).

Within "paradoxical communication", a passive membership, internally divided and dependent on information which it cannot receive, reflects, so to speak, a primarily self-informed organization.

(1) A major characteristic of the SPD membership in the 80s is *passivity*. This is illustrated by the large-scale study of the "SPD from the Inside". In this inventory of the SPD in North Rhine-Westphalia, for which data was collected in the early 1980s (a period of decline for the SPD, then the West German governing party), the following is written about the activities and work of local clubs: "The active core of the local SPD-club is relatively small, at least half of which is made up of functionaries and elected officials. In addition to the active core, there is a group of members of approximately the same size which is occasionally active . . . . On the average, the local club leadership estimates that 12% of the membership are regularly active members and 13% occasionally active ones . . . . Apparently, it is primarily the 'active core' which attends regular meetings. For the annual general meeting, this circle expands to

18. Volker Gransow and Claus Offe, "Political Culture in the SPD", in *Telos*, no. 53 (Fall 1982), pp. 67-80.

19. From *Vorwaerts*, September 22, 1984.

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include members who — according to local leaders — are at least 'occasionally' active."[20] This kind of empirical social research can only grasp part of reality. An important aspect of this passivity is simple boredom — a boredom with no subjective causes, but rather resulting from the fact that the same people discuss the same topics in the same order in various party committees. Similarly, all these committees continually accept reports from the next higher committee or political organizations, which basically have little or nothing to do with local conditions.

(2) Even if this suggests that, at local meetings, the organization meets mostly with itself, the existence of other groups cannot be totally ignored. They are all part of a membership which does not depend on communication with the organization for support, but rather on their own experiences and/or on the press and television as sources of information. It is not surprising that the real "SPD from the Inside" is characterized by a distinct *fragmentation*. Based on real social shifts, four major trends can be distinguished:[21]

a) *Romantic Industrialism*. Here, predominantly Senior Citizens defend their support for growth based on their experiences with the prosperous modernist 1950 local politics. This is based on a narrow interpretation of parliamentary rule safe from communists, foreigners and other outsiders.

b) *Agressive Industrialism*. This group includes active trade union members or functionaries which are neither "Right" nor "Left." They also support growth and oppose the ascetic ethics of intellectuals. Issues related to the workplace are essential for these people.

c) *Academic Marxism*. Abstractly identifying with the working class, these intellectuals resolve their dilemma in "theory." Their dilemma, of course, is one of having to be orthodox Marxists in the SPD (since it is the party of the working class), but also unable to do so because it is a reformist party.

d) *Eco-pax*. This group includes counter-culture members often engaged in education. They are concerned with issues such as environmental policy, gender, and arms limitations.

(3) Like fragmentation, passivity is related to the Information Gap generated by "paradoxical communication." The trend to "Americanize" European political parties into "catch-all parties," also means the transformation of the party members into regular voters.[22] This does not require the use of the barely-alive party press or other party information sources, but rather "public opinion formation" through technically very new mass communication.[23] The resulting personalization of politics encourages concentrating on information from party gossip when (mostly during election campaigns) a rare meeting occurs between a member and a top politician.

20. Horst Becker and Bodo Hombach, *et al.*, *Die SPD von innen: Bestandsaufnahme an der Basis der Partei*, (Bonn 1983), p. 80.

21. Volker Gransow, "Risse im Beton: Bemerkungen zur SPD-Kultur", in Zeuner, *op. cit.*

22. Otto Kirchheimer, "Der Wandel des westeuropaeischen Parteisystems", in *Politische Vierteljahresschrist*, no. 1 (1965).

23. Volker Gransow, *Der autistische Walkman: Elektronik, Privatheit und Oeffentlichkeit*, (Berlin, 1985).

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Because the structure of "paradoxical communication" is not understood, the grass-roots level humility of the one side is as unaccepted as the isolation of the other. In the early to mid-1980s, Richard Meng interviewed Social Democrats at the federal, state, and local levels. His summary was: On the federal level, prospects from 4 to 8 years are considered; State politicians have hardly any time to prepare decisions; and at the local level, the overriding impression is that of passivity at the mercy of federal and state political development.[24]

In spite of various changes, the Social Democratic political "syndrome" developed earlier persists in the 80's: a) fixation on growth; b) capital orientation; c) integral budgetism; d) neo-corporatism; e) uncritical modernization; f) segregation of minorities. "Paradoxical communication" between the organization and its membership is a major cause for the tenacious continuation of the "syndrome," in spite of the opposition's comparably favorable situation. This "paradoxical communication" entails for the organization a loss of reality, a lack of principles and dependence on public opinion. For the membership it means: passivity, fragmentation, and an information gap. A resolution of this problem must precede changes in the "political syndrome," if the SPD wants to have a chance to regain hegemonic strength through social struggles.

My suggestion is a return to what Otto Bauer called "functional democracy" in contraposition to the "functional oligarchy" of the state and the banks. This functional democracy involved a consideration of the function of the worker in society, and the agreement between government acts and labor organizations.[25] Intra-party functional democracy — the transposing of these principles onto the political party — would be the opposite of paradoxical communication. It would in no way encroach on the fundamentally representative-parliamentary character of the party institution. Yet, through the implementation of grass-roots democratic or direct democratic elements (imperative mandates, rotation principle, quotas), as are currently demanded by some Social Democratic women, it could contribute to a reduction and eventually the elimination of the barriers between organization and membership. At the same time, this contribution could inspire a renewal of the party program.

Both can only work if the SPD as a whole breaks with its present outlook. Rau's politics, following the recommendations of public opinion polls, essentially boil down to successfully losing the federal election in 1987.[26] Since a Great Coalition with the Christian Democrats would decimate the party, as would a renewed social-liberal alliance, internal renewal can only be achieved through a red-green coalition. This, however, is to be avoided. While Rau tries

24. *Frankfurter Rundschau*, from 11 December 1985.

25. Otto Bauer, *Das Gleichgewicht der Klassenkräfte*. collected works, Vol. 9, (Vienna, 1980). For a convincing interpretation of Bauer cf., Richard Saage, *Rückkehr zum starken Staat?*, (Frankfurt, 1984).

26. Norbert Kostede, "Konzept Rau — Erfolgreich verlieren," in *die tageszeitung*, September 18, 1985.

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to attract CDU voters with vague aphorisms, the Left, the "Eco-pax"-oriented and the intellectual cynics are given the task of pressing the Greens under 5% of the vote in accordance with the recommendations of public opinion surveys. With this orientation, the SPD could move in the next legislative term as a radiant and exclusive Opposition party. Unfortunately, they would have won nothing for their program and internal structure.

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The Left and Democracy: Recent Debates in Latin America

Robert Barros

Introduction

In Brazil, Chile, Uruguay, and Argentina the experience of authoritarian rule during the past decade has produced a fundamental re-evaluation of the importance of civil and political rights for protecting individual lives and the possibility of politics. In situations in which dictatorships had suppressed the functioning of representative institutions and trade unions, denied the legitimacy of all forms of politics other than their own, and repeatedly repressed any challenges to this monopoly, any expression of particular interests also had to be accompanied by a general demand for the termination of military rule. Under these circumstances "democracy" emerged as the banner for any number of proscribed aspirations. As the symbolic embodiment of alternatives to dictatorship, democracy came to mean any number of things, including the introduction of narrow channels of elite representation, an end to arbitrary detentions, torture and murder, the recovery of liberal institutions, more jobs, housing, education, and health care, as well as structural transformations in favor of the popular classes. With recent transitions in Argentina, Uruguay, and Brazil military regimes of varying institutional configuration, duration, and repressiveness have given way to political democracy. What until recently could only exist as an aspiration, now, with the exception of Chile, stands as a reality. These new circumstances pose for all political actors the practical question of what to do about democracy. Each now must confront the relation between these newly created institutions and the particular ends and interests for which democracy is either valued or, as in the case of those who only grudgingly accepted democratization, feared.

This problem is extremely pertinent for the social movements, labor organizations, and political parties that today make up "the Left" in the Southern Cone. After, undoubtedly, the most traumatic and destructive period in their history, these groups —many of whom had redefined their goals in terms of the recovery and strengthening of democracy— are now in a position to exercise their rights to publically articulate their positions, develop an alternative culture, organize unions and associations, and compete in elections. But are these rights and formally democratic institutions adequate means for satisfying demands systematically repressed by the military or are they merely another mask for bourgeois domination? If democracy is not the answer to

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misery and oppression, then are there any reasons why it should be valued by the Left? If so, what are the practical implications of such a committment?

Since about 1980 these questions have increasingly been at the center of Left intellectual debates concerning alternatives to military rule, particularly as the appearance of fissures in the authoritarian state put political re-democratization on the horizon. Though these events have charged these debates with a heightened sense of urgency, much more is at stake in these discussions than the determination of future tactics. The debate over democracy and socialism in the Southern Cone is as much a debate over the identity of the Left and its past as it is about a —now present— future (democracy). The defeat of the Left in Chile, Uruguay, and Argentina at what was thought to be the height of each one's power, along with the ferocious repression unleashed to destroy the guerilla organizations, disorganize Left parties and trade unions, and instill fear in their supporters have badly shaken the previous ideological certainties of the Left.

The need to make sense of this reversal and to find new bearings in societies profoundly transformed by authoritarian restructuring has generated a major re-examination of the Left's pre-coup conceptions of politics and popular mobilization, considerable reflection on democracy, and serious efforts to refound the Left on grounds other than the rigid dichotomy of "reform or revolution." This "renovation" of the Left, as it has been called, has not been universal. Ideological rigidity, clinging to the orthodoxy of the past, has also provided a means to avoid confronting this setback.[1] Nevertheless, many of the terms of pre-coup Marxist discourse — the necessity of revolution, the impossibility of capitalist development in the periphery, and the imperative of destroying the bourgeois state— have been dislodged from their once central position, and replaced by theoretical work that unfolds in many directions, spans a breadth of themes, and clearly evinces the influence of new theoretical trends encountered in exile, as well as the impact of contemporary debates on the crisis of the Soviet model.

This unprecedented diversity and broadening of the parameters of Left intellectual concerns is not without a unifying concept. Unquestionably, this is provided by democracy. Of little interest in the past, the issues of democracy and human rights were forced upon the Left by military rule. Repression very quickly turned the defense of human rights into an urgent question of life and

1. This type of response has been typical of the political parties. In these cases the lessons of the past decades are predictable and in no way question or implicate earlier political strategies. Responsibility for defeat inevitably lies external to the party, either with the dominant classes or with a rival party. The mutual recriminations between the Communist Party of Chile and the Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR) after the 1973 coup are a good example of this. As one theorist, critical of this type of fatalism notes, the characterization of past events in terms of defeat is itself a mode of denial and absolution of responsibility: one is a victim of defeat, not an active protagonist in the events that culminate in this undesired outcome. Cf. Manuel Antonio Garretón, "Continuidád ruptura y vacío teórico ideológico: dos hipótesis sobre el proceso político chileno 1970-1973, *Revista Mexicana de sociología* 39:4 (1977), p. 1292. And, it should be stressed that the challenges to the former orthodoxy have come primarily from intellectuals who have assumed a critical distance from their former affiliations —intellectually, if not organizationally— and not the political parties.

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death. Likewise, with the suppression of unrestricted channels of interest articulation, the possibility of advancing even the most elementary revindicative demands of lower class groups came to hinge on the recovery of civil and political liberties.[2] This intertwining of individual security, demands for social redress, and struggles for political liberty has forced the Left in the Southern Cone —across the spectrum— to clarify its theoretical and programmatic relation to democracy.[3]

In broad terms three positions have emerged out of this debate over the contemporary significance of democracy and socialism. One restates the classical opposition between "formal" and "real" democracy, sets out the contradiction between capitalism and democracy, and goes on to argue that the reinstitution of democratic forms of governance can only be a tactical objective for the working class, necessary to facilitate the formation of a revolutionary movement, but nonetheless a stage to be surpassed along the road to socialism. At the other extreme is a second position which bypasses the question of socialism. Arguing that the Left's present priority must be the introduction and consolidation of democratic institutions, the theorists behind this position turn away from Marxism and focus their attention on the relation between institutions and political identities. Whereas each of these two positions, in their own manner, dissociate democracy and socialism, the third position finds fertile ground for their convergence in the dependence of advances in popular organization on the recovery of rights of citizenship. It emphasizes the importance of democratic practices and institutions for the formation of a broad popular-democratic movement.

Whether this discovery of democracy and broadening of Left thinking has served to clarify for the Left the constraints and choices it faces, and thereby contribute to the development of a viable new conception of radical politics in the Southern Cone of Latin America is the subject of this essay. This question will be examined through a reconstruction of the three positions just outlined. Though much of this is a debate over the meaning and significance of "democracy" for the Left, it is necessary to carefully distinguish between each position's discussion of democratic institutions and any normative arguments for democracy. In principle democracy *is* compatible with a number of substantive aims, as well as its extension beyond the political realm. However, as has already been suggested, the concrete dilemma before the Left is how to relate to procedural institutions (rights, elections, parliaments, specific decision rules, etc.) that may or may not advance its substantive ends, despite their critical importance for delimiting a context in which a popular Left politics

2. Cf. on the Brazilian case, José Alvaro Moisés, "What is the Strategy of the New Syndicalism?", *Latin American Perspectives* 9:4 (1982). esp. pp. 66 73.

3. For further discussion of the sociological genesis of this "new democratic ideology," see Angel Flisfisch, "El surgimiento de una nueva ideología democrática en América Latina," *Crítica y Utopía* 9 (1983), pp. 11-29; Norbert Lechner, "De la Revolución a la Democracia," *Leviatan* 21 (1985). pp. 103-115; as well as Tomás Moulián's more personal, semi-autobiographical account, "Una Relfexión Sobre Intelectuales y Politica," in *Democracia y Socialismo en Chile* (Santiago: FLACSO 1983), pp. 7-19.

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can be openly articulated. Therefore, the reconstruction of each position will be organized around three broad questions: What sort of argument, if any, is made for democracy? How are the limits and subsequent possibilities of formally democratic mechanisms posed? And how does a committment to democracy alter conceptions of socialism, as well as the capacity of Marxism to ground an emancipatory project? To highlight the novelty in Latin America of this surge of thinking about democracy the subordinate position of democracy in the pre-coup political thought of the Left will first be examined.

Reform or Revolution

The now commonplace observation that democracy has replaced revolution as the central category of political and intellectual debate is undoubtedly correct. One would be hard pressed to find any sustained discussion of democracy within Left circles during the 1960s. In a manner analogous to the earlier equation of liberalism with oligarchical rule, democracy in the early 1960's was associated with anti-communist governments openly posing as alternatives to the Left.[4] In a context marked by the inability of these reformist-developmentalist governments to break the post-Korean War cycle of economic stagnation, socio-economic concerns predominated over any reflection on political institu tions. And here the Cuban revolution provided the way out, by demonstrating the concrete possibility of a break with capitalism, as well as of socialism, which now no longer appeared as an abstract, distant ideal. Through this convergence revolution emerged as an urgent imperative —the only preferable alternative in the diagnosis "Socialism" or "Fascism" which gained currency within the Left in the late 1960s.

Leaving aside the equally divisive organizational question —armed versus non-violent forms of struggle, rural versus urban guerilla warfare, popular versus vanguard party, etc.— the essential parameters of the ideological milieu of the sixties can be illustrated through the confrontation between the emergent "revolutionary" Left and the established, pro-Soviet Communist Parties.[5] Although the dichotomy "reform" or "revolution" captures the

4. Cf. Marcelo Cavarozzi, "El 'Desarollismo' y las Relaciones entre Democracia y Capitalismo Dependiente en *Dependencia y Desarollo en América Latina", Latin America Research Review* 17:1 (1982), pp. 152-165. Ernesto Laclau discusses the identification of liberalism with oligarchical rule in "Towards a Theory of Populism" in *Politics and Ideology in Marxist Theory* (London: New Left Books, 1977).

5. This is necessarily a schematic overview. Nowhere were these differences posed in such a clear cut manner. The relation between the new Left and the Communist Parties evolved with different tempos and intensities in each country over a period of years. Furthermore, the strategic questions of alliances and forms of struggle, which are ignored here, overlapped with the definition of the character of the revolution to produce a myriad of political-organizational combinations defying any image of a unified "revolutionary Left." To date, there are no good critical histories of the socialist movement in Latin America. Nonetheless, useful information on doctrinal permutations can be found in Michael Lowy, *El Marxismo en América Latina (de 1909 a Nuestros Dias)*, 0. Barahona and U. Doyhamboure, trans. (Mexico: Era, 1982); and Donald C. Hodges, *The Latin American Revolution* (New York: William Morris & Co., 1974). Also of interest is Regis Debray's *A Critique of Arms* (Middlesex: Penguin, 1977). This void is beginning to be filled as part of efforts to rethink Left practices. Particularly noteworthy are José Aricó's groundbreaking

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terms of this rift, this opposition veils the underlying orthodoxy that set the limits for this controversy. Neither party ever departed from the terms of the objectivistic Marxism of the Third International. For both, socialism meant expropriation of capital, state control, and central planning. The preconditions for socialism, likewise, were defined principally in reference to the "objective factor": for the contradiction of productive forces and relations of production to emerge full blown required a high degree of industrialization, a high productivity of labor, and a highly developed, skilled and disciplined labor force. It was over the possibility of ever arriving at these conditions within the existing framework that the revolutionary Left and the Communist Parties parted ways. The division was over opposed theories of capitalist development implying very different definitions of the character of the Latin American revolution, not fundamental theoretical differences.

Since the 1930's, following the theory of revolution by stages sanctified by the Sixth Congress of the Comintern, the Latin American Communist Parties maintained that, in the absence of the above conditions, industrialization necessarily takes precedence over socialization. The consequent designation of the period as "bourgeois-democratic" translated into a quiescent politics of encouraging the development of national capitalism through an anti-feudal and anti-imperialist program, pursued in alliance with the local national bourgeoisie. This separation of the anti-imperialist and anti-capitalist struggles was the target of continous attacks by new Left theorists throughout the 1960's. The key argument —bolstered by a socio-historic rejection of the CP's application of the category of feudalism to Latin America— was that the sharp post-War increase in direct foreign investment in industry had buried any so-called "progressive national bourgeoisie" capable of directing an autonomous process of capitalist development. Once coupled to the catastrophic claim that no form of development was possible under the terms of imperialist integration, socialism appeared as the only way out.[6]

This ideological constellation left very little room for seriously integrating democracy into the theory and practice of the Left. The communist parties, ideologically subordinate to the international line of Moscow, despite their

reinterpretation of Marx's failure to make sense of Latin American social formations, *Marx y América Latina*. (Lima: CEDEP, 1980); and Juan Carlos Portantiero's short interpretative survey on the fate of socialist movements, "Socialismos y Política en América Latina (Notas para una Revisión)", as well as Tomás Moulián's excellent reconstruction of the theoretical trajectory of the Chilean Left, "Evolución Histórica de la Izquierda Chilena: la Influencia del Marxismo," both in Norbert Lechner, ed., *¿Qué Significa Hacer Política?* (Lima: DESCO, 1982), pp. 51-67 and 71-106, respectively.

6. This was the ideological significance of Gunder Frank's, Dos Santos', and Marini's dependency theory and the boom in Latin American Marxist research during the 1960's. On the tremendous political influence of these theories, see Tulio Halperin Donghi, "Dependency Theory and Latin American Historiography," *Latin American Research Review* 17:1 (1982), pp. 115-130. Ernesto Laclau's overview of Left interpretations of Peronism, in its orthodoxy, illustrates well the extent to which "reformism" and the "revolutionary Left" diverged on these empirical questions and, subsequently, strategy and tactics —rather than deeper theoretical principles. See his "Argentina: Peronism and Revolution," in Colin Harding and Christopher Roper, eds., *Latin America Review 1 of Books* (Palo Alto: Ramparts Press, 1973), pp. 119-132.

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electoral activities never produced any democratic theory. In the term "bourgeois-democratic" the weight has always been on the side of the "bourgeois", with the "democratic" side of the conjunction left dangling. For the revolutionary Left, on the other hand, democracy could have no value as a mode of will formation: ends were known, the real problem was one of the proper combination of tactics and strategy. In this instrumental conception of politics democracy arose primarily as a tactical problem of adapting to given circumstances for organizations that arose within formally democratic contexts, such as the Chilean MIR or the Uruguayan *Tupamaros*. At best, democracy presented the possibility of an additional "form of struggle." But just as often it was rhetorically cast off as a bourgeois trap.[7]

Bourgeois and Socialist Democracy

The first position in the contemporary debates pits "real" against "formal" democracy, and maintains the theoretical discourse, strategic conceptions, and goals of the revolutionary Left of the sixties and seventies. Among theorists within this perspective, defeat and the experience of authoritarian rule have not led to any fundamental rethinking of pre-coup conceptions. Rather, they have confirmed the validity of earlier analyses of the exclusionary character of dependent monopoly capitalism and again demonstrated the need for revolutionary direction. Here the discussion of democracy is primarily a further extension of these earlier analyses —they were also employed to explain the rise of authoritarianism— to address an issue whose practical immediacy demands clarification if tactical errors are to be avoided.[8] The common argument is as follows: democratic openings provide more favorable conditions for advancing the demands of the popular classes, but the scope of these possibilities is constrained by the character of contemporary dependent capitalism; bourgeois democracy, thus, is ultimately incompatible with the advance of the working class and its allies; the recovery of formal democracy, therefore, can only be considered a tactical objective, one which will eventually give way to the strategic objective, socialism.[9]

7. For representative examples of this type of discourse, see the documents collected in Lowy, *Marxismo en América Latina*, *op. cit.*

8. Theotonio Dos Santos explicitly lauds this continuity. He begins one essay stating, "Since 1966 we have defended the thesis that the dominant pattern of economic development in Latin America, characterized as dependent, super-exploitive, monopolistic, centralistic, exclusionary, and marginalizing is not compatible with bourgeois democracy." Dos Santos, "La Viabilidad del Capitalismo Dependiente y la Democracia," *América Latina: Estudios y Perspectivas* 1 (1979). p. 43. And all of the footnotes in this essay vindicate passages from his earlier work, *Socialismo o Fascismo: El Nuevo Cáracter de la Dependencia y el Dilema Latinoamericano*. (Santiago: Prensa Latinoamericana, 1972).

9. For representative statements of this position, see Susana Bruna, "Democracia Burguesa y Democracia Socialista," *Historia y Sociedad* 22 (1979), pp.23-39; Dos Santos, *op. cit.*, pp.43-55; A. Murga Frassinetti and L. Hernández Palacios, "Contrarrevolución, Lucha de Clases y Democracia en América Latina" in Sofia Méndez V., ed., *La Crisis Internacional y la América Latina* (Mexico: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1984), pp. 250-275; Ruy Mauro Marini, "The Question of the State in the Latin American Class Struggle," Contemporary Marxism 1 (1980), pp. 1-9; Pablo González Casanova, "The Crisis of the State and the Struggle for Democracy in Latin America,"

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Although the often authoritarian implications of the discourse of "true" and "false" democracy are well known, and the specific economic analyses buttressing it here were effectively criticized when used to characterize recent military regimes as the state form correspondent to a particular stage of dependent capitalist development,[10] these arguments are nonetheless worth examining. In the debate over the contemporary significance of democracy and socialism this position is unique in that it directly addresses the problem that concerns us: the present constraints limiting political democracy in the Southern Cone, the parameters for further democratization, and the implications of both for the concrete goals of the Left. The discussion of this position, thus, allows a further delineation of this issue. But there is also a substantive point. Irrespective of its many shortcomings, this line of argument poses a serious question, which to the extent that it is not answered by other sectors of the Left, at least in Latin America remains open. That is, why should the Left place so many of its hopes in the recovery of democracy if formally democratic institutions stand a good chance of not providing the means with which to overcome poverty, inequality, and oppression?

Without any intention of critically resuscitating the distinction between formal and real democracy, it should be noted that, at least, logically this opposition doesn't imply mutual incompatibility. The juxtaposition between the classical definition of democracy —which emphasizes the social content of rule— as the rule of the "many", the "people" or the "masses" and now predominant conceptions of democracy as a series of procedural rules and institutions —political freedoms, competitive elections, representative bodies, etc.— permitting, at least formally, the equal direct and indirect participation of all citizens in decisions concerning the collectivity, in itself says nothing about the character of the nexus between the two. Rather the tension suggested between the institutional mechanisms through which political power is supposed to be exercised and the actual locus of power poses for democratic theory the task of evaluating the limits to effective, popular participation in particular capitalist democracies.[11]

Contemporary Marxism 1 (1980). pp. 64-72; Pío García, "Notas Sobre Formas de Estado y Regimenes Militares en América Latina," *Revista Mexicana de Sociologia* 28 (1981), pp. 545-553.

10. Two important critiques of this type of explanation of the rise of military authoritarian regimes are Albert Hirschman, "The Turn to Authoritarianism in Latin America and the Search for its Economic Determinants" and José Serra, "Three Mistaken Theses Regarding the Connection Between Industrialization and Authoritarian Regimes," both in *The New Authoritarianism in Latin America*, David Collier, ed. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979), pp. 61-98 and 99-163.

11. For example, how do particular political mediations differentially impede or facilitate the equal consideration of societal interests and needs which democracies are supposed to permit? What constraints does the civil institution of private property place on the operation of democratic institutions? And given these limits, what room exists for further democratization? Only by addressing these questions could one determine from a democratic standpoint whether formally democratic institutions do or do not permit the "masses" an effective participation in political life. This type of democratic theory requires the elaboration of a historically informed theory of the state having as its focal point the links among popular participation, democratic institutions, and capitalist forms of civil society, rather than the relationship between capitalist reproduction and the state which has dominated contemporary Marxist theories of the state.

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This critique of bourgeois democracy focuses all but exclusively on the constraints that capitalism places on democracy.[12] Almost inevitably two lines of argument, implying very different commitments to democracy, are interwoven in this position. One in the name of democratic values proceeds in the form of a norm against reality critique, while the other, denying the contingency of democratic will formation, immediately introduces "objective" interests as the substance of the popular will and quickly slides into a Leninism incompatible with democratic values. While it is the case that the latter ultimately undermines any normative thrust of the former, the failure to distinguish these two dimensions has allowed other theorists to advance a critique of the authoritarian aspects of this position and embrace democracy without always facing the implications of its analysis of capitalism and democracy.

The critique of representative institutions in capitalist societies from the standpoint of the norms of citizenship, popular sovereignty, autonomy, and equality is well known. Here theorists are merely restating a popularized version of Marx's critique of political emancipation. Schematically, the argument is that the equality posited to individuals as citizens in no way implies the abolition of social inequalities, and it is precisely these inequalities which deform democratic rights in capitalist societies. The limits of political democracy, then, are not the consequence of any administrative or political deficiencies. Rather they are rooted in social relations: capitalism systematically generates social and economic inequalities; these create differential possibilities for participating in politics, which, in turn, result in the reproduction of the initial social differences. Consequently, democratic rights in capitalist societies are realized only as "abstract" and "formal" rights.[13] This is nothing new. What distinguishes this restatement of the true-false discourse is the further claim that the particular characteristics of capital accumulation in the Southern Cone place even formal democracy on rather shaky grounds. For this point, trends that have been evident for the past two decades are stressed. With the exhaustion of the so-called "easy phase" of import-substitution and the increased investment of foreign capital in consumer durables, economic dynamism shifted away from sectors producing for popular consumption towards luxury production aimed at the effective demand of middle and upper income groups. This has been a source of sectoral imbalances that have only

12. Among theorists in this vein, a dogmatic commitment to instrumentalist theories of the state more often than not renders superfluous any sensitivity to the issues of institutional selectivity and parameters for further democratization. For example, for Bruna, the state is nothing more than a superstructure, "the form of expression of the class structure," for Dos Santos, it is an "apparatus for executing the interests of capital," while Marini describes the military in recent authoritarian regimes as "only a body of functionaries whose economic and political will belongs strictly to that class which it serves." Cf. Bruna, *op. cit.*, p. 35; Dos Santos, *op. cit.*, p. 51; and Marini, "Question of the State," *op. cit.*, p. 5. Once such reductionist conceptions of power are assumed any pursuit of institutional reforms becomes pointless. That particular elegibility requirements, legal regulations on associations and parties, finance rules, voting systems, and parliamentary procedures permit different degrees of democratic control of the state can only be illusory if the state, irrespective of its form, is seen as necessarily autocratic by virtue of its class foundation.

13. Cf. Dos Santos, *op. cit.*, p. 51 and Bruna, *op. cit.*, pp. 32-35.

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been exacerbated by recent neo-liberal policies of integration into the world market. Given this erosion —and, in the cases of Argentina and Chile, destruction through deindustrialization— of the foundations for any return to a populist alliance or "state of compromise," the possibilities for integrating popular demands through representative institutions are seen as extremely circumscribed. Democratization in this context, it is argued, can consist only of attempts by the dominant classes to institutionalize authoritarian patterns of exclusion, or, if the tight equation between state and class is loosened, of a situation wrought with the danger of an authoritarian involution, particularly if the popular classes fail to redirect their antagonisms towards the structural conditions generating them and, instead, massively advance claims whose absence of solution within the existing order can only precipitate a crisis.[14]

Though this type of analysis points to a problem that is critical for any elaboration of popular and democratic alternatives to authoritarianism, the question of economic constraints on democracy is immersed in a strategic-political discourse that just about obliterates any attempt to critically dissect the position. Inevitably, the discourse of "formal" and "real" democracy turns out to be a cover for an authoritarian Marxism whose real concepts are objective interests, vanguard party, political revolution, and dictatorship of the proletariat. Here, the logic of substitutionism reigns. The masses —and thus the majority whose will democratic institutions are to account to— are equated with the working class, whose objective interests then provide a substantive content for the popular will —the demand for socialism. No longer are popular-democratic aspirations a matter for determination by the "masses" themselves, but a form of consciousness that they must acquire.[15] Once coupled to reductionist notions of the state as a mere reflection of economic power relations, democracy ceases to have anything to do with constructing participatory, egalitarian institutions and is transformed into a problem whose realization is exhausted by a transformation of productive relations subsequent to the seizure of power. Though the notion that such a transfor-

14. That the revolutionary Left itself lacks a strategy that could avoid the recurrence of a military coup is, of course, another question altogether. As in the sixties, the magic word, with different degrees of emphasis, is "armed struggle," while the possibility of military victory is given by the example of Nicaragua. That Argentina, Chile, and Brazil are not Nicaragua or El Salvador is a difficulty easily eluded through the deployment of the abstraction "Latin America," which provides a basis for all sorts of geographical hopscotch and the defense of just about any position. For a discussion of the many differences erased by facile references to Latin America, see Juan Carlos Portantiero, "Sociedad Civil, Partidos y Grupos de Presión," in Fundación Pablo Iglesias *Los Caminos de la Democracia en América Latina* (Madrid: Pablo Iglesias, 1984). pp. 263-272. Democratization as the institutionalization of a restricted democracy is stressed by Marini, *op. cit.*, pp. 4-7; as well as in "La América Latina Ante la Crisis Mundial" in Méndez, ed., *La Crisis Internacional*, *op. cit.*, pp. 49-52. Also see Frassinetti and Hernández Palaciós, *op. cit.*, pp.266-274. For an emphasis of the economic-corporative constraints on democracy, see Dos Santos, *op. cit.*, pp. 43-47; and Bruna, *op. cit.*, pp. 30, 32-33.

15. Whether such a process is even necessary is unclear. Marini, for one, informs us that "the working class is the only class in bourgeois society that understands the realization of democracy as the abolition of the bourgeois itself." What will this democracy look like? It "will be necessarily the dictatorship of the proletariat, that is, proletarian democracy." Cf. Marini, "Question of the State," *op. cit.*, p. 8.

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mation will dissolve all forms of power, and thereby resolve the problem of political organization has historically, as well as theoretically proven to be a dangerous illusion, it is repeated here.[16]

Not only does this substitutionism reveal the shallowness of these theorists' commitment to democracy, it also results in a disregard for the actual reasons why sectors of the popular classes may aspire to some form of bourgeois democracy. Democratic rights, besides being associated with the possibility of trade union activity, permit these groups to advance claims to goods and services in their capacity as "citizens" that they cannot demand in their status of private individuals in civil society. Though, as their analyses of capitalism and democracy suggest, the margins for satisfying such demands may be extremely narrow, these theorists evade their responsibility to assess the degree of contingent variation present in this situation, as well to search for concrete modes for their enlargement. This is no easy task, but the alternative is a socialism that provides all the answers, yet constantly slips into the future.

Democracy without Socialism?

In sharp contrast to the orthodox Left discourse on democracy and revolution is a new tendency that defines democracy as its central concern, often to the point of disregarding such traditional Left concerns as the critique of capitalism and imperialism, the struggle for equality, and the possibility of a just social order. This redefinition of priorities has led to an almost exclusive focus on problems associated with the introduction and consolidation of representative institutions. Whether predicated on a critique of Marxism or merely the adoption of a new set of categories and problematics, this trend clearly indicates the impact that authoritarian rule has had on the doctrinal boundaries of the Left, as well as on perceptions of the range of historical possibility. A little over a decade ago, any claim that formal democracy should be the immediate goal of the Left would have placed anyone beyond the realm of dominant Left discourse. With the experience of military rule, this is no longer the case. Democracy in itself has become a legitimate concern for Left intellectuals.

What then does this imply for a Left politics? Does this concern with the consolidation of representative institutions signify the renouncement of utopia or its redefinition? What from the vantage point of orthodox Marxism appears as capitulation or reformism, from the standpoint of its critique could be the point of departure for redefining a vision of radical politics. This does not seem to be the case here. Most writers are agnostic on this question or

16. Thus Dos Santos, in one breath, stresses the inevitability of coercive forms of domination during a transition to socialism, and, in another, states that communism will break "with the need for any form of constrictive government,...by eliminating all forms of government democracy is transcended as a reality and objective." Cf. Dos Santos, *op. cit.* p. 52. Although Bruna is critical of this type of formulation, her grounding of a democratic socialism in a return to a "revolutionary Marxist praxis," which is, of course, "a democratic and emancipatory praxis," is not too convincing. A dictatorship of the whole class and its allies replaces that of the proletariat, *the* party remains, and particularity continues to be subordinated to a collectivity whose institutional articulation is not specified. See Bruna, *op. cit.*, pp. 36-39.

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else maintain that future transformations presuppose an institutionalized political realm, and therefore the latter takes precedence. But can the creation of democratic institutions be divorced from the ends for which they are valued without running the risk that what was initially thought to be only a temporal separation may become a permanent one?

That this dilemma besets this approach will be illustrated through a discussion of writings by Oscar Landi and Francisco Delich, whose work though hardly exhaustive are good examples of this trend. Each with different emphases explores how political cultures can contribute to democratic outcomes. But how socio-economic conditions or even the particular institutions created in the course of a transition may effect the efficacy of representative institutions in the Southern Cone is not considered. Their discussions of democracy, legitimacy, and political identities proceed without any analysis of constraints that may limit democracy. To the extent that constraints are present at all, these consist of the barriers that political actors in the past have placed before the consolidation of a stable democratic order by prioritizing their own ends over the safeguarding of democracy.[17] This backdrop defines for these theorists the distinctive character of access to citizenship during transitions from military authoritarian rule. Since legality cannot be equated with legitimacy,[18] the creation of institutions socially recognized as valid modes of organizing political conflict and competition must involve more than merely institutional design. In addition it requires the emergence among political actors of the capacity to value democratic institutions as an "authoritative good," whose non-negotiable status distinguishes it from the goods and goals that are the object of their strategic interactions.[19] How such a democratic ethic could emerge through a process of resignification of social and political identities is the common problematic that Landi and Delich seek to address.

However, why democracy should be a value, as well as how it relates to some form of emancipatory politics is not at all clear. Landi, for example, rightly argues that a number of components of Marxism —reductionism, instrumental conceptions of politics, and a devaluation of political institutions, evidenced in the objective of a society without a state— obstruct the elaboration of a theory of representative institutions.[20] But the underlying motivation apparently is to identify inadequate theories, rather than to attempt to rearticulate radicalism with democracy. The real referents for this work are the neoconservative onslaught against democracy,[21] and the recurrent cycles

17. This has been a constant in Argentine history. For excellent introductions to this history, see Alain Rouquié, "Hegemonía Militar, Estado y Dominación Social," in Rouquié, ed. *Argentina Hoy* (Mexico: Siglo XXI, 1982), pp. 11-50; and Guillermo O'Donnell, "State and Alliances in Argentina 1956-1976," *Journal of Development Studies* 15 (1978). pp. 3-33.

18. Oscar Landi, "Sobre Lenguajes, Identidades y Ciudadanías Políticas," *Estudios CEDES* 4 (1981), p. 39; and Francisco Delich, "La Construccion Social de la Legitimidad Política en Procesos de Transición a la Democracia (I)," *Crítica y Utopia* 9 (1983), pp. 39-40.

19. Oscar Landi, "Crisis y Lenguajes Políticos," *Estudios CEDES* 4 (1981), pp. 6-7; and Francisco Delich, *op. cit.*, pp. 32.

20. See Landi, "Identidades y Ciudadanías Políticas," *op. cit.*, pp. 40-42.

21. In the past decade neoconservative arguments have been an influential component in the authoritarian diagnosis of specific national political crises, subsequent strategies of social

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of political instability and military intervention, which, at least for Argentina, have turned the establishment of a governable democratic regime into "the most radical question of what it is to do politics."[22] In itself, this would be no small feat, yet democracy is valued not only as an alternative to dictatorship, but as a means to pursue substantive ends as well. What sorts of conflicts could be handled through a "legitimate" or "governable" democracy is left open by Landi and Delich.

Though a democratic agnosticism appears to lie behind these silences, the concept of democracy nevertheless ends up doing a lot of the talking. Through its repeated, generic deployment "democracy" assumes connotations that are never grounded. Both have in mind the creation of a realm of political exchange in which conflicts among political actors can be institutionalized and resolved according to accepted rules and procedures. Landi speaks of "an institutional network...with the capacity to express majoritarian social interests without putting in danger the functioning of democratic institutions."[23] Implicit is the suggestion of some variant, however modest, of social democracy. But what is absent is the recognition that the social democratic articulation of representative institutions and democratic demands corresponds to a particular historical phenomena in Western Europe, the conditions for which may well be lacking in Latin America.[24] Rather than ask what "democracy" can mean in the Southern Cone at this point in the political and socio-economic development of these societies, characteristics that are actually concrete and particular unwittingly come to signify general attributes of democracy. By decontextualizing democracy, primarily political-institutional approaches to democratization risk ignoring how objective constraints and strategic interactions can intersect to produce a very different kind of democracy, including variants that may not further popular democratic demands, nor be conducive to later democratization. This problem hinders Landi and Delich's respective attempts to ground foundations for a democratic ethic in the present situation.

Both see the emergence of such an ethic as essentially a question of the social genesis of norms, of the generation of shared principles concerning political action, which is understood as inextricably tied to the transformation of the political identities of subjects who have placed their own partial demands before the preservation of democratic institutions.

For Landi this problem calls for an exploration of the "geneology of politi-

restructuration, and projects of institutionalizing restricted forms of democracy. Cf. Norbert Lechner, "El Proyecto Neoconservador y la Democracia," and Angel Flisfisch, "La Polis Censitaria: La Politica y el Mercado," both in Daniel Camacho, et. al. *Autoritarismo y Alternativas Populares en América Latina* (San Jose, C.R.: FLACSO, 1982).

22. Landi, "Crisis y Lenguajes Politicas," *op. cit.*, p. 6.

23. *Ibid.*, p. 6.

24. Ernesto Laclau, "Tesis Acerca de la Forma Hegemónica de la Politica," in Julio Labastida Martín del Campo, ed., *Hegemonía y Alternativas Políticas en América Latina* (Mexico: Siglo XXI), p. 35. For an analysis of the structural obstacles to social-democratic compromise in Latin America, see Adam Prezworski, "Compromiso de Clases y Estado: Europa Occidental y America Latina," in Lechner, ed., *Estado y Política en América Latina* (Mexico: Siglo XXI, 1982), esp. pp. 263-269.

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cal actors," which he pursues in the form of a theoretical analysis of the multiple factors that intervene in the shaping of identities. This involves a critique of essentialist conceptions of the subject which remove from consideration the imbrication of politics and identities —the crux of the problem of political culture— by reducing politics solely to a form of strategic action.[25] Against these approaches, he asserts, drawing on recent French social and psychoanalytical theory, the primacy of a discursively and practically constituted social-symbolic order in the formation of individual and social identities. Insofar as the historically-shaped matrices of institutions and cultural practices structuring the context of discourse are themselves the objects of challenges, the possibility is opened that the productive encounter of discourses can result in a resignification of meanings and thus be a source of new normative orientations and identities.[26] But whether this theory can identify specific institutional mediations and cultural practices from which democratic norms might originate is another question. To the extent that the general theory is not linked with a historical or even conceptual analysis of the constitution of the particular type of democratic identity prescribed, Landi's results are limited to a vindication of the plasticity of social identities and, hence, of only the abstract possibility of a democratic political culture.[27]

A more concrete approach to the relation between political culture and democratic consolidation would have to examine the conditions of possibility for a democratic ethic at this point in the Southern Cone. For instance, can the acceptance of democratic institutions be predicated on a shared valuation of their legitimacy, particularly given the history of social and political antagonisms preceding military rule, or must this depend on other factors?[28] In other words, how does the presence of strategic power relations among groups with contradictory interests affect the possibility of the social genesis of bind-

25. As Landi notes, "If explicitly or implicitly we work with the supposition that individuals or social classes have the character of *subjectum* (of all that is real), then political conflict can only be considered as a means through which the essential attributes of the political actors under study are either deployed or blocked. In this manner, the political process, in a strict sense, would not be productive, it would generate nothing substantially new." Landi, "Identidades y Cuidadanias Politicas," *op. cit.*, p. 14.

26. *Ibid.*, pp. 13-28.

27. Landi does discuss two periods in the history of Peronism (1945-47 and 1972-72) as examples of two "alternatives of intervention of the symbolic order" in a political process. Nonetheless, this serves primarily to illustrate the formation of a conception of citizenship articulated around symbols of social rights in the first period and Peron's failed attempt to refound these conceptions of participation in terms of the values of representative democracy after his return in 1972. These historical examples are not used to examine the conditions of possibility for the emergence of broadly accepted democratic norms.

28. Max Weber himself mentions a number of grounds for compliance to a form of domination other than legitimacy, "Loyalty may be hypocritically simulated by individuals or by whole groups on purely opportunistic grounds, or carried out in practice for reasons of material self interest. Or people may submit from individual weakness and helplessness because there is no acceptable alternative." Consideration of these motivations would suggest a number of different conditions for support for democratic institutions. Self interest has been analyzed by Adam Przeworski in "Material Bases of Consent: Economics and Politics in a Hegemonic System," *Political Power and Social Theory* 1 (1980), pp. The quote from Weber is from *Economy and Society*. G. Roth and C. Wittich, eds., (New York: Bedminster Press, 1968), p. 214.

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ing democratic norms?

Although Delich's analysis is posed concretely in terms of how the dynamics of one type of transition —a negotiated devolution of authority— could contribute to the alteration of identities and the emergence of new forms of legitimacy, clear answers to these questions are not found in his work. Despite his description of transitions as a "consistent and permanent tension among social tendencies, ideologies, economic interests, and cultural projects,"[29] as well as his insistence on their volatility and reversibility, conceptual inconsistencies result in his underestimating how the factors just alluded to not only could short-circuit a transition, but even if surmounted result in an institutional configuration of tenous legitimacy.

His scenario for the genesis of democratic norms centers on the peculiar "space of encounter" or "coexistence" that appears with the relaxation of controls on dissidence and the toleration of some degree of policy challenge once a process of liberalization is initiated. It is in the dynamics between government and opposition in this space, in the interaction between what Delich calls the "logic of dictatorship" and the "logic of democracy,"[30] that the possibility of a legitimate democratic outcome is located. In a nutshell, the argument is that while an "opening" permits an eruption of formerly suppressed identities and the public reappearence of political actors, it also imposes constraints on the types of identities that subjects can assume.[31] Opposition groups can break out of their forced marginality only by recognizing the dictatorship as a legitimate interlocutor and by assuming co-responsibility in the reinstallation of democracy. If this process is to advance, political forces must adjust their particular interests to the requirements of constructing a democratic political system.

Though this might be a tenable scenario for a democratic outcome, there do not appear to be any strong reasons to expect that the resulting institutions will be perceived as legitimate. First of all, any process that advances under the shadow of the threat of its violent and/or arbitrary termination is just as likely to produce institutions that are seen as the product of force. Closely related to this are the implications of the heterogeneity of the forces advocating a return to democracy, which are often underestimated by Delich. For example, while it is the case that the dictatorial suppression of political society converts seemingly private activities into events charged with political significance, it is misleading to construe these forms of opposition as constituting a single "logic of democracy." The point, as has been stressed all along, is that

29. Delich, *op. cit.*, p. 32.

30. *Ibid.*, p. 23.

31. As Delich notes in another essay, "these actors cannot organize their identities except in relation to parameters which they cannot modify without modifying themselves: the situation of dictatorship...and the relations in which the identities constructed operate practically. In other words, the actors constitute themselves as such under the condition that they simultaneously construct the conditions for democracy, which implies that they cannot construct just any identity but only that permitted by the relationships that they simultaneously propose to establish and stabilize." Cf. "Teoría y Práctica Política en Situaciónes de Dictadura," *Critica y Utopia* 8 (1983), p. 27.

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the demand for a democratic politics is not uniform; it is present in the aspirations of a number of groups as a condition for their satisfaction, and hence is associated with diverse perceptions of the crisis of the military-authoritarian regime and of the content of a democratic alternative.[32] The problem of the transition, therefore, may be better posed in terms of whether or not from amidst the conflictual interactions among the armed forces, its civilian allies, and the heterogenous groupings of the democratic opposition, a single "logic of democracy" can emerge in the form of an agreed upon set of institutions.

The snag for a democratic ethic is that if democratic concertation is a strategic game in which self interested actors each struggle for the introduction of those particular institutional arrangements —specific voting systems, electoral arrangements, eligibility requirements, etc.— which, given their available resources, are thought to favor them, then any solution —if one is possible— is likely to assume the form of a compromise.[33] The legitimacy of the resulting institutions would probably be only partial and would face the same difficulties as do all contractarian solutions to the problem of political order.[34] If, consequently, adhesion to democratic rules on the part of major political actors is only pragmatic and conditional, then the grounds motivating Landi and Delich's search for a democratic ethic of political responsibility remain. But what types of institutions and practices can be possible sources for such an ethic, as well as the conditions for its emergence, are open questions.

Furthermore, a strategic approach to transitions also suggests what has to be the sharpest thorn in the side of primarily institutional approaches to democratization —the very real possibility that democratic institutions may be so constructed as to allow the articulation and resolution of only those demands that do not challenge the basic interests of the former ruling bloc. If the acquiesence of the armed forces in a negotiated transition is contingent upon finding institutional arrangements which can provide those groups directly associated with the dictatorship —such as the armed forces themselves, the security apparatuses, and the bureaucracy, as well as their civilian supporters— with reasonable assurance that their basic interests will not be ad-

32. For example, as Garreton points out, in this issue of *Telos*, some sectors of the opposition may conceive of the transition essentially as an end to military rule and a recuperation of the institutions of representative democracy. For others, this meaning is shared but it is associated with a vision of democracy whose content is sharply opposed to the policies of the period of authoritarian rule. At the other end of the spectrum are the expectations and conceptions of the authoritarian *coalition*. For the armed forces it is a choice between the institutional cost of continuing to stay in power and the political risks associated with democracy. For them the return to democracy is understood primarily as a defensive move. This is also likely to be the perception of the right and groups of capitalism, who may desire democratic institutions in hope of resolving their economic difficulties, but who are unlikely to reject the general content of the military's project of domination.

33. For this approach to transitions to democracy, see Adam Przeworski, "Democracy as a Contingent Outcome of Conflicts," forthcoming in Jon Elster, ed., *Constitutionalism and Democracy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).

34. As Franz Neumann noted, "A contractual system can exist only as long as the parties exist, as long as they desire to maintain the contracts, or if, in the event that they do not wish to fulfill them, there is a coercive agency which can enforce their execution." Franz Neumann, *The Democratic and the Authoritarian State*, Herbert Marcuse, ed., (New York: The Free Press), p.49.

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versely affected by democracy, then social and economic conservatism may be the necessary price of democracy.[35]

And this is the source of the Gordian knot that lies before advocates of a democratic socialism: how can institutions designed to minimize the extent of post-authoritarian transformations both be strengthened and at the same time subverted? In other words, how can a popular movement strengthen democracy so as to avoid another collapse into military rule, while simultaneously challenging the exclusionary mechanisms of specific democratic institutions? This is the paradox that a democratic Left in the Southern Cone now faces. However, this dilemma has not always been at the center of contemporary attempts to articulate democracy with socialism in the Southern Cone.

A Radical Democratic Alternative to Bourgeois Democracy?

This third intellectual tendency, until recently unkown within the Latin American Left, emerged out of a series of often unconnected essays, partial critiques, and polemics having in common the appeal for a "renovation" or "renewal" of the Left. As these origins suggest, the object of much of this work is the received political culture of the Left, which during authoritarian rule increasingly came to be seen as an obstacle to the development of effective forms of resistance, as well as the future construction of a broad movement for socialism. Thus, while sharing with the rest of the Left the conviction that democratic political institutionalization by itself is not enough, that the content and the form of domination both must be challenged, these intellectuals vehemently reject any facile deployment of an allegedly infallible revolutionary Marxist theory as the solution to the problems before the Left. Already, this type of Marxism proved incapable of providing efficacious alternatives to the traditional forms of popular mobilization and representation that entered into crisis with the disintegration of the state of compromise. In the present, it is argued, it functions as a set of blinders that obstructs a sober appraisal of the decimation suffered by the popular movement and the subsequent defiances facing any reconstruction of the Left. Irrespective of the working class's "inherent revolutionary potential," repression, the suppression of political society, and changes in social stratification, class composition, and values during military rule have dramatically eroded and transformed the former constituencies and terrain of the Left. In this situation, a continued reliance on analytical categories, strategies, and styles of political work that implicitly presume already-constituted popular subjects —precisely when their dissolution is the critical issue— can only be detrimental.[36]

35. This is Przeworski's hypothesis. See "Democracy." *op. cit.*

36. These issues emerged with particular urgency in Chile, where the dictatorship —at least until 1981— revealed an unparalleled capacity to effectively reorganize state-society relations on the basis of free-market principles, and were at the root of the talk of a "crisis of the Left" which followed the division of the Socialist Party in 1979. Cf. Manuel Antonio Garreton, "Vigencia, Crisis y Renovación de los Partidos de Izquierda," *Chile-América* 64-65 (1980), pp.108-113; and Tomás Moulián, "La Crisis de la Izquierda," *Revista Mexicana de Sociologia* 44:2 (1982), pp. 649-664. The division of the Socialist Party is the subject of the dossier "La Crisis del Socialismo" in *Chile-América* 54-55 (1979).

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Faced with this fragmentation and atomization, the task for the Left is fundamentally practical, not technical: the challenge is to move from a number of discrete forms of discontent towards consensus and a shared project of a future society.[37] Any political recomposition, it is argued, must depart from the concrete experiences, traditions and struggles of a plurality of subjects, and move from there towards their unification and autonomy. This development of a hegemonic practice demands a "secularization" of Marxism,[38] an abandonment of the "heroic discourse on the working class"[39] and a shift towards a practice that emphasizes the constitution of political subjects, rather than the application of some pre-defined line —a tendency which in the past has led only to isolation[40] or, at best, a defensive economic-corporative practice without "expansive potential."[41] Once having rejected any "ontology of the popular," autonomy and self-constitution emerge as the key values for a socialist movement. The goal is to challenge modes of political aggregation that fragment popular struggles and maintain them at the level of discrete interest conflicts, which therefore neither transcend the organizational principle of capitalism, nor thematize the overall organization of society. Against fetishized forms of organicist recomposition from above, the aim is to construct a social and political order in which the plurality of social antagonisms against domination can fully develop and differences can be handled. The immediate task, then, is the development of alternative forms of culture, organization, and struggle that challenge institutionalized norms and hierarchies, and thereby contribute to the formation of popular subjects endowed with the autonomy and will to actively engage in public life. Along these lines, the Gramscian themes of "intellectual and moral reform," the "critique of common sense," "hegemony," and the construction of a "national-popular will"

37. Norbert Lechner, "¿Revolución o Ruptura Pactada?" in Fundación Pablo Iglesias, *Caminos de la Democracia*, *op. cit.* p. 258. Also see by the same author, "¿Qué Significa Hacer Política?" in Lechner, ed., *¿Qué Significa Hacer Política?*, *op. cit.*

38. See Tomás Moulián, "Por Un Marxismo Secularizado," *Chile-América* 72-73 (1981), pp. 100-104.

39. See José Nun, "La Rebellión del Coro," *Nexos* (1981), pp. 19-26.

40. The historical schism between Marxism and Peronism is the paradigmatic example. Rather than penetrate populism and nationalism as self-constituitive experiences of the working class and other popular sectors, these were written off as forms of false consciousness, a maneuver that served only to generate a sharp antagonism between nationalism and socialism —at the expense of the latter. Cf. Juan Carlos Portantiero, "Lo Nacional-Popular y la Alternativa Democratica en América Latina," in Henry Peasce Garcia, et. al., *América Latina 80: Democracia y Movimiento Popular* (Lima: DESCO 1981), pp. 230ff.

41. This is the thesis of Moulián's superb overview of the doctrinal permutations of the parties of the Chilean Left. Particularly after 1958, the diffusion of an increasingly anti-reformist Marxism in the form of a number of "principles of faith" —the leading role of the working class, the party as its embodiment, the equation of socialism with the dictatorship of the proletariat, etc. — limited the Left's practice to one of effecting a cultural-symbolic differentiation within the popular classes. As a "segregatory discourse," this type of Marxism prevented any mediation of the divisions that polarized the popular sector into Marxist and Christian-Democratic subcultures. Even more dramatically, it sharply diverged from the real sources of support for the Left parties: their presence in popular struggles, their dense network of social organizations, and, most significantly, their representation and defense of interests at the national level. This disjuncture between theory and practice would have tragic consequences during the *Unidad Popular* government. Cf. Moulián, "Evolución Histórica de la Izquierda Chilena," *op. cit.*

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provide the raw material for setting out a radical democratic alternative to limited democracy. Here, democracy, understood as the active praxis of the subaltern classes, emerges as inseparable from the process of self-constitution of historical popular subjects and from socialism conceived as an extension and deepening of democratic control over social existence.[42]

This renaissance of theoretical work clearly has given rise to a strong commitment to democracy among these theorists, as well as serious theoretical efforts to articulate democracy with socialism. In addition, a critical dimension of democracy absent in the other positions has been stressed —the importance of decentralized, local and intermediary forms of participation without which democracy can be rendered merely formal. But what is not so clear is the degree to which this turn to radical democratic notions of democracy has actually contributed to a realistic appraisal of the possibilities that democracy in the Southern Cone at this point presents for the Left. Insofar as this position has been oriented primarily to a resignification of the place of "democracy" within the discourse of the Left, rather than an analysis of democracy *qua* formal democracy its contribution is limited. It is hardly the case that these theorists ignore the precarious foundations for political democracy,[43] rather the problem is that these constraints remain external to the elaboration of an alternative project. We are left with the contours of a normative conception of democracy, but no attempt to ground possibilities for its realization. By hiving off the analysis of "bourgeois," "restricted," or "governed" democracies, this position obscures the tension between its project and the fragile bases of post-authoritarian democratic compromises, a jam that has to be the starting point for any politics of popular democratization.

Granted the preliminary and, often polemical character of this work, it is still not evident that this shortcoming is only a function of immaturity or a different object of critique. Just as significant is the way in which the critique of reductionism has resulted in a conversion to a democratic theory of action, in the guise of hegemony, at the expense of any social theory capable of illuminating constraints on social action.[44] We have a recovery of Gramsci's emancipatory teleology, but not of his "absolute historicism." As a result,

42. In addition to the works already cited, see Juan Carlos Portantiero and Emilio de Ipola, "Lo Nacional-Popular y los Populismos Realmente Existentes," *Nueva Sociedad* 54 (1981), pp. 7-18; José Nun, "¿Democracia y Socialismo: Etapas o Niveles?," in Fundación Pablo Iglesias, *Caminos de la Democracia*, *op. cit.*, pp. 249-261; José Aricó "Mariategui y la Formación del Partido Socialista del Peru," *Socialismo y Participación* 11 (1980), pp. 139-167; Ernesto Laclau, "Tesis Acerca la Forma Hegemónica de la Politica," *op. cit.*; Liliana de Riz and Emilio de Ípola, "Acerca de la Hegemónía Como Producción Historica," in Labastida Martin del Campo, ed., *Hegemonia y Alternativas Políticas*, *op. cit.*, pp.45-70 and Tomás Moulián, "Democracia, Socialismo y Proyecto Nacional Popular," in *Democracia y Socialismo en Chile*, *op. cit.*, pp. 161-179.

43. See in particular Tomás Moulián, "El Futuro de la Democracia en América Latina," in Carlos Portales, ed., *La América Latina en el Nuevo Orden Internacional* (Mexico: Fondo de Cultura Economica, 1983), pp. 386-389; and Juan Carlos Portantiero, "América Latina: La Mirada Desde la Sociedad," *Economia de America Latina* 5 (1981), pp. 93-103.

44. Thus, Portantiero repeatedly rebuts objectivism by pointing out that subjects are constituted through social praxis on the terrain of concrete historical societies: "the structure only places limits." But what these limits are and how they are efficacious is never addressed.

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questions critical to any contemporary appropriation of Gramsci in Latin America are screened out.[45] The consequences of this absence of sociological realism are clearly seen in the dissolution of any constraints on democracy into a question of subjective volition, as well as in the difficulty in posing the relation between this project and the particular formally democratic institutions constructed during transitions.

In their attempts to undo the orthodox rhetoric of democracy as a superstructure of capitalism these intellectuals are forced to provide arguments for how democracy can be something more than a form of bourgeois domination. Hence, they repeatedly face the task of evaluating the limits on democracy and possibilities for their attenuation. However, the usual approach is to differentiate the positive from the negative and sunder their connection, rather than confront what contemporary economic and political constraints imply for social movements and popular organizations. The sequence is to recognize the negative implications of dependent capitalism, reject any simplistic reduction of the state to classes, and then switch tracks by emphasizing either democracy as a popular practice or formal democracy as a domain of interaction indispensable for the constitution of popular subjects. Negative dimensions consequently remain external to the project of popular democratic recomposition.[46] These are not fetters inherent to democracy *per se*, but to a particular form of its realization. Democracy, it is argued, is a process autonomous from the state or the economy, it is essentially an active practice, a permanent struggle through which the popular classes "project their will to control life." Though it requires a formal institutional framework, democracy is a "conflictual popular creation" and not an attribute of an economic structure or any set of institutions.[47] In this manner, all structural and institutional constraints on democracy become a function of politics: "Whether representative democracy is a corset that binds, by means of force, legitimation, or the integration via consumption of certain working class stra-

45. For example, can the concepts of "hegemony" and the "national popular will" be dissociated from the particular socio-historical conditions in which they were elaborated? And, further, can one adopt as relatively unproblematic Gramsci's contention that hegemony can only be posed in reference to the "fundamental classes" in societies with low levels of inter-sectoral integration, pockets of intensive capitalist production controlled by transnational and local oligopolies, and a relatively small industrial working class which is extremely variegated and stratifies by wage differentials? Throw in the social and political fragmentation of other social classes, intensive penetration of consumerist orientations, and the concentration and pervasiveness of mass forms of culture and the task appears intractible. For a critique along these lines, see Sergio Zermeño, "Los Referentes Históricos y Sociologicos de la Hegemonía," in Labastida Martin del Campo, ed., *Hegemonía y Alternativas Políticas*, *op. cit.*, pp. 251-278. Despite the rejection of the discourse of the working class as an already-constituted subject, the problem of the sources for "radical needs" for a transcendent project is never resolved by these theorists.

46. Moulián's critique of orthodox approaches is a good example of this. He argues that the democratic state represents a "contradictory realization of liberty," whose particular forms of domination are not exposed by the generic category of dictatorship. But, again, what these forms are and what they imply for his own project is never brought out. Only the positive dimension of democracy as a realm in which the subaltern classes can constitute themselves as political subjects is emphasized. Cf. Tomás Moulián, "Crítica de la Crítica Marxista de la Democracia Burguesa," in Peasce Garcia, *América Latina 80*. *op. cit.*, pp. 51ff.

47. Portantiero, "Lo Nacional-Popular," *op. cit.*, pp. 236-240.

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ta, will depend on the capacity of the subaltern classes to constitute themselves as political subjects."[48]

At a very general level this is necessarily so and, as these theorists insist no project can proceed without subjects. But, on the basis of intentionality alone, it is difficult to conceptualize how democratization from below can both be an efficacious form of popular activity and not be a threat to the stability of democratic institutions. It is the case that the precarious structural bases for democracy imply the need for profound social and economic changes as a condition for political consolidation, but at the same time these appear to be precluded by the realities of power and the probable compromise nature of post-authoritarian democratic institutions. Absent here is any sense of how it might be possible to safely cross the chasm that separates "bourgeois" democracy from a more inclusionary, participatory democracy. José Nun's attempt to open this discussion is illustrative of the distance that remains before this question can be posed more concretely.

In opposition to the claim that the difficulties of introducing even political democracy bar any simultaneous struggle for socialism, Nun advances the positive argument that the two are not incompatible ends: one can support the re-establishment of "governed democracy" (representative institutions) and, at the same time, pursue a program of a "governing democracy" (popular democracy).[49] The critical distinction is that each occurs on a different level of action: one in the realm of political-institutional conflict, the other on the terrain of society. At least practically, then, political democratization does not have to preempt the democratization of systems of authority within the family, the workplace, the neighborhood, or the union. One, he claims, is meaningless without the other. However, the relationship between the two is never adequately specified. He states that the two are incompatible for the "adversaries of socialism," and hence that there will be 'conflicts.' But what this strategic dimension of politics implies for attempts at extending democratic practices in a context of weak political institutionalization is left open to the future.

True, the limits in such a situation ultimately can only be verified in practice; nevertheless this question must be addressed concretely in the present. As long as the normative imperative of participation "from below" leads to an almost exclusive concern with the organization of civil society at the expense of consideration of the state and formally democratic institutions, whatever narrow possibilities may exist for greater democratization will remain in the dark. Two problems, which can only be touched upon here, suggest the importance of reintroducing the state and political institutions as something more than merely negative constraints. The first concerns the institutional articulation of some form of collective will. Despite invocations for "articulatory practices" and "expansive politics," if different levels and types of social practice *are* unique, and if, in addition, grievances and conflicts within these

48. Moulián, *Crítica de la Crítica Marxista*, *op. cit.*, p. 52.
49. José Nun, "Democracia y Socialismo," *op. cit.*, p. 257ff.

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spaces are also experienced as particular, then any determination of shared ends that is not to take the form of a false generality imposed from above must involve some institutional arena for mediating this heterogeneity. While the need for general institutions has been recognized by these theorists, this has always been "in principle" or for "the transition."[50] The real problem is that if no common ends are given from the outset, can the elaboration of more general goals ignore existing representative institutions? And, if not, how can these be made more accessible and accountable to this social plurality?[51] The second problem concerns the efficacy of forms of self-organization within different areas of civil society in contexts in which major decisions affecting these realms are made elsewhere —within state agencies and the executive offices of huge firms. Without a broader political articulation with the state such organizations —despite their potential as new arenas of democratic interaction and alternative social relations— run the risk of isolation or a partial, manipulative integration from above. Fernando Henrique Cardoso, who has addressed this issue at some length, notes that this problem implies more than merely rethinking the relationship between social movements and political parties. At issue as well is whether traditional mechanisms of representation, such as parliaments and parties, can be effective instruments for pressuring and controlling the real nuclei of decision-making and power.[52] Unfortunately, this task of beginning to flesh out a conception of the types of institutions that could democratically channel social conflicts and begin to check the prerogatives of capital and the state has not been taken up by this group of intellectuals. However, if this approach is to become more than a normative alternative to authoritarian forms of socialism and organization, an analysis of objective constraints and, at least, a tentative

50. For example, the absence of parliamentary forms of representation leads Portantiero to reject as insufficient any proposal of councils as an alternative to the shortcomings of state socialism. Not only is a system based solely on workers' councils exclusionary, due to its unilateral definition of the producer as sovereign. In addition, in the absence of institutional mechanisms for resolving conflicts of interest between different strata and classes, councils can only represent limited sectoral interests. This corporatist character implies that any political recompostion of the whole necessarily is left to the prerogative of a state whose institutional control falls outside of council schemes. Therefore, as an alternative Portantiero proposes a conception of "mixed democracy," involving a combination of workers' councils, parliamentary forms of representation, and a plural party system. But this is in the context of a discussion about "the transition." Cf. Portantiero, "El Socialismo Como Construcción de un Orden Político Democrático," *Socialismo y Participación* 15 (1981), pp. 63-72.

51. This only opens up a can of worms. Inevitably, we come full circle back to the problems that beset the argument for a democratic political culture. The tolerance of difference presupposes an initial consensus, whether tacit or explicit, as to its value. Hence, a democratic ethic of political responsibility is again required, regardless of the rather tenuous conditions for its emergence. In addition, this raises the question of the capacity of the institutions of competitive democracies, particularly of political parties, to both represent particular interests and at the same time be a source of complex collective identities.

52. See in particular Fernando Henrique Cardoso, "Poulantzas e os Partidos do Brasil," *Novos Estudos* 2 #1982), pp. 3-7 as well as "Las Políticas Sociales en la Decada de los Años Ochenta: Nuevas Opciones?," *El Trimestre Económico* 197 (1983), esp. pp.184-188 and "Regimen Político y Cambio Social" in Lechner, ed., *Estado y Política en America Latina*, *op. cit.*, pp. 272-299.

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elaboration of strategies of institutional reform must complement its popular-democratic intentions.

A Final Remark

This essay began by noting the plurality of aspirations associated with "democracy" under conditions of dictatorship, and unfortunately, one has to conclude that the recurrence of this polysemy within this debate has limited its productivity. For these intellectuals as well, democracy provided an anchor from which to both begin to make sense of the nightmare of defeat and authoritarian rule, and to hold out for a better future. Certainly, in some cases this has led to a profound rethinking of previous theoretical commitments and political goals. The positive contributions here are a demystification of the myth of revolution, a revalorization of politics and of democracy, and a strong sense of the political responsibility of the theorist. However, insofar as "democracy" has largely been appropriated, no matter how inadvertantly, as a vehicle for each tendency's particular utopia —be it social equality, a non-violent resolution of political conflicts, or popular self-determination— any possibilities for each have been shrouded by the failure to relate these ends with democracy, not as a product of long struggles for its realization, but as a stopgap solution to the crisis of authoritarian rule, to the military's incapacity to institute stable forms of domination under conditions of dictatorship. In this context, democracy faces a number of defiances —the continued presence of armed forces that have been weakened, but nonetheless retain their institutional autonomy; social sectors that have accepted democracy only grudgingly and as a "second best" solution; and economies that are in shambles, with no apparent alternative model for their reorganization on the horizon. Each of the three positions in the present debate has pointed to an area relevant to any popular democratic response to this situation. The first has brought out the critical economic dimension, the second, the need for some type of democratic political culture, and the third the importance of decentralized popular forms of direct democracy. But how these can cohere into a conception of politics adequate to contemporary circumstances remains to be seen. Here the contemporary crisis of the socialist project in Latin America is strongly evident: the orthodox Left retains the goal of socialism, but at the expense of democracy and any discourse that could appeal to broader strata; those who have privileged democratic political institutionalization have abandoned the question altogether; while the attempt to salvage socialism by reposing it as a deepening of democracy has only given rise to a diffuse alternative, a notion of the mediations necessary for some form of popular self-rule but without the *ideas fuerzas* that could give life to it.

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The Failure of Dictatorships in the Southern Cone

*Manuel A. Garretón**

1984 marked the twentieth anniversary of military dictatorships in the Southern Cone, beginning with the *coup d'etat* in Brazil in 1964, and continuing with the Argentine military regimes of 1966 and 1976 and the Chilean and Uruguayan ones of 1973. The longevity of several of these regimes, their brutality, common traits, and originality *vis à vis* other Latin American dictatorships have generated considerable interest.[1] Several of these regimes have ended while others are nearing the end. All of them have failed to carry out their *national projects*. Yet, there is no doubt as to the extent of their impact on the future development of their respective societies. It is now possible to provide an evaluation of these regimes and the problems they left behind.

An approach to this problem pays particular attention to the relation between the State and civil society.[2] The focus is on the mediations between the State and society which make it impossible for the State to totally absorb society. These regimes are *authoritarian*, as opposed to *democratic* or *totalitarian* systems. Although the focus on domination is correct, this approach often underplays the role of class struggle. The risk here is of equating certain defining traits with a general characterization which decontextualizes these regimes' historical specificity.

A second approach, on the contrary, sees these regimes as a particular phase in dependent capitalist development.[3] Here the focus is on capital accumulation within the system of international division of labor, in a context of class conflicts which lead to the imposition of a repressive regime meant to checkmate the working class so that conditions for accumulation can be met.

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1. A good synthesis of the discussion and a complete bibliography up to the moment of its publication can be found in D. Collier, ed., *The New Authoritarianism in Latin America*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979).

2. On this, see Juan Linz, "Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes," in F. Greenstein and N. Polsby, eds., *Handbook of Political Science* (Reading Mass: Addison Wesley, 1975), Vol. 5. See also, Collier's article in Collier, ed., *The New Authoritarianism*, *op. cit.* On Corporatism, See J. Malloy, ed., *Authoritarianism and Corporatism in Latin America* (Pittsburgh: Pittsburgh University Press, 1976); and Ph. Schmitter, "Still the Century of Corporatism?," *The Review of Politics* 36, No. 1 (1974).

3. See G. O'Donnell, "Reflexiones Sobre las Tendencias de Cambio en el estado Burocrático-autoritario," in *Revista Mexicana de Sociología 1* (1977); and Ildis, *El Control Político el Cono Sur* (Mexico: Siglo XXI, 1978).

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Here, the problem of the historical specification of these regimes is at least confronted. The danger, however, is one of falling into economic determinism and reducing socio-political behavior to the dynamics of social classes, thus ignoring forms of behavior not reducible to a class framework.

A third approach focuses on the military.[4] Here, the analysis centers on the recent transformations of the Armed Forces in equipment, professional formation, organization, and their relations to State and society. These transformations are meant to expand their internal role as "*protectors of the Nation*" and thus prompt them to take control of the State during political crises to *assure the unity of the Nation* and the fulfillment of its destiny. The transfer of military characteristics to the organization of society and the State accounts for these regimes' characteristics. Studies of the new professionalism of the Armed Forces, of militaristic expansion and of the National Security State accurately point to the rise of a new political actor. This interpretation, however, risks degenerating into a conspiratorial account whereby all social dynamics are explained by the monopoly of the Armed Force operating in a social vacuum.

Most of these explanations emphasize certain things at the expense of others, thus resulting in different and even contradictory interpretations. Yet, the appearance of these dictatorships seems related to certain processes. On the one hand, they are identified with a socio-political crisis of the so-called *State of compromise*: their general crisis of hegemony. The peculiarity of this crisis lies in the degree of mobilization of the forces of change, especially the masses. This process of mobilization, accompanied by ideological radicalization, is seen by the dominant sectors, and the large middle sectors *manipulated* by them, as a threat to their domination, i.e., a crisis of survival to be met with force regardless of the price.

But the appearance of these regimes and their subsequent evolution cannot be understood independently of another process: the modernization, professionalization and ideological homogenization of the Armed Forces under North American military hegemony.[6] The incorporation of the Latin American Armed Forces into the U.S.-led military block has meant new equipment, a new discipline and organization, and a new ideological perspective redefining their role *vis à vis* society. The *national security* doctrine and antisubversive training play a crucial role in this new ideological perspective; the vision of a society threatened by an internal enemy (communism or subversion) against

4. See A. Rouquié, *L'état militaire en Amérique Latine* (Paris: Seuil, 1982); J. Comblin and A. Stepan, "The New Professionalism of Internal Warfare and Military Role Expansion," in A. Stepan, ed., *Authoritarian Brazil* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1973).

5. By state of compromise is understood the pattern of unstable arrangements that follow the oligarchic state, in which middle sectors weigh heavily and no class or faction is able to exclusively exercise hegemony. It may exist with or without democratic regimes. See J. Graciarena and R. Franco, *Formaciones Sociales y Estructuras de Poder en América Latina* (Madrid: Cis, 1981).

6. See A. Varas, "Acumulación Financiera y Gobiernos Militares de Derecha en América Latina," in Portales, ed., *La América Latina en el Nuevo Orden*, *op. cit.* on the national security doctrine and its sources see G. Arriagada and M.A. Garretón, "Doctrina de Seguridad Nacional y Régimen Militar," *Estudios Sociales Centroamericanos* 20, 21 (1978). Also in Cisec, *Las Fuerzas Armadas en la Sociedad Civil* (Santiago, 1978).

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whom a non-conventional *total war* is necessary, and where the Armed Forces are the nation's *last bastion* and *moral reserve.*

The appearance of these regimes is also incomprehensible independently of the international and local restructuring of capitalism. This does not mean, as was thought at one point, that there is a coherent world-wide capitalist project which assigns precise roles to the peripheral economies in a new international division of labor.[7] History has turned out to be much more complex. The roads peripheral economies have followed have not been those they were supposedly assigned in a well-defined project of accumulation requiring an authoritarian State to follow them. Yet, the so-called *State of compromise* did not merely succumb to a political crisis. Its developmental model was self-contradictory in relation to democratization, internal accumulation and integration within international capitalism. For the capitalist sectors a rectification of this model to roll back *excessive* State intervention or redistributive *exaggerations* seemed indispensible. Although not clear in exactly which direction, there was a consensus in these sectors concerning the need to repair and expand capitalism without previous democratizing interferences. The political crisis and its unravelling seemed to provide this opportunity. On the other hand, at the international level, structural and later financial changes had a significant influence on the direction taken by the military regimes. Local crisis cannot be separated from world capitalism and the solutions sought by these regimes.

Clearly, however, these regimes cannot be reduced to their *political form* or to their military or repressive character. They are, or were, attempts to respond to these questions: How to contain the change that threatens national capitalism? How to transform society to create a new order? And, finally: How to maintain the system of domination even when it is not possible to transform society? Each of these questions come to the forefront in different phases of the regime.

From this perspective, these regimes saw as the main enemy the State of compromise, populist society, and those social subjects emphasizing political action and reliance on the State. The utopia they sought included the eradication of politics or, at least, the constitution of a political system with limited participation and ruling out alternatives for change, i.e., an authoritarian and conservative order. The military regime was not the final goal but, rather, the historical precondition to undertake structural and institutional transformations ushering in the future authoritarian political order, usually defined as *new democracy.* The particular model of capitalist development adopted would determine these transformations. The ruling nucleus of the regime would be made up of a combination of military and capitalist representations.

These regimes are thus characterized by repression needed to disarticulate socio-political subjects active in the preceding society and efforts to undertake

7. Cf. A. Briones, *Economiá y Política del Fascismo Dependiente* (Mexico: Siglo XXI, 1978). An adequate overview of the international economic context is found in C. Portales, ed., *La América Latina en el Nuevo Orden Económico, op. cit.*

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an institutional reorganization needed to create a new sociopolitical order through some type of *modern* capitalism reinserted in the international system. The extent of the repression depends as much on the initial perception of the threat and the silence regarding that repression as on the efficiency of the repressive military apparatus. The viability of the institutional reorganization depends on the formation of a ruling group out of the regime's supporters, able to implement the historical project above factional strife and civil society's resistance.

In this context, it is possible to distinguish a reactive from a foundational phase in the genesis of these regimes, even though repression is always present. At the same time the absence, weakness or failure of institutional reorganization tends to precipitate a phase of permanent recurring crises. Thus, they become declining regimes, with no social project and concerned only with their own survival. Finally, there is a terminal phase characterized by the eruption of a final crisis where the regime's main concern becomes how to leave most efficiently. These phases may development sequentially. The reactive phase tends to coincide with the regime's beginning; the transformative phase with the subsequent institutional reorganization, the phase of recurring crises with the exhaustion of the regime's project; and the terminal phase with the accumulation of crises. The central issue for regimes in the reactive phase is how to eliminate adversaries and, more generally, how to dismantle the fundamental mechanisms of the preceding society. Normally, the main actors in this phase are the Armed Forces. Institutional reorganization remains latent and different groups vie for positions to determine its future direction. The predominance of repression, which becomes massive, brutal and at times technically sophisticated, is protected by silence within society, where the traumas of the crisis preceding the military coup encourage broad cooperation. Occasionally, repression appears as generalized revenge. The regime's predominant ideology is *national security* and the main model of legitimation is the pursuit of victory in a war to save the Nation from *chaos and cnarchy.*

In this phase the opposition consists almost exclusively of those defeated by the military coup — although they are not the only victims of repression. Its central concern is physical survival and, if possible, the survival of its organization apparatus. Human rights almost become the only ideological issue for this opposition. In some cases, this explains the central role of the Catholic Church.

The shift from the reactive to the foundational phase comes about with the exhaustion of previous principles of legitimacy, the consolidation of a ruling group directing the State, and the beginning of policies implementing a new social project. The basic objective here is to define a model of development, a new system of social relations and a future political model to succeed the military regime. The usual economic model is the neoliberal one. The main objective is institutionalization. Indeed, this political institutionalization before the arrival of crises has significant consequences for the regime's stability. This is the triumphant phase of *economic miracles* when the population

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is encouraged to consume, of limited openings *from above*, of rigged plebiscites. New actors rise alongside the military leadership to implement a new social model: technocrats, businessmen, financiers, intellectuals, etc. The dominant ideology ceases to be purely military and "national security" combines with "economic development." A vision of the future now impregnates ideological themes.

The central issue for the opposition in this phase is how to prevent a rollback of earlier achievements, how to gain spaces in the regime's new institutions as well as in those not yet under the regime's control, and how to unify all forms of resistence. This is the time for a social and cultural emphasis when politics as such tend to recede. This explains why social movements become preeminent, at times under the wings of organizations such as the Church, taking initiative independently of any united political effort. In this phase, previous passive supporters of the regime become affected by its policies and tend to shift to the opposition.

The shift to the phase of recurring crises usually occurs with the economic failure of the institutional reorganization. The dogmatism or incompetence of the technocratic team, the absence of a solid investment plan, extreme dependence on financial capital in a moment of dwindling liquidity, the speculative and predatory character of large economic groups formed under the protection of state policies, to name just a few economic factors, along with the weak ability to rally civil society to its schemes, leave the military regime without a social project. The external debt, unemployment and recession, the deterioration of the productive apparatus, the emergence of corporative groups making demands on a State having difficulties getting things done, force a return to increasingly incoherent reactive policies which intensify the crisis. How to *extinguish fires* here and there and assure the regime's survival becomes the central problem. Thus, this phase is characterized by forgetting about change, a weakening of State leadership, the erosion of the regime's supporters into corporate groups having no general loyalty beyond their own interests, the subsequent isolation of the Armed Forces *vis à vis* other ruling groups, and erratic State policies. Unlike the foundational phase, when liberalization was an offensive strategy of consolidation, in this phase it becomes a defensive effort to share the administration of failures and thus guarantee survival. The ideological message now aims at stirring fears of a return to the past. This time, however, things are much more disorganized. The opposition's task during this phase is to unify discontent and resistence into a movement to prevent the mere transformation of the regime and head it to a terminal crisis. Now civil society loses much of its fear and begins to mobilize, taking advantage of the regime's weakness and its difficulties in enforcing the original repressive system. In this process of *resurrection of civil society* the unity of the opposition becomes a problem. On the one hand, there is the relation between the *social world* with its own dynamics and the *political world* which resurfaces publically with its old organizations. On the other hand, there is competition between previously opposing parties which have different outlooks beyond their common opposition to the military regime.

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The different perceptions of the crisis and the meaning of a democratic alternative become the focus for a united opposition.

The failure of the foundational phase does not mean that the regime moves on to the terminal phase. It can stumble from crisis to crisis for a long time. In the terminal phase, however, the central problem is no longer social transformation or simply holding on to power but rather how to yield power and what will follow. A relatively modern and united Armed Forces and autonomous middle classes prevent this terminal phase from succumbing to an insurrection with an internal defeat of the Armed Forces. This phase is thus defined by the Armed Forces' decision to retire and administer or negotiate the conditions of the regime's departure. This decision to retire in an orderly way presupposes the internationalization of their failure. This can be provoked by external military defeat as well as by an economic crisis, or the perception of the ungovernability of society due to the intensification of social mobilization. During this terminal phase, the shifting to the opposition of sectors which initially supported the regime can be decisive. The basic problem for the opposition is to channel social mobilization so that it penetrates within the Armed Forces and to generate a consensus around an institutional project allowing for the departure of the Armed Forces and the instauration of a democratic regime. At this point it is possible to move from a military regime to a democratic one, without a transitional phase and the transition takes place under the auspices of the military regime. It is important to distinguishing between the terminal phase and the transition since the social forces that can precipitate a terminal crisis are not necessarily the same ones that can assure a democratic transition.

It is useful here to situate within this evolution the different significance of democracy. Thus, in the predominantly reactive phase, democracy is the main negative reference point. The task is to end military rule and to institute a yet-undefined *new order*. For the original opposition, democracy is invoked mainly as a system of guarantees against arbitrariness and the denial of basic rights — beginning with the right to life. In the foundational phase, a new feeling toward democracy emerges in the regime: it is the goal to be reached after a long period of military rule. But it is understood as a *new democracy* as opposed to the liberal one of the past: an arena of restricted political participation and representation, under military *protection* and tempered by mechanisms of exclusion. Historical legitimacy or memory do not allow that this system be called anything except *democracy*. The *transition* here means a process of institutionalization of the authoritarian model. In this phase the opposition's concept of democracy tends to combine, sometimes in a contradictory way, the idea of the *recuperation* of a system of public liberties and of political democracy with the idea of a context opposed to authoritarian domination. In the administration of permanent crises and the terminal phases, the transition to democracy appears to the regime's supporters as a path to defend a system safeguarding the privileges they obtained under the dictatorship. For a part of the opposition, transition means the end of the military regime and the establishment of the classic institutions of representative democracy. This is

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shared but broadened by other sectors of the opposition to include organized popular participation at all levels of power and social transformation to meet accumulated popular demands. Clearly, the military regime has meant for all of the opposition a definitive re-evaluation of democracy as a desirable political regime. But it is also clear that its meaning remains open to debate.

The military dictatorships of the Southern Cone have ended or are inexorably headed in that direction. On the one hand, the inability to resolve any of the nation's important problems is documented by economic stagnation, external dependence, unemployment, increasing inequality, misery, the disintegration of social relations, etc. Where there was a modernizing impulse, it did not affect all of society and greatly exacerbated internal divisions. But this failure is also the failure of a class or of a project. The military regimes failed in their own terms. They were not able to either transcend the preceding society or to establish a new political order. Somehow, the political sphere remained intact and the old organizations retained some continuity with the emerging ones during the military regime. Thus, when the Armed Forces retire what replaces them are well-known political forms. But a failure of these regimes' project does not mean that their respective societies have not changed nor that the transition to democratic regimes implies that *there is nothing new under the sun* or that *everything begins once again where it was before the dictatorships.* On the contrary, these regimes have left a deep mark. In this sense, social change seems to have gone in two different directions. The first one is incomplete modernization which combined an advance in industrialization, State intervention, and the creation of structural bases for the development of new social subjects. The existence of representative spaces allowed here a tense confrontation and combination of the *old* and the *new.* During the economic and political crisis of military regimes social conflict focuses on the costs and benefits of this perverse modernization. A second direction was the stagnation or reversal of industrialization, the reduction of the social role of the State and the elimination of all spaces for public representation. This meant a weakening of the old socio-political subjects without the development of new one to take their place. This is the problem of regaining identity and the transition to democracy is redefined in terms of national reconstruction.

The destructive impact of these regimes is a cumbersome legacy presenting problems far exceeding the classical ones of transition between two regimes. It is the beginning of a new epoch or of a new type of social organization. It is analogous to the challenge presented in the past by the collapse of the oligarchical order and the creation of the State of compromise. As in the past, the major question concerns the social forces able to construct this new order.

Thus, it is worth mentioning the very presence of the autonomous undefeated Armed Forces. Their weakness at the time of transition does not entail a substantial change in their vision of society or of their own role. These Armed Forces have not accepted democracy except tactically when forced to it. Thus, they are a permanent threat to democratic stability, necessitating a profound change in their organization, socialization and relation to political

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power.

This indifference toward democracy is not limited to the military but extends also to other important sectors of civil society, especially in the capitalist class. The capitalists and the Right seem to haye only a tacit preference for a regime different from the military one, in the hope that it can resolve conjunctural economic problems. This can be seen in their conduct *vis à vis* repression and the elimination of liberties during the military regime. As with the Armed Forces, these sectors represent a Damocles sword for a democratic regime which must bring about profound transformations of the capitalist system to retain mass support.

The persistence of non-democratic enclaves is not the only problem faced by regmies which succeed these dictatorships. There is also the crisis of the developmental model and of the social organization which leaves as a legacy a combination of military power and a neo-liberal framework. The reemergence of the State of compromise does not resolve the problems of employment, dependency, growth and redistribution. The flaws of this model are well-known. The neo-liberal model chosen by the dictatorships did nothing to resolve these problems.

Similarly, in other areas, these societies must resolve old problems which have lingered and worsened over decades along with new problems proper to advanced societies: the preservation of the environment, the creation of spheres of collective participation and decision-making, the emergence of new social subjects, the drastic redefinition of resource use, the relation between State power and public liberties, etc. It is not a matter of postponing dealing with some of these challenges in order to resolve others. All of these pressures drag down emergent democracies. A basis for development, a model of social relations and a social self-image imply a much deeper consensus than a simple agreement on the rules of the game or on the institutions of political democracy. Moreover, democracy today must take into account the consolidation of the masses, as distinct from what occurred when development was redefined in the 30s. Thus, a consensus regarding development and social organization engendering the stability of the political regime is not easy to achieve.

This brings up the problem of the relation between the social and political forces which were part of the democratic opposition to the military regime and whose harmony was generated by the confrontation with a common enemy. Beyond this democratic coalition, built around different motives, lies the task of contructing a progressive coalition that can transform society with a viable model of development and social organization. The project is still unclear and it depends on groups which lately have been at odds with each others, such as the center and the left parties. At the same time, processes of connecting political organizations with an emerging social base are still unfinished. Thus, the internal renovation of politics and the long term adjustment needed to assure democratic stability are two unresolved challenges for the regimes that follow the collapse of military dictatorships.

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*Power Without the State**

Carla Pasquinelli

A Long Silence

An expression like "Power without State" sounds ambiguous since it combines different things. Here it is used to indicate two distinct phenomena — those societies in which power is not located in a State or its apparatuses, and those forms of diffuse power within societies that do have a State, and which grew outside or against it. This may seem arbitrary rather than ambiguous since it attempts to couple cultures and histories which we have always been accustomed to consider separately — primitive societies and today's Western world. It is a juxtaposition based on a negative definition which, as such, is weak because its object remains blurred in no longer being anchored to the State and it is upon the state that our image of power is tied.

Anyway this expression is meant to suggest an alternative notion of power, not hierarchical authoritarian nor repressive, but, rather, providing identity for the community. This kind of power began to be discussed when political anthropologists started to ask questions about the presence and quality of power in acephalous societies. But these analyses have always been conducted in isolation. Yet, they have intersected at more than one point and, in particular, research into the forms of power in primitive societies has not been inconsequential for the direction taken over the past few years by the analysis of power in complex societies.

For a long time power in primitive societies remained invisible — at least to Western eyes. As long as it was sought in the form of a State, it remained evanescent. Westerners are accustomed to power as something visible and recognizable, located in its proper place (the State). If there was no State, that meant there was no power either. This is why primitive societies have been seen as societies without power. Then functionalists came along and argued convincingly that those kind of societies cannot exist since it is power that holds a society together. Thus, to approach the problem adequately, it was necessary to set aside all residual Eurocentrism, and stop trying to look at primitive societies to find our own image anticipated and deformed in them. Yet, power remained hidden. So, it became necessary to go and look for it in places one would least expect to find it: in those institutions ordinarily seen as private — the family, kinship, lineage, etc.

Stateless Societies

Two books broke the ice, *African Political Systems* edited by Fortes and Evans-

*Translated by T.D. Erikson.

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Pritchard, and *The Nuer* by Evans-Pritchard, both published in 1940 — the year now identified with the birth of political anthropology. The first book tackled directly methodological and theoretical problems posed by an analysis of power in societies without institutions specialized in representing it. This turned out to be a pioneering endeavor since the few available instruments were those provided by Western political philosophy — instruments which turned out to be rather inadequate to the task. The available concept of power had been developed in reference to a very narrow typology.

Thus, in the "Preface" to *African Political Systems*, Radcliffe-Brown suggested a different definition of power adequate to the task. According to this definition, power deals with "the maintenance or establishment of social order, within a territorial framework, by the organized exercise of coercive authority through the use, or the possibility of use, of physical force."[1] As Beattie was to note many years later, Radcliffe-Brown sought to combine two different criteria: "First, reference is made to the end to which political activity is directed, the regulation and control of the social order within a certain territory. And, secondly, the means whereby this is achieved are brought in; the organized exercise of authority, backed by force."[2] While the second criterion remains caught within the Weberian logic of command and obedience so as to be inadequate to explain a larger number of primitive societies, the first criterion helps in the analysis of Stateless societies. Although Radcliffe-Brown was only partially successful in providing an adequate concept of power, he did lead anthropologists in the right direction by suggesting that to study power means to discover how a society ensures social order since there are no societies where rules "are automatically obeyed."[3]

One of the first advantages of this approach was a successful analysis of lineage societies which thus at last revealed order and regulation where for a long time only anarchy and chance had been perceived. These are societies formed by groups linked in the male line by effectively determinable kinship relations (patrilinear descent). The structure of the lineage constitutes the basis for the political system: each lineage is subdivided into a much larger number of minor lineages (segments) and all members are tied to their own lineage by bonds of solidarity. These lineages constitute corporate groups, envisaging a high degree of cooperation — so much so that if one member is offended or killed, all other members of the lineage are committed to exacting compensation for the damage suffered, and the compensation is then divided among all of them. If the offense is not duly compensated, then the quarrel degenerates into a feud.

For Evans-Pritchard the feud is one of the keys to understanding primitive power. Behind the apparent senselessness and cruelty of an interminable series of homicides and vendettas can be seen one of the Nuer's main political

1. A.R. Radcliffe-Brown, "Preface" to M. Fortes and E.E. Evans-Pritchard eds. *African Political Systems* (Oxford University Press: London, 1970), p. XIV.
2. J. Beattie, *Other Cultures* (The Free Press of Glencoe: New York, 1964), p. 142.
3. L. Mair, *Primitive Government* (Penguin Books: Baltimore, Md., 1962), p. 18.

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institutions. The pursuit of a vendetta is in fact the signal of the existence of a norm that has been violated and for which respect must somehow be guaranteed. Both compensation and vendetta are nothing other than an implicit acknowledgement that murder is against the rules. But it is not only this: this feud is effective not only as a social sanction, insofar as the fear of suffering from it can be an important incentive to respect the rules, it is also the means whereby group solidarity is reinforced, the group's boundaries are drawn, and the group is constituted as a political community. If a political community is understood to be a group made up of all those who accept a common rule of law, then the Nuer's political community is that group within which compensation is paid for homicide. In inter-tribal clashes, on the other hand, no payment is accepted as reparation for a killing. Thus, instead of being a feud it is a war. And war is also an index of the political system, because it defines the lineage community precisely when it is counterposed to and clashes with other lineages. Moreover, in all of these societies in which power obtains as a sort of diffuse energy, it can be perceived more easily by examining external relations.

Subsequently, with the growth of researches on acephalous societies, this approach was refined to deal with positive features, increasingly relegating reference to force to the background. From the maintenance of social order, which according to Radcliffe-Brown coincided with power, the emphasis shifted to cooperation among the members of the group. Thus, power came to be seen as "that aspect of the total organization which is concerned with the establishment and maintenance of internal cooperation and external independence."[4]

The search for rules defining cooperation among members of a group thus become the privileged standpoint pointing to the forms of power in acephalous societies. Analysis focused primarily on these institutions cementing community ties and group solidarity, e.g., the rites and ceremonies which, by ensuring periodic social renewals, contribute to maintaining internal cooperation. With Gluckman the rite came to be seen not only as a way to express conflicts, but also for reconstituting them by reasserting the unity of society and by leading people to accept the social order much more efficiently than by the threat of force. Beside being a form of social control, the rite is also an epiphany of power: a way in which the community manifests its internal articulations. Only by participating in the rite do the differences in status become explicit, dividing up the egalitarian appearance of primitive societies into a distinct series of roles and functions.

Functionalists have been often criticized for their exclusive concentration on the functioning of the social system and its institutions rather than on an analysis of institutions themselves. On closer examination, however, it was precisely this approach that enabled them to see what other methodologies occluded. In the specific case of power, functional analysis has been able, in

4. Shapere, *Government and Politics in Tribal Society* (The Athlone Press: London, 1956), p. 218.

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the absence of specialized circuits such as the State, to locate it in many pre-political institutions. The discovery that every primitive institution carries out more than one function led British anthropologists to the tracks of power. Thus, kinship does not have its own content, but is rather a container or, better, the symbolic form in which the various contents of social life are expressed. In other words, in many acephalous societies kinship relations function as political relations, e.g., among the Bushman bands, political structure is fused with kinship.[5] Another aspect of power in primitive societies which clashes with the usual focus on the command-obedience relation is the multiplicity of levels on which it manifests itself. This is what Southall discussed in connection with kinship and Bernardi developed in the analysis of the age-class system. Briefly, the age-class system is that type of organization in which individuals of the same age are recruited in groups and pass through the successive roles of warrior, husband, elder, etc., i.e., through different social roles defined by age. As such, all individuals (never as individuals, but always as members of a class) are called upon to play various social roles during the course of their life and to exercise the corresponding power. As such, power is divided among the various age-classes. This is a diffuse power, distributed in society not in a casual manner but following a very close-knit grill of norms which envisages a partial and temporary exercise of power for all members. Here, power is nothing other than "the capacity to carry out social activity."[6]

This diffusion of power changes the very nature of power or, rather, our image of power. When primitive societies lose their ambiguously exotic physiognomy in favor of an unsuspected complexity, we suddenly learn something. Thanks to them, power loses its demonic aspect and reveals a benign countenance unknown in the West. It turns out to be more of a duty than a right: it is the exercise of a social activity aimed at strengthening cooperation and community bonds rather than a mere exercise of force — a productive power, defined more by the ability to do, than by the possibility of forbidding, a community power viable as long as it is not monopolized by one group or institution. It remains to be seen whether in primitive societies power is diffuse because of these positive characteristics, or whether its diffusion makes it positive and free of the connotations of domination and force. Such an answer will not come from the functionalists whose main concern is with social order and balance.

From Clastres to Foucault

Functionalist anthropology was the first to investigate power in primitive societies and emphasize its communal character. Despite this, however, it has also remained a prisoner of statist thinking. The State remains the reference point against which power in the various societies is assessed in terms of Western concepts (cohesion, order, coercion, etc.). Typical in this regard is Lucy

5. Or, among the Northern Somalis, a genealogy is not a mere family tree, but "represents the social divisons of people into corporate political groups." Cf. I.M. Lewis, *A Pastoral Democracy* (African Publishing Co.: New York, 1961), p. 2.

6. B. Bernardi, *I Sistemi di Classe di Età*, (Loescher: Torino, 1984), p. 59.

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Mair who seeks to locate a threshold beyond which power becomes visible. In *Primitive Government*, the part devoted to acephalous societies is subdivided according to a progressive escalation beginning with embryonic forms of power — those further away from the State — and ending with those closest to the Western model — the antichamber to the State. The result is an evolutionary reading reducing the manifestations of power to the linearity of a single course terminating with the appearance of the State.

The same can be said of Marxism and its theory of the transition. It is precisely the theme of the origin of the State that underlies Marx's interest in primitive societies. Their analysis was meant to reveal that missing link documenting the passage from the primitive community to class society and thus the birth of the State. This question is the great unfinished theme of Marx's research — a theme taken up and abandoned several times in the Fourth Volume of *Capital*, which was never written, but of which Marx has left indications in the draft of 1857. In his "Ethnological Notebooks" Morgan's analysis of the *gens* is the key for identifying the origin of the State in the transition from gentile society to class society. Thus, Marx writes that the State arises after the "primitive collective relation" has dissolved.

What lies behind this is the idea of a continuous evolution, marked by a break but not such as to alter a process that finds in each preceding stage the reasons for its subsequent development. The model is not very different from the schema of succession of each social formation, which for Marx "only arises when the material conditions for its solution are already present or are at least in the course of formation."[7] In other words, both Marx and the functionalists combine incomparable forms of power and assume a continuity of development between them. But power in primitive societies cannot be defined as "pre-State," i.e., incomplete, lacking a missing dimension provided in the following stage by the providential container of the State. Between the two there is an unbridgeable theoretical gap.

Only with the works of Pierre Clastres is primitive power finally disentangled from the domination of the State. In acephalous societies power is immanent to society: it is the community "we," in the sense that there is no separate power counterposed to the social body. This idea of community power is very far from the functionalist interpretations according to which power is the maintenance of social order, internal cooperation or both. Clastres is very critical of the functionalists' effort to locate power in the various primitive institutions, for "everything then comes back to the sphere of politics, all the subgroups and units (kinship groups, age-class, units of production, etc.) that make up a society are invested, correctly and incorrectly, with a political meaning which eventually covers the entire social space, thus losing its peculiar specificity. For if politics is everywhere, it is no longer anywhere."[8] For Clastres, the functionalist analysis is nothing other than an

7. K. Marx, *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy*, (International Publishers: New York, 1970), p. 21.

8. P. Clastres, *La Societá contro lo Stato* (Feltrinelli: Milano, 1977), p. 18.

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umpteenth attempt to delegitimate primitive power by reducing it to a sort of imperfect power, where perfection (unattainable for these societies) is once again constituted by the Western model.

Power concentrated in the State, however, "is not the model of true power, but simply a particular case, a concrete instance of political power in certain cultures, such as Western culture."[9] Thus, coercion is not *the* form of power, but one of its particular historical expressions: that based on the command-obedience relation. Thus, primitive societies are not societies *without* a State but societies *against* the State, not only because they operate according to a different model of power but because they are organized *against* its appearance. The State becomes the image of bad power against which primitive societies defend themselves by preventing its birth. According to Clastres, every one of them practises a series of contrivances to prevent the appearance of the State and its perverse mechanisms. War, for example, is the best guarantee against it because it is a way of maintaining equality among all members of society. War provides the feeling of the communal "we" because "to keep itself undivided, the savage community has a structural need of the figure of the enemy, through which alone it can read its own unity."[10] Thus, primitive societies do not need a metasocial expression of their identity as is normally provided by the State. On the contrary, the State is far from being a guarantor of unity and identity. Rather, it is more the grave-digger of the communal "we," insofar as it ushers in inequality. For Clastres, therefore, primitive power is "good" because it is diffuse or, better, because it is not concentrated in an institution standing over and dominating the rest of the community.

Even in those societies that have "chiefs," these chiefs are always under the obligation to show the innocence of their function. In other words, their power must always justify itself: it requires consensus and allows for a considerable amount of reciprocity. "We find ourselves faced with an enormous number of societies in which the holders of what elsewhere would be called power are in effect powerless, in which the political sphere is determined outside any form of coercion or violence or hierarchical subordination, in which, in brief, there exists no relation of command obedience."[11] Thus, chieftainship is not the herald of the State, but the expression of a power irreducible to any institutional apparatus.

Between them and the West there is a gap. Behind the enigma of "impotent power" lies hidden another form of power; a power without coercion, force, or authority. The only quality we can ascribe to it is prestige. Thus the "big man" in Melanesia is the chief, condemned to be neither obeyed nor heard. His power is as precarious as his fortune and his wealth since he is obliged by his very status to distribute them. But he is also the one who, through his prestige, stands as guarantor of the community's identity. With Marshall Sahlins' analyses of the "big man," primitive power is revealed as based on a strategy of

9. *Ibid.*, p. 21.
10. *Ibid.*, p. 167.
11. *Ibid.*, p. 12.

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exchanges and on a sort of asymmetrical reciprocity, where personal qualities take on symbolic functions of domination: a power destined to remain naked, without institutions to mediate and represent it, condemned to transparency by the personal nature of the relations that make it possible.

Thus, in primitive societies power is visible, but not to Western eyes, because it is immediate. Institutions such as the State and its apparatuses, by acting as intermediaries of power, actually hide it. The situation is reversed in primitive societies: power has become visible — so visible as to conceal with its effervescence the forms power takes in Western society. So much so that Foucault says that what is commonly called political life, the way power represents itself, is on the contrary the way power hides itself the most.

With *Discipline and Punish*, and even more with *The History of Sexuality* Foucault changed his ideas on power. There are two noteworthy aspects of this change and they both concern the conception of power as "State." The traditional notion of a center of irradiation located in the State and its apparatuses is substituted by Foucault with the idea of a diffuse power, distrubuted within the body of society, of a plurality of local powers exercised from innumerable points. At the same time, he criticizes the juridical-discursive conception "centered on the sole functioning of the law and on the sole functioning of prohibition" or the State model, for its highly limiting character. "A power that is poor in its resources, economical in its proceedings, monotonous in the tactics that is uses [. . .] a power that supposedly has nothing other than the ability or saying no."[12]

Against all this Foucault counterposes a "new" concept of power, "what could be called a new 'economy of power' "[13] which he locates in the relation between power and knowledge. In this, Foucault follows Clastres' analyses according to which coercive power is not *the* model of power but just a particular expression of it. Here we have a good example of how the study of "other" societies has had an impact on Western society and culture by revealing things which remain hidden to those who live inside it.

The Sociologists' Contributions

Drawing on the analysis of "primitive power" enabled Foucault to criticize the narrowness of the Western concept of power. This critique, however, was not sufficient to lead to a new concept of power. Although he sought an alternative interpretation of power, his idea of "productive power" remained tied to the Weberian logic associating power with force. Foucault's notion of resistance is a good illustration of this ambivalence. For Foucault, "where there is power, there is resistance." This presupposes a concept of power as repression, since resistance is a response to power conceived as based primarily on force. In almost the same breath Foucault goes on to say that resistance is "never external to power,"[14] it follows that the very possibility of resistance disap-

12. M. Foucault, *The History of Sexuality* (Pantheon Books: New York, 1978), p. 76.
13. M. Foucault, *Discipline and Punish* (Pantheon Books: New York, 1977), p. 95.
14. *Ibid.*, p. 95.

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pears: if resistance is immanent to power then it is no longer possible to identify resistance as something outside of or contraposed to power. For Foucault power is so pervasive that it even contains its own negation. Productive power turns out to be based much more on force than repressive power which, as Foucault pointed out, is a weak form of power, having only the possibility of veto. In any event, force remains central to Foucault's concept of power. "It seems to me," he wrote in *The History of Sexuality* "that power must be understood in the first instance as the multiplicity of force relations immanent in the sphere in which they operate and which constitute their own organization."[15] This diffusion of power ends up as a *bellum omnium contra omnes.* His logic is the same as Hobbes, but inverted. Outside of State, power relations remain in the wild. Thus, Foucault's account of the diffusion of power is very different from the image provided by primitive societies. In the latter the diffusion of power is regulated by well determined social roles and expectations, whereas for Foucault power is distributed in a wild and unforeseeable manner. A community power able to provide identity and recognition for members of the same community is completely foreign to Foucault.

Foucault, however, was not the only one to discuss diffuse power. Some discussion began around the mid-fifties in peripheral fields far from mainstream political science, although it was still almost exclusively concerned with political institutions. Initial attempts were made by C. Wright Mills, who restored the analysis of power to that central position which it had always held in the best sociological tradition, and which American sociology had always sought to marginalize.

With Mills power was no longer seen as residing in a single locus with the State and the political parties, but extended beyond political institutions to vital areas such as economic and military institutions. Despite the fact that power was inserted into a broader scenario, the very hierarchical manner in which it is seen operating — a power which Parsons qualified as a "zero sum game," i.e., having a fixed quantity, so that whoever holds it always does so at the expense and detriment of others who are thus deprived of it[16] — remained far from the idea of diffuse power. With Mills power was was still located in one center from which it radiated to the rest of society. The only thing that changed was the boundary of this center, which no longer coincided with that of the State. More than a critique of power, what Mills provided was a critique of politics as a separate sphere. For the rest Mills remained faithful to a traditional Weberian vision of power: recourse to force and, to complete its physiognomy, its character of property in the hands of those few who exert it over the many.

Precisely this idea of power as property asymmetrically distributed was increasingly coming under fire during those very same years by the so-called pluralists who focused on the community as the terrain within which to develop their critique. Drawing on the American sociological tendency to use

15. *Ibid.*, P. 92.
16. T. Parsons, *Politics and Social Structure* (The Free Press: New York, 1969).

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the urban community as a laboratory, they sought to discover what was hidden within its diversified domain. Of course, even "the elitists" began with the study of local power (the Lynds' famous work *Middletown* was written in the late twenties), yet the reference point almost exclusively ended up being *The Power Elite*. Thus, shortly before publishing *Who Governs?*, his celebrated study on power in New Haven, Dahl took issue with Mills' work, criticizing the regression *ad infinitum* of his explanation and the absence of a solid empirical base.[17]

Through a meticulous study of who governed New Haven (a community with a population of 150,000 at the time), Dahl focussed his attention not so much on the origin of power but on its exercise. What emerged was a jagged-edged panorama in which a plurality of groups, institutions and individuals balanced each other out, ruling out any notion of an arrogant and exclusive élites. Among other things, he rejected stratification whereby there had to be one group dominating the community. For Dahl power was not only decentralized and, as such, extended beyond political institutions but, above all, as he had already anticipated in his earlier work,[18] it was not a property but a relation between persons who bear and exert it according to their shifting fortunes at all levels of social and political life. No longer stratified on a vertical axis that determines hierarchies and asymmetries, power became a horizontal relation in which the roles of those who have it and those who do not are no longer fixed and are never such as to prevent those who hold power from feeling the influence or the power of those on whom it is exercised.[19]

As it has been pointed out, this approach to power relations is nothing but the reproduction on a different level of the market model of the neo-classical economists.[20] This analogy enables the pluralists to emphasize the voluntary character of participation and the egalitarian nature of power relations so as to neglect relations of domination, i.e., the coercive and hierarchical aspects of power. This, however, should not lead to an underestimation of the changes that have taken place in the forms of power in modern society.

With the pluralists power becomes participation in decision-making concerning the community. From a source of antagonisms and conflicts power becomes the cement that holds society together — what enables mobilization of resources for collective aims. The emphasis is on community — a magic word entrusted with the redemption of power and of its perverse nature. Presumably, in a community in which no one force prevails over all others, the interplay of a plurality of interests is, by its very plurality, a guarantee of democracy. Thus, when defining and measuring community power, the pluralists focus primarily on *individual* power so that community structure

17. R.A. Dahl, *Who Governs? Democracy and Power in an American City* (Yale University Press: New Haven and London, 1961).

18. R.A. Dahl, "The Concept of Power," in *Behavioral Science*, 1957, n. 2.

19. Dahl notes the example of universal suffrage and argues that it is unwise to underestimate the degree of indirect influence on the decisions of the leaders which voters have through elections. Cf. Dahl, "The Concept of Power," *op. cit.*

20. N.C.M. Hartsock, *Money, Sex and Power* (Longman: New York and London, 1983).

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turns out to be essentially a collection of individuals and of their different quantities of power.

Indeed for pluralists power is always an individual act and not, as for Parsons, a function of the system. With the pluralists the functioning of a complex society is the result of the decisions of individuals unhindered by any constraint from a central source. Decision is the key word. Power is the capacity to make decisions; to organize the life and choices of others. This notion of decision had already been stressed by Lasswell and Kaplan whose work greatly influenced Dahl and Polsby. But while for Lasswell and Kaplan decision-making is still part of a coercive vision of power since it is "a policy involving severe sanctions (deprivations)."[21] With Dahl and Polsby things are a little different. The coercive aspects cease to be central. Decisions are not so much ready-made choices to be imposed, but the very constitution of an order.

Through decisions, power gains a visibility unknown to the elitists for whom, from Mills on, power is mostly hidden. For pluralists power becomes visible when decisions are taken, since every decision always entails observable conflicts. This assumption of the perfect transparency of power (partly founded on behaviorist methodology) did not gain much acceptance. Power has at least two sides: a visible one revealed in decision-making processes and a hidden one. For Bachrach and Baratz, to cite the two most polemical critics, power does not consist simply and solely in decision-making, but also in stopping other people from making decisions.[22] With the hidden face of power, relations of domination also resurface after having been carelessly ignored by the pluralists. Something, however, remained of the pluralist analysis: power is no longer a phenomenon applicable solely to political institutions but obtains in the most diverse social spheres as a relation among people.

The real turning point, however, came with Talcott Parsons, for whom power is not seen as a prerogative of individuals, but is a characteristic of the system. Parsons established an analogy between power and money on the assumption that each of the subsystems that make up the social system follows the same logical structure, satisfies the same general conditions and obeys the same overall principles. Like money, power is a circulating medium which operates both within the political system and between the political and other social subsystems. As such, power is not a property of the political system, i.e., it does not lie somewhere in latency. It is in short, a means of communication: an element of circulation that acts on the interaction of the actors and of the collectivity in every part of the social system.

Like the pluralists, Parsons also saw the power as so extended as to eventually blunt its hierarchical and authoritarian aspects. Indeed, Parsons moved even further than the pluralist from an analysis of power relations as relations of domination. As with money, the exercise of power must inspire confidence

21. H.D. Lasswell and A. Kaplan, *Power and Society, A Framework for Political Inquiry* (Yale University Press: New Haven, Conn., 1950), p. 74.

22. P. Bachrach and M.S. Baratz, "The Two Faces of Power," in *American Political Science Review*, n. 56 (1962).

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and must be legitimated "which in the present contexts means" as he himself points out "that in certain respects compliance [. . .] is not binding, to say nothing of being coerced, but is optional."[23] In other words, for Parsons power is no longer exclusively defined by recourse to force, since force "will turn out by itself to be inadequate" to explain power. Yet, while it may not operate with the threat of force, it cannot be thought of without reference to force. Force is to power as metal is to money. Power is thus defined more by the possibility of using force than by the actual exercise of force: it is more of a threat than compulsion. Parsons attempted to separate, as far as he could, force from power as a result of his separation of power and authority, taking to its ultimate consequences Weber's distinction and going so far as to purge the notion of power of any lingering domination: he made authority into the hierarchical structure through which the use of power becomes meaningful for the members of a given community.

Something analogous occurs also in Hannah Arendt, who was working on the same questions roughly at the same time. She saw power and authority, like power and force, as incompatible, given that power is always merely consensual. The Athenian city-state became the model of good power, power that "springs up whenever people get together and act in concert."[24] It is the image of the polis, the community, that provided for her the connotation of power or, rather, her interpretation of power is part of her project to revive the community and its values. Community and power thus practically coincide, because if power is acting-together, it is also the cement that holds it together. With Arendt we have the most extreme attempt to provide a positive account of power; for her coercion, manipulation and violence cease to be phenomena of power and consequently disappear from her theoretical horizon.

Parsons also sees questions of power eventually turning into questions regarding the community since the role of power is defined by the realization of collective ends. This role is, however, partly delegated to the category of influence. As in the case of power, the comparison with money is also valid for influence (both are mechanisms of social interaction, "they have in common the imperative mood, i.e., they are ways of getting results"), but whereas power remains defined by the threat of force, this is not so for influence which at most operates as a positive sanction. This is an important distinction for Parsons since he seems to want to entrust to the category of influence the task of representing a wholly positive version of power, anchored in a revival of community values. As with Arendt, Parsons also identifies power with the community: the acceptance of power by the members of a community gives them a sense "of their 'belonging' together." Power turns out to be a factor of identification, i.e., it becomes the carrier of identity, of "that common belongingness in a *Geimeinschaft* type of solidarity."[25]

At this point, Weber has practically dropped out of Parson's theoretical

23. T. Parsons, *Politics and Social Structure* (The Free Press: New York, 1969), p. 367.
24. Hannah Arendt, *On Violence*, (Harcourt, Brace and World: New York, 1969), p. 52.
25. Parsons, *Politics and Social Structure, op. cit.*, p. 416.

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horizon in favor of Durkheim. Following the latter, Parsons puts the finishing touches to a productive interpretation of power as "acting in common," and as "standing together," which relegates the command obedience relation increasingly to the background. The tendency to locate power in the State also disappears, leaving a broader scenario in which power functions as a generalized means of communication. This extension of power to the entire social body is a measure of the distance that now separates contemporary sociology, and above all Parsons, from Weber.

A close examination, however, reveals that part of these results were already to some extent present in Weber himself, who seemed to have neglected them on purpose. First of all, he was aware that he was restricting power by limiting it to the States and political institutions, since he recognized how "even the conventional exchanges of social life constitute 'power' in the broader sense, from the 'drawing-room king' to the arbiter elegantiarum of imperial Rome and the courts of love of the ladies of Provence."[26] He also knew that this limitation of power is made necessary by the very concept of power that he chose (the one based on the command obedience relation), or as he himself put it, he was "utilizing the concept of power in its narrow meaning"[27] (Weber, 1981, IV, p. 48). This narrow meaning is no longer useful when power extends beyond the State to the whole of social life. Here the earlier question about primitive societies reappears, i.e., whether the productive aspect of power is a cause or an effect of its diffusion. At this point, however, any answer appears superfluous and the question pointless. All that matters is to note that the two go together. Every time power extends beyond the limits of the State the command-obedience relation gives way to a much more articulate morphology.

With Luhmann things become even more complicated, even though in the end his position turns out to be less clear than Parsons'. Although his main interest is political power as an autonomized subsystem that has the task of transmitting binding decisions, he actually recognizes that "power is a condition of human existence which is present in every aspect of society."[28] As with Parsons, Luhmann sees power as a means of communication. The analogy with money reappears, and Luhmann extends it to truth and love as well, the other two means of communication characterized by symbolical generalization, which regulate the transmission of selective services. By treating power as a means of communication, Luhmann highlights its relational character. "Every means of communication presupposes the existence of a social situation which offers to both parties involved definite opportunities of choice and of situations which are therefore characterized by a two-fold contingent selectivity."[29] If power is a means of communication, this means that both partners are able to exercise it reciprocally, or at least it is no longer possible to assign

26. M. Weber, *Economia e Societá* (Feltrinelli: Milano, 1981), vol. IV, p. 48.
27. *Ibid.*
28. N. Luhmann, *Potere e Complessitá Sociole* (Il Saggaitore: Milano, 1983), p. 105.
29. *Ibid.*, p. 5.

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power only to one of the two. In Luhmann's view, traditional theory, according to which power is always developed indirectionally in hierarchical forms from the top down, is today inadequate for understanding the new morphology of power. This is because it does not take into account a fundamental characteristic of modern power: it ignores the fact that each social subject can exercise alternately roles of subordinate or superordinate power. *Power is the faculty for both partners to reduce complexity for the Other.* On this basis Luhmann distinguishes power from constraint, because the latter removes the relational character of power. In fact "the reduction of complexity is not shared but falls back completely on the one who exercises the constraint."[30]

Despite this distinction between power and constraint, Luhmann, deep down, holds on to a negative concept of power. Like any other means of communication, power is simply "a limitation of the selective space available to the partner."[31] Power is the faculty of reducing complexity for others. In short, power is only the power of veto, or, in the best of cases, of reciprocal vetoes. To a large extent, Luhmann's approach remains within the command obedience relation. Reference to physical force and threat of sanctions are still the source of power. Although "force surely cannot be power," it is still "the inescapable limiting case of an alternative which must be avoided and which is the basis of power."[32] So, in the end, Luhmann turns out to be much closer to Weber than Parsons.

Notwithstanding these problems, Luhmann's position remains the one that has paid most attention to the "new potencies" produced by the process of socialization of politics, which are now ungovernable within the horizons of the liberal State.[33] In other words, today civil society seems to be regaining some of those spaces that had been taken away from it during the development of the capitalist State. This is happening both in the sense of a multiplication of power centers (economic, administrative, bureaucratic, etc.), and in the sense of what is by now a stable but sporadic presence of new movements, of spontaneous and decentralized demonstrations which multiply the diffusion of decisions. To use Luhmann's words, the environment has become so complex that it is increasingly difficult for the political system to carry out the reduction of complexity it needs in order to be able to govern.

In Search of Power

Today the State is losing that central position it has hitherto had in the history of the West, thus necessitating a change in the predominant concept of power. Complex societies and primitive societies become unexpectedly close, in the sense that they both have to do with forms of power independent of the State and its apparatuses. Research into the nation of primitive societies has helped us to extrapolate power from the State, and to ask hitherto impossible to conceptualize questions about power. As long as power remained iden-

30. *Ibid.*
31. *Ibid.*, p. 10.
32. *Ibid.*, p. 72.
33. G. Marramao, *Potere e Secolarizzazione*, (Editori Riuniti: Roma, 1983).

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tified with the State and its appratuses, all discussions of power turned into analyses of the State. Today it has become possible to discuss power as an autonomous dimension. As such, the following are some of the questions that need to be posed. Power has always been associated with inequality understood as a relation of dependence. But dependence has never been associated only with those who are confronted by power. The power holder is also dependent because it needs the Other in order to exist. Moreover this dependence has always entailed identity. Power bestows identity in the sense that it constitutes what enables a person to establish the boundaries of self. But power also needs recognition. Hence its ambiguity: power needs consensus in order to be exercised, but consensus limits it. Thus, consensus becomes a form of indirect control which power is obliged to take into account. But just as there is no power without consensus, so there is no power without resistance. The idea of resistance leads back to the command-obedience relation. And just as power in its coercive form is only a power, as Foucault has reminded us, which has merely the "potency of saying 'no'," so resistance to power has only the possibility of negation. It is a weak form, defined always and only in opposition to something else which decides of its existence.

With the notion of diffuse power, the very possibility of resistance disappears. If power is everywhere and nowhere in particular, there is no more possibility, nor need, to oppose it. The space broadens out and resistance becomes at most an expression or a moment of its diffusion. But diffuse power, contrarily to what Foucault seems to suggest, does not eliminate the reasons of domination, it simply hides them. In this new economy of power, is there still place for notions such as resistance, or must resistance find new forms? But how can we think of power without resistance? Is it not resistance to power that enabled us to unveil it each time? If today power has been translated into discourse, it is because the revolt against power has suddenly made it visible where we would least have expected it.

Freed from the State, power loses all transcendence and becomes another social relation. Can we still tie power inequality, or must power simply be considered an asymmetry? Or better, an asymmetrical relation? But this asymmetry no longer appears hierarchical and top-down — on the contrary, it appears reversible. And does not this reversibility remove from power all possibility of legitimation? And along with this, do not certain fundamental categories of power eventually fade away, like identity? Or is this new-found reciprocity capable of providing other forms of recognition, no longer frozen in the roles of order-giver and order-taker? Or, again, is Luhmann right to speak of an "inflative" tendency of power, in the sense that in complex societies power no longer tends to realize its possibilities?

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The Disappearance of Art: The Postmodernism Debate in the U.S.

Christa Bürger

The Dichotomy Between High and Low Art

In his speech for the opening of the Frankfurt Book Fair, whose theme was provided by the year 1984, Neil Postman recalled that "besides Orwell's gloomy vision,"[1] there existed another, no less depressing one: Huxley's *Brave New World*. In view of the accelerated development of the electronic media in America, it is not Orwell's future which frightens him, but rather Huxley's. He predicts for the coming years a cultural transformation compared to which the Chinese Cultural Revolution would have been child's play. "America is in the process of carrying out the most all-encompassing experiment in the world —totally integrating itself into the technological diversions made possible by the electrical outlet." The qualitative originality of this process with respect to earlier transformations lies in the inability to defend against it, since this process is not perceived as something threatening. "What happens when no one cries for help? Who reaches for weapons against a sea of amusement?" The concern here is not with the hidden positivism of this position —a positivism which Postman shares with the author whom he invokes and which Adorno criticized with reference to this same author.[2] The present concern is rather with the symptomatic character of Postman's position. If one in fact searches for the structuring idea which underlies the debate over the concept of postmodernism, then Postman's speech can provide a clue. The American discussion of postmodernism responds to a social transformation which is experienced by intellectuals as a cultural revolution threatening their conditions of existence and legitimacy. Almost regardless of the political positions of the participants in this discussion, their arguments are constantly re-

1. Neil Postman, "Wie man sich zu Tode vegnügt [. . .]", in *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, October 10, 1984, p. 24. Postman's book, *Wir amüsieren uns zu Tode*, appeared one year later (Frankfurt a.M., 1985).

2. Cf. Theodor W. Adorno, "Aldous Huxley and Utopia" in Theodor W. Adorno, *Prisms*, tr. by Samuel and Shierry Weber, (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 1967), pp. 95-118: "[Huxley] is in basic agreement with descriptively oriented cultural criticism which, in lamenting the inexorable decline of culture, provides a pretext for the strengthening of domination [. . .] Instead of antagonisms, Huxley envisages something like an intrinsically non-self-contradictory total subject of technological reason, and correspondingly, a simplistic total development. Such conceptions belong to the currently fashionable ideas of 'universal history' and 'style of life' which are part of the cultural facade. Although he gives an incisive physiognomy of total unification, he fails to decipher its symptoms as expressions of an antagonistic essence, the pressure of domination, in which the tendency to totalization is inherent" (p. 114).

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lated to the omnipresent phenomenon of mass culture.

It is not coincidental that the first substantial theory of the culture industry formulated by Adorno and Horkheimer was developed as a response to experiences in America. This is already true for Adorno's 1938 essay "On the Fetish Character in Music and Regression of Listening" which he conceived as the frame of reference for his musical-sociological observations, but simultaneously as a reply to Benjamin's essay on the work of art, which seemed to Adorno to "attempt to 'redeem' all too undamaged the problematic of the industrial production of culture."[3] To be sure, Adorno sees himself forced, also as a result of his American experiences, to reflect again on his own criticism: "Unless one retreats into an elitist isolation, the question cannot be avoided in America of whether the notion of culture with which one has been raised has become obsolete; of whether that which culture is generally undergoing is the payment for its own failure, for the debt which it took on by isolating itself within the special sphere of the mind without realizing itself in the structure of society. Such a realization has certainly not occurred in America, but the horizon of this realization is not so obstructed as it is in Europe."[4] Here, at least as a point of departure, an alternate notion of culture becomes conceivable which would go beyond the separation of art and society. Yet, the sublation of the autonomy of art, insofar as this autonomy is for Adorno an expression of an antagonistic society, remains always related to a change in social conditions.

The problem of the culture industry first found entrance into cultural studies in Germany during the sixties and in connection with the student movement. Yet, the demands of the students for an expansion of the literary canon and for reflections on methods were a reaction more to the perceived obsolescence of literary critical practices than to a change in the character of culture. The study of popular literature was established as a new discipline outside of traditional literary scholarship. The separation of traditional scholarship, concerned with "high" literature, and the study of popular literature can be explained as a failure to understand the dichotomy between high and low literature as an historical phenomenon. In contrast, Adorno consistently emphasized the *necessary* relation between high and low literature or art: "Light art has been the shadow of autonomous art. It is the social bad conscience of serious art. The truth which the later necessarily lacked because of its social premises gives the other the semblance of legitimacy."[5] The autonomy of art, the precondition for its critical function, is bought with the exclusion of the underprivileged. *The Dialectic of Enlightenment* expresses the connection between culture and oppression with the image of Odysseus who, tied to the mast of the ship, can listen to the song of the sirens while the slaves under-

3. Adorno, "Wissenshcaftliche Erfahrungen in America" in Adorno, *Stichworte. Kritische Modelle 2* (edition Suhrkamp, 347. Frankfurt a.M., 1969), p. 117.

4. *Ibid.*, p. 147.

5. Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno, *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, tr. by John Cumming (New York: The Seabury Press, 1972), p. 135.

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neath work at the oars, cut off from the aesthetic experience which is reserved only for those in power. "The purity of bourgeois art, which hypostasized itself as a world of freedom in contrast to what was happening in the material world, was from the beginning bought with the exclusion of the lower classes —with whose cause, the real universality, art keeps faith precisely by its freedom from the ends of the false universality." The strained dialectic of this sentence —with its opposition of true universality, which is historically and philosophically grounded, and false universality, which is based upon a submission to the alienated needs of a mass society— captures the inner strife of the bourgeois intellectual who seeks to maintain solidarity with the masses but, at the same time, must remain detached from them.[6] Adorno conceives the relation between high and low literature and art as an expression of social conditions; he stays nevertheless within the interpretative framework of the institution of art by turning toward esoteric art on the one hand (defending a strict canon of aesthetic modernism) and toward a critique of the culture industry on the other.[7] In contrast to the simple attempts at a re-evaluation undertaken primarily in the sixties, Adorno's rigor, which adamantly separated low from high art and completely rejected that which lay in between, is significant in that it maintains the distance which autonomous art established. "Both [high art as well as industrially produced consumer art] bear the stigmata of capitalism, both contain elements of change (but never, of course, the middle-term between Schönberg and the American film). Both are torn halves of an integral freedom, to which, however, they do not add up."[8]

The problem of the real dichotomy of art underlies the American discussion of postmodernism and determines its historical content. Indicatively, this discussion began in the U.S. as early as the sixties and was taken up in Western Europe as an intellectual debate. Understood as a critical concept, postmodernism aims, as Huyssen explains, at a radical calling into question "of those presuppositions which linked modernism and the avant-garde to the mindset of modernization."[9] The rebellion of the sixties, connected with the names of Sontag, Fiedler, and Hassan,[10] directed itself —as a sort of reenactment of the historical avant-garde movement— against the strict canon of aesthetic modernism, but above all against the modernist dogma of the separation of high and low art/literature. This iconoclastic impulse took as its guiding vision a "new creative relation between high art and certain forms of mass culture."[11] From today's perspective it may appear easy to criticize this

6. Adorno, "Letter to Walter Benjamin of March 18, 1936" in Ernst Bloch, *et. al. Aesthetic and Politics*, trans. and edited by Ronald Taylor, (London: NLB, 1977), p. 126.

7. Cf. my introduction in Christa Bürger ed., *Zur Dichotomisierung von hoher und niederer Literatur*, (Frankfurt, Suhrkamp: 1982), pp. 9-39, and the article by J. Schulte-Sasse in the same volume, "Gebrauchswerte der Literatur [. . .]," pp. 62-107.

8. Adorno, "Letter to Benjamin of March 3, 1936" in *Aesthetic and Politics, op. cit.*, p. 123.

9. Andreas Huyssen, "Mapping the Postmodern" in *New German Critique* 33 (1984), pp. 5-52.

10. Cf. the corresponding articles in the reader by M. Putz and P. Freese eds., *Postmodernism in American Literature*, (Darmstadt, 1984).

11. Huyssen, *op. cit.*, p. 23.

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phase of postmodernism. In point of fact, the leveling out of the opposition between art and the culture industry, which can be apprehended by Fiedler's continually quoted phrase "close that gap," corresponds to a hitherto unheard-of gulf between artists and the media-manipulated consumers of culture. Fiedler's and Sontag's conception of an alienation-free postmodern art is, consequently, "not only similar to the culture industry's conception, it actually delivers up to the historically older notion those manifestations which prove its truth [...]. The culture industry achieves its total domination only by assimilating the resistance, the subcultures which provide the supply of forms and rituals necessary for its all-devouring formalism."[12] Interestingly enough, American critics and art historians in general are still more tolerant of trends such as the breakdown of the autonomy of art and the sublation of the separation between art and popular culture. Their tolerance is probably tied to the fact that, even in cases where they find themselves in opposition to contemporary society and culture, they see this society and culture simultaneously as a history which they seek to appropriate as their own.[13] The concept of postmodernism receives its epochal meaning in this process of appropriation, in which the issue for critical intelligence is the guarantee of the continuity of its own history. Of the usefulness of the concept, at least as a descriptive category, there can be hardly any more doubt. The fascination which the concept also exerts —one has been able to speak of the "postmodern aura"[14]— is connected perhaps to its imaginative achievement: it provides critical intellectuals with the consciousness of their own historicity.

This dimension of the concept becomes comprehensible in a newly released book by Charles Newman which one can read as an American version of formalistic evolution theory. Modernism and postmodernism are treated as responses to phases of social development: modernism —meaning always aesthetic modernism— responding to industrialization, postmodernism responding to an information society characterized by a blind compulsion to innovation. Within this scheme of global development Newman describes postmodernism as the product of two revolutions: the historical avant-garde and —this is the book's thesis— an inflation of critical discourse. Within institutionalized discourse, aesthetic modernism is interpreted, canonized, and marketed, losing its emancipatory impulse. Even when the movement which, mediated by literary criticism, carries modernism into the cultural estate of the middle class appears as a process of democratization, this process is an empty one because the inflation of discourse turns into cultural control: the forces of the market are more effective than political censorship. The problem of the avant-gardists is consequently no longer repression from social institutions, but rather the public's indifference. It is in this change that Newman

12. Andreas Kilb, in Christa Bürger ed., *Zur Postmoderne*, (forthcoming).

13. Cf. Fredric Jameson, "The Politics of Theory: Ideological Positions in the Postmodernism Debate," in *New German Critique* 33 (1984), pp. 53-65.

14. Charles Newman, *The Post-Modern Aura. The Act of Fiction in an Age of Inflation* (Evanston, 1985).

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sees the historical originality of the current situation.[15] This new situation explains for him the ironic self-reflexivity of the "postmodern mentality," whose aesthetic expression is the parody or, perhaps, an historicism become universal: where modernism has become legitimate culture, "tradition" becomes avant-garde.[16]

Jameson has similarly attempted to interpret postmodernism as the cultural form of expression of consumer capitalism. One of his main arguments for this historical categorization is the loss of history common to both; "the transformation of reality into images, the fragmentation of time into a series of perpetual presents."[17] This loss of history means the simultaneity of everything with everything; the postmodern consciousness has no clear temporal horizon; it restlessly wanders between present and past, indiscriminately retrieving its aesthetic forms from the imaginary museum of the cultural tradition. The *pastiche* is the form of expression adequate to it. The *pastiche*, the most extreme realization of which is demonstrated by Rosalind Kraus with the example of Sherrie Levine's photo-piracy, reveals simultaneously the anti-modern and the anti-avant-garde impulse of postmodernism. Levine signs photographs which she produces from the originals and "destroys" in this way the concept, constitutive for aesthetic modernity, of the original and of originality; in its place steps the endless series of repetitions.[18] On the other hand, she does not sign —like Duchamp— serial products. Instead, she participates in the art market as an artist who represents a particular type of work. Levine's aesthetic practice presupposes a non-auratic notion of the work, which Benjamin demonstrated to be a consequence of mechanical reproduction, but which in this case curiously has not overturned the traditional notion of the artist.

Yet, the *pastiche* is clearly ahead of other artistic practices in that it virtually forces evaluations. Jameson, accordingly, pushes his argument always toward the single point: we must realize that we are "*en situation*" (Jameson intentionally makes use of Sartre's notion), i.e., that we are living in a postmodern situation. In judging the creations of postmodernism, we are thus simultaneously

15. *Ibid.*, p. 184. Similar considerations arise with E.W. Said, who also sees a connection between the depolitization of the intelligentsia or, rather, the sealing off of the expert culture from the public and the academicization of criticism. ("Opponents, Audiences, Constituencies and Community" in *The Anti-Aesthetic. Essays on Postmodern Culture*, ed. by H. Foster, (Washington, 1983), pp. 135-159.

16. Newman, *op. cit.*, p. 182. To give a concrete example: Kenneth Frampton argues for a critical regionalism in architecture, i.e., for a considered return to tradition: "Architecture can only be sustained today as a critical practice if it assumes an arrieregarde position, that is to say, one which distances itself equally from the Enlightenment myth of progress and from a reactionary, unrealistic impulse to return to the architectonic forms of the preindustrial past" ("Towards a Critical Regionalism: Six Points for an Architecture of Resistance" in H. Foster, *The Anti-Aesthetic, op. cit.*, pp. 16-30.

17. Fredric Jameson, "Postmodernism and Consumer Society" in H. Foster, ed., *The Anti-Aesthetic, op. cit.*, pp. 111-125. The editor of *The Anti-Aesthetic* suggests the same categorization on pp. ix-xvi.

18. Rosalind Kraus, "The Originality of the Avant-Garde: A Postmodernist Repetition" in *October* 18 (Fall, 1981), pp. 47-66.

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judging ourselves. The stance behind this argument has little to do with the positing gesture, the strategies of delimitation and exclusion which frequently dominate the debates of the West European intelligentsia. If we live in a postmodern situation, we would do well to recall Adorno's American experiences: "Unless one retreats into an elitist isolation, the question cannot be avoided in America of whether the notion of culture with which one has been raised has become obsolete."[19] The chief characteristic of postmodernism for Jameson as well is its populist priorities, concurring here with the architectural theorist Jenck. Classical modernism distinguished between high and low art. Zola may have been the last artist to offer the possibility of a coexistence of artistic novel and bestseller. If, afterwards, Joyce or Mahler took up "popular" elements, this occurred recognizably as quotation. In postmodernism, however, such elements are integrated in a manner which does not allow the functional separation of high and low art and which consequently forces the consideration of a broadened notion of culture.

This perspective enables leftist critics to provide different evaluations of cultural developments in the U.S. While Huyssen may criticize the poststructuralism dominant in many American universities as a simple expression of the prevailing condition of society and its "triumphant hedonism,"[20] he can see in postmodernism a new form of the crisis of modern culture. Postmodernism then would be modernism in the phase of its self-criticism. With the loss of belief in forward progress, a series of traditional conceptual oppositions become on the one hand untenable: left and right politics, high and low art, etc. On the other hand, political gains can be extracted from this crisis if one is prepared to perceive the new "as the result of the coalescence of a 'moral' culture."[21] As an indication of the rise of new cultural attitudes, Huyssen points toward the growing recognition of the inner and outer imperialism of Western culture. This recognition, according to Huyssen, leads to a new interest in non-European cultures, the open articulation of demands for equal rights within the Black and the women's civil rights movements and, finally, the consciousness, surfacing in the ecology movement, of the vulnerablity of natural, social, and historical environments. In this context, his plea for a "postmodernism of resistance, including resistance to that easy postmodernism of the 'anything goes' variety"[22] attains a decidedly concrete culture-political dimension. The question remains, however, of whether this plea stands in a perhaps all-too blatant contradiction to the description of developmental tendencies in contemporary American culture.

De-aestheticization of art—Aestheticization of everyday life.

In the descriptions which leftist intellectuals such as Jameson or Berman provide of the postmodern situation, a theme constantly appears which is of

19. Adorno, "Wissenschaftliche Erfahrungen," *op. cit.*, p. 147.
20. Huyssen, "Mapping the Postmodern," *op. cit.*, p. 39.
21. Helmut Dubiel, *Was ist Neokonservatismus?* (Frankfurt a.M., Suhrkamp: 1985), p. 40.
22. Huyssen, "Mapping the Postmodern," *op. cit.*, p. 52f.

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truly explosive diagnostic significance: the symbiotic relation into which contemporary American culture and politics are entering.[23] Berman sees American society as subject to an inexorable process of the aestheticization of everyday life. Out of a surface phenomenon such as "muzak" he deciphers a fundamental change in the public sphere. The ubiquity of industrially produced music, in which all distinctions between serious and entertainment music are evened out, destroys the still existent communicative structures, cripples individual resistance to the administration of the life-world, and suggests "the beautiful illusion of a collective, singing along in dictatorial unanimity."[24] The aestheticization of everyday life to be seen in contemporary America does not limit itself to the commodity sphere: "it refers instead to the universal disappearance of an outside to art. There is no pre-aesthetic dimension to social activity, since social order has become dependent on aesthetic organization. Similarly, nature, which art once imitated, has become secondary to art; any given piece of coastline, any single craggy peak cannot measure up to the standards set by nature photographers and the Sierra Club Calendars."[25] In light of this development, the postmodern resort to mythical images and motifs, whose origins and significance are unfamiliar to the great majority of recipients, appears in a different light: as the gutting of symbolic signs. "Aesthetically," they can only continue to be received and continue to function —very much like the canon of cultivation of the 19th century— as status symbols.

Berman then links this description to a thesis concerning the dialectic of aesthetic modernism. With the historicization of the avant-garde movements, their works lose their privileged status. Thus, borrowing from the arguments of *Theory of the Avant-Garde*, he attempts to extend it into a theory of society. A de-auraticized art —which is how postmodernism presents itself when considered as an historical movement and not as an artistic trend— can no longer be a counter-image to the dominant culture. Berman defines postmodernism as a new version of the thesis of the end of art. In postmodern society the gradual disappearance of aura has become irreversible; this process corresponds to the (bad) aestheticization of everyday life. Released from a commitment to form, the aesthetic crosses the boundaries of the institution of art and penetrates into all aspects of social existence. This desublimation of the art work, according to Berman, gives rise to hybrid forms, exemplified by the renaissance of the mythical. The aestheticization of everyday life liquidates, along with the autonomy of art, also its critical potential. It leads to a condition of society in which all social conflicts take on visual concreteness, in which all images have the same status, leaving the utopian image of autonomous art to fade away. "If image has replaced substance in the new social

23. Cf. Fredric Jameson, "Postmodernism or The Culture Logic of Late Capitalism," in *New Left Review* 146 (1984), p. 87ff.

24. Russell A. Berman, "Modern Art and Desublimation" in *Telos* 62 (Winter 84-85), pp. 31-57.

25. *Ibid.*, p. 48.

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spectacle, then any struggle over images becomes a struggle for power."[26] The potential social consequences of the postmodern end of art present themselves to the critic in a stark light: "The avant-gardist attack on the autonomous work finally succeeds in delegitimizing the aesthetic institution, while the desired aestheticization of quotidian experience stimulates a latent aggression held in check by traditional cultural mechanisms."[27] In the historical experiment, which Postman similarly describes but with different political premises, only half of the avant-garde project seems to have become reality; the aestheticization of everyday life occurs —produced by the culture industry— without a radical transformation of life. The surrealist utopia of a finally livable world seems to have been distorted into its opposite. This disappointment of a hope may explain the polemic sharpness of Berman's critique of postmodernism —a critique which is not even intimidated by its kinship to culturally conservative arguments.

Clearly then, proponents of a critical culture industry are of the opinion that the difference between art and culture industry has to a large extent been leveled out. Not only that, but the power of criticism inherent to art, and precisely the esoteric art of modernism, threatens to disappear as quickly as the aestheticization of everyday life advances. The dramatization of critical theory which seems to have taken place here can perhaps best be elucidated by looking once more at Adorno's *Aesthetic Theory*. Adorno also starts from the premise that the process of history is pressing toward *de-aestheticization*. Nevertheless, he attempts to maintain the contradiction of bourgeois society in the separation of the spheres of high and low art. Adorno consequently analyzes the process of de-aestheticization on different levels, treating the complementary relation between art and the culture industry only on the level of the material conditions of production. While art works are mediated by the market, the products of the culture industry are directly subjugated to it.

The relation between the market and art becomes discernible in the category of the new. "The phenomenon of novelty is a historical product. In its original economic setting, novelty is that characteristic of consumer goods through which they are supposed to set themselves off from the self-same aggregate supply, stimulating consumer decisions subject to the needs of capital. As soon as capital does not expand, or, in the language of circulation, as soon as capital stops offering something new, it is going to lose ground in the competitive struggle. Art has appropriated this economic category. The new in art is the aesthetic counterpart to the expanding reproduction of capital in society. Both hold out the promise of undiminished plenitude."[28] Because autonomy is only with difficulty wrestled from society, as the powerless resistance of works of art against the market, and because this autonomy originates itself in society, there exists a constant threat of a "relapse into

26. *Ibid.*, p. 55.
27. *Ibid.*, p. 51.
28. Theodor W. Adorno, *Aesthetic Theory*, trans. by Christian Lenhardt (London: Routledge and Kegan, 1984), p. 31.

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heteronomy. Because autonomy, historically recent as it is, is weaker than the accumulated force of the immutable and is therefore liable to regress."[29] To the extent that art, through the compulsion toward newness, enters into the guilt complex of society, the boundary between it and heteronomy, the law of the culture industry, also becomes unstable. "The more they [works of art] sought to free themselves from external purposes, the more they became subject to self-posited principles of organizing the creative process. Thus they reflected and internalized the domination of society. If this is kept in mind, it becomes impossible to criticize the culture industry without criticizing art at the same time."[30] Nevertheless, Adorno holds tightly to this boundary and analyzes the process of de-aestheticization primarily on the level of reception (beginning in his essay "On the Fetish Character in Music and Regression of Listening.") Insofar as he differentiates the analysis of reception from the philosophical aesthetics which deciphers the contents of works of art, he can continue to consider the sphere of the work under the concept of autonomy; the work of art is free from the taint of reification. The capacity for resistance of works of art can be measured by the extent of their refusal to communicate. To the extent that they block themselves off from application, close themselves up in silence, they oppose themselves to the need for utilization. Adorno invokes the "hermetic essence of art, which is the notion evocated by Hölderlin that art must refuse to heed any demands for practical utility." For, "[w]hat is called communication today is the adaptation of spirit to useful aims, and worse, to commodity fetishism."[31] The conformity of the mind to the useful, imposed upon it by the commodity form, designates, however, the path of the culture industry.

Adorno's idiosyncratic resistance to the explanation of works of art, along with his insistence upon the enigmatic character of art, now becomes understandable. The incomprehensibility of the hermetic works of modernism also alters, according to Adorno, the status of already canonized works of art; these works, as a consequence of the shock unleashed by the esoteric of the new works, win back their original incomprehensibility. Adorno's hope, directed against his time, is that the works which have been "certified by tradition and public opinion as understood" might "underneath their veneer of intelligibility withdraw back into themselves and become completely

29. *Ibid.*, p. 338.

30. *Ibid.*, p. 26. If one accepts Adorno's critique of the category of the new, then Jameson's claim — against Adorno — of a "structural dependency" between art and the culture industry is not very far from Adorno's own position: she compulsion toward newness can be extended to Jameson's characterization of aesthetic modernism as reactive, by which he means the resistance of (esoteric) art to the commodity form. Thus, his critique of Adorno does not seem entirely convincing. Cf. Fredric Jameson, "Reification and Utopia in Mass Culture" in *Social Text* 1 (Winter, 1979).

31. Adorno, *Aesthetic Theory*, *op. cit.*, p. 109. At this point one could question Wellmer's attempt at reformulating Adorno's aesthetic in terms of a theory of communicative action. Cf. Albrecht Wellmer, "Truth, Semblance and Reconciliation: Adorno's Aesthetic Redemption of Modernity," in *Telos* 62 (Winter 1984-85), pp. 89-116.

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incomprehensible."[32] The "inflation of discourse," so it seems, has made this hope moot. The unsettling ambivalence of communication has become manifest. By communicatively apprehending the essential freedom of modernist art, turning its abstract and hermetic character back into something familiar, the discourse of interpretation silences the protest of modernist art. Canonization always brings with it a restorative element. However much interpretation seeks to lead art into the universality in which it ideally participates, interpretation nevertheless forces art into institutionalized conceptions. The discourse subjugates art to the principle of utilization.

The aestheticization of everyday life weakens art in a different way; this process has as its final goal the elimination of the distance between art and life upon which the critical potential of autonomous art was based.[33] Expression disintegrates in the face of the universality of the aesthetic. The protest of art becomes dulled when form is everywhere. For, "the concept of form draws a qualitative and antagonistic dividing line between art and empirical life, the modern variety of which is denying art the right to exist. In this situation, art's fortunes are tied to those of form: they will live or die together."[34] Where everything is "styled," art does not have a chance. Art is then no longer the other to society. In the social criticism of the American Left appears the horrific vision of what Günter Anders has called an "image-ridden world" which no one can escape: "No society has ever been as saturated with signs and messages as this one. If we accept Debord's thesis of the ever-present and all-powerful imagery of today's consumer capitalism, then the priorities of the real appear totally reversed and everything is mediated by culture."[35] The explosive contents of aesthetic modernism are deactivated by a society in which even advertisements tend toward "l'art pour l'art." The example of the magazines beginning to accompany the larger newspapers show that they only indirectly serve to increase sales; more importantly, they participate in a pure representation of economic power.

The weakening of the institution of art affects not only aesthetic modernism, but also the cultural tradition as a whole. The development of museums in the U.S. seems to confirm critical theory's assertion that tradition is funda-

32. Adorno, *Aesthetic Theory*, *op. cit.*, p. 179.

33. Insight into the negativity of his historical development is provided by Marcuse, who in the sixties defended the power for social transformation of the new subjectivity in *Essay on Liberation*, but was moved in the early seventies to change his position and insist on the autonomy of art.

34. Adorno, *Aesthetic Theory*, *op. cit.*, p. 205.

35. Jameson, "Reification and Utopia in Mass Culture," *op. cit.*, p. 125. Jameson refers to Guy Debord's *The Society of the Spectacle*, (Detroit: Black & Red, 1977). The more complex, more precise and earlier analysis of media society by Günther Anders, *Die Antiquiertheit des Menschen* (1956) does not seem to have attracted critical attention. Yet, Anders anticipated important insights such as the ideas of the fragmentation of time and the fictionalization of reality through television-produced phantom-images which allowed fiction to appear as reality. (TV series protagonists become real partners in the emotional life of viewers). One of Anders's central theses appears almost word for word in Postman: "that the world, *as* world, disappears when all of its nearby and far-away regions appear to us to be at the same uniform distance: *Die Antiquiertheit des Menschen,* (Munich, 1980), p. 120; cf. Neil Postman, *Das Verschwinden der Kindheit*, (Frankfurt, 1983).

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mentally incompatible with bourgeois society.[36] Several of the larger museums in the U.S. are already being run according to business criteria. New in this development is not so much the expansion of secondary establishments such as cafes, restaurants, shops, etc. as the fact that individual exhibition pieces are being evaluated according to their usefulness. Many museums regularly perform audits; a computer, in which the pieces are entered according to frequency of exhibition, scientific value, etc., selects out the less attractive pieces and designates a part of the collection as open for sale. The proceeds from the sale of these less profitable pieces can then be used for new acquisitions.[37] That preservation, along with collecting, was considered one of the most important tasks of the museum in the great era of their founding throughout the 19th century does not have to be emphasized in order for one to notice the change currently taking place.

The inclination to overemphasis which is frequently felt in the contemporary analyses of American social critics is probably due in part to the fact that the authors, in whom a vehement and almost conservative culture-critical gesture conflicts with a historico-philosophical base disposition, cannot direct their discontent with the present situation against an "enemy." In contrast, neo-conservatives, who combine a fundamentally affirmative stance on social modernization with a rejection of cultural modernism, have such a target. In the "new class" of intellectuals, neo-conservatives have found an opponent whom they can make responsible for the "straining of cultural resources."[38] The leftist intellectuals opposing the conservative call for a return to traditional values and norms find themselves in a paradoxical situation: the dichotomy of culture is for them the expression of inequality and is subject to criticism. The tendency toward a leveling out of the gap between high and low culture which they locate in postmodernism appears to them, not as the promising sign of a cultural transformation but, like the aestheticization of everyday life, as the false sublation of the autonomy of art. Only now does it become clear why they might blame the intentions of the historical avant-garde for the realization in American society of the avant-garde project of a sublation of art into life practice —a realization which has been shortchanged of a genuine transformation in social life. Leftist intellectuals fall in this way into a dangerous proximity with the neo-conservative talk of the subversive effect of the avant-garde even if they clearly do not share this evaluation.

36. "Bourgeois society is ruled universally by the law of exchange, the 'same for the same' of calculations which come to an end without leaving anything behind. Exchange is in its essence something timeless [. . .] This means nothing less than that remembrance, time, and memory, as a sort of irrational reminder, become liquidated by the advancing bourgeois society itself." (Adorno, "Was bedeutet: Aufarbeitung der Vergangenheit" in Adorno, *Erziehung zur Mündigkeit* [. . .], ed. G. Kadelbach, (Frankfurt a.M., 1977).

37. Cf. A. Herbst, "Reklame und Kunst [. . .]" in *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* 67, March 20, 1986, p. 25.

38. Jürgen Habermas, "Neo-Conservative cultural Criticism in the United States and West Germany," in *Telos* 56 (Summer 1983), pp. 75-89; Helmut Dubiel, *Was ist Neoconservatismus?*, *op. cit.*; Jameson, "The Politics of Theory," *op. cit.*

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Open Questions.

The question of a tie between a describable aestheticization of everyday life and the de-aestheticization of art is of immediate interest to the extent that the discussion of the cultural hegemony of the U.S. over Europe seems well-founded and one is willing to take seriously the previously quoted warning from Postman. It is important to distinguish in the American discussion of postmodernism between the description of surface phenomena and their *interpretation*. As apt as the previously discussed analyses may be as descriptions of current trends, one might still ask whether many of the interpretations and conclusions can be explained by the neoconservative climate of the Reagan era. To pose the question in our terms; can one really speak of a disappearance of the institution of art? One could almost defend the counter-thesis and claim that the more similar the products of art and of the culture industry become, and the more art and everyday life blend into each other (with many products of pop-art the difference has indeed been reduced to the signature of the artist), then the institution must mark off the distinction all the more sharply. For, only the product signed by Warhol has —as a work of art— aesthetic value, not the Campbell Corporation's advertisement.[39] The situation becomes absurd in an extreme case where the same object, which has value within the framework of the institution of art, may outside of this framework be simply an everyday object, even though it has the same empirical qualities. The justified critique of this absurdity is invalidated by a double mechanism: the museum and art criticism. The positing of something as a work of art becomes, in the wake of the de-aestheticization of art, itself an expressive act by which the aesthetic work constitutes itself. (It must be emphasized that we are dealing here not with a critique of this development, but a problematization of the thesis of the tendential sublation of art in an aesthetic of the everyday).

Certain assessment difficulties in the postmodernism discussion become understandable when one takes into account that the phenomena which are being focused upon are difficult to judge. Reality itself is ambiguous. Consider the example of the new museum culture. It offers itself because of the very visible change which is occurring: while museum architecture used to obey functional principles, new museum buildings themselves are now being conceived as works of art. Architects and museum directors are operating frequently with the concept of the total work of art. The museum is meant to be "the potential total work of art of the twentieth century," taking the place of temples and cathedrals.[40] Within a well calculated setting, the exhibitions become part of a unified aesthetic production. The stance suggested by the museum architecture, as if the avant-garde had never existed, is one of silent consideration, of contemplation. Even if the single work of art in this case

39. Cf. also the cutting critique of pop art in H. Platschek, *Engel bringt das Gewünschte. Kunst, Neokunst, Kunstmarktkunst*, (Stuttgart, 1978), pp. 11-29.

40. J. Cladders, director of the *Museum Abteiberg* (Mönchengladbach), quoted by M. Müller, "Vom 'Schönen Schein,' " in *Werk, Bauen + Wohnen*, Nr. 12 (1985), p. 53.

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only fulfills a certain function within an architectural total work of art, we are dealing, at first glance, with a strengthening of the institution of art, hitherto hardly considered possible.

The simultaneous replacement of the old notion of the museum with the new one of "museum culture" demonstrates that we are being confronted with changes of unpredictable dimensions. One can claim, at any rate, that the new museum practices direct themselves against the reformist museum politics of the seventies, which, in the form of the didactic exhibition developed at that time, allied itself with the social process of democratization. The museum culture of the eighties, on the other hand, falls in with the unmistakeable trend toward hedonism. Whoever has been in the halls of *Dokumenta 7*, which helped the Expressionism of the "Neue Wilden" to make its breakthrough, will have experienced how the paintings pale before the fantastic self-exhibitions of the young visitors, whose own bodies serve as objects of aesthetic creation. One may then ask whether the boundaries of the institution of art can still be drawn.

The tendency toward universal aestheticization changes not only the demeanor of visitors of museums and exhibitions; this change is also evident in the architectural attitude underlying the physical construction of museums. The following description of a part of the *Museum Abteiberg* designed by the Viennese architect Hans Hollein makes this especially clear: "One of the 'houses' which one reaches from the urban setting of the entrance hall is the cafeteria of the museum. This otherwise profane location opens on a wall with a large square window. It provides a view of a truly magnificent architectural and natural landscape: a Gothic church on a cliff surrounded by old trees. The window forms itself around this view into reality like a large picture frame. The mode of perception which dominates at this location is without a doubt the primary one for the museum and is carefully worked out. It transforms the outer world into an aesthetic world, won back into the perspective of the museum. Reality thereby becomes itself a staged scene; the Gothic church on the cliff becomes a pictorial citation of itself. The total work of art created by Hollein incorporates reality piecemeal into its plan. At the same time, it seeks to demonstrate how reality can be seen."[41] From the totalizing viewpoint of the museum, the whole world appears to be aesthetic. The concept of the total work of art attains here its full significance; the museum would be the place of cultivation of the aesthetic-hedonistic attitude necessary for the functioning of consumer society. Such an interpretation would support the American diagnoses: the disappearance of art and the aestheticization of reality would be two sides of an inexorable historical process.[42]

41. *Ibid.*, p. 58.

42. For the architectural theorist Heinrich Klotz the new museum constructions consequently correspond to the demands of a leisure time society "which is still ready to sink contemplatively into the single work of art, but which simultaneously demands an atmospheric stimulation which does not come from the single art object, but from the entire museum as a total work

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Yet, we have only considered one side of the new museum culture. When we ask about the participants, we receive a different answer, the U.S. again leading the way. In recent years, we have seen how ever increasing, sometimes startling, prices are paid, not only for already canonized works, but —and this is new— also for works by living, even young, artists. One can certainly argue that the boom of the "Neue Wilden" has nothing to do with art, but is rather a pure market phenomenon to be explained by the existence of large quantities of uninvested dollars. This argument is not completely convincing insofar as, not any works of art, but only certain ones are able to command such high prices ("world art prices"), i.e., those works which buyers presume to be secure investments —art is indeed an economic sector which has up to now never experienced any major collapses. Such works can only be valuable as investments if they are bought by the large international museums, which not only clear the market, but more importantly guarantee the aesthetic value of objects. Even if one is of the opinion that aesthetic options have become arbitrary, one must admit that the described situation speaks for the vitality of the institution of art.

One other observation also speaks for this vitality. As Bourdieu has shown, bourgeois society tends to "naturalize" inequalities based on individual class position by setting up differences in the realm of culture.[43] Indeed, current museum politics seem to aim at reversing the democratization process introduced in the seventies, not only by way of the high entrance fees for the large exhibitions, but also through a series of newly developed inequalities and privileges. So, e.g., the paying members or sponsors of large American museums can take advantage of specially reserved visiting hours —a real privilege in light of the growing queues for the ever-more spectacular exhibitions. This, however, would signify a strengthening of the institution of art, and from two viewpoints; the dynamic of one-up-manship of the large international exhibitions (and of art tourism) guarantees the presentation of auratic works of art; museum economics entrench the cultural inequality upon which the dichotomy of art and culture industry is based. If these considerations are at all plausible, then the current situation of art is not nearly as clear-cut as the American theorists of postmodernism have presented it. On the contrary, in addition to the definite tendencies toward a dissolution of the institution of art, other tendencies are evident which demonstrate its recent vitality.

of art." Introduction to H. Klotz and W. Krase eds., *Neue Museumsbauten in der Bundesrepublik*, (Frankfurt a.M. and Stuttgart, 1985), p. 20.

43. Pierre Bourdieu, *Distinction: a Social Critique of the Judgment of Taste*, tr. by Richard Nice, (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard Univ. Press, 1984).

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

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

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SYMPOSIUM ON *SOVIET PEASANTS*

In 1981, an extraordinary work, written by Lev Timofeev, was smuggled to the West and immediately printed in Russian. It has now been translated into English for the first time under the title *Soviet Peasants (or: The Peasants' Art of Starving)*.[1] The book is a rare exercise in social anthropology inasmuch as Timofeev manages to bring together an expert's knowledge of Soviet agricultural policy with penetrating observations on the everyday life of peasants based on his own direct experience of the Russian countryside. Most of what Timofeev reveals about the economic, social, and moral quality of life in the USSR are things which have long been hidden (or denied) by Soviet authorities. Partly for this reason, the book has provoked some discussion in Europe since its appearance; and in the USSR Timofeev has recently been arrested and sentenced to prison for having written the book in the first place.

In order to better introduce *Soviet Peasants* to an English-speaking readership, we have solicited comments from the following individuals. Each has briefly recorded his own response to the book, both positive and negative; each has also explained why the work is significant, given what it elucidates about the larger dimensions of Soviet or Eastern European society today. This symposium also includes a "biographical note" by one of the editors of the book, Victor Zaslavsky, to clarify the strange circumstances surrounding this publication.

David Gross

LEV MIKHAILOVICH TIMOFEEV: A BIOGRAPHICAL NOTE

In preparing Timofeev's *Soviet Peasants* for publication, the editors deliberately misled the readers about the true identity of the author. We owe the readers an apology and an explanation, the more so now that Timofeev has started serving his 11-year term for "slandering the Soviet state and anti-Soviet propaganda."

The manuscript on Soviet peasants authored by a "Lev Timofeev" arrived in the West from the Soviet Union in 1980 and was immediately published by two Russian-language journals in Belgium and West Germany. Timofeev's work clearly stood out against the background of the late 1970's Soviet dissident writings because of the author's profound knowledge of everday life and conditions of Soviet collective farmers, because of his access to data and materials deemed classified and thus inaccessible to ordinary Soviet scholars, and because of his skilled and highly unusual analysis of the Kolkhoz system as a black market economy.

Timofeev, etymologically son of Timothy, is a very common Russian name, and readers inevitably assumed it to be simply a pseudonym of a Soviet dissident scholar, hiding from the KGB. In 1982, in publishing the Italian edition of the book, I learned, to my great surprise, that Timofeev was the author's real name. Moreover, when

1. This symposium has been organized and edited by David Gross. Lev Timofeev, *Soviet Peasants (or: The Peasants' Art of Starving)*, trans. Jean Alexander and Alexander Zaslavsky, edited with an introduction by Armando Pitassio and Victor Zaslavsky (Telos Press: New York, 1985).

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approached by a common acquaintance, the author suggested that editors should stress that Timofeev was but a pen-name for a Soviet agricultural specialist. Timofeev's ruse proved to be quite ingenious. After all, it would have been highly improbable for KGB analysts to imagine that the author of this sober and sophisticated analysis of the Soviet agriculture and the Soviet system in general was actually published under his own name.

Timofeev survived unscathed the last years of Brezhnev's rule, as well as Andropov's and Chernenko's periods. During these years he managed to publish in the West two other manuscripts — a pamphlet "The Last Hope to Survive" (1983), a bitter indictment of present day Soviet society, and a play "Moscow, the Epiphany" (1984). In March or April 1985 Timofeev was arrested. The news of his arrest reached the West in the end of June after Telos Press had published Timofeev's *Soviet Peasants* still introducing Timofeev as a mere pseudonym.

Lev Timofeev's biography is somewhat extraordinary even by Soviet standards. In 1960 he graduated from the well-known Moscow Institute of International Relations, which is probably the most prestigious Soviet university open mainly to the children of the Soviet elite, and meant to educate future members of the *nomenklatura*. Thus, the children of Molotov, Andropov, Gromyko and other party leaders, ministers and lesser officials graduated from the MIIR. Timofeev specialized in foreign trade and his career was predictable. Upon graduation, he joined the party and became a collaborator and then member of the editorial board of the influential journal *Young Communist*. Naturally, he was likely to be promoted to even higher ranks of the Soviet political elite. But in 1978 40-year-old Timofeev had dramatically changed his life's trajectory. He left his prestigious and well-paid job at the *Young Communist* and became a simple sailor in the Soviet Far East trawler fleet. Later, he returned to Moscow and tried other jobs including trade inspector and private tutor. While still a member of the powerful "Union of Journalists," Timofeev obtained permission to buy a small house in the village of Zhelannoe, in the Kaluga district. There, during his prolonged stays in central Russia, he studied firsthand the life of Soviet peasants and wrote his book on the subject.

Timofeev's last published work, the play "Moscow, the Epiphany" (*Vremya i my*, 79, 1984) in which he highlights the situation of Soviet dissident intellectuals, has an obviously autobiographic character. The play is structured as a dialogue between an author, who clandestinely published a book abroad, and his wife. The two protagonists — clearly Timofeev and his wife — try to understand the source of their predicament and come to terms with their social situation. The problem is not so much that they were both deprived of their jobs without any savings, with two small children to support and forced to live on the verge of hunger selling books, pawning clothes and anticipating the moment when there will be nothing to sell or pawn. It is not even the tremendous burden of imminent arrest and imprisonment which obviously drains their physical and intellectual strength to live and work. The real problem is their awareness of the sheer futility of their efforts, of fear and indifference of the people around and of the hopeless situation of their society. "If I am a journalist who studied the system and understood how it operates, I cannot go on staying silent any longer. It is utterly humiliating" — this is how the author in the play justifies his sending the manuscript abroad as the only way to see it published. But he does not receive much support. Having read the manuscript, the author's friend exclaims: "Well, you are suicidal, this I can understand . . . but why don't you think about what is going to happen to your wife and children, you beast!" Even the author's wife is not fully suppor-

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tive: She reminds him that, as an official journalist, he always tried to defend "decent people from the attacks of the scum" and to tell the truth within the limits of the possible. Having published abroad, he lost all these possibilities while his book is no more accessible to the Soviet population than heavily jammed Russian-language broadcasts of the Western radio. The author's wife in the play describes herself as a Russian who learned how to resist lies but could not liberate herself of fear. She feels that they are alone, surrounded by gangsters, and constantly in fear of "them" entering during the night and killing all the family — including her little daughters. And no one will help.

Timofeev's play is grim and prophetic. A few months after its publication he was arrested and then sentenced to six years' hard labor and five years' internal exile. Timofeev's arrest and trial which happened during the honeymoon between Gorbachev, the reformer, and the Western mass media, remained largely unnoticed. *The New York Times*, however, published a letter by John Macrae and Jeri Laber, respectively chairman and executive director of the International Freedom to Publish Committee of the Association of American Publishers, where they wrote: "We were especially shocked because on the very day of Mr. Timofeev's secret trial — September 13 — members of our committee were in Moscow at the Fifth International Moscow Book Fair. We cannot reconcile that at the moment that efforts to renew literary contacts were being made by both Russians and Americans, a Russian writer was convicted of 'anti-Soviet activity' merely for publishing his works abroad." (*The New York Times*, December 9, 1985).

The extremely harsh sentence passed onto Timofeev can be easily explained. First, he did not repent during the half a year of interrogation, in spite of all pressures and attempts to break him. Secondly, he was treated as a traitor to the interests of the *nomenklatura* into whose ranks he was initially accepted and whose privileges he ungratefully denounced in his publications abroad. Thirdly, Timofeev's sentence serves as a stern warning to all those intellectuals who, during the period of the proclaimed "radical change" in the Soviet economy, could delude themselves into believing that their criticisms and uninvited reform programs could be of some use to the new generation of Soviet leaders.

Victor Zaslavsky

Tim Luke:

The translation of Timofeev's text provides Western readers with an incisive portrait of the Kolkhoz system in present-day Soviet agriculture. Timofeev's first-hand observations of the kolkhozniks' living and working conditions starkly reveal why centrally planned agriculture persists as a system of control. His analysis also provides a subtle understanding of how individual peasant households survive in the neo-Stalinist state. While recognizing that the political economy of the Soviet regime is virtually incapable of reform, he addresses his critique to the dissident intelligentsia, reminding them that their relative privileges rest upon the systematic exploitation of the kolkhozniks. Therefore, any transformation in Soviet society can only grow out of a new alliance of the intelligentsia with the rural and urban working classes.

Timofeev's book is intellectually and politically significant because it raises a num-

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ber of issues crucial to any current consideration of Soviet politics and society. Virtually everyone is aware of the USSR's chronic agricultural problems. In part, they can be traced to the simple geographical disposition of its lands, which result in a shorter growing season, lesser productivity, and limited arability. Along with these natural constraints, the technological base of Soviet agriculture has not taken full advantage of many modern agricultural, product storage, and food processing techniques. Yet, even with these shortcomings, the organization and institutions of the Soviet state persist as the ultimate source of agriculture's biggest problems. Many others have commented upon Moscow's stranglehold over Soviet farming, but Timofeev's study richly details the impact of these state institutions on the everyday life of individual peasants.

One can argue the real significance of Timofeev's work derives from his unique ethnographic approach. Of course, in a strict methodological sense like all ethnographies, Timofeev's micrological observations are limited. He only worked for a comparatively short time among the inhabitants of one village in a single kolkhoz. Nonetheless, he does compare and contrast the microstructures of this village's political economy with other nearby villages, with agricultural data from other union republics, and with the living standards of Soviet urban areas. Consequently, Timofeev broadens the scope of his "ethnographic" treatment into a convincing, macrological critique of Soviet agriculture in general. He fuses his micrology of the village with a macrology of "actually existing socialism." Thus, he draws a careful description of the two workplaces and the two workdays that kolkhozniks must accept — one for the state and one for themselves — simply to survive. By taking resources from the kolkhoz, and employment labor that the state does not fully mobilize, peasant households produce an essential surplus on their private plots to consume and sell themselves. The mode of survival is submitting to the logic of black markets: cheating the state that cheats you into cheating itself.

At the bottom line, Timofeev's book must strike a chord in anyone who reads it because it asks the critical question about the kolkhoz system: who, whom? Who dominates whom, and who benefits most fully from the networks of domination? Timofeev's entire discussion of the kolkhozniks' misery leads to the doorsteps of "the party bureaucracy, the three million functionaries of the party apparatus and its agencies of propaganda and repression. They are the ruling structure, the preservers of the stability of the established socio-political and economic system" (p. 123). The main problem that the Soviet peasantry faces in the near future, in turn, is the same one it has faced for many decades: the state.

The ruling structure maintains its power over the peasantry and all other classes by arbitrarily setting the "price for the economic system's most important commodity — labor" (p. 128). From this valorizing act, an entire political economy unfolds. In the case of Soviet peasants, the value placed on their labor is set at close to zero; thus, "the standard of living considered necessary for satisfying individual needs can . . . be reduced to practically nothing, to labor-camp rations" (p. 153). In the case of the *nomenklatura*, however, the value placed on its own labor is exorbitantly high, forcing the party and state apparatus to extract tremendous resources from the peasants, workers and non-party intelligentsia to sustain its privileges. The low value that the ruling strata place on the peasantry's labor compels kolkhoznik households to work an extra day everyday on their private plots, which compensates both for their underpayment and for the institutionally induced low productivity of the kolkhoz. By these mechanisms, the toiling masses are forced into the black market in goods and services to

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produce the essential surpluses that guarantee material privileges for the *nomenklatura*.

A perverted symmetry or ironic symbiosis, then, emerges from the political economy of bureaucratic centralism. The typical Soviet worker and peasant simply cannot earn enough by working eight-hour days to satisfy their material needs: "not enough to buy meat through the back door, buy shoes from a speculator, and give bribes when necessary to obtain essential goods. Therefore, he has to work overtime at his job, or look for extra work on the side, or steal, or spend time growing vegetables in his own garden. He cannot survive without supplementing his regular 'planned' work by selling his labor on the illicit black market. Neither could the professional politicians maintain the system's stability without purchasing 'unplanned' black-market labor" (pp. 150-151). Despite its apparent economic irrationalities, these networks of exchange insure the power of the ruling structures. By inefficiently undervaluing labor, the command economy "plans" upon rational expectations leading to the manifold "unplanned" black markets that efficiently compensate for "undervalued labor" with "overemployed workers." Therefore, as Timofeev observes, the *kolkhoznik* and *apparatchik* follow the same calculus of choice: "just as a peasant living off his individual plot can ignore the success or failure of production on the collective farm, a party official living off the black market can afford to ignore the state of the economy as a whole. He has a personal plot of his own — the privileges and perks of office. He does not have to concern himself with the nitty-gritty of commerce. His job is to extract as much as possible for the state, and the state takes care of him. He keeps close watch on his own interests as well, of course" (p. 131). Although no one has a vested interest in making the official economy work well, everyone has a big stake in protecting their corner in the underground economy that enables the official economy to sputter along but obviates the imperatives of reforming it.

In the end, Timofeev's Marxian critique of class, power and privilege in the USSR ironically culminates in a profession of faith for the market. Echoing sentiments that Friedrich von Hayek, George Gilder or Ronald Reagan would strongly endorse, Timofeev asks, "Is it so difficult to comprehend the abundance that would result if the crippling prohibitions on personal initiative were removed?" (p. 136). Here, he points to the limited reforms of I.N. Khudenko, who instituted a number of experimental entrepreneurial practices in kolkhoz management "by giving the worker a direct material interest in the final result of his labor" (p. 139).

With these innovations, however, Timofeev also admits that Khudenko would have forced Moscow into perilous new relations of production, involving relatively free exchange, unplannable markets, and open trade with the kolkhozniks.This path, which once was identified with the late Lenin, Bukharin and the NEP, is dangerous. For the *nomenklatura*, "to become a trading partner means to let go of the absolute privilege of power. To make a peasant into a trading partner means to give him breathing space, a sense of self-worth and the opportunity to develop civic awareness" (p. 139). Despite his faith in the market, Timofeev admits that "market Marxism-Leninism" consequently is a non-starter. "Considering the gallery of mediocrities admitted to the ruling structure over the years . . . who would agree to such a fate? Khudenko was a naive dreamer, a sacrificial hero" (p. 139). In Timofeev's analysis, nothing short of a new mass movement of the workers, peasants, and critical intelligentsia against the ruling party structure offers much hope for the millions of kolkhozniks. The chances, however, for such a movement developing now in the USSR are nearly non-existent. On this score, Timofeev's faith in the market and the masses make him a much more naive dreamer than Khundenko.

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While the forthcoming new party program and 27th Congress might embrace "agricultural reform," it seems unlikely that anything like Bukharinism or NEP agricultural practices will re-emerge in the USSR. The penchant of the Gorbachev regime for limited reforms might permit some domesticated strain of a "guided responsibility" system to develop in certain areas. Andropov's personal interests, for example, in the comparatively more open organization of Hungarian agricultural cooperatives were the first tentative signs of such "reformism," which is motivated purely by an interest in boosting agricultural productivity and efficiency. Yet, as seems to be the case now with the Chinese experiments of Deng Zaioping, any grafting of a few new "capitalist" sprouts to the trunk of entrenched bureaucratic centralism is unlikely to wither the deep roots of the staunchly neo-Stalinist state.

Steven Sampson:

In their introduction to Timofeev's book, Pitassio and Zaslavsky claim that *Soviet Peasants* is a work of social anthropology. This claim is exaggerated. Timofeev has too few real informants to make his work truly anthropological. His case material is limited, and much of his sympathy borders on the sentimental and even the patronizing when he describes the "tyranny of custom" in Russian villages. Moreover, his exposé-journalistic style and polemical tone do not lend themselves to the kind of intensive analysis typical of anthropological studies of Soviet or East European peasant life. The real value of Timofeev's book lies not in its anthropology but in its description of the political economy of the Soviet system. Timofeev integrates what seem to be three disparate phenomena into a single scheme of analysis. He shows how the collective farm is linked to the private plot, how the state planning system is tied to the black market, and how well-off, apparently contented, peasants can coexist with the drudgery, alcoholism and personal degradation of Soviet village life. Although all three of these aspects are important, what seems most relevant here is the importance of the "personal plot" not only as an economic reality but as a whole way of thinking about life in the USSR and in Eastern Europe. In fact, the "personal plot" mentality undergirds all sectors of socialist life.

Specifically, the personal plot as Timofeev discusses it is the small piece of land given to the collective farm peasants as usufruct, but it also includes the garden lands attached to the peasant household, and the animals which the peasants keep privately. The products of this household enterprise are consumed by the peasants themselves, sold to the state on contract or marketed in the towns.

The private plot is essential for both the kolkhoz and the peasant household. By "paying" collective farmers with usufruct rights to the plots, the kolkhoz can send larger portions of its surplus product directly into state coffers. For the peasants, the personal plot is their only motive for remaining on the collective farm. Without the plots, the collective would have no work force, the peasants no sustenance, and the urban workers no food. Hence, the personal plot and the new forms of contract labor systems in agriculture (essentially sharecropping) are not islands of peasant initiative but more insidious forms of exploitation. In order to survive, kolkhozniks must work what amounts to a second shift, and they must call on the labor of children, aged parents, and husbands working in industry.

The Soviet system of official, formal, state institutions on the one hand, and unoffi-

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cial, personal, household survival strategies (based on the personal plot) on the other, has had profound moral consequences. Timofeev speaks, for example, of the problem of "theft," of peasants who reluctantly send their children out to steal from the kolkhoz. Yet the notion of "theft" is Timofeev's. Most peasants are quite aware of the difference between stealing from the state and stealing from individuals. The former is not theft, but simply taking one's share, something European peasant-poachers have been doing for centuries. Soviet peasants do not work *for* the collective farm but *on* the collective farm *for* the benefit of their household.

Peasants are faced with the dilemma of undermining the same moral values which they hold dear (work, respect for property, trust). This social schizophrenia leads to what Timofeev calls "pathologies of consciousness (nervousness, psychological illness) and behavior (alcoholism, violence, rudeness, hooliganism, rape)." Supported by some questionable statistics, Timofeev states that peasant youth have higher rates of psychic disorder, and that villagers have more murder, alcoholism, and moral depravity than do city dwellers. However, traditions of rural violence, alcoholism, murder and even group rape predate the kolkhoz, being part of long-standing peasant reactions to an oppressive state apparatus. Moreover, the assertion that rural areas have higher levels of deviance contradicts most other studies from Eastern Europe. Instead of the village, the centers of alcoholism, violence, depravity, and psychic disorder tend to be found within the new workers' colonies, among recently arrived migrants, or in rapidly urbanizing villages. While life among Soviet peasants is undoubtedly nasty, brutish and short, the village also seems to offer some degree of social security, just as the peasant household provides a degree of autonomy from the worst features of real socialism.

Althouth Timofeev's book focuses on the peasantry, he mentions in a footnote that there is "a personal plot economy for millions of urbanites" in the Soviet Union (p. 115). The idea of a "personal plot" (which might here be broadened to mean the *entire mental disposition* which leads people to evade or subvert formal bureaucratic institutions) can serve as a useful way of understanding how actually existing socialism operates on a day to day basis. The major concerns and daily activities of most East Europeans center around finding and cultivating their "personal plot." The sales clerk selling goods under the counter, the worker pilfering parts, the truck driver taking private passengers, the party official who "arranges" residence permits, the professor who gets his nephew into the Law Faculty, all are, in effect, cultivating their "personal plots."

Like Timofeev's kolkhoz peasants, urbanites need their "plots" to supplement the inadequate wages and resources supplied by the formal system. And just as the peasants try to squeeze every last bit out of their tiny agricultural plots, Eastern Europe's workers, functionaries and intellectuals do the same — from the illegal caviar canners in the Soviet Union right down to the kiosk woman in the Romanian hotel who rents her only copy of *Newsweek* to the locals by the hour until she is finally forced to sell it to a foreign tourist. Like the peasants' personal plots, the personal plot economies of East Europeans are also manipulated by the state. Periodic "discipline campaigns" or anti-corruption measures do not really restore discipline, increase labor productivity or reduce waste. Rather, such measures re-set the limits of how large the personal plots can be, how much inventory can be pilfered, how much state labor time can be used for personal needs, etc. The state's only alternative to the personal plot is to legalize some parts of it. (Hence, the Hungarian "reform," whereby people now have the freedom to work 16 hours per day, and can thus blame themselves if they do not have the good things in life.)

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Personal plot *economies* lead to personal plot *societies*. At the top are those in the *nomenklatura* whose personal plots are administered by the state; they are supplied with special stores, apartments and services, what has been termed the "third economy."

Below these are citizens who cultivate their plots (i.e., pursue private or household interests) *within their formal occupations*. Included here would be the doctor who obtains extra gifts from patients, the party official who sells favors, the bus driver who takes payment but "forgets" to issue a ticket, or the construction crew which sells its services to private home builders. In effect, such people have two livelihoods within a single 8 hour day.

Still lower down in the hierarchy of personal plot societies are those whose needs can only be fulfilled by a "second shift." Timofeev's peasants who must first work on the kolkhoz brigade before they can start on their private plot is just one example. Factory workers who return home to their garden work is another, as are the various moonlighting craftsmen who work at private repairs or schoolteachers who do tutoring on the side. What differentiates Timofeev's peasants from others is the fact that they actually have to work during this first shift, whereas many other Eastern Europeans simply put in time at the work place ("We act like we work, they act like they pay us a wage.")

Finally, some people in personal plot societies do not have the possibilities to cultivate a private niche. The elderly, the sick, the wholly unskilled, the new migrants, the office clerk without the opportunity to deal with the public, the peasant who lives too far from the town to sell his or her produce, all are at the mercy of the state's wage system and must therefore depend on the grace of family, friends or colleagues. In personal plot societies, these people are the truly exploited; they lack both reasonable compensation by the state and the security net provided by a personal plot. Most of these people are not in a political position to articulate their discontent. When they do, however, the social consequences can be explosive. This was the case with the Polish shipyard workers and miners who lacked adequate compensation from either the first or second economies.

Personal plot societies also produce *personal plot moralities*. Close friends and superficial acquaintances are pressed into service to help "cultivate" plots. One who helps another altruistically may fall under suspicion; or worse, may create obligations which cannot be reciprocated. As Timofeev states: "a man sees himself as a living token of the black market and looks at others as black-market operators" (p.121). The public sphere, the bureaucracy, becomes part of nature, a place where resources can be appropriated when need be.

Under such conditions, the public sphere becomes the world of indifference, misrepresentation, apathy, fear and duplicity. One has a "job" but it is not necessarily where one "works." The workplace becomes a security blanket where one can rest, plan or literally sleep before going into action. Much of the actual work of Soviets and Eastern Europeans —exhausting, productive, satisfying, exhilarating, creative work— takes place only when they start cultivating their private plots. Yet, let us not be deceived by this inventiveness and ingenuity. Insofar as these regimes tacitly encourage the stealing, duplicity, and evasion which characterize much of life under socialism, they are turning what was once a *societal response* into a *"way of life."* Indifference toward the public sphere becomes a normative value. Those who do not treat the state as a collective forest, who do not steal when there is something to steal, will come to be regarded as "stupid." Society increasingly degenerates into competing bands, each trying to cultivate their personal plots, be they on a kolkhoz, in a butcher

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shop, at a construction site or in an office dispensing Moscow residence permits.

If Sennett were to rewrite *The Fall of Public Man*, he would find plenty of examples east (as well as west) of the Elbe of what an unhealthy public life looks like today.

Jim Scott:

To enter rural Russia with Timofeev as our intrepid, witty, caustic, and knowledgeable guide is to enter a Land of Oz. Nothing is quite as it seems. We meet and come to know the major players in a vast game for high stakes. The players are the peasant, particularly Aksinya Egoryevna, the official, and the state. The stakes for the peasant are food, work, cash, autonomy, and a modicum of security. The stakes for the official are status, bribes, income, and position. The stakes for the state are labor, foodgrains, taxes, and, before everything, political control. Our guide has no doubt that the state is winning and will continue to win, even at the cost of efficiency and production. By setting the groundrules by which the game is played, Timofeev argues, the peasant as 'artful dodger' gains merely the appearence of eluding the state's grasp while, in fact, his strategems on such a titled playing field merely contribute to the state's aims. I am not sure about this, but as a preface to my doubts it is necessary to sketch Timofeev's remarkable and powerful argument.

That argument begins with the purposes and results of collectivization and the liquidation of those labeled Kulaks beginning in 1929. The key problem that collectivization was designed to solve was the provisioning of the cities. A failure in this realm not only threatened plans for industrialization but the very survival of the Soviet state besieged by hungry workers and soldiers. Collectivization was *not*, then, an attempt to increase production — although fond hopes were entertained — but rather an effort to maximize the state's appropriation of rural production at confiscatory prices. The strategy pursued, even as it was a disaster for rural producers and for production, was a short-term success in terms of appropriation. It was also a short-term political success inasmuch as it destroyed both the pre-existing village community as well as an increasingly productive petty-bourgeois agricultural sector, and replaced them with a state organ of control and appropriation: the collective.

Here it is worth noting the nature of the hostility of real existing socialism and its rent-collective state to the petty bourgeoisie. The rentier-socialist state does not object to a small-holding peasantry on the basis of its efficiency and productivity. It has, after all, been shown again and again that small-holder agriculture, suitably provided with inputs, credit, and access to markets, almost always out-performs plantations on collectives in terms of production per unit of land. Nor would it appear that the rentier-socialist state objects to the *small* peasant property because it is an exploiting class. The vast majority of this class — and here one might include small traders, shopkeepers, independent artisans as well — are, as Chayanov long ago noted, mostly exploiters of themselves and of their families! They typically work sixteen-hour days for an effective wage that is below that of factory workers. They are likely to hire themselves out to others as much as they hire in labor during the busy planting harvest seasons.

No, the problem with the rural petty-bourgeois producers lies elsewhere. It lies in their autonomy from direct state control, their capacity to escape taxation, and their capacity, however limited, to withhold their surplus unless and until they are given something of comparable value in exchange. In a word, the petty bourgeois is notori-

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ously slippery — here today, gone tomorrow, hard to monitor, hiding their meagre profits, and eluding regimentation. No matter that they provide goods-and-services when and where they are needed to a mass of consumers at competitive prices. The great advantage, for the state, of the collective farm over a host of petty commodity producers is simply that it vastly facilitates the task of state appropriation.

Something else, however, is also at work in this attack on petty producers. How else are we to explain the effusion of official rhetoric in the late 1920s and in the 1930s which brings together the germ theory of disease and the campaign against the petty bourgeoisie — the talk of peasants having been "infected" with the petty bourgeois "bacillus"? It seems that the Stalinist state abhors any zone of cultural and social autonomy lest it become a zone of political resistance. The hostility to such autonomy would help explain state policies in most communist states against nomads, hill-tribes (Vietnam), and gypsies. Since fixed settlement patterns are a precondition of effective political control, great efforts have been made to create administrative settlements for such groups.

Timofeev's account of the contemporary rural economy hinges on the relation between the collective farm and miniscule personal plots to which all Kolkhoz members are entitled and on which they earn a vital share of their near-subsistence income. He is most assuredly correct in avoiding the term "private" for these plots inasmuch as they cannot be sold, inherited, or otherwise transferred. They are more like the "tied" cottages of 18th century rural England in the sense that they are provided only to those who work for the Kolkhoz. Timofeev's argument is basically that the collective pays, *by design*, less than a family subsistence wage, forcing the *Kolkhozniki* to labor mightily on their minute (also by design) personal plots in order to provide the necessary cash and foodstuffs to make good the short-fall of the family budget. The pattern thus permits the state to appropriate labor in the collective sector for less than a subsistence wage. At the same time it impels the peasantry to a paroxysm of self-exploitation on the personal plots which, in turn, provides much of the meat, vegetables, fruit, eggs and so on for non-farm customers. The state thus turns the neat trick of a double-exploitation of the same individual — first as underpaid Kolkhoz member and second as self-exploiting petty commodity producer. The author then points to "the obvious truth that our socialism lives off black-market 'micro-capitalism' " (p. 75).

At times Timofeev's tone indicates that this double workday is a cunning plot by the state. While condemning market relations in public, the state pushes the peasant onto the market with the products of his garden. Since the plots are so small, since the prices of necessities which the peasant must buy are fixed by the state, and since personal plot cooperatives are forbidden, this designed black market poses no threat to the state but rather sustains a parasitic collectivized sector by feeding the peasantry and much of the urban population.

All of this will sound strikingly familiar to students of plantation economies in the Third World, or for that matter in the *ante-bellum* U.S. South. It was the custom for such plantations to avoid, where possible, the full costs of the reproduction of the labor force. This was achieved, in the same fashion as in rural Russia, either by setting aside small garden plots for the labor force or else allowing the villages supplying labor to retain their minifudia plots. So long as flight was impossible or impractical (viz. internal passport system in Soviet Russia) this allowed the plantation enterprise to pay a wage below subsistence that was then made good by self-exploitation on the personal plot. The personal plot must on no account grow too large for then it would be impossible to recruit a labor force at all with such derisory wages. Where small-holding peasants

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could subsist on its own land, they had to be pried loose by confiscating most or all of their land or else taxing them at a level that would oblige them to take wage work on the plantation. The key is the size of the personal plot: not so small as to force the plantation (state) to pay a full subsistence wage and not so large as to allow the work force to escape into the petty bourgeoisie altogether. A collective farm director in the Tula region to whom Timofeev spoke was crystal clear about the danger: "If we rented land to the peasants or gave them a quarter of the potato harvest, who would do his assigned work?" "What would happen to norms and wage-rates?" "Do you mean we should break up the collective farms?" (p. 134). It appears from this account that the Soviet authorities have achieved just the right balance for their purposes. Subsistence needs are, on the historical evidence, perhaps the most effective work incentives known to man.

On the consequences of this vast Soviet experiment for the human material subjected to it, Timofeev's narrative is moving. The personal plot system is, he writes, "a colossal exploiter of children, the aged, and the invalid." "There are twelve million rural inhabitants who work nowhere but on these plots, of whom seven-and-a-half million are aged or adolescent." "The rest are mainly disabled or partially unfit for work or mothers of large families" (p. 80). We have here the contemporary rural Russian equivalent of the Hammonds' family of English weavers or Chayanov's artisan/flax-growing family working night and day for a marginal wage nearing zero in order to meet subsistence needs. The only difference is that the former are treading water in a system which describes itself as developed socialism; the latter were treading water under liberal capitalism. Elsewhere in his analysis, Timofeev attributes the high rates of alcoholism, delinquency, nervous disorders, physical debilitation, and early death to the system of rural production and exploitation.

This close-to-the-ground description is a riveting, persuasive and, in most respects, convincing indictment of state appropriation and exploitation. But has Timofeev proven his contention that it is all, in effect, a massive shell-game designed by the state in which the peasant, even when he thinks he is evading appropriation, is actually caught in a still larger and more cunning net? Yes and no. Yes, in the sense that the peasant (and the worker as well) must work double-days and overtime even on the black market to subsist within conditions fixed by the state monopoly over land, capital, and coercive force. Like the capitalist monopolist, the state can impose and collect monopoly rents as the price for subsistence. No, however, in the sense that the state can at the same time create a productive, efficient and stable state sector while paying less than subsistence wages. Timofeev's account itself gives ample evidence of how peasants and workers have, by their everyday resistance, crippled the state sector in which their labor is largely confiscated. The goods of the collective farm are privatized in the interest of subsistence, grain is stolen, machinery and parts are purloined, lumber is pilfered and used for housing, fertilizer is spirited away for private plots, trucks and equipment are used for personal income. Above all, that most precious commodity, labor time, is stolen in the form of low-productivity, footdragging, dissimulation, absenteeism and truancy.

All of this is accomplished by what appears to be a vast movement of complicity that has the marks of collective action even though it has no formal organization, banners, or manifestos. And yet it has massive effects which reach Gorbachev in the form of aggregate production statistics, much as the small acts of anthozoan polyps create willy-nilly a coral reef lying just beneath the surface. In a curious way, the officials of the collectives all the way down to clerks, drivers, agronomists, foremen, and technicians

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are themselves usually complicitous. They seldom resist the temptation of using their petty monopolies to sell their services or accept bribes for looking the other way. They themselves assert property rights in their offices as would-be petty-bourgeois producers whose commodity, in this case, is their small corner of state power. The consequence is a further leeching of the state sector's productivity.

What the peasantry achieves by these everyday forms of resistance within admittedly narrow constraints is a destructive power that comes, in part, at the cost of their own self-exploitation. And yet, they have eventually the potential of diverting the course of history. The recent shift to what the Chinese call the "responsibility system" which has improved peasant welfare was not a far-sighted move by a party elite sensible enough to try a variety of market socialism. It was *imposed* upon them by a fiscal crisis of state appropriation which the peasantry had brought about by its millions of petty "votes of no confidence." Observers of Third World development programs can similarly cite scores of disadvantageous schemes that peasants have ruined by nibbling away until they were abandoned. The collectivized agricultural sector of Vietnam — an even lower-income version of the Russian model — has similarly been brought to a grinding halt by a quiet form of what in Northern Europe used to be called "Irish democracy." These achievements, it must be emphasized, are often more costly for the saboteurs (malnutrition, starvation, detention, etc.) than they are for the state.

All I wish to assert here is that Russian peasants are, in this instance, historical actors rather than just dupes. They know the system — they *live* the system — and they conduct a daily plebiscite on the confiscation of their labor by their non-cooperation. They certainly do not have the power to enact reforms or reorganize the agrarian sector in a less exploitative way. What they can do, and *are* doing, however, is to determine what will not work.

*Alexis Berelowitch:**

Timofeev's book is important in the first instance because its author paid with his freedom for its publication in the West. Though other Russian authors have published abroad — one thinks of Pasternak, Bitov, or Iskander — none used their works, as Timofeev has, to make a frontal assault on the Soviet regime itself. By publishing his book under his own name Timofeev chose to violate prohibitions, fully aware that he was risking his social position and his liberty. This moral deed cannot but help arouse respect and admiration.

Soviet Peasants differs from most works by dissidents, for it ignores the favorite themes of the opposition (creative freedom, the fate of the intellectuals, etc.) and deals with a subject that is essential for the USSR: the situation of the peasants today.

The genre within which Timofeev has chosen to write belongs to the tradition of the "sketch" (*ocherk*) which dates back to the 18th century. Rejecting fiction on the one hand and "scientific objectivity" on the other, this type of literature speaks in the first person of economic, social, and moral problems. The *ocherk* combines observations made on the spot about "things seen," pictures, personal reflections, and general considerations. It sometimes tends toward literary fiction, travel notes, memoires, or the format of an economic or sociological treatise; often, in fact, it is all of these things at

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once. In a country where the social or political sciences are under continuous governmental surveillance, it is an appealing mode of expression for those who want to write about their nation's problems.

In *Soviet Peasants*, Timofeev's reflections are organized around three axes: the peasant's misery, the prominence of individual exploitation in agricultural production and in the peasants' income, and the black market as a basic component of Soviet socialism.

On the first point, the author clearly demonstrates the misery that prevails in the countryside, particularly the absence of services, the lack of medical care, the excessive mortality rates, famine, the crushing level of taxes, and the exhausting amount of labor necessary to sustain life from one year to the next. But this picture should perhaps be given some finer nuances. Since the 1960s, for example, the conditions of peasant life have been steadily improving, even if the peasant standard of living still remains much lower than that of the urbanite. The peasants now are guaranteed a minimum wage and various other retirement benefits, and have also obtained the right to a domestic passport.

Regarding the second point, Timofeev insists on the importance of the "individual plots of land" which, although occupying a minute percentage of the arable lands, provide one-third of the agricultural production. These numbers suffice to show the disaster which collectivation has been for Soviet agriculture. Timofeev stresses that the productivity of the family land is possibly due only to the intense labor of the peasant family, the over-exploitation of the peasant by himself, and the labor of adolescents and the aged. Here, too, one would like to apply a slight corrective to Timofeev's points, though on the whole they are correct. If, for instance, the percentage of family production is very high, it is primarily because family production is directed toward self-consumption, for the same high productivity rates do not hold for mercantile production. The relation which exists between the size of the family and the return from agriculture, and the minute percentage of farm income which actually augments the monetary earnings of the peasant household, confirm this.

As for the last point, Timofeev rightly notes the existence of a "gigantic black market" in the semi-legal or illegal "private" sphere, and he points out that it is part of the foundation of the socialist economy. Since the authorities have sole power over what to prohibit or not prohibit, they paradoxically tolerate the black market in order to assure the maintenance of their power. Without an underground economy they would be unable to ensure that the economy as a whole will work; they keep the "private sphere" more or less illegal out of fear of what would happen if there really were a free play of economic forces. The state has no intention of being an economic partner; it only wants to exercise an arbitrary power which enables it to impose a policy that runs contrary to the interests of society as a whole.

Despite the value of all I have mentioned so far, the principle merit of *Soviet Peasants* is not so much the economic and political analyses as it is the affirmation (two centuries after Karamzin) that the peasants too are men. Timofeev's work is thus inscribed within a movement to rehabilitate the peasant — a very important movement that has been in existence in the USSR at least since the 1960s.

For decades the peasant was considered a second-class citizen. He was the incarnation of the past, a drag on progress and the working class. His distinctive traits were conservatism, obscurantism, individualism, and many other "isms." In the Bolshevik tradition, the "muzhik countryside" was an alien and hostile terrain. Only self-renunciation could enable the peasant in Stalin-era novels to become a self-conscious

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collective farmer, loyally allied with the working class. But after the end of Stalinism, a whole group of writers began taking a new look at the countryside. The heroes of their novels became the simple peasant and not a collective farm chairman. This peasant became the bearer of rehabilitated traditional virtues such as love of work, loyalty, respect for the elderly, honesty, and the like. Most often, in this literature, all these qualities have been embodied in an old woman such as Solzhenitsyn's Matriona, Melentyevna in Abramov's *Wooden Horses*, or Nastasya in Rasputin's *Farewell to Matiora*. Often, too, she is favorably contrasted to the younger generation which has gone to seek an easier life in the city.

This pattern is easy to recognize in Timofeev's book in the person of the old woman Aksinya Egoryevna and her children who invite her to come and live with them in the city only to gain a few supplementary square yards of lodging. However, it is thanks to Timofeev's underestimation of the difficulties faced by the workers (whose role in surplus accumulation he perhaps too easily forgets), and to his distrust of the intellectuals accused of living at the expense of the peasantry and being beneficiaries of the regime, that he is able to rediscover the "anti-urban" accents of "peasants" literature. But interestingly enough, Timofeev is not of rural origin; he "discovered" the countryside only as an adult, and his reaction of solidarity with the peasant class, and his sense of guilt as an intellectual, recalls the populists of the 19th century. His book thus marks a will to overcome a profound lack of understanding and even hostility which has for so long been directed against the peasant masses in Russia. In contrast to those intellectuals who consider themselves to be an island of culture amid a nation of barbarians, Timofeev has based his work on a deeply human, empathetic understanding of the "other" which alone can lead one to hope, on a very long-term basis, for the reconstitution of Russian civil society, such as one which was attempted in Poland.

G.L. Ulmen:

Like some other observers in the pre-Soviet period, Timofeev attempts a critique of Soviet economy and society by concentrating on agrarian conditions and relations. The fact that it works as well as it does is witness to the continued significance of the peasant or agrarian question in Soviet Russian history.

Timofeev's effort is flawed by some ideological and methodological problems. But it is nevertheless remarkable, as the editors attest in their introduction. On their part, they attempt to compensate for the author's ignorance of relevant Western scholarship and their introduction is, as they noted, "essential to all but knowledgeable specialists on Soviet economy." One might quibble with their choice of references. But they do provide enough information to make the book intelligible. What one misses is a fuller discussion of the indigenous Russian sociological and statistical research on peasant economy conducted between 1890 and 1930; specifically, that of the greatest analyst of peasant economy Alexander Chayanov, since the similarities and differences between Chayanov's theory and Timofeev's analysis go far to demonstrate the latter's problems.

Timofeev takes his subtitle, "The Peasants' Art of Starving," from Karl Kautsky's book, *The Agrarian Question*, which is as good a place as any to start. It is well known that Kautsky went beyond Marx and Engels in his discussion of modern agriculture; that he explained systematically the technical improvements being made in agriculture; that

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he stated clearly that these improvements, while essentially benefitting large farms, did not make them dominant; and that his book became the cornerstone of the orthodox Marxist approach to the agrarian question. In a section of the first volume of *Capital* titled "Big Industry and Agriculture," Marx wrote: "In the sphere of agriculture, big industry has the most revolutionary effect in that it annihilates the bulwark of the old society, the 'peasant,' and replaces him with the wage-laborer." Having virtually abandoned Marx's thesis of the necessary victory of large capitalist farming over small peasant farming in the body of his book, Kautsky nevertheless concluded on the orthodox Marxist assumption that "societal development in agriculture is taking the same road as in industry." Lenin hailed Kautsky's book as "the most important event in present-day economic literature since the third volume of *Capital*," to which Engels had added a postscript reasserting Marx's thesis that "big industry . . . also terminates the small production and natural economy of the self-sufficient peasant family."

What is interesting in this context is Kautsky's unorthodox and contradictory contention in the body of his book that trends in world economy were reducing the number of large in favor of small farms and that large and small farms were mutually interdependent, that oscillations in their relations led to a cyclical movement between the concentration and fragmentation of land, which would last "as long as bourgeois conditions continue to exist." Specifically, Kautsky attributed the durability of the small farm to the preasant's capacity for "overwork" and "underconsumption." Chayanov's concrete concept for analyzing peasant economy was what he called the "labor-consumer balance" between the satisfaction of family needs and the drudgery of human labor, i.e., a balance between overwork and underconsumption. But Chayanov carried his argument further by insisting that at the national or "macro" level peasant economy should be treated as an economic system in its own right, as a *non-capitalist* system of national economy. Taking the entire family household as a single economic unit, Chayanov implicitly challenged orthodox Marxism by contending that the economic behavior of peasant families differed fundamentally from that of capitalist farmers. In conditions where capitalist farmers would go bankrupt, peasant families would work longer hours, sell at lower prices, obtain no net surplus, and yet manage to survive as economic units. The competitive power of peasant family farms was thus presumably much greater than large capitalist farms, which Marx and Engels saw as the stepping-stone to socialist agriculture.

Lenin's criterion of a capitalist farm was the existence of hired labor. As early as 1899 he claimed that capitalist farmers, though constituting no more than 20% of peasant household, were masters of the Russian countryside. Chayanov found that more than 90% of peasant households had no hired labor, that the vast majority were based on family labor. Timofeev makes exploitation rather than hired labor the criterion of a capitalist farm: ". . . the peasant's family is a micro-capitalist enterprise where the head of the family is required to exploit the labor of all its members in order to obtain maximum surplus value from the personal plot and so to make up for the necessary product not received on the collective farm." But in the absence of hired labor, exploitation is a social and ethical rather than an economic category. Alone, it does not either constitute or create capitalist relations of production. Timofeev is on firmer ground when he indicates what peasant farm families produce on their private plots is sold in the "market place." But his understanding of this aspect of production-consumer relations is also amiss: "The peasant market, restricted to the confines of the market square, is distorted by the feudal [sic!] personal dependence of the collective farmer on the administrative authority." Timofeev's misunderstanding of feudalism is no less a

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problem than his misunderstanding of capitalism. Both can be traced to his misapplication of Kautsky's insights: "Much of what Kautsky wrote a hundred years ago about the West European peasantry, especially about small farms, is applicable today to the Soviet socialist peasantry." While small farms the world over may share some specific characteristics, the general import of this statement is false. No more than feudalism and serfdom can capitalist and socialist farming be equated. Kautsky minus Chayanov leads necessarily to a misconception of the production-consumer relations of Soviet peasant farms.

What is clearly at work in Timofeev's observations is a rather naive and crude idea of laissez-faire capitalism, which he contrasts with a more sophisticated and telling conception of the Soviet economy as a whole. Even his opinion of capitalism is divided: "The market seller has no soul. He is strictly an economic figure, with the whole Soviet system behind him." But Timofeev also writes that "restriction of private initiative leads to speculation, corruption, and secret exploitation" and champions the freedom of the market. The crux of his dichotomy is found in the following statement: "The *black* market is a mechanism that supports the stability of the economic system, its independence from the laws of political life." Taken at face value, this formulation has some merit in conversely demonstrating the interdependence of the two; specifically the dependence of the Soviet economy on the private-plot mechanism of production and consumption. This raises yet another problem in Timofeev's analysis. On the one hand, he writes: "The black market is the very basis of a Soviet economy, the foundation on which the planned economic structure rests. The black market is the socialist mechanism of power and exploitation, the very essence of our socio-economic system, more obviously so in recent times." On the other hand, he says that the peasant family is one which "feeds itself and the whole nation by its own labor on its own land" and that "the economy is a mechanism where a planned bureaucratic system will creak and grind to a halt without a link to the flywheel of market relations worked out by the entire history of mankind." In this last comment, Timofeev has the tail wagging the dog. At the same time that he attempts to construct an antithesis between the *open* and the *black* market, he succeeds only in demonstrating their mutual interdependence, even to the point of suggesting that the exploitation of the state is filtered down to the peasant family head, who in turn exploits the family. Moreover, we read: "Though ostensibly condemning market relations, the authorities in fact push the peasant onto the market with the products of household plots." In this, he is perfectly correct. But then the dichotomy does not work. What Timofeev ultimately succeeds in demonstrating is that the Soviet economy is of a piece, that the *open* market is in fact part and parcel of the *black* market, participating equally in bribery, speculation and theft.

Zygmunt Bauman:

In the words of Barrington Moore, Jr., the process of modernization begins with peasant revolutions that fail and culminates with peasant revolutions that succeed. In the case of Russia, however, Communist rule began with a peasant revolution that succeeded; and it took root only after this success was turned into a defeat.

It is impossible to over-estimate the role played by the peasantry in the advent, the evolution, and indeed the present shape of the Soviet communism. It was Lenin's idea

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of the 'war-political alliance' with the peasantry — a heresy and an offence to the most sacred principles of the Marxist establishment of the time — which made the Bolshevik take-over of the state possible. This idea meant using the peasant rebellion and massive disobedience to destroy the old political order, so that is could be replaced with an order bent on a social transformation which the peasants neither desired nor recognized as the fulfillment of their aspirations. It was the terrifying memory of the elemental might of the peasantry on the loose which supplied both the subject-matter and the outer framework to the intra-party struggles in the aftermath of the revolution and the civil war, which led to the destruction of the opposition, the elimination of political discussion and free speech, and the emergence of the dictatorship of the party over the nation and of the small self-coopting inner circle of party leaders over the party. It was the unbroken power of the peasantry standing between the party and its full control over society which prompted the party to commit the most egregious of its massive crimes, one which cast a full generation into the suffocating atmosphere of a 'besieged fortress' and laid the solid foundation for the self-perpetuating police state.

Thus the peasantry played a formidable role in giving Soviet Communism its distinctive shape, and Russia's yet unfinished leap into modernity its convoluted and sinister course. The peasantry played this role sometimes as an acting, though rather elemental and unfocused, force; mostly, however, the role was played simply by 'being there,' by the massive (even if silent) presence pervading the whole horizon of dreamed-out or plausible socialist futures. Once played, the role left an indelible imprint which has long survived its causes.

No longer does the peasantry constitute 'the nation' of Soviet Russia. Still numerous, it is now a minority, and its numbers continue to dwindle. This numerical decline has had its consequences. To begin with, peasants today are no longer perceived as a major threat to the Communist state. Likewise, the peasant contribution to the national product, now reduced to a minor factor in the balancing books can no longer finance the growth of heavy industry, considering the huge appetite of the latter. Finally, the peasantry has lost its role as the pool from which the bulk of the middle-rank party officials, military personnel and managerial staff have been drawn. Its ambitions, prejudices, and fears do not color explicit ideologies anymore; it is no longer a major factor in shaping party strategies.

If the impact of the peasantry is still felt and visible, it is mostly through historical memory, sedimented and ossified in the entrenched institutions of the Soviet state and society. The police state — self-reproducing since it was born of the attempt of a small visionary elite to rule over conquered and hostile 'natives' — is perhaps the most widely discussed and researched aspect of this impact. But there are other aspects, less frequently noted, though hardly less seminal. For example, there is the network of patron-client relations, permeating Soviet society in every sphere of life, be it politics, economics, culture or social mobility; this network spreads not only on the margin of visible institutions and ostensible rules, but also constitutes their true, though hidden, content. Now patronage has been documented around the world as the specifically peasant way of adaptation to an insecure and volatile environment.

In this sense, at least, the role of the peasants in the Soviet system cannot be dismissed as merely a matter of historical interest. In other senses, however, peasants do constitute a minority group of little economic or political power and still less influence on the political process. Consequently, they are treated as a minor irritant and rarely considered seriously as a possible agent of political action. In power politics, this evaluation normally augurs indifference and neglect.

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Lev Timofeev's book is this indifference and neglect conscientiously and poignantly documented. Item by item, Timofeev leads us through the all-too-well known inventory of poverty: the peasant sense of inferiority; the distant and uncaring health service; the remote and inadequate schools; shop shelves filled with shoddy goods; the low wages, making quite ordinary necessities into luxuries; and the general lowering of expectations, absence of hope for change and lack of energy to fight back.

This is familiar enough from Oscar Lewis's study of the culture of poverty. What is shocking, though, is the flourishing of such a culture in the very class which made the revolution seventy years ago and which entered the 'socialist' age fifty years ago. But Timofeev's picture is richer still. It contains shapes and colors unfamiliar from elsewhere. It is these shapes and colors which render the poverty of Soviet peasants a special case.

First of all, there is the phenomenon of 'individual plots.' We have been told repeatedly by successive rulers of the Soviet Union that this has been and remains the price the socialist society has to pay for the not-yet eradicated mentality of the traditional small property owners. Timofeev painstakingly accumulates evidence which calls the bluff of this official formula and exposes the true roots of the permanence of this so-called 'temporary compromise.' By offering the peasants their tiny individual plots, the state is able to remove all limits to the exploitation of the main bulk of productive land; and the labor used to cultivate it may be paid well below the value of the labor force without endangering its reproduction. However meagre the pittance they receive for the drudgery on collective land, it is assumed that the peasants will somehow survive, since the missing food will be supplied by 'personal plots.' Not a particularly novel arrangement, to be sure. In the time of Catherine the Great a kind-hearted Russian aristocrat, Radischev, discovered on his journey from Petersburg to Moscow that the serfs, having devoted all their waking hours to the lords' land, tilled their own plots at nights and on Sundays. Work still needing to be done beyond this was filled in by family members too old, too young, or too ill to attract the landlord's interest. Timofeev's account reads as an up-dated account of what was true two centuries ago.

A second thing that perhaps makes the Soviet system a special case is the moral devastation which the official lies, which refuse to call things by their proper names, leave in their wake. Some of the most shattering pages of Timofeev's book is his description of peasant children at play amusing themselves rehearsing the theft of milk from the collective farm. Peasants steal to live, not to get rich. They know that everyone else around them does the same. Stealing being such a universal part of the business of life, they may well find it ever more difficult to tell stealing from taking, receiving, or being given something; they are losing their ability to distinguish between rights which are officially denied and officially proclaimed rights which stay unfulfilled. To be sure, they know of little ground for a moral condemnation of one or praise of the other. What they produce, they do not own; the results of their work are taken away, and no one seriously pretends that what they are offered in exchange compensates for the loss. So they keep part of the produce before it disappears. The horrible message of the book is that, in the peasant's conscience, the boundaries are blurred, and the passion for moral rectitude is extinguished, making a morally healthy organisation of daily life impossible.

Long years of stifled imagination and suppressed alternatives weigh heavily even on Timofeev's uncompromising and radical analysis. As Pitassio and Zaslavsky aptly note in their highly informative introduction, the cures Timofeev prescribes are

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blatantly incompatible with the illness he diagnoses. Timofeev suggests, for example, an unbound profit-orientated market which would somehow thrive within the framework of an inept and clumsy planning system. The absence of any solution better than this by so acute and courageous a critic as Timofeev provides the most striking, if inadvertent, proof of the system's triumph over its own future.

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

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Notes and Commentary

Nietzsche after 1968: A Conference Report

Barton Byg et. al*

Near the end of the Amherst Colloquium on "Nietzsche Today: The Reception of his Work after 1968,"[1] Geoff Waite challenged the underlying historical assumption: "Is 1968 chosen because it marks the approximate date of the publication of the first volume of the splendid critical edition of Nietzsche's work by Colli and Montinari, or rather the approximate date of the until recently wholly apolitical appropriation of Nietzsche by post-structuralism? Do we wish to allude to the year of the Zagreb meeting on Nietzsche of "creative Marxists" trying, as they said, to locate "the theme of human freedom in Nietzsche," or rather to the year that Jürgen Habermas delivered himself of the opinion that "Nietzsche is no longer contagious?" For some of us, however, 1968 has to mean also and mainly *May* '68." The title could indeed suggest a direct confrontation with the "profoundly apolitical" reception of Nietzsche by deconstruction and post-structuralism. Yet, as it turned out, the colloquium made "Nietzsche today" seem far from controversial, since the recent French reception of Nietzsche has allowed German philosophers to approach him again in an unpolitical, business-as-usual manner. Meanwhile the French, if Sarah Kofman is any indication, have moved on from Nietzsche to the Greeks themselves, and more traditional philosophical issues. What at first may have seemed revolutionary in post-structuralist Nietzsche reception now seems to fit quite comfortably into institutionalized philosophical investigations.

Rather than a debate of post-1968 thought and politics, the colloquium consisted of two separate discussions: when Waite asked, "Where is history?" Ernst Behler's response was, "This *is* history — the history of philosophy." The speakers split along these lines. The philosophers addressed the "end of metaphysics," while others with historical and political priorities mostly treated the early reception of Nietzsche. Thus, "Nietzsche Today" was avoided. Only Mazzino Montinari, the keynote speaker, tried to appreciate both groups.[2]

Montinari used historical and philological methods to challenge the recent French reception which denies Nietzsche's roots in French decadence in order to avoid historical and political issues. The issues that concerned Nietzsche were primarily *French* issues. Nietzsche refers to "Wagnerianism" in France, and notes that Wagner, like

*This report has been jointly written by Barton Byg, Marc Ferguson, Cynthia Kaufman, Sara Lennox, Temsin Lorraine, Gerald McCausland and Thomas Molden. Consequently, none of the authors can be held responsible for its contents.

1. The colloquium brought with it a number of firsts: It was the first visit to the U.S. for Mazzino Montinari, Wolfgang Müller-Lauter and Alfred Schmidt. It was also the first time Susan Sontag went to the Port Authority and got on a bus.

2. Montinari first came to Nietzsche through the influence of his philosophy teacher Giorgio Colli. For them, Nietzsche was important reading as they resisted Fascism. Montinari, with Colli, is the editor of the groundbreaking Nietzsche edition, *Nietzsche Werke: kritische Gesamtausgabe* (Berlin/New York, 1969+).

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Heine, Schopenhauer, and himself, was only "accidentally German." Decadence, the cultural malaise which Nietzsche and his French counterparts addressed, was most advanced in France, a last gasp of Romanticism. In response to doubts raised by Kofman about the unique importance of French thought to Nietzsche, Montinari strengthened his insistence that "Nietzsche's contemporaries were the French, not the Germans, not the Italians, not the English." Ignorance of Nietzsche's reading of the French and their common concerns "is no longer admissable," he declared, and merely to mention in passing that Nietzsche admired George Sand or LaRochefoucauld — "that is really nothing — too little, to truly understand Nietzsche as a contemporary of his times."

Yet Kofman was not interested in Nietzsche as a contemporary of his time or ours. Rather than examine why Western notions of Truth were attacked in 1968, she compared Nietzsche's reading of Heraclitus with readings given by Plato, Aristotle and Hegel. The latter three offer traditional metaphysical accounts, with clarity, rather than obscurity as their aim. All three "illuminate" the obscurity of Heraclitus by reappropriating him, thus mastering his texts by bringing them into line with their own. For Nietzsche, this is part of the plot that the nihilistic forces of resentment hatch against the affirmative forces. In contrast, he wants to recognize Heraclitus as the representative of possibility for living and thinking that is irrefutable and irreplaceable. He substitutes a typological conception of time and history for the linear, teleological, dialectical conception of his predecessors. In place of a history of truth, progressing from obscurity to clarity, he sets a history of types of forces that are in perpetual battle. Plato, Aristotle, and Hegel failed to understand how their concepts could only be fictions designed to falsify the world of Becoming. For Nietzsche, Heraclitus, full of life, remains unafraid of affirming Becoming as the essence of everything and therefore prefers a "poetic" language.

Behler's paper "Nietzsche, Derrida und die Apokalypse" shared with Kofman's an emphasis on a new type of reading, which refuses any unified and definable "truth." While Kofman depicted this type of reading as the proper, Nietzschean way to "understand" Heraclitus, Behler stressed Derrida's critique of Heidegger's Nietzsche interpretation as a major change in Nietzsche's reception since 1968. His talk drew primarily on a discussion between Gadamer and Derrida in Paris, now published in *Otobiographies*.[3] For Heidegger, Nietzsche's philosophy represents the culmination and apocalyptic end of Western metaphysics — a final endeavor to ground all being in a single principle. Heidegger argues that for Nietzsche the seemingly irreconcilable principles of will to power and eternal recurrence form an essential unity, revealing the end of philosophy and its meaning. Nietzsche thus fails to think the meaning of Being and cannot overcome nihilism. Although Nietzsche turns metaphysics into its opposite, it remains metaphysics, in the form of an inverted Platonism.

But for Derrida, Behler maintained, Nietzsche's radicalization of the concepts of interpretation, perspective, evaluation, and difference contribute to the liberation of the signifier from the logos. Derrida argues that for Nietzsche, all writing, including his own, was an originary act, not a transcription of a previously recognized meaning or truth, and the absolute heterogeneity of Nietzsche's text makes it impossible to speak of a truth of Nietzsche's philosophy. Derrida argues that Nietzsche must be protected from a reading like Heidegger's which remains captive within the metaphysical edifice it seeks to destroy by reestablishing the logos and the truth of Being. Although

3. Cf. *The Ear of the Other: Otobiography, Transference, Translation. Texts and Discussions with Jacques Derrida*. Ed. Christie V. McDonald. Trans. Peggy Kamuf. (New York: Schocken, 1985).

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Nietzsche's works contains an emphatic reference to beginnings and endings, eschatologies and teleologies, Derrida sees this discourse traversed by another discourse of narrative and metaphor. In this position of double-gesture, double-play, double-bind, lies Nietzsche's message for a post-Heideggerian period.

Wolfgang Müller-Lauter's talk on the will to power fundamentally contradicts Heidegger's interpretation. Because Müller-Lauter does not consider the will to power as the sole basic event underlying Being, but as a contradictory, permanently coalescing and disintegrating multiplicity of relations, and he reexamines Nietzsche's critique of free will. For both Kant and Schopenhauer, free will refers to a universal concept of responsibility, whereas Nietzsche reveals through his genealogical approach to ethics the fictitious character of every philosophy of "intelligible freedom." The world becomes an "absolute flow of events." Because of the drive for survival and the insensitivity of the organs of perception, human beings work with assumptions of "eternal facts" and "unchangeable structures" and so create a world of error. The idea of a free will, and even more radically, the idea of individuality itself, are parts of this illusionary world, just as are all the categories of the sciences and the humanities.

The world is nothing but a multitude of unstructured, volatile, often antagonistic and ultimately unidentifiable events, and the human species itself, is "just such a multiplicity. It is constituted as a unity over and against other unities which are composed of multiplicities." Therefore, there is no single will to power, neither as a subject nor as a *deus-ex-machina*, but the whole process of events, the whole of Being is "wills to power."

With "multiplicity of relations" replacing categories of thought and even the human individual, Müller-Lauter echoes Kofman, while also drawing from Gilles Deleuze. In fact, much of post-structuralism is finding its way into German philosophical discussions of ethics and ontology. Thus, Alfred Schmidt, in his talk, "Myth, Illusion and Truth in Nietzsche," joined the others in praising Nietzsche's radical departure from Truth and metaphysics, this time in contrast to Schopenhauer. Yet, while Schmidt ended with a gesture toward a more contemporary cultural critique, if remained merely a gesture. Whereas the post-structuralist reading of Nietzsche has been rather a "work with Nietzsche," Schmidt suggested the more modest undertaking of a "work on Nietzsche," especially a reexamination of Schopenhauer's influence on Nietzsche. Schmidt's thesis was that the preponderance of ethical questions in Nietzsche is a result of an indebtedness to Schopenhauer, whose metaphysics of negation of life was one of the last confrontations of *Dasein* as a whole. While Schopenhauer understands that there is no longer a recourse to theology, his partial destruction of traditional philosophy results in a mere substitution of the old center, and the "will" serves as a new organizing principle. Nietzsche radicalizes the concept of truth implicit in Schopenhauer: the search for truth becomes an endless process of interpretation. But in contrast to his predecessor, Nietzsche recognizes the futility of reducing the stream of events to a unity. He reduces the concept of truth, so that where the difference between the notion of a true world and a false one dwindles. Thus, the destructions of myths does not spare the realm of logic.

In terms of ethics, Nietzsche's reversal of Schopenhauer's model of unity equals an insight into the vacuum of values and a rejection of the hope that God's death would lead to a simplification of ethics. As a relentless critic of all "social ethics of sympathy," Nietzsche proves to be "one of the last defenders of the individual," Schmidt claims, by rejecting all attempts to recreate the chimera of an ethical order in the world. Zarathustra's problem therefore is not just overcoming God, but also overcoming the

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void. The task of the philosopher becomes one of legislation since culture, dominated by proliferating barbarism, needs a structuring influence. Schmidt concludes that this recognition of a need to structure the random growth of civilization must be seen in the light of "the best aspects of Marx's philosophy."

These concluding remarks seem diametrically opposed to the apolitical tendencies of post-structuralism and imply its inadequacy as a "philosophy" which could influence action, but Schmidt chose not to elaborate on this. Instead, he claimed to present an alternative to the contemporary social and cultural thrust of the French reception by examining the "objective meaning" of Schopenhauer within the "epochal context" of Nietzsche. The result, however, seems not to contradict or criticize the post-structuralist readings, but to incorporate them into the "objective" methodology of traditional philosophy.

A similar process seems to have occurred in the U.S., perhaps also indirectly, via the aesthetic readings of Nietzsche provided by the French. This was Robert Ackermann's theme as he spoke of "Current American Thought on Nietzsche." Ackermann focused on Nehamas' recent book, *Nietzsche, Life as Literature*, which he claimed is being well received in American philosophical circles because it moves within the dominant analytic paradigm. American philosophers formerly tended to dismiss Nietzsche as an irrationalist since he seemed incapable of presenting coherent arguments. After WWII, American philosophers began to ignore his "embarrassing excesses" and focus instead on his "arguments." Because of the methodological restrictions imposed by this analytic approach, American interpreters have tended to dismiss Nietzsche's rhetorical side. They have academicized his philosophy and missed the sense of engagement with the world which motivated his philosophical project.

Exemplifying this approach, Nehamas argues that Nietzsche has a doctrine of aestheticism whereby individual lives should be read as texts. The eternal return claims that lives are only justified if their authors would not wish to change any aspect of them. Ackerman finds that this sounds more like American self-help philosophy than Nietzsche. More significantly, however, this misses the engagement with life in Nietzsche's philosophy. What is at issue for Nietzsche is not the narcissistic goal of self improvement for the philosopher. Instead, Nietzsche was deeply engaged in a fight against nihilism, which he believed had the capacity to destroy all life. Nehamas' aestheticization of Nietzsche fits the American pattern of importing Nietzsche mainly through French and comparative literature departments. Now major philosophy departments are noticing him, but only by turning him into an analytic philosopher. Ackermann concluded by wondering why Nietzsche is seen as the source of shallow, optimistic individualism in a dying imperialist society.

Those who took a historical approach to Nietzsche also did not confront the post-1968 reception head-on but, instead, like Montinari, offered alternative views of Nietzsche in a historical context. They spoke of various political, rather than philosophical, appropriations of Nietzsche, but avoided discussing the confusion of the two which has obviously occurred since 1968. In speaking on "Nietzsche and the Jews," Peter Heller pointed out the prejudice that always surrounds the question, be it Nazism's ignoring Nietzsche's anti-anti-Semitism or Walter Kaufman's need to make Nietzsche a "friend of the Jews." Heller tried to go beyond these scattered observations by citing the testimony of Nietzsche's freind — Overbeck regarding Nietzsche's opposition to anti-Semitism, and the derivation of his anti-Christianity from an anti-Semitic foundation. Nietzsche made the Jews responsible for Christianity, and Nietzsche's anti-anti-Semitism fits in with his attempt to reverse the development of Chris-

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tianity. Eventually, Nietzsche saw Jews as allies in the fight to defeat Christianity and to transcend the nonsense of race in favor of the good European and an individualist hierarchy. According to Heller, this comes close to racist mythology.

But Heller also sees a "closeness" to Christianity experience? Jesus of Nazareth is the "sublime decadent," the same decadent, according to Heller, whom Nietzsche (the decadent and the opposite of a decadent) must overcome within himself. The antecedent of this overcoming, Judeo-Christianity, now appears not as redemption but as the "fall." Just as in the biblical account, this is now seen as a *necessary* fall, prerequisite for the redemption *from* Judeo-Christianity initiated by the coming of Nietzsche.

Gert Mattenklott spoke on the Jewish reception of Nietzsche around the turn of the century. Despite Arnold Zweig's subsequent association of Nietzsche with the Third Reich, some elements of Nietzsche's thought had early relevance to Jews as they struggled for their own identity. Young Zionists saw Nietzsche as a prophet of their own emancipatory goals, albeit in two divergent directions. The most significant active Nietzschean among early Zionists was the Hassidic poet had philosopher M.J. Berdyszewsky (Ben-Gurion). He preached Nietzsche's call to action and criticized the literary tradition in which he saw the Jews of the West confined. But Nietzsche influenced this tradition as well, including followers of the poet Stefan George like (Karl Wolfskehl) by the soul, character and fate of nations. The Jewish character (according to Wolfskehl) is bound up with a literary tradition. He encouraged the Jews to throw off their historical, intellectual and religious tradition in order to draw strength from their pre-historical, oriental, Dionysian (à la Nietzsche) past.

A similarly positive evaluation of Nietzsche motivated Bernice Rosenthal in her account of the simplistic political rejection of Nietzsche in the Soviet Union. Speaking on "Current Soviet Thought on Nietzsche," she said that Nietzsche has mainly drawn the attention of Soviet literary scholars in the last 15-20 years. These critics, reacting to Western views which see Nietzsche and Dostoyevsky as "spiritually akin," have contrasted Dostoyevsky the humanist with Nietzsche the nihilist. Rosenthal finds that the Soviets distort Nietzsche's thought to demonstrate its affinity with racism, fascism, nihilism, and individualism. As a result of the unavailability of Nietzsche's work in the Soviet Union, the Soviets are unaware of such positive Nietzschean ideas as "self-discipline," "personal integrity," "forming one's own character," and the need for a "new moral code." They "never cite such lines as 'Be true to the Earth, my brothers,' " she stated. In her attack on official Soviet ideology, Rosenthal chose to examine only the work of "obvious party hacks" (as one member of the academic audience put it) such as S.F. Aduyev and George Freelander. She ignored other "unofficial" or dissident Soviet critics such as Bakhtin. Rosenthal seemed to be arguing from an unquestioning acceptance of Nietzsche as a humanist, and was entirely dismissive of such valid criticism of Nietzsche as serving bourgeois class interests. With the implication that all Soviet thought is flat and monolithic, she also apparently denies the possibility of finding genuine intellectual resistance in Soviet society.

Geoffrey Waite spoke on "Zarathustra or the Modern Prince: Notes on Post-Machiavellian Political Philosophy," and proposed a reconciliation of Nietzsche and Marx — one of the most important questions of our time, according to Gorky and Weber — based on a critique of Nietzsche through Gramsci's theory of hegemony. In *The Modern Prince*, Gramsci admired Machiavelli's insight that the prince must merge with the people in order to control them. The modern prince, according to Gramsci, is no longer an individual but a "collective will." Political control now depends on the

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passive development of consent, and Nietzsche has had the political effect of increasing the integration of eager intellectuals into this capitalist hegemony. The attacks on the state and political parties in *Thus Spake Zarathustra* are meant to deceive "the last men." "The whole point," Waite maintains, "is to 'neutralize' and 'stabilize' political participation, to vilify the state in the abstract so as to maintain in perpetuity the state that favors the superman."

Robert Eden's paper asked "To What Extent has the World of Concern to Contemporary Man Been Created by Nietzschean Politics?" It addressed the relations between Nietzschean perspectivism and political activism. According to Eden, Nietzsche's influence on the Left may be partly responsible for the failure of radical politics during the 60s and 70s in the West. Did the Left, influenced by Nietzsche, "overestimate what could be accomplished with expressive or symbolic actions, and underestimate the resilience of institutions and laws grounded in necessities?" While Eden acknowledges that this analysis would cast serious doubt on the usefulness of Nietzsche's thought for political action, he passes over it quickly without ever resolving whether radical politics since 1968 is Nietzschean politics. Indeed, it is not clear what Eden means by "Nietzschean politics" and whether we can locate such a thing in the world.

Eden confronts the issue of "Why Nietzsche since 1968?" by claiming that a collision of two disparate cultures (almost irreconcilable ways of life) has shaped the reception of Nietzsche since 1968. These two "cultures" are political activism (low or vulgar Nietzscheanism) and philosophical perspectivism (high Nietzscheanism). Nietzschean politics claim that "philosophy creates the world in which the active man takes his bearings," and Eden therefore criticizes Nietzsche for overestimating the role of speech and underestimating necessity. Nietzsche needs to substantiate his claim that contemplation is practical, that the "world of concern to us" is created by philosophers, through a political history of philosophy. And it is questionable anyway whether this "world of concern" is a "political entity" or merely a "symbolic entity."

Eden claims that Nietzsche himself anticipated these objections in his appropriation of Machiavelli. This claim that Nietzschean politics is Machiavellian was "boldly" asserted, with reference to Eden's book but not explained. It is not clear how invoking Machiavellian *Realpolitik* on the side of Nietzschean politics can explain the failure of radicalism since 1968; indeed it makes the failure even more curious if this radicalism were true Nietzschean politics. Eden may rightly contend that this is another question, but it is a crucial one. Eden has raised the question of whether Nietzsche's influence on radical politics is pernicious and debilitating, but the spectre of reactionary idealism in Nietzschean politics cannot be exorcised merely by invoking Machiavelli. If left-wing politics since '68 represents the "vulgar Nietzscheanism" that Eden refers to, the implication that its failure is a result of overestimating the power of "symbolic actions" contradicts the accusation that vulgar Nietzscheans do not appreciate the practicality of contemplation of the higher Nietzscheans. The concepts of "will to power" and "will to truth" in Nietzsche cannot be so easily separated. We are left wondering "to what extent has the world of concern to contemporary man been created by Nietzschean politics?"

The difficulty of making a connection between philosophical or aesthetic/metaphysical readings of Nietzsche and political practice is implicit in all the papers discussed so far. It can perhaps best be exemplified, finally, by the broad spectrum of feminist positions on Nietzsche, including Susan Sontag's contribution to the conference. As to the "new Nietzsche" or the "French Nietzsche," Sontag stated that, for her at least, "this 1968 caesura was not important." Indeed, her first reaction to Derrida's *Spurs* was to throw

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the book across the room. Despite this disclaimer, however, the story Sontag read indicates she is not completely unaffected by post-structuralism. In "Description of a Description," a short passage from Nietzsche's *Daybreak* forms the skeleton for her fragmented narrative: Sontag's text is also a reading of another text.

Sontag's personal Nietzsche-reception, as recounted in her autobiographical remarks, goes back to her childhood reading of Schopenhauer and a meeting with Thomas Mann in California. Later it was shaped by Leo Strauss and although Montinari's presence at the conference had made her more inclined to attend, she is quite content to read Walter Kaufmann's English translations. In sum, Sontag insisted that she sees Nietzsche primarily as a writer, "one of the greatest writers that ever lived."

Furthermore, Sontag said she values Nietzsche because "I think that most of what he says it true." She even sees him as a great moral — even Christian — inspiration. Truly objectionable passages in Nietzsche, however, Sontag simply skips over in her reading, treating sexism and racism as "period errors."

Sontag's selective reading of Nietzsche produced the most dramatic confrontation of the colloquium, since Kofman strenuously objected, claiming that it is simply impossible to skip over a point which is absolutely fundamental to the reading of Nietzsche — the question of woman. While Sontag claims to be able to read Nietzsche as a "genderless mind," Kofman defended the reading of Nietzsche "as a Frenchwoman, as a woman, as a Jew." At this point it almost seemed as if the roles were reversed, with Kofman defending the integrity of Nietzsche's work as a whole against Sontag's post-modernist plundering. This issue, too, had been addressed in Montinari's opening remarks: in *The Case of Wagner*, Nietzsche adapts a description of literary decadence from the work of Paul Bourget. The result of such decadence is that the word becomes sovereign and springs from the sentence, the sentence obscures the page, the page overcomes the whole work, until finally "The Whole is no longer a Whole."

The problem, of course, is whether it is even possible to speak of a "whole" of Nietzsche. The dispute seems to be over which aspect of a bundle of contradictions is to be given precedence. While Sontag believes the "Truth" in Nietzsche is accessible to a "genderless mind," both "Truth" and "mind" are terms Nietzsche has overturned, in Kofman's view, for Kofman, truth cedes to metaphor and the mind cedes to the body, i.e., to the intuitive ear of woman. This third ear, the artistic ear, situates itself beyond metaphysical oppositions of truth and error, good and bad, depth and surface, clarity and obscurity. Nietzsche's way of reading Heraclitus, according to Kofman, was to assimilate the text with the transforming capacity of an animal, ruminating like a cow. With such metaphors, Kofman believes Nietzsche moves past the binary opposites of the metaphysical tradition to new models for knowledge.

One wonders by what standard of "Truth" Kofman is defending her Nietzsche against Sontag's. Furthermore, even such a privileged position for the ear of woman is defined by those gaps left open by patriarchal speech. The question is whether this "feminine" model for knowledge is actually the property of women, for them to use in the world, or whether it is merely a functional aspect of a patriarchal philosophy. According to Heide Schlüpmann's paper, early German feminists may have believed the former, but post-1968 events have not linked up to this optimistic Nietzsche reception. Schlüpmann investigated Nietzsche's importance for the first German women's movement in order to argue for the continued usefulness of his thought for contemporary feminism. Particularly, Helene Stöcker found in Nietzsche the assertion of a liberating individualism which repudiated absolutes and authorities (including the

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absolute superiority of man), a critique of repressive morality and asceticism which permitted the rehabilitation of sensuality and sexuality for women, and an attention to gender which, despite its sexism, directed attention to gender differences in relation to forms of thought, embodiedness, and artistic productivity. Contemporary feminism, Schlüpmann asserted, has still not surpassed Stöcker's positions.

But that social movement and theoretical tradition was destroyed by fascism, so that the second wave of German feminists after 1968 could not recognize Nietzsche's possible utility for them. The Critical Theorists' appropriation of Nietzsche represents a reception of his work which could now be made productive for feminism. Horkheimer drew on Nietzsche to stress the instinctual deformations which bourgeois rationality demanded and used Nietzsche's insights on gender to draw conclusions about the relation between the domination of nature (including humans' own nature) and the domination of women. Adorno elaborated on Nietzsche's attention to aesthetics, freeing it from its ties to art and natural beauty and, like Nietzsche, integrating it into his own philosophy as part of the effort to transcend philosophy. Adorno drew attention also to the relation between "ascetic ideals" and the categories of bourgeois thought. After 1968 feminists appropriated Critical Theory as a legacy of Marx, not of Nietzsche. They therefore did not use his work to construct still-missing feminist theoretical positions on sexual politics, the "subjective factor," and sexuality. The lack of connection to this tradition may be responsible in part for the theoretical cul-de-sac in which feminism now finds itself.

Only recently have feminists, particularly within film theory and literary criticism, rediscovered Nietzsche, and now their reception is a selective one, stressing his aesthetic rather than ethical dimensions, particularly investigating the relation of the question of woman to the production of theory and language. Yet, Schlüpmann suggests, this recent attention to Nietzsche has taken place in academic circles, out of touch with the women's movement, and has not formulated strategies of action which would address the problems it identifies. The task of the Nietzsche appropriation which still lies before feminism is to continue Stöcker's effort to appropriate the feminine metaphors Nietzsche so frequently uses to describe his own creativity and, by standing Nietzsche on his feet, to liberate in reality the female productivity which until now has been excluded from participation in society and culture.

Montinari's final exhortation was to "learn to think historically." Such thinking would raise a number of difficult questions about approaches to Nietzsche. If study of early Nietzsche reception neglects the conference title, "Nietzsche Today," it does raise the issue of a truly "radical Nietzsche." If early readers of Nietzsche saw his vitalism as an impulse to social change, why have post-1968 politics (and even the political ramifications of recent philosophy) been influenced by Nietzsche's nihilism, not his struggle against it? The treatments of Zionist, feminist and leftist receptions of Nietzsche flirt with the issue of the date 1968 in the title of the conference, but perhaps the reference to "May, 1968" itself privileges the history of western scholars. For the civil rights movement in the U.S., the date might have been April '68 and the end of non-violence; for "socialism with a human face," August 1968. In general, the segregation of "historical" and "philosophical" topics at the conference eclipses the role of Nietzsche in the anti-imperialist movements of the 1960s and in Derrida's assault on the foundations of Western thougth in that context.

To understand "Nietzsche Today" one must ask why, in 1986, German philosophers are helping to institutionalize a French reception of Nietzsche which is already *passé*, but which allows them to remove Nietzsche from the unpleasant historical and

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political realities of the German past. And why did post-1968 French intellectuals identify with Nietzsche, and by implication, with French decadence of the late 19th century, when other French precedents might have told them more about their intellectual and political dilemma? For feminism and the Left, it is not clear whether Nietzsche now is of any use or interest. At present there is no indication that aesthetic readings of Nietzsche or the end of metaphysics will become socially or politically relevant, at least on behalf of the Left. Perhaps Nietzsche was of political importance to early feminist or leftist readers, or in the thought of the Frankfurt School, but this remains implicit in the historical reception and is nowhere apparent in the present.

By the end of the colloquium, graffiti on one of the posters had changed the title to "Nietzsche Today: *Wieder salonfähig?*" Indeed, the verdict of recent reception seems to be that Nietzsche is "once more acceptable in polite society." This has been possible in West Germany as philosophers institutionalize a post-structuralist reading, and the U.S., where Nietzsche is aesthetically appreciated as text in university literature departments or gradually exalted to the harmless rank of analytic philosopher. The vulgar reception in literature and popular culture is ignored, as is the serious threat to Western intellectual hegemony Nietzsche reception may have represented around 1968. In 1966, Derrida could imagine the reign of Western ideas coming to an end, and something new "proclaiming itself." Far from the orderly and scholarly incorporation of Nietzsche described above, Derrida could then only foresee the "new" taking on "the formless, mute, infant and terrifying form of monstrosity."[4]

On the contrary, this supposed assault on Western thought — by Nietzsche or by deconstruction — may be merely a refined way of keeping it going endlessly. Franz Kafka wrote of a character in a Chinese book who says to his teacher, "Constantly you speak of death and yet do not die." Kafka warns us not to smile condescendingly over the theatrical hero who lies mortally wounded on the stage, and yet sings an aria: "We lie and sing for years."[5]

4. Jacques Derrida, "Structure, Sign and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences," in *The Structuralist Controversy: The Languages of Criticism and the Sciences of Man*, ed. Richard Macksey and Eugenio Donato (Baltimore, 1972), p. 265.

5. Franz Kafka, *Briefe an Milena* (Frankfurt, 1977), p. 183.

Vienna and Budapest: Complementary Figures at the Turn of the Century

Arpad Ajtony

In an aticle written in 1917 for the Hungarian journal *Nyugat* (Occident), Freud speaks of three deep humiliations that scientific investigation had to inflict on the self-love of humanity. The first is *cosmological*, which is associated with the work of Copernicus, who proved that the habitat of man, the earth, is not at the center of the universe. The second is *biological*, and it is indebted to the work of Darwin, who destroyed man's

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belief in his divine descent, thus making it impossible for him to break his bonds of solidarity with the animal world. The third is *psychological*. Certain diseases — especially neuroses — demonstrate that the ego — an organ of control and command — which until then believed itself to be the master of all the important processes in the psychic apparatus, now "feels uneasy." At the onset of the disorder, the ego assumes it is attacked by a "foreign invasion." However, psychoanalysis discovers that it is not a question of "evil spirits from without," but the insufficiency of information that the subject possesses of his unconscious impulses: "they have rebelled and have taken their own obscure paths to escape this suppression . . ." Freud emphasizes that "the ego is not master in its own house," which is one reason for the difficulty psychoanalysis faces in gaining the ego's sympathy.[1]

The fact that Freud addresses himself here to a Hungarian public (precisely at the time when the favorable outlooks of Hungarian psychoanalysts appeared to have a non-negligible impact on the future of the entire psychoanalytic movement) necessitates the examination of the article in a larger context (i.e., not only Austrian but Austro-Hungarian). From this perspective, the third humiliation of human narcissism seems to have a strong political connotation. But before coming to the heart of the matter, we will briefly sketch its historical and cultural framework.

The sixth decade of the nineteenth century witnessed the rise of liberalism in the Habsburg Empire. Its obsolete political structures, inherited in part from the Middle Ages and based on incomprehensible and often unreasonable principles, were replaced by new institutions guaranteed by a modern Constitution. As a result of an agreement between the two dominant nationalities, (Austro-Hungarian Compromise of 1867) the Hungarian and Austrian liberals expected to regulate the internal peace of the empire on a national level. But the question arose: was the liberal regime with its modern parliamentary government capable of functioning in this immense State so diversified from the social, cultural, political, economic and national viewpoint? The unexpected answer given in Cisleithania (as Austria was commonly called at this time) was different from the one given in Transleithania (i.e., Hungary).[2]

Although Austrian liberals established a particularly refined and supple electoral system, "Schmerling's chef-d'oevre"[3] the Austrian parliament showed signs of serious weakness. In the western part of the Danubian empire, local politics remained autonomous and very soon facilitated the development of nationalism. Beginning in the 1880s, the delegates grouped themselves into regional parliaments (*Landtag*) — particularly in the Bohemian parliament — not according to their political affiliations (liberalism, conservatism), but according to national groups (German, Czech). During the eighties, such a differentiation also characterized the *Reichsrat* of Vienna. At the turn of the century, Austrian parliamentary life was often paralyzed by the protracted obstructions of the different non-German national factions. Occasionally, the debate turned into a free-for-all. "To my disgrace, the whole world will mock us," complained the old Emperor

*English translation by Peter Frank.

1. S. Freud, "A Difficulty in the Path of Psycho-analysis," in *Standard Edition* (London: Hogarth Press, 1955), vol. XVII, pp. 135-144.

2. The Leitha, a tributary of the Danube, constitutes at one point in its course the border between the archduchy of Austria and the Hungarian kingdom. Yet, the names — Cisleithania and Transleithania — are inaccurate, because several distant countries, i.e., Polish Galicia or Hungarian Transylvania — countries which do not have any connection with this small river near Vienna, are defined in relation to it.

3. The KnighzAnton von Schmerling (1805-1893) was the leader of the Austrian liberals at this time. The quote is from Karl Renner, an Austrian-Marxist.

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Franz Joseph to a leader of the opposition.[4] The Austrian political regime could only survive through frequent recourse to the famous Article 14 of the Constitution, which permitted the Emperor to rule with a government unapproved by Parliament.

Nationalism not only undermined the parliamentary system but liberalism itself. Schorske has recently drawn attention to this fact: the founders of the anti-Semitic German Nationalist parties in the Habsburg Empire had previously been liberals (Schoenerer, Lueger).[5] In time, the Liberal Party made concessions to its former adversaries and progressively abandoned its most cherished principles for electoral and parliamentary ends. At first, it denied these principles in its language, then in its political dealings with the conservatives and the Christian Social party.[6] This evolution disoriented a large part of the Viennese intelligentsia, who had traditionally represented an important source of support for liberalism.[7] In the system of equilibrium of Austrian political life, the Social Democratic party took on in part the role that had been played by the Liberal Party. But those Viennese intellectuals who could not adopt the Social Democratic program in its entirety — and they were a majority — found themselves in a political void.

In the same period, Hungarian liberalism followed another course. The Hungarian political regime, which was dominated by liberalism, proved itself to be less "comprehensive" than its Austrian counterpart in relation to its disadvantaged classes and to Hungary's national minorities. At the end of the period, the political behavior of the liberals in power reverted to conservatism. However, on the formal level of parliamentary government the regime had fewer shortcomings. As a result of the extra-parliamentary character of the political activity of the lower classes and the national minorities in Hungarian society, the Budapest parliament functioned without divisive

4. R. Charmatz, *Oesterreichs inner Geschichte von 1848 bis 1907* (Leipzig, 1911), vol. II, p. 154.

5. Carl E. Schorske, "Politics in a New Key: An Austrian Trio," in *Fin-de-siécle, Vienna, Politics and Culture* (New York, 1980).

6. It is not a question of a "childhood disease" of liberalism. Of course, in Austria, as in many other European countries, liberalism was not always deserving of the name it bore. In 1870, the Austrian liberals imprisoned the socialist leaders who demonstrated for universal suffrage and the right to organize. The absence of preventive social legislation under their government greatly aggravated the consequences of the 1873 economic depression. In addition, several liberal rulers were implicated in the financial scandals which followed the crisis. Those measures which improved the living conditions of the "working classes" were often due to conservative governments. (Limitations on the length of the workday, 1885; mandatory insurance against work-related accidents, 1887; etc.) Nevertheless, real troubles began with the resurgence of nationalist currents within liberalism itself. In 1881, a radical wing of the Liberal Party put out the Linz Program — the first political manifestation of German nationalism in Austria. In 1885, the Pan-Germanic Union split from the party. But the Liberal Party itself tried to adapt to the new political and moral climate. In 1891 and 1893, it entered into a coalition government with the conservatives, in order to guarantee a German majority over the Czechs. At the end of this decade, the liberals participated in the *Deutsche Gemeinburgershaft*, whose base was Christian Social. In the party's rhetoric, one found increasingly the appearance of German nationalist elements. At the time of the last elections to the *Reichsrat*, the Liberal Party, in order to become part of the German National Verband (1910), accepted the principle of sanctions against the Jews.

7. "Humanity is a physical deception which survives with a natural necessity," Karl Kraus writes, "Liberalism always places its candle beneath a glass bell, and it believes that it will burn in the vacuum. It would burn much better in the tempest of life. When the oxygen is consumed, the candle is extinguished. But by chance, the bell happens to be in the water of phraseology, and the latter rises at the instant when the wick burns out. If one lifted the bell glass, one will then smell, finally, the true character of liberalism. It stinks of carbon dioxide." in Karl Kraus, *Dits et contredits* (Ed. Champ libre, 1975), p. 80.

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conflicts.[8] A certain democracy, even if in many respects illusory, remained relatively intact. Hungarian liberalism did not become nationalist, as it had always been so. Its legitimation of nationalism was based on the menace of an Austro-Germanic nationalism in the west, rather than on the agitation of the less cultivated minorities in the Hungarian territory. In other words, it justified itself by the necessity of a politics of defense, rather than by a politics of repression. At the same time, the Hungarian political class did not produce extremist and anti-Semitic tendencies as was the case in Austria,[9] and its official liberalism (with a very modest content) could proclaim its loyalty to traditional values.

Beyond their different ordering of the political field, Austria and Hungary presented still other signs of dissimilarity. With the almost simultaneous appearance of a great number of talents in art and science, an extraordinary intellectual renewal occurred in both Vienna and Budapest at the start of the century. But the attitude of the young writers, artists, and scientists towards their society — and more specifically towards politics — was not the same in the two capitals. While the younger generation in Austria was apparently *apolitical* (with a certain indifference towards "social problems"), those of Hungary appeared to be *over-politicized* (with a strong sociological interest).

Literature — and poetry, most of all — functioned as a seismograph in the two capitals. Literature not only signals the advent of significant intellectual currents, but often their direction and scope. On this point, it is worthwhile to compare the works of Hugo von Hofmannsthal and Endre Ady. Their association on a purely literary level is not easily justified. But we can draw a parallel between them in so far as each of them is the representative of a generation, even of a revolution in literature: Hugo von Hofmannsthal who, according to the testimony of a contemporary, "realizes the highest ambitions" of "Young Austria," and Endre Ady who, also according to a contemporary, was "the purest and deepest realization of the new Hungary."[10] Yet, their

8. The old ruling class, the feudal class — associated with certain factions of the "rising" bourgeoisie — preserved its predominance in the institutions of the Hungarian state, a fact which permitted the latter to function "well." Moreover, from a national viewpoint, these institutions were homogenous. The national minorities could not utilize them in their struggle for autonomy. One could say that the minority leaders were compelled to deploy their activities outside of the political field.

9. Along with the agitation of the Austrians, the Hungarian anti-Semites began to organize themselves in the 1880s. But the Hungarian anti-Semite party did not become a significant political factor, and it disappeared in the early 1890s. Judit Kubinszky, *The History of Political Anti-Semitism in Hungary (1875-1890)*, (in Hungarian), (Budapest, Kossuth, 1976).

10. In speaking of the "young" Hofmannsthal, Zweig notes that young people saw in him "not only their highest ambitions realized, but also the fullest and the most absolute poetic perfection." After describing the poet's impact on several members of his generation, he adds: "Without hoping that one of us could ever repeat the miracle of Hofmannsthal, we were all strengthened by the mere fact of his material existence." Stefan Zweig, *Le monde d'hier* (Paris, 1982), p. 66, pp. 67-72, and p. 73. Endre Ady (poet, journalist, novelist, 1877-1919), was perhaps the most influential member of the journal *Nyugat*. His impact on Hungarian intellectuals was equally great. Especially after his *New Poems* (1906), he was not only the one who overthrew literary traditions, but also the innovator of political reflection. Oskar Jaszi spoke of Ady in superlatives: "Today he is the purest and deepest realization of the new Hungary." (cf. *The History of Hungary* (in Hungarian) (Budapest, 1978), vol. II, p. 723. Lukács acknowledged that his encounter with Ady's poetry was one of the most decisive moments in his intellectual evolution. (cf. Georg Lukács, *Mon Chemin vers Marx* (In Hungarian) (Budapest, 1971), vol. I, p. 11. and *Hungarian Literature, Hungarian Culture* (in Hungarian) (Budapest, 1970), p. 8. Ferenczy also recognized the "grandeur" of Ady. He modestly refused of take the poet into psychotherapy, because "he does not have the courage to treat a man of genius." We could endlessly cite examples. The Galilee Circle — an organization of progressive students — repeatedly paid homage to Ady, who they passionately embraced as

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orientation is clearly different. While for the first, the "social question" "seems not to have a real character,"[11] the second creates a poetry full of quasi-sociological analyses.

In this period, Paris was once again a source of inspiration to the young intellectuals of the Habsburg Monarchy. But the French capital had a different impact on Viennese than on Budapest intellectuals. The sojourns of Hermann Bahr and Endre Ady in Paris brought about a decisive turn in their work. The two became followers of the French symbolists and decadents. But whereas Bahr passed from political activism to a politically neutral aestheticism, Paris awoke a political messianism in Ady.

The case of Lukács is equally informative. His first works illustrate the differences between the "spirit" of Vienna and that of Budapest. *Soul and Form* (in Hungarian: 1910, in German: 1911) may be considered Lukács' most "Viennese" book. In it he discusses numerous Viennese authors or those related to them, as for example Kierkegaard, who was rediscovered in Europe precisely by the Austrians.[12] Addressing himself to the crisis of culture and identity in Vienna where "everything flows, everything merges into another thing,"[13] Lukács sketches and criticizes this impressionistic universe using no less impressionistic literary means. He does not think it necessary to emphasize sociological or political matters. On the other hand, in *The History of Modern Drama* (written in 1906-07, revised in 1908-09, published in Hungarian in 1911; this book will not be published in its entirety in German), the book that bears the imprint of the author's ties to Budapest, the tone is completely different. Between 1904 and 1908, Lukács and his friends formed the "Thalia Company" with a compound goal: the diffusion of modern dramatic authors in Hungary, not only for an intellectual public but for a working-class one as well. Theatrical practice was accompanied by theoretical activity. Lukács examined the evolution of Western dramaturgy, but he approached it distantly from the position of a foreign observer. In this text, he relies on Simmel's thought and, through him, on that of Marx. Even if in a modified form, one sees here the appearance of such notions as "infrastructure" and "superstructure," "alienation" and "reification," etc. Sociology combines with a certain philosophy of history, but Lukács' approach is clear: he blends with the "sociologism" of his Budapest contemporaries.

The two books were written in Hungarian and translated afterwards in German. The Hungarian of *Soul and Form* may give rise to misunderstandings. On the other hand, the language of *The History of Modern Drama* is clear. But the criticism addressed to the first book did not fault it excessively: this is its "Viennese" contribution. In regards to the second, he presented it to the meeting of the Kisfaludy Society of Budapest, who would give it an award. The circumstances of the translations of these books is equally instructive. Lukács translated the essays of the first book without modifications. By contrast, he felt the need to revise the second for the German language reader. He made several attempts to abridge it and to modify its construction. In the end, he only published a portion of the book in German. The problems of language and translation reveal not only the disjunction between a language and an object expressed by this language, but

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the major figure in Hungarian modernity. Scf. Zsigmond Kende, *La fondation du Cercle Galilee* (in Hungarian) (Budapest, 1974) and *The History of Hungary*, *op. cit.*, vol. II, p. 745.

11. H. Arntzen, "Karl Kraus et Hugo von Hofmannsthal," *Karl Kraus, Cahiers de l'Herne*, (Paris, 1975), p. 256.

12. In particular, by Rudolph Kassner. The first monograph on Kierkegaard was also the work of an Austrian author.

13. Georg Lukács, *Soul and Form* (Cambridge, Mass., 1974), p. 153.

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also the cultural insertion of these books.[14] Moreover, they throw into relief the contrast between an "impressionist" and "aesthetic" Vienna and a "sociological," "political" Budapest.

Let us return to psychoanalysis. Vienna was characterized by a proliferation of ideas and diverse intellectual currents. Yet, the most coherent school of thought there was concerned with the interiority of man, whose environment was trivialized into the vague notion of the "external world." In comparison, the most predominant movement in Budapest intellectual circles was a *sociological* school, that of Oscar Jaszi and his colleagues. And when Freud gathered followers among the Hungarians, they adapted psychoanalysis to their own image. Often, they emphasized the subject's social environment. It was not an accident if Geza Csath, in introducing Freud's studies on hysteria in the journal *Nyugat*, resorted to the examples of a humiliated office employee and an exploited worker.[15]

Vienna was not only the meeting place of apolitical talents, but also a place well protected against any projects involving the organization of individuals. What made it difficult to define certain groups of artists, writers or scientific authors as an actual movement was precisely the lack of common programs. The artists called "the Secession," who left the principal Austrian academy of fine arts to form their own association in 1897, had only a negative program: to fight academic canons.[16] The writers called "Young Austria," who frequented the soon to be demolished Café Griensteidl, found themselves in the same situation: "Is what they themselves and others consider to be an innovation such that one could confer on it the name and aureole of a school?" Hermann Bahr asked. "Where does one go from here? The young men do not know how to express themselves very well. They have neither a formula nor a program. They do not have any aesthetic theory. They limit themselves to repeating that they want to be modern . . . . They say it without arrogance . . ."[17] Among the Austrian intellectuals were numerous supporters of the theories of the physicist Ernst Mach, but one cannot speak of an empirio-criticism movement.

Of course, there are exceptions: Austro-Marxism and the psychoanalytic movement. (The Vienna Circle of scientists would not be founded until after WWI). The Austro-Marxists, who began publication of *Marx Studies* in 1904, constituted themselves necessarily in a movement. They had "professional obligations." But the anti-movement spirit of Vienna exercised a positive influence on them. They were less dogmatic than the theoreticians of their fellow-parties in East Europe. They often showed a surprisingly large theoretical range (Kantism, Machism), and they understood the methodological aspect of Marx's teachings. As for Freud, the foundation of a movement appeared to him undoubtedly indispensible in view of his unfavorable reception in the medical and university milieus. Membership regulations can also guarantee a certain rigor in the diffusion of psychoanalytic ideas. But his disciplinary problems with his first followers said a lot about the difficulties that the creation of a movement represented in Vienna at the start of the century. Freud's activity was not as appreciated in his original milieu as one might suppose from his latter success. The

14. cf. Kristof J. Nyiri, "The history of the translation of *Soul and Form*," (in Hungarian), in *Magyar Filozoftai Szemle*, 1974, n. 2-3, p. 401.

15. Geza Csath, "Hysteria," *In the Unknown House* (in Hungarian) (Novi Sad, 1977), vol. II, pp. 471-481.

16. This is why specialists have such difficulty defining this generation: "Jugendstil," "Secessionstil," "naturalism," "modernism," "impressionism," "stylism?" cf. Peter Vergo, *Art in Vienna 1898-1918* (London, 1975), p. 24.

17. Hermann Bahr, "Das Junge Oesterreich," *Studien zur Kritik der Modern*, 1894, p. 73.

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fact that psychoanalysis presented itself as a movement certainly intensified the distrust it encountered. Behind every type of militancy, the Viennese suspected dogmatism or sectarianism. The imperial capital preferred individual talent that belonged to a virtual rather than an already realized community: solitary individuals such as Karl Kraus, Robert Musil or Ludwig Wittgenstein — the man of genius whose theoretician and caricature was Otto Weininger.

In contrast, the Hungarians willingly affirmed their attachment to a group or to a politically-colored movement. The most significant group politically was undoubtedly the sociological circle of Oskar Jaszi and his colleagues, who founded the journal *Huszadik Szazad* (*Twentieth Century*, 1900), the *Society of the Social Sciences* (1901), and then *The Free School of the Social Sciences* (1906). There was a very close collaboration between the various intellectual milieus in Budapest. Thus, sociologists supported the journal *Nyugat*, the organ of literary modernism (founded in 1908). The writers of the latter participated in the debates of the *Society of the Social Sciences* and held discussions in *The Free School of the Social Sciences*. It was often a critique of the status quo or a project of change which formed the basis for this cooperation. One of the most important references of the members of the *Galilee Circle* (a student organization also founded in 1908 with the aid of certain members of the *Society of the Social Sciences*) was Ady's poetry. In turn, the poet of the journal *Nyugat* recognized himself in these allies, he paid homage to the circle of sociologists[18] and regularly encouraged, in poems dedicated to the *Galilee Circle*, the revolutionary elan of the Hungarian youth.[19] The fact that the editor of *Nyugat* was one of the founders of the *Hungarian Psychoanalytic Society* (1913) is only explained by the social sensibility common to the first Hungarian psychoanalysts and their contemporaries. The psychoanalysts themselves participated in the different activities of the progressive intelligentsia. Jaszi and his friends not only had an important political weight, but they united the different groups into a vast oppositional movement. The basic premise of this association was the belief in the intelligence of political activity, in the possibility of a marriage between rationalism and politics. A friend of Jaszi published in *Huszadik Szazad* an article whose title is revealing: "A scientific politics — Is it possible?" The answer was affirmative. "The process of rationalism in consciousness," he wrote, "represents more than a simple intellectual evolution. It contributes equally to the acceleration of social Progress."[20]

The author of a monograph on the Budapest intelligentsia at the start of the century spoke of the "second generation of reformers."[21] (The first was the liberal generation of the first half of the nineteenth century, who prepared the 1848 revolution). It was evident that many members of this generation wanted only to renovate classical liberalism. And the program of the *Radical Party* (the idea for which had been on the agenda since 1906, but which would not be created until 1914) did not go any further than this. Yet, there were numerous socialist sympathizers and many who, at the end of WWI, adopted bolshevism. In this context, the notion of the intellectual intersects with the notion of political engagement.

18. Ady wrote on the sociological movement of Oskar Jaszi and his colleagues: "They have already won the battle where it is fought with intellectual weapons. They will also triumph in the political struggle. This will be the time of Hungary's renaissance." (*History of Hungary*, *op. cit.*, vol II, p. 733).

19. Kende, *op. cit.*

20. Ervin Szabo, "A scientific politics — Is it possible?" *La premiére atelier hongroise de la sociologie. Le cercle du Vingtiéme siecle*, (in Hungarian) (Budapest, 1973), vol. I, p. 291.

21. Zoltan Horvath, *The Turn of the Century in Hungary* (in Hungarian) (Budapest, 1974).

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The correspondence between political identity and cultural identity was posed differently in Austria and Hungary. In Cisleithania, the growth of nationalisms of various colors, the decomposition of liberalism, as well as the transformation of the rules of the game in politics provoked, in a large part of the Viennese intelligentsia, a sentiment of despair and emptiness. Karl Kraus explained the cultural renewal at the turn of the century by the transfer of talent from the political to the cultural sphere. When Schorske analyzed the generational conflicts in Vienna at this time, he came to a similar conclusion.[22] The affective aspect of this question needs to be emphasized. That nationalism — an approach which focused not on what may unite men, but on what separates them — could dominate the political plane in this cosmopolitan Vienna appeared undoubtedly shocking. The totalitarian character of a nationalism that sought to engulf the whole citizen — in his intimate feelings as well as his thoughts — ruled out a discussion respecting the personalities of all protagonists. The difference between the particularism (even the provincialism) of the nationalists and the cosmopolitan and universalist traditions of Vienna was not just a matter of details but basic principles.[23] If the question of language was central to the nationalists, those who sought to go against the stream began to question the meaning of silence.

The crisis of language which exploded in imperial Vienna has often been the object of study. Its most often cited text is Hugo von Hofmannsthal's *The Letter of Lord Chandos*. Its philosophical formulation is attributed to Wittgenstein, for whom "the misunderstanding of the logic of language" — which became the central object of philosophical reflection — made it difficult, if not impossible, to express "the problems of our lives."[24] Kraus' preoccupation with language was equally important. But the work of Fritz Mauthner — who was perhaps the first "philosopher of language" — is less known. However, this work was the demonstration of a correspondence between the crisis of language and the political crisis in Austria at the end of the last century and the beginning of the present one. The author proposed a critique of philosophy whose only valid goal was presented as a "suicide of language," and he ended in a "mysticism without God." But the great importance he gave to the critique of political vocabulary was an unequivocal sign of the origin of his motivations.[25]

Whether it was a question of a crisis of culture expressed by a crisis of language or

22. Carl E. Schorske, "Conflit de genérations et changement culturel. Reflexion sur le cas de Vienne," *Actes de la Recherche*, n. 26-27, mars-avril 1979.

23. On this point, see Robert Musil's *The Man without Qualities*. In this novel, the organizers of the Collateral Campaign attempted to satisfy simultaneously the nationalistic spirit of the time and those pre-eminent Austrian traditions of universalism and supranationalism. This quest for an idea which could represent Austria before the world led them increasingly into possible adventures.

24. According to Wittgenstein, it is only questions having answers which may be posed: (*Tractatus*, 6.5), i.e., scientific questions. But "we feel that even when all possible scientific questions have been answered, the problems of life remain completely untouched." See his reaction to a "superficial" remark that his friend and student Malcolm made in reference to the "national character" of the English. Cf. Norman Malcolm, "Ludwig Wittgenstein," in Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Le Cahier bleu et le Cahier brun* (Paris, 1965), pp. 346-347 and 354-357.

25. Of Jewish origin, the German-speaking Fritz Mauthner was born in Bohemia. During his student years in Prague, he took part in the explosion of national quarrels between the Czechs and the Austrians. An Austro-German nationalist, he was disappointed in the Prussian defeat of the Austrians, and he left for Berlin. But the increase of anti-Semitism in Germany also cured him of his Pan-Germanic sentiments. He published a series of works: *The Vocabulary of Philosophy*, 1901, *Contributions to a Critique of Language*, 1901-03, *Language*, 1906. In struggling against linguistic fetishes and superstitions, he placed in question language as an instrument of thought. W.M. Johnston, *The Austrian Mind* (Berkeley, 1972), pp. 196-199.

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simply of problems specific to the German language during a certain transitional period, the question of language was equally central to Austrian political life in this epoch. "For a language decree" was one of the slogans that provoked the most dramatic divisions in parliament and that eventually led to its paralysis (the other was "For universal suffrage").[26] The introduction of national languages, not only within education but also in the administration, was one of the fundamental demands on the leaders of national minorities. (A mandatory bilingualism for government functionaries would result in a Slavic majority over Germans in Cisleithania; in effect, the cultivated classes of the minorities — classes who were a potential source of functionaries — spoke both languages, their national language and German; but the German-speaking Austrians rarely knew any of the national languages). The Czech opposition played a major role at the center of these disturbances. Moreover, its case concerned, at least as an example, the other Slavic minorities. The Czechs wanted only the status accorded to the Hungarians (by the Austro-Hungarian Compromise of 1867), which was refused to them (by the rejection of the Austro-Czech Compromise in 1871). Both Austrian and Hungarian liberals, who did not want to see their work upset by new compromises, had a hand in this defeat of the Czechs. The liberal position still seemed to be in contention with a conservative regionalism. But the Austro-Hungarian Compromise established an important principle. It proved that the restructuration of the Monarchy on a national basis was possible, and that the Habsburg's choice of nationalism over supranationalism did not really menace the power of the dynasty and did not entail the disintegration of the Danubian empire. After a brief period of "passive resistance," the Czechs could counter-attack. If the Austrians were powerful enough to deny to the Czechs the advantages of a modern political regime with national colors, the Czechs were strong enough to obstruct the functioning of the Austrian liberal regime. The machine turned in circles. Questions of a political and social nature were transformed into linguistic ones. For the new generations of Austrian intellectuals, who did not want to take part in the debate on this level, the only thing left was to reopen the question of the possibilities of expression of language and an interrogation on the limits of language. The mode of communication in conformity with the time was obstruction. For the Czechs, their obstruction was only concerned with parliament; for the Austrians, obstruction assumed a universal form. But one must not forget the very pragmatic nature of the Austrian's metaphysical obstruction: it acted as a refusal to deal with the problematic dominated by this "pestilence of pestilences" (Stefan Zweig's name for nationalism),[27] i.e., any problematic of a social or political nature. On the literary level, the ineffable appears mystical, even if it is a question of "lucid mysticism."[28] On the everyday level, it becomes a tool. Obviously, this metaphysical tendency does not have any constructive value, but only serves to defer the inevitable.

26. In the beginning, the system of curiae — a particularly sophisticated electoral system based on property qualifications — gave a lot of playroom to the liberals. Through the introduction of universal suffrage, the Czech opposition hoped to capitalize on the numerical majority of Slavs in Cisleithania.

27. Zweig, *Le monde d'hier*, *op. cit.*, p. 13.

28. Robert Musil spoke of a "daylight mystic" in *The Man without Qualities* (Seuil, 1974), vol. IV, p. 63. The world of the Collateral Campaign, the world of politics, of babble and of ideology was opposed to the "other state," to the mystical voyage of Ulrich and Agathe beyond what was expressible. However, the author clearly distinguished the mysticism of those "who believe themselves touched by God" from an almost mathematically calculable mysticism. But in the end, Musil recognized that both worlds were repudiated, and the "other state" "does not give any recipes for practical life." (vol IV, p. 683 and p. 684.)

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As previously explained, Hungarian liberalism — in spite of the rigidity and the increasingly conservative character of its "official" version — was able to insure the functioning of the parliamentary system and thereby proclaimed itself a "democratic regime" apparently adapted to Central European conditions. The new generations who entered the scene at the end of the 19th century were able to obtain positions in Hungarian political life. The young intellectuals who appeared in the diverse domains of art and science tended to participate in political life, rather than to withdraw from it. Whether it was in the name of a corrupt liberalism or as a result of a movement towards socialist ideas, they constituted a large opposition to the liberalism in power. Their task was to transform (or to overthrow) those institutions which functioned more or less poorly, but were not paralyzed as in Austria. It is in this perspective that we speak of a different development between political identity and cultural identity in the two parts of the Danubian empire. While the desired identification with liberalism seemed impossible to young Austrians, young Hungarians engaged in a struggle against official liberalism. While the "prodigal child" of "Junge Oesterreich," von Hofmannsthal, had "lost completely the ability to speak or to think of anything coherently" and, in particular, on the "affairs of the Court" or on the "incidents in parliament," the Hungarian, Ady, put into verse his anger at one of the Hungarian liberal leaders, at "the madness of Geszt."[29] Although it was strongly criticized, liberalism appeared to be a partner that needed to be combated.[30] The political as such was not rejected. The arguments of the progressives were situated in the same universe as their adversaries, within the politician's universe.

To comprehend the allusions contained in the article cited at the beginning, it is necessary to examine Freud's personality and, above all, his relationship to politics.

In a frequently cited passage from *The Interpretation of Dreams*, we learn that Freud, under the influence of his father, was enthusiastic when the first liberal government came to power in 1867.[31] As a child and as an adolescent, he showed a great interest in

29. This refers to Istvan Tisza, one of the most controversial figures of Hungarian liberalism. He was also a landed proprietor whose estate (30,000 acres) was located near Geszt.

30. One could say that Hungarian liberalism still seems to be visible to its opposition. At their start, both the editorial board of the journal *Huszadik Szazad* and the staff of the *Society of the Social Sciences* were composed of various liberal tendencies. Following the rupture of 1906 (between the conservative and the progressive branches of liberalism), the journal as well as the *Society* were marked by a preponderance of left and radical liberals. The collaborators of the journal and the members of the Society (who were for the most part the same) often sympathized with socialist ideas. In their ranks, one even found representatives of various socialisms (anarchism, syndicalism, marxism). We may speak of a unique type of entente between radical and the socialist intellectuals. Jaszi wrote in 1907: "Although it seems to be a paradox, I will risk saying it: Hungary will become socialist or it will cease to exist." (*History of Hungary*, *op. cit.*, vol. II, p. 732.) In discussing the theses of the Austro-Marxists, he analyzed in his monograph the national question in a marxist vocabulary. But when he considered political action, he never exceeded the limits of liberalism. The Radical Party exhibited its moderation. In opposition to certain groups of intellectuals who, at the end of WWI, accepted Bolshevism as a possible alternative, Jaszi stipulated that he was a partisan of classical liberalism. In the final analysis, as a publicist, as the organizer of a vast oppositional movement, he was often a visionary and a revolutionary, but as a sociologist and political man, he was more realistic and returned to liberalism. In other words, socialism on the distant horizon, bourgeois democracy in the immediate future. Undoubtedly, the very strong presence of the feudal element in political and social life necessitated this ambiguity, which Jaszi shared with the whole Hungarian movement. As a result, we find a certain "intimacy" between "official" liberalism and "oppositional" liberalism. And this, in spite of the latter's strong critique of the former.

31. "Those were the days of the 'Burger' Ministry. Shortly before, my father had brought home portraits of these middle-class professional men — Herbst, Griska, Unger, Berger and the

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politics. He followed attentively the wars of the time,[32] planned on going to law school, which was, at least in Austro-Hungarian society, the usual preparation for a political career, and he only chose medicine at the last moment.[33] As a student, he never stopped thinking of politics, and he participated in the student associations of the German nationalists, which were led by former liberals who were dissatisfied with their party's social and national politics.[34] It was only the rise of anti-Semitism that "put an end forever to this phase of German nationalist enthusiasm through which he passed in early years."[35]

Comparing Freud's career with that of Herzl, the founder of Zionism, and Victor Adler, the leader of Austrian Social Democracy, Dayan points out that these men, who emerged from the same socio-cultural milieu, belonged to the same generation, and who initially followed the same itinerary (liberalism, disappointment with liberalism, Austro-German nationalism or Pan-Germanism, rejection of nationalism with the rise of anti-Semitism) were each able to find a terrain of activity, either in a national or a transnational perspective, suitable to the political style of the era. The hypothesis according to which the history of the psychoanalytic movement was "the enactment and the test of an unpublished policy to carefully avoid any collision with social history and to abstain from any disputes involving other forms of power" seems correct.[36] Freud's first steps towards the elaboration of psychoanalytic theories coincided with the exclusion of the "social" from his field of vision.

Freud's development from "A Project for a Scientific Psychology" (evidence of his ambition to include all of his "theoretical megalomania"[37] during the Fleiss period) to *The Interpretation of Dreams* (the first fundamental work of the psychoanalytic enterprise) involved a series of decisions in the course of which he discovered his true subject, the unconscious. This discovery entailed the rejection of several premises which had hitherto aided him. At the time of the publication of "A Project," in which the relations between organism and environment were described in neurological terms, Freud referred to the infantile seduction theory, i.e., to a theory which held to the real character of the analytic scene and required the examination of the patient's actual life. This theory still implied the "social." A rereading of the articles written in the early nineties may surprise us by the abundance of sociological observations.[38] (Of course, it is only an abundance in relation to a subsequent "absence"). The often mentioned abandonment of an actual traumatism (which occurs simultaneously with the rejection of neuro-physiological language) made possible the introduction of the topological viewpoint into investigations of the psychic apparatus. The shift of emphasis from the "external world" to the "internal world" necessarily diminished Freud's "sociological" interest. We do not want to exaggerate the significance of this shift in his development.

rest — and we had illuminated the house in their honor. There had even been some Jews among them. So henceforth every industrious Jewish Schoolboy carried a Cabinet Minister's portfolio in his satchel." Freud, *op. cit.*, vol. IV, p. 193.

32. Ernst Jones, *The Life and Work of Sigmund Freud* (New York, 1953), vol. I, p. 23.

33. Freud, *op. cit.*, p. 193.

34. Marie-Louise Testenoise, "Freud et Vienne en 1900," in: *Vienne, début d'un siécle*, *Critique*, n. 339-340, 1975.

35. Jones, *op. cit.*, p. 22.

36. Maurice Dayan, "Freud en Cacanie," in *Psychanalyse à l'Université*, n. 6, 1977.

37. The expression is from André Green, "De l'Esquisse à l'Interpretation des rêves: coupure et clôture," in *Nouvelle Revue de Psychanalyse*, n. 5, 1975, p. 163.

38. Cf. the first series of articles collected in *Névrose, psychose et perversion*, (PUF, 1978), especially "Obsession et phobie." This "sociological" Freud permits certain authors to speak of a "revolutionary" Freud. Cf. Juliet Mitchell, *Psychoanalysis and Feminism* (New York, 1974).

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The exclusion of the social was only one of the decisions that he had to make in order to deepen his research into unconscious phenomenon. Other decisions were more important, as for example his bracketing of neuro-physiology. But we can draw attention to the fact that his evolution was determined here by both internal and external needs. The effacement of the "external world" did not only encourage the differentiation of a territory specifically belonging to the Ego, but it was also the completion of a process of separation which began with his withdrawal from politics. The period was central for the development of psychoanalysis and for the history of Austria.

The "desocialized" and "depoliticized" Ego, as it appeared from the start, conformed to the sensibilities of the new generation of Austrian intellectuals who deliberately ignored politics and society. Over forty years old, Freud had little in common with those members of his generation who succumbed to opportunism or who followed uncertain political courses. Rather, his attitude revealed more affinities with the generation of the second half of the nineties, who chose to retreat from politics, from a domain which, in their eyes, escaped all control. Clearly, it would be foolish to speak of his growing young again. Yet, it was a transition period in Freud's life: he was starting a new term as a psychoanalyst.

Just as the neuro-physiological reference reappeared from time to time in the background of psychoanalytic research, Freud's political sensibility resurfaced several times in the course of his life. In his 1917 article, he resorted to a contemporary political vocabulary in order to describe the resistance of the Ego to having its weaknesses exposed by psychoanalysis. He spoke there of a "foreign invasion," of "a hierarchy of superordinated and subordinated agencies," of an "intelligence service," and of "carrying out orders," of "rebelling" and of a "suppression," then of "an absolute ruler," of "his highest officials," and finally of "the people." It was not simply a question of the metaphors of a scientific writer with literary tastes. The war, by its recall of "the last days of humanity" (as the title of a play by Kraus described it), and by the expectation of the imminent fall of the unloved giant State of the House of Austria, certainly effected Freud, as a citizen. But we should also take into consideration the sensibility of the readers to whom the article in question was originally addressed. Freud had to be aware that they were receptive to formulas presenting man as a subject of history. "In these sad times, I have not succeeded in writing anything more cheerful," he noted in a letter accompanying the manuscript to the editor of *Nyugat*. Several months later in a letter explaining why he was unable to write a second article for the Hungarian journal, he made the following remark: "The tension which has dragged on so long without hope of détente and the growth of internal discord since the Russian Revolution has gotten the better of me and made it impossible to concentrate on scientific and literary works."[39]

Towards the end of WWI, the Hungarian intellectual milieus became more and more "radical." The post-war revolutions were being prepared: the so-called "bourgeois" revolution and the so-called "proletarian" revolution. This political mobilization was coupled with a general cultural effervescence. The small circle of the first Hungarian psychoanalysts and their sympathizers were caught up in this movement. The Fifth International Psycho-Analytic Congress was held in Budapest during the "revolution of chrysanthemums" (Autumn 1918). The Thermal Hotel, "Gellert", which had just opened its doors, a special steamer on the Danube, dinners and receptions given in honor of the participants — this was how the new authorities welcomed the psy-

39. *De la correspondance d'Ignotus* (in Hungarian), ed. Erzsebet Vozer, in *Kritika*, 1983/11.

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choanalysts to Hungary under the rule of the Red Count, Karolyi. Clearly, Freud did not overestimate the intellectual capacities of the latter (this is the least that one can say!),[40] but he thought that Budapest could eventually become the center of the psychoanalytic movement. At the end of his inaugural address, Freud expressed his hope that one day the poorest social stratum would receive psychoanalytic treatment.[41]

Freud was delighted about the prospects open to psychoanalysis in Hungary. He approved of the Hungarians' indifference towards "the mystic glamor of St. Stephen's Crown." But he warned Ferenczi not to become too involved in events: "So withdraw your libido in good time from your Fatherland."[42] After the proclamation of the Council Republic in 1919, Ferenczi received a university professorship, the first psychoanalytic chair in history. (A few weeks earlier, Geza Roheim had become professor of anthropology). Again, to Ferenczi, Freud wrote: "Keep a reserved attitude. We are not suited to any kind of official existence, and we need independence in all respects. Perhaps we have reason to say: God protect us from our friends."[43]

The difference between what Freud knew as political experience and that of his contemporary Hungarians is one of degrees. Freud had been able to closely observe the spectacular defeat of rationalism in politics. The history of the Austrian liberals destroyed the great hopes of the past for a possible reorganization of political structures according to the principles of Reason and gave prominence to what is incalculable in human organizations. In the space of a few decades, the awakening of the long ignored non-German ethnic groups transformed the political field into an unstable and swampy battle field — an ideal terrain for the underhanded or shabby tricks of the contenders. The national movements often found themselves accused of being incited to revolt from the outside, but they proved very quickly how well rooted they were in proper Habsburg ground. They utilized the same channels which were intended to convey the Austrian man (and also to protect him, since he had been weakened by his own identity problems) on the road of Progress. Everything happened as if hitherto unknown forces had risen up from somewhere in the depths, on the basis of still indecipherable natural laws, but with an elemental power.

It would be useless to establish a parallelism between the "unconscious movements" of the article and the "national movements" or other revolutionary movements, between the Ego in disarray on its own territory and a liberal government or its protector, the dynasty. What matters to us here is the lesson that Freud drew from the Austrian political avatars. The latter did not agree at all with the enthusiasm of the Hungarian progressives, who still believed it was possible to act upon the world through reasonable means. We have seen that even if he accepted that the rise of progressivism favored the position of psychoanalysis in Hungary, and thereby the psychoanalytic movement in general, he preserved a mistrust towards too splendid

40. "I should like to feel a great deal of sympathy for the Hungarians, but I cannot bring myself to," Freud wrote to Ferenczi. "I cannot get over the ferocity and the lack of sense in that quite uncultivated people. I was assuredly not an adherent of the old regime, but I doubt if it is a sign of political wisdom to kill the cleverest of the many Counts and to make the stupidest of them a President." Jones, *op. cit.*, vol. II, p. 201. Freud alluded here to Tisza. Viewed as the embodiment of the old regime, a group of soldiers murdered him in his apartment. It is October 31, 1918, "the revolution of chrysanthemums," which granted power to Mihaly Karolyi, unjustly underrated by Freud (according to Jones).

41. On the situation of psychoanalysis in Hungary after WWI, see Jones, *op. cit.*, and Gyorgy Vikar, "L'école de Budapest," in *Critique*, n. 346.

42. Jones, *op. cit.*, vol. II, p. 200.

43. *Ibid.*, vol. III, p. 6.

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forecasts. He wrote his article before Hungarian progressivism reached its final phase of revolutionary flames, but in a period when the narcissism of Hungarian politics had already shown itself. When he observes that the Ego — despite all its efforts of rationalization — cannot master its own country, this statement contains a tacit recommendation. Across the successive humiliations of his self-love, man's field of activity narrows but also becomes more sharply defined . . . . If it is so difficult for man to be the master of the "inside," how could he transform the "outside"? It is not a question of a simple antagonism between optimism and pessimism. The gaze without illusions of the atheist of politics crosses with that of the believers.

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Reviews

Russell Jacoby, *The Repression of Psychoanalysis: Otto Fenichel and the Political Freudians* (New York: Basic Books, 1983)

Jacoby's exceptionally well written essay is a study of psychoanalysis and political engagement. The central figure in his research is Otto Fenichel (1897-1946) and a circle of friends who first clustered around him in Berlin, who were then dispersed by the rise of Fascism and the coming of WWII. Several in the circle arrived in America. These seven colleagues (Annie Reich, Edith Jacobson, Kate Friedlander, Georg Gero, Barbara Lantos, Edith Gyomroi, and possibly Berta Bornstein) shared a number of things in common besides the cohort experience of being born around 1900; they represented the second generation of European psychoanalysis. As young men and women their adolescences were marked by the Great War; they come of age during a period of post-war social revolution and repression, economic dislocation, and the clash of mass movements on the Left and the Right. Their early years were decisively colored by radical youth movements, Left-wing politics, the early inspiration of the Russian Revolution, a serious immersion in Marxist culture, a commitment to either Socialist or Communist parties, and a desire to integrate classical psychoanalysis into a broader framework of Marxist social theorizing.

Jacoby's work undermines the conventional picture of Fenichel as simply an outstanding and prolific contributor to "mainline" psychoanalysis. It forces us to reconsider the legacy of mainline. The "big" Fenichel, *The Psychoanalytic Theory of Neurosis* (1945), served as an encyclopedic and reliable compendium to analysts for twenty to twenty-five years after its publication. The "little" Fenichel, *Problems of Psychoanalytic Technique* (1939), set forth guiding principles for a theory of psychoanalytic therapy; it surpasses anything that Freud ever ventured to do, namely, to collect all of his thoughts about technique into a single unified text. Both of Fenichel's books are balanced and sensible; both refuse either a biological or cultural reductionism; both cling to instinctual drive theory and indicate Fenichel's deep attachment to Freud and to his early training at the Vienna Psychoanalytic Institute. However, Fenichel's *engagé* past, his radical politics, and his devotion to a vast project of psychoanalytic social theorizing have been forgotten, or dimly remembered. Jacoby not only rehabitates Fenichel, but also retrieves a lost chapter in psychoanalytic history. The extinction of a political psychoanalysis within a Marxist epistemological framework, he claims, has led to a decline of American psychoanalysis, resulting in a loss of health for the psychoanalytic enterprise.

Jacoby's scholarship displays a sophisticated and unique mastery of the Frankfurt School's method of social analysis. His writing blends a classical Freudian psychoanalysis with a non-dogmatic, Hegelian version of Marxism. Jacoby's main preoccupation is with memory, with the social repercussions of forgetting. Just as he has no mercy for conformist forms of non-psychoanalytic psychology, so, too, does his Marxism contain a denunciation of banal leftist posturing, an impatience with the trivializations of Leninism, and a polemical contempt for the pieties and infantile aspects of vulgar Marxism. *The Repression of Psychoanalysis*, like his earlier books, *Social Amnesia* (1975) and *The Dialectic of Defeat* (1981) demonstrate Jacoby's proficiency in critical

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theory. His books are exercises in the power of the negative dialectic. To read Jacoby is to confront the revolutionary, even the dangerous, aspects of reason. He has a dissolving approach to fixed ideas. He demystifies received forms of knowledge, especially those officially sanctioned by Internationals. Jacoby offers a view of the totality which unites apparently separate fields of human activity and which intersects different universes of discourse. As a social critic deliberately addressing a wide literate audience, Jacoby's prose sparkles. He wastes no words. He surpasses his mentors Marcuse, Korsch, and Adorno in his mastery of the English language and in his deft, frequently felicitous, handling of abstract ideas. He is an Hegelian with a sense of humor: that alone would make him a wonderful read; his humor is dry, dead pan, ironic. If his style is corrosive, his manner of addressing his public is polemical, which will not be to everyone's taste. Jacoby is impassioned about his subject and he wages war for the sake of ideas and their consequences. His forray into the history of the psychoanalytic movement is done in order to extrapolate the revolutionary spirit and content of those who lived this history. He writes about psychoanalytic commitment from a committed vantage point. His revolutionary enthusiasms neither idealize nor sentimentalize the past. Compared to the judiciousness and moderation of official histories, Jacoby's essay is a refreshing contrast. His history also vividly contrasts with the widespread apathy in and around psychoanalytic institutes in contemporary America, an indifference perhaps best exemplified by a loss of serious interest in their own history, in their political and philosophical foundations, and in a demonstrable inability to criticize themselves constructively. Jacoby, incidentally, also joins a group of first-rate researchers denied access to the Freud Archives by Kurt Eissler.

In tracing Fenichel's itinerary, Jacoby brings alive a nearly forgotten generation of European psychoanalysts who were also radical humanists and non-conformists; they were deeply influenced by a Central European Marxist tradition of social theorizing. Psychoanalytic culture in the period between the wars was inseparable from an intellectual and political milieu saturated by Left-wing social movements and ideologies. For many, to be a psychoanalyst was to be a progressive, a free thinker, a maverick and a renegade. Moreover, Fenichel and his circle were not dismissed as alienated outsiders, peripheral to any significant movement. They were insiders, well trained and respected within the classical psychoanalytic community. Fenichel presented his first paper before the Vienna Psychoanalytic Society in the early 1920s. Members of his circle were esteemed as teachers and supervisors; they were clinically astute; several conducted research and made important contributions to psychoanalytic literature. Jacoby depicts his protagonist as a well educated, highly cultivated Central European intellectual. Psychoanalysis appealed to Fenichel and his circle because it challenged received scientific and philosophic ideas; psychoanalytic theory and methodology oriented them in an increasingly disoriented world. Moreover, psychoanalysis was irreverent. It was critical. They came to psychoanalysis as dissenters, hoping to preserve and revitalize a Left-wing political tradition within classical parameters.

Jacoby's sketch of Fenichel catches the exuberance and obsessional qualities of the man; the portrait is all too brief, one wishes he could have extended it into a full intellectual biography. Fenichel's mania for lists and remembering went with a spontaneous zest for living, traveling, joking, and communicating with others. He was an omnivorous reader. He was both a brilliant lecturer and a good listener. If he loved compiling the works of others, he also had a taste for poetry and an admiration for Rilke. Another typical product of *fin-de-siècle* Vienna, Fenichel's identification with high German culture did not mean an anti-democratic contempt for the masses and

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for the economically and culturally deprived; nor did it result in a rejection of his Jewish cultural heritage or a sense of himself as a Jew. With his prodigeous capacity to work, his impressive memory, his love of many branches of learning, his introspective discipline, Fenichel's clinical work was careful and empathic. Not an original or innovative thinker, he was more gifted in synthesizing the work of others than in staking out new directions of his own. He refused to separate Freudian individual psychology from an understanding of history and social structure. Knowing and changing oneself, he insisted, had to occur alongside of revolutionizing society. Marx and Freud had to complement one another; Marx provided a methodological key to understanding social relations and Freud to the dimensions of subjectivity and the inner world. Fenichel's devotion to a social psychoanalysis sprang from a youthful rebelliousness, an interest in the subversive aspects of sexuality and the unconscious, which was never quite extinguished prior to his exile. Nor was he a reclusive scholarly type; Jacoby describes his character style as active, quite the opposite of deferential. He spoke up often, identified himself with unpopular causes, such as defending the theories of Wilhelm Reich. He was not one to bow to authority out of reverence for hierarchy, age, or experience.

Jacoby dramatically tracks Fenichel's move from Vienna to Berlin in 1922; his exile to Oslo in 1933; then on to Prague and Los Angeles. His great archival discovery is the *Rundbriefe*, 119 circular letters, written during Fenichel's exile for eleven and one half years from 1934 to 1945. They averaged 15 to 25 type written pages; the last was composed on Bastille Day, 1945. These letters were simultaneously mailed to at least six other analysts who constituted a secret opposition.

The Fenichel circle were decisively influenced by the educational climate and efflorescence of the Berlin Psychoanalytic Institute, in addition to the explosive political and cultural ambience of Weimar Germany. With Karl Abraham dead in 1926, the Berlin Psychoanalytic Institute lacked a master thinker on a par with Freud. Freud's fatherly presence may have led to more internal cohesiveness and apparently more conservatism, permitting creative departures in the fields of child and adolescent analysis, and theoretical developments in ego psychology, all of which occurred in Vienna without necessitating a split or acrimonious quarrels. In contrast, Weimar Berlin was marked by social and cultural openness, by deep political conflicts, and the rapid polarization of Communist and Fascist mass movements; within psychoanalysis there was an interest in experimentation in education, a clear civic spirit, a desire to develop forms of psychoanalytic therapy for the economically disadvantaged. Lay analysis was encouraged, even promoted. Subsequent psychoanalytic "heresies" originated in Berlin; one has only to mention the names of Karen Horney, Melanie Klein, and Franz Alexander to sense the diversity of the Berlin group. Ernst Simmel, a subsequent founder of the Los Angeles Psychoanalytic Society, was a Berlin Socialist physician who established the first sanatorium, the Schloss Tegel, occassionally frequented by Freud. The recipients of Fenichel's circular letters originally formed a study group outside of formal seminars at the Berlin Psychoanalytic Institute, calling themselves, perhaps ironically, the Children's Seminar. In rejecting the formality, authoritarianism, and pyramidal structure of the Institute, they constituted themselves as a Left-leaning, informal, democratic, and rebellious bunch, generating a good deal of comraderie toward one another.

Fenichel appears to have gravitated toward German communism, as did his colleague Wilhelm Reich. He had clear sympathies for the Russian Revolution until 1932,

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visited the U.S.S.R. several times, publically lectured on the relation between psychoanalysis and Socialism. According to Jacoby, Fenichel was well versed in a conventional or ordinary Marxism characteristic of the 1930s. What appealed to Fenichel about Marxism was its scientific rigor and method; its sociology provided a critical theory of society that was absent in psychoanalytic theory. If psychoanalytic therapy could help isolated individuals to lead less unhappy lives, the psychoanalytic practitioner was powerless to effect radical social change.

Fenichel and his circle were both personally and intellectually challenged by Wilhelm Reich, particularly his contributions to psychoanalytic theory and technique in the late 1920s and early 1930s, that is, the period of Reich's greatest creativity. Jacoby's handling of the Fenichel-Reich encounter is sensitive and informed but not uncritical. He avoids almost all of the inevitable clichés in any discussion of Reich. Fenichel, the documents reveal, largely agreed with Reich's Marxism, defended him both openly and behind the scenes. He agreed with the core of Reich's work and his development of a systematic approach to psychoanalytic interpretations as outlined in the first edition of *Character Analysis* (1933). By 1933 effective dialogue with Reich proved impossible (Annie Reich's marriage with him ended sometime in 1933, and she remained within Fenichel's circle). Reich demanded that one agree with him even to the point of exclusion from the International Psychoanalytic Association (Reich was expelled from both the Communist Party and the International Psychoanalytic Association in 1934). If they appreciated Reich's originality and potency as a theorist, they refused to accept his personal dogmatism and his mental instability. They welcomed his major contributions, especially the brilliant *Mass Psychology of Fascism* (1933), while distancing themselves from Reich's sexual reductionism and over-simplifications. Technically, Fenichel opposed Reich's demand to shatter the patient's defensive armor as overly aggressive. He disagreed with Reich's love of precipitating false crises in the analytic situation by his histrionic interventions, often resulting in non-therapeutic "eruptions."

Fascism and exile shattered the lives and commitments of the political Freudians. Reich's destiny also haunted them. Fenichel and his circle, Jacoby argues, never recovered from their expulsion from Central Europe. They refused to risk censorship or exclusion by the International Psychoanalytic Association. As the European world of their youth crumbled, their subsequent arrival in America resulted not only in a conceptual retreat and conservatism, but also in a turning inward, that is, a repression and even a "self-repression" of their pasts and Left-wing identities. In fitting in, in achieving personal successes as immigrants, in re-establishing their psychoanalytic careers, they remained a secret opposition until Fenichel's death. Many made brilliant careers in America and England. However, they generated no students, transmitting little of their left Freudian legacy. The Americanization of the Fenichel circle was nothing less than a "cultural defeat," that is, a retreat from public issues and from the public forum. It necessitated burying their own past. As psychoanalytic culture divorced itself from a progressive or Marxist underpinning, it suffered a theoretical retreat, becoming vaporized and prettified. In America, the Fenichel circle defended a classical version of psychoanalysis, while surrendering a political psychoanalysis.

And in America, Fenichel discovered a political culture and a psychoanalytic setting utterly different from Europe. If Fascism ruptured the political continuum in their lives, exile further estranged them from their efforts to synthesize Marx and Freud. As insecure immigrant analysts, triply tainted for being psychoanalysts, Marxists, and Jews, they opted for caution. Here Jacoby shifts gears, abandons his intellectual por-

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trait of Fenichel, and analyzes the impact of America and of American pyschoanalysis on his generation of political Freudians.

Jacoby focuses on four features of American life which contributed to the cautiousness, silence, and ultimately the collusion of the Fenichel circle in repressing their own European version of a political psychoanalysis: medicalizations, Americanization, neo-Freudianism, and anti-Marxism.

By 1938, the American Psychoanalytic Association banned the further training of lay analysts. Psychoanalysis in America, contrary to Freud's unequivocal position on the matter, became a medical specialty. With the triumph of medicalization, Jacoby argues, there came an accompanying theoretical banalization. Therapeutic concerns and the vicissitudes of carrying on a successful private practice took precedence over research and a commitment to the subversive aspects of psychoanalytic forms of thinking. Not only did the therapy overwhelm the science, but admissions into analytic training became restricted. Official American psychoanalysis became a private club with a snobbish and elitist mentality; it limited entry to women, humanists, dissenters, and free thinkers. Jacoby holds that professionalization was inextricably tied to regulation and containment; by pre-selecting the available pool of candidates to be physicians, the future of American psychoanalysis promised to be dominated by "conventional and conservative" doctors. The medical/psychiatric underpinning also penetrated into the main body of psychoanalytic literature. A heavy, jargon ridden, technical prose replaced the accessible, imaginative, and metaphoric aspects of Freud's writings. Moreover, the straining for "scientific" legitimacy did not generate a respected body of scientific knowledge and replicable research. Instead, it produced an affluent sub-class of specialists who smugly treated an increasingly affluent clientele.

By Americanization, Jacoby is referring to a cultural process by which psychoanalysis became absorbed into peculiarly American institutions and patterns of thinking. For him, Americanization is tantamount to trivialization. Once refracted in American, psychoanalytic theory and practice lost its rebellious edge, its orientation toward questioning, its function as a general theory of civilization. What replaced it was a pragmatic, deeply anti-intellectual, impoverished and conformist psychoanalysis — a psychoanalysis which was ultimately narrow, conventional, and conservative, compared with its European predecessor.

The neo-Freudians raised and subsequently dashed the hopes of the Fenichel circle. Erich Fromm, Karen Horney, and Clara Thompson did not mask their social and cultural commitments nor their opposition to biological reductionism. Fenichel was unable to join the ranks of the neo-Freudians because of their abandonment of instinctual drive theory. Against the neo-Freudians, Fenichel held that psychoanalysis as a critical theory could not surrender its grasp of sexuality and of unconscious process. (Fenichel appeared to reject the late Freud's postulation of a death instinct as "a complete biologization of neuroses.") Freudian orthodoxy in matters of psychoanalytic technique remained more radical, he thought, than those attempting to introduce modifications and reforms in clinical practice; he opposed, for example, the call for more affection and less tact and neutrality in technique as advocated by Ferenzi. With his customary balance, Fenichel opposed both biological and cultural dogmatism; either/or thinking was anathema to him. Psychoanalytic investigation had to situate itself on an interface where individual subjective experience and early childhood development converged with a specific family and social framework; it could not be oblivious to reality considerations. In America, Fenichel found himself in the paradoxical positon of siding with the psychoanalytic conservatives against the neo-Freudians,

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while disagreeing with the classical psychoanalytic position on Marxist critical theory. Fenichel, himself, was claimed by neither faction and never felt at home among the neo-Freudians or the orthodox.

That America in the late 1930s and early 1940s was anti-Marxist does not deserve further discussion. Communists or fellow travelers were deprecated as "premature anti-Fascists." Fenichel and his circle effectively covered up their radical pasts in such an ambience. The depoliticized or counter-political context of America led inevitably to a deculturing of classical European psychoanalysis. In order to survive in America, Fenichel and his circle censored their own legacy and remained silent about their Marxist commitments. Silence, contends Jacoby, guaranteed that the opposition would remain secret, but more injuriously, that it would generate no students and no existing body of literature to be transmitted to posterity. Jacoby insinuates that the Fenichel group was self-serving; they opportunistically veiled their radical pasts while making brilliant careers in America. In promoting psychoanalysis as a technical, clinical discipline, they inadvertently contributed to a domestication of American psychoanalysis.

Ernst Simmel had preceded Fenichel to California in 1934. A Psychoanalytic Study Group was founded, largely under his direction. A crucial feature of the Study Group, formalized in 1946 into the Los Angeles Psychoanalytic Society, was the favorable reception offered to lay analysts. In point of fact Simmel and Fenichel, despite having earned their medical degrees in Europe, were designated as "lay" because of a California law on certification. Out of loyalty to Freud and out of profound conviction, Fenichel and his circle openly advocated and sponsored lay analysis. The key figures in the early years of psychoanalysis in Los Angeles were non-medical analysts, many of whom were trained in Europe, a number of whom were analyzed by Freud and his leading disciples. People like David Brunswick (who translated Fenichel's technique book), Frances Deri, and Hanna Fenichel, Fenichel's wife, were regarded as the leading theoretical minds and clinicians in Los Angeles in the early decades of the Institute's existence. Moreover, the issue of a medical and psychiatric orientation for psychoanalysis became crucial in the 1950 split in Los Angeles; the new group reconstituted itself as the Society for Psychoanalytic Medicine of Southern California, accentuating the importance of its "medical" identity and thereby indicating its rupture with the European version of classical psychoanalysis.

Jacoby writes from the slant of a professional critic of professionalization; he is an American critic of Americanization. In unmasking the embourgeoisement of American psychoanalysis, he points to the loss of its rebelliousness, its creativity, and its extinction of original thinking. It is not my intention to dispute his perception of the acculturation of psychoanalysis in America. There are a number of issues, however, which I would like to dispute, and which call for further research and critical exploration.

Jacoby's analysis of Americanization, while trendy, lacks an explanatory edge to it. For him (and other writers in the lineage of the Frankfurt School), America is the land of the conventional, the consensus mentality, the anti-theoretical, the vulgarly pragmatic. America, in short, is considered a second-rate culture and an inferior ideological climate. Hence Americanization always represents a leveling down. (Freud, incidentally, might have agreed with these sentiments). The strength of such a view is problematic, given its tautological structure and simple-mindedness.

Likewise, Fenichel's revolutionary activity remains cloudy; he was, it seems, a revolutionary intellectual, a reflective and scholarly man, not someone who had the

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time, energy, or inclination to be a party militant, or to participate in demonstrations and forms of left-wing political activism or agitation. Jacoby never nails down the specific limits of Fenichel's political practice, even in the openly Marxist phase of his life.

It is unhistorical and probably erroneous to suggest that an indigenous radicalism did not exist within the framework of American psychiatry or American psychoanalysis in the late 1930s and 1940s. To be sure, these radicals represented a minority; except for the isolated Communists, their theoretical leanings owed less to Marx than to non-conformist and anti-authoritarian forms of thinking. There were Freudo-Marxists clustered around the psychoanalytic journal, *American Imago*, unmentioned by Jacoby, and certainly deserving of some detailed research (as is the life and work of its editor, Harry Slochower). Similarly, there must have been East coast analysts who read and possibly contributed to *The Partisan Review* in its heyday. Fenichel and his circle most probably revised their commitments to Marxism in the light of Stalin's excesses; their shift in America may reflect a disillusionment and a reassessment of authoritarian Socialism in the Soviet Union as a result of the Moscow Purge Trials of 1936 and the Nazi-Soviet Pact of 1939. Jacoby overlooks that the ideological and utopian aspects of Marxism in the 1920s and 1930s may no longer have made sense in the Stalinist period, nor fit into an American political and cultural context. It remains unclear how much this circle retained of Marxism as a critical method of inquiry.

In documenting and evaluating Fenichel's "repression," Jacoby's thesis is probably inaccurate; he unnecessarily impugns the integrity of this generation of European psychoanalysts. Their motives for not disclosing their personal and political histories were complex. To suggest that they consciously repressed their history is to argue that they were cowards, that they acted in bad faith. This is a resurrection of the "sell-out" notion, current in the discourse of cultural criticism in the 1960s. It lacks foundation.

The harsh (and I think wrong-headed) notion of self-repression by the political Freudians overlooks a number of crucial factors about Fenichel and his lifelong commitments. Jacoby misses the obvious continuities in Fenichel's life. Psychoanalysis for him was the very air he breathed. It was simultaneously a practice and a theory, not an immersion in theoretical activity for the sake of theory building. His self-esteem and identity, both in Europe and in America, was as a practitioner and theoretician of psychoanalysis. His creativity demanded that he remained tied to Freud, that he not break with the International, and that he achieve some measure of recognition from the American branch of psychoanalysis. The comparison with Reich here is glaring. Jacoby's high estimation of European cultural developments glosses over, debunks, practical considerations. Fenichel took the high level of European psychoanalytic abstraction and speculation and attempted to integrate it into clinical practice. Jacoby's criticism moves in the direction of restoring the split, of maintaining the divorce of theoretical work from clinical application. Because his orientation is philosophical, he overlooks that psychoanalysis is designed to help real people understand and change real situations in their lives.

Fenichel's position on the relation between psychoanalysis and politics remained closer to the classical psychoanalytic ethic than to the Marxist one. For this generation, the liberal, individualistic foundations of psychoanalysis served as an ideological frame, limiting certain forms of commitment, even if one's sympathies were for revolutionary groups and activities. That ethic precluded the intrusion of politics into

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clinical work, as well as into supervision and teaching. The political tastes and concerns of a given psychoanalyst must be separated from his practical activity, but certainly could find expression in public forums as a responsible citizen. Fenichel, so it seems, remained less interested in the politicization of psychoanalysis than Jacoby would have liked. He focused on theoretical and practical solutions to clinical questions rather than on issues of intellectual power, succession of power in psychoanalytic institutes, the personal domination of a group, or a group's domination over competing groups (such as the neo-Freudians). Fenichel may have discovered that the politicization of psychoanalysis was exhausting and that it almost always revived conflicts which have little clinical or scientific importance.

In conclusion, Jacoby might have remembered that psychoanalysis itself is engagement. This engagement is far more subtle than the possibilities entailed in understanding and changing modern society, root and branch. Psychoanalytic engagement is nevertheless a form of thinking and doing, despite being conducted in a highly private domain of exploration. If there is nothing in the psychoanalytic ethic to prevent the clinician from having political opinions and from maintaining visibility on the public scene, there is always a question about the degree and relativity of the analyst's concrete political practice. Fenichel and his circle understood, perhaps agonized over, the necessity to remain a neutral, impartial, and enigmatic personality in their analytic stance, in order to gain deeper access to the patient's unconscious. The politicization of the analytic situation, or the highly politicized visibility of the analyst, inhibits the patient's freedom and possibilities for liberation, if they think of their analyst as either a public figure on the Left or the Right. Jacoby is critically astute in seeing the current embourgeoisement of American psychoanalysis as a cultural malaise, which is also inevitably a political malaise. He does not grasp that Fenichel and his circle also appreciated this malaise, struggled against it, while fitting into an American milieu not entirely of their making, all the while remaining engaged in their own fashion.

David James Fisher

Douglas Kahn and Diane Neumaier eds., *Cultures in Contention*, (Seattle: The Real Comet Press, 1985).

How many illusions of everyday life must Leftist culture unmask before it confronts its own, empty vision? The collapse of America's Vietnam War effort ended the drama of impending Final Conflict between progressive forces and the ruling class. Since then, Leftist culture has moved back into a situation structurally similar to the rest of American culture: whether Leftist or mainstream, culture, as is, functions to provide the only legitimate forum for public confrontation with the universal crisis of personal identity within the vast wash of our society. The writers in *Cultures in Contention* demand more.

Unlike previous eras of radical activist artists, the current generation as represented in *Cultures in Contention* hopes to combine the esthetic ideal of a personal style with the self-effacing necessities of promoting social change. Bridging the two elements, howev-

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er, rarely works, and the local self-regenerated communities depicted in the texts may be about the furthest limit of cultural-political vision the Left has to offer in response to accelerating social flux. The attempt to go beyond this limit engenders sundry tribes of nouveau aborigines, occasionally exhibiting themselves with public performances, but no real movement towards an understanding of the present political and cultural dilemma all individuals face.

To claim an identity, *Cultures in Contention* insists that one must elect affinity to a tribe of some sort. According to the many writers, artists, critics, and performers in this collection, this tribalized identity seems to be the primary element to distinguish radical Leftist cultural work from other kinds of culture. A hefty coffee table anthology for socialistic group houses and community centers with an extra twenty dollars around, *Cultures in Contention* was produced by Douglas Kahn and Diane Neumaier as a follow-up to the ArtPolitik conference held in Seattle in 1981. They have collected twenty-four different essays and an introduction, black-and-white photographs and posters, covering a range of topics and events from billboard defacement in Australia to political theater in Kenya.

"Contentious culture," as the editors term it, seeks to establish, criticize, oppose, and ultimately regenerate social and political context. It starts from an anthropological view of the role of art as community expression, rather than as an unmediated object standing aloof from its historical and social moment. Such cultural work names the badguys and organizes and strengthens the progressive forces. Each piece in the anthology documents specific events, shows, performances, organizations, and practices, and assesses available tactics in the use of cultural venues for political ends. Almost all provide case studies as primers for further action. For example, Peter Dunn's and Loraine Leeson's essay and photos from their use of billboards in East London's ramshackle Docklands examine their ongoing project of visual presentation of issues concerning the local population. This includes health, environment, and community participation in urban revitalization, and focuses on the history of the issues confronted, the practical problems encountered, the results achieved and desired, the vandalization by private citizens and government officials, and the continuing struggle.

The other pieces are much the same, such as the intriguing story of Günther Wallraff's undercover investigation of right wing organizations in Portugal, Suzanne Lacy's and Leslie Labowitz's discussion of feminist media strategies, Peter King's project of billboard defacement in Australia, and Holly Near's tale about women's song in the resistance movement in Uruguay. All explore how we do it —in several instances, used to do it— despite great opposition and public apathy, how you can do it too, and how we all, each tribe, form part of a vast network of progressive forces seeking genuine social change. As Near concludes, "A song is a small act —yet it is the accumulation of thousands of small acts that effects change. Perhaps the songs help us to remember our own power." Some of the pieces focus on theory, though always alluding to the practical implications of the work, such as the discussion of the problematics of "advocacy criticism" by renegade *Village Voice* art critic Lucy Lippard and the interview with jazz musician and professor Archie Shepp on the role of music in the creation of political power.

The bottom line, however, is always the performance: this is politics, but politics using cultural vehicles to circumvent the closures of normal political practices. The cultural events discussed rely upon the traditionally-perceived contradiction between politics and art to pursue their ends of provocation and social change. The measure of success never rests in the unmediated object as the bourgeois art-world would claim, but rather is based solely on its impact: did the audience "buy" it and join in, did the media cover it, did the ruling class shake a bit? Even the more object-centered artwork of Hans Haacke and the photomontages by Klaus Staeck measure success through im-

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pact: at times it becomes a race —usually a losing one— to see if the Left can reach sufficient numbers with its message to offset the more powerful voices of the ruling culture.

The pieces gathered here from the rainbow Left depict culture in late-imperialist capitalism as a vast auditorium pervaded by the ruling class's alluring hegemonic forces of cultural and, hence, consciousness control. Their Big Voices boom to a military cadence from the High Podium in the center of the auditorium and all but drown out the myriad little voices of the oppressed who struggle to sing their own songs above the din. Enraptured by the power and harmony of the Big Voices and their great high-tech megaphones, the masses listen attentively to the Siren songs of industrial and, now, post-industrial culture. If the little voices could just get their message out to enough people, these oppositional culture producers believe, the false harmony of the Big Voices would crack and their imposing cultural machinery would topple like a facade on the set of some B-grade Hollywood epic, baring a vicious, rapacious structural reality. With the grand illusion revealed, the hoardes would begin to shout not for a new illusion but a better reality.

In the great auditorium of the late '80's, however, anybody who speaks loudly enough will be heard; if not by the power elite on or near the High Podium, at least by other folks confronting identity conflicts related to their own. There is always an available audience sympathetic to each new voice: access to culture in the West is so open, so genuinely welcoming —if always tinged by self-interest— to any new contender for the evanescent prize of "culture," that there no longer seems to be any point of contention. The juggernaut of Western capitalist forces speeds merrily by, while the tribes perform their rituals and ceremonies. In *Cultures in Contention*, a primer for the losers, everybody wins the grand title of "Culture": the more cultures the better, and in the auditorium of world-culture, the more noise packed in, the more rejoicing there seems in every part of the hall, even the High Podium. There they call it democratic pluralism, elsewhere they call it fragmentation of the forces of change.

Declaring your liberation from the disarray of the West's popular culture by affiliating with a tribe of your own choosing helps to solve, at least for a period, the personal identity crisis that characterizes Western society. By seeking then to awaken the somnambulistic, unenlightened consumers of mass culture, you are, the editors write, creating radical political culture. Combining the search for personal identity with vehicles for intended political change, however, too often produces occasions that look, act, and *feel* like group therapy in drag. Accomplishment of goals tends quickly to be subsumed within the self-fulfilling dynamics of the group. Whether the goal is world revolution or the raising of lesbian consciousness in L.A. —the topic of Arlene Raven's essay— it is all just theater. All too often, bad theater.

For all the good it does people in need of such bolstering, Leftist cultural projects and affiliations have not moved the West one step closer to a solution to its perhaps endless crisis of cultural identity or even promulgated a vision of what a genuine culture of truly liberated minds and hearts and bodies might be. The groups portrayed here have virtually met their goals if they can gather a sympathetic audience of friends to listen to their epic tales of woe and rebirth. The show is always worth the price of admission to those who come: they would not be there if the performers were not singing the songs they already know by heart. Otherwise there are many other festivals, performances, events, readings, openings, and concerts to attend, each as much a ritual act of tribalization as the other.

The antics described by Abbie Hoffman —remember him?— titled "Wall Street Action" are childish pranks, yet the Artaudian absurdist theatrics that he advocates underpin several projects discussed in *Cultures in Contention*. The basic job for the cultural program advocated in many essays appears to be provocation of the social mainstream into a revealing self-parody. When we see who they really are, we will know better just

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who we are. However, the mask of the harmonious pursuit of brotherhood and well-being fell away long ago, even for the most devout members of the bourgeoisie; such tactics now seem merely redundant and naive at best and often offensive to the very audience they should be attempting to reach: those who waver between passive acceptance of a problematic status quo and active alignment with the available means of resistance. Join the tribe or bleed by yourself is the message of too many of these projects: given the choice among the tribal healing rituals offered and nursing my own wounds, more often than not I will choose to purchase my compress at the local pharmacy.

Nostalgia for an easier era of protest is reflected in the tales of Hoffman: his valiant blows fell against an unprepared empire before the happy minions of fellow protesters and the dismayed looks of establishment types. In those days when revolution was in the air, one knew which tribe one belonged to by the clothes and the length of hair worn: the enemy was clearly identifiable. But I wonder if we find ourselves in a better world because several years back Hoffman and some Yippie cohorts went to the New York Stock Exchange, slipped out of the visitors gallery onto a parapet overlooking the trading floor, and tossed a few hundred dollars to the eager hands below? Boy, throw those guys money, the bread of life and affliction, and they jump for it in the most rabid manner. By gosh, they grabbed at the greenbacks, those traders and messengers in their suits and ties. You mean it all comes down to such moneygrubbing? What an embarrassment to the brokerage houses and the investment banks! Imagine their employees pleased to catch a couple bucks floating down from the skies! The police came, the press came, the fables and rumors and glee spread. Wall Street closed off access to the trading floor from the gallery.

In the hodge-podge of contentious cultures these days, things have surely grown more complex. If you wear a black leather jacket and adhere to a radical lesbian group in L.A., I am not so sure you would care all that much about the doings of an Australian group defacing billboards to reveal the subliminal and not-so-subliminal messages pandered to the consumers.

Although one may wish to be grudgingly generous and see the Hoffman piece as a relic of an ingenuous era on the Left, it is hard to find much greater sophistication among the newer cultural contenders. The more self-effacing are doing agit-prop, cultural activities as a means of community organizing, and informational art for union workers, housewives, and destitute communities. Martha Gever's feminist videos, Fred Lonidier's photo-text analyses for union laborers, and Ross Kidd's popular theater in Africa seem invariably short of funds, measure success with head counts and the comments left in date books and solicited from viewers. We are witnessing the Reagan government's moral mortgaging of its own future in savaging the new social and cultural programs among the poor in Nicaragua, which are described in Ernesto Cardenal's 1982 UNESCO speech translated for the volume. The Big Voices, who understand things beyond the High Podium only as terrifying threats to their own places, would not stand for that one.

The more sophisticated cultural contenders portrayed in *Cultures in Contention* form communities and talk among themselves. They seem to have access to relatively advanced means of communication and understand the operations of the media, such as DeeDee Hallack's public access cable television projects, Lucy Lippard's political art and documentation group, and Hans Haacke's reconstructed and parody advertisements. But coverage in *The Voice* or the second section of *The Times* or any more than local newspaper appears to be a coup for one of their performances or events and the continued strength of the collective, the tribe of the self-elect, the real aim. The choice, it seems, must be made for contentious culture enthusiasts between the self-effacing work towards short-term, concrete impact on specific issues among a low-profile audience of the needy or the making of a longer-term, more personally-stylized

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commitment to a collectivity of politically-identified cultural workers who create for the needs of the collectivity with a small but knowledgable and enthusiastic audience. A broader social spectrum remains out-of-reach in either case.

For Americans from the full array of the political market basket, art has become the most common religious experience, other than shopping: instead of church, the family dresses up and visits the museum on Sunday; the blockbuster show has become the new revival meeting, barnstorming the grand public architectural palaces from L.A. to Houston to Minneapolis to Atlanta to Buffalo to Chicago to the competing I.M. Pei polyhedrons dotting the Northeast Corridor trying to snatch the evangelical fervor out of New York City. Individual and group association with culture, from patron to artist, marks out the elect among all those who otherwise pursue mere and tawdry pelf. Cultivated collecting has become the sought-after insignia of *Bildung* for new money as well as old: good taste and not birth distinguishes the nobility within the American aristocracy of lucre. Of course, it is still the barbarians who rule the heartland. Hollywood by definition refuses the imprimatur of the museum: when the camera stops rolling the stars die for us.

In inflationary post-modernism value races out of the atelier with the artist's eyes always fixed on the competition, like a star running back carrying a slab of day glow-colored jello instead of the football in his paws, just one step ahead of the market ready to swallow it up. And yet, in spite of (could it be because of?) all the throw-aways, neon, and noise, the aura of the art object does not decay. In the art backdrops to the vast theaters of post-modernism in Tribeca dance clubs and SoHo boutiques, the object retains something that until it falls apart, or is vandalized beyond recognition, or lies forgotten, shares in the historical power that only the one-of-a-kind (or a few-of-a-kind) commodity has. Art is detritus, the offal of a select breed of producers, as ephemeral as all the rest, just more scrap on the endlessly growing heap of experience, but it's the scrap that makes us miss the pile, even as they cart us away and prepare to toss us atop.

Curiously, the art of contentious cultures specifies its own decay and assures the swift passage of any aura in the object of something greater than the common life. Its producers do not want us to miss the heap for the sake of the shiny chunk of foolsgold. The objects they create tend to be performance and poster art and collages of contemporary images from various media, the "consciousness industry" Hans Haacke terms it. This presents the essential structure of post-modern culture: it is the cry of its occasion —hopefully sufficiently attractive as to reap some form of reward—and certainly not a thing to endure beyond the museum of the moment. As in Brecht's epic theater, their political art work attempts to break down the distance between the performance and the audience's personal experience of history; decidedly non-Brechtian is the willful denial or ignorance or simple disinterest in any greater sweep of historical consciousness. Gabriel Garcia Marquez's discussion of a Nicaraguan film is the lone piece in the collection that looks well beyond the events discussed to how "the most powerful and fascinating country in the world has not learned from the terrible lessons of its own history."

The works presented in *Cultures in Contention* center on issues and not ways of perceiving experience, except as such perception helps to explain specific problems. As such, the critical consciousness educed in audiences will be directly measurable in commitment to the cause, to the tribe. When the cause disappears or gets absorbed or redefined by the ruling classes, the tribe invariably finds itself in grave jeopardy of an ineffectual demise. The spurious psychological nationalism in the Leftist anthropological approach to culture actually makes life *easier* for the Big Voices to continue to dominate the auditorium of world-culture. In a competitive society without legal restrictions on expression, contentious culture is just another chapter in the cycle of sentimental individualisms —with all the unnamable hopes and vapid mysticisms of the tradition.

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Can the art object or performance that historicizes itself in the very idea impelling its creation hope to accomplish anything more than left wing journalism might do as effectively? Given its effectiveness as historical criticism, can contentious culture still have more traditional art's power to point beyond itself to a fuller, more enduring experience against which reality must be brought to judgement? As Harold Rosenberg claimed for the abstract expressionist paintings of High Modernism, the most effective art —"the anxious object" in his memorable words— pursues its own idea rather than re-presenting the machinations of the given. Through the refusal of externally-imposed definition and form in its creation, the art object and the artistic identity engendered in the creative process thus place themselves against the grain of social and historical institutions designed to control the crisis of art and society. When you look at and read a Klaus Staeck photomontage, you get the message and need look no more. You may desire to respond to that message. When you look at and read a Susan Rothenberg horse painting, you do not get the message until you look at and read *yourself* connecting to the object. You may base action upon this more entangled and compressed message, but you must constantly read it anew if you still wish to get it. And those second readings are where intelligent decision-making and real commitment begin.

Such commitment refuses to be tribalized and then re-tribalized as the first tribe languishes under changing conditions, nor can it be defused and suppressed by the destruction of today's tribe. Enforced tribalization through propaganda, whether by means of guilt, repression, or explication of the faults of the foes, cannot endure. Pluralism means never having to say you are sorry for joining a different tribe tomorrow. And there are as many tribes as there are days in a lifetime, each inviting you to attend its ritual ceremonies of healing and cultural regeneration.

In our politics no less than in our art we want the sublime sting that carries the inadequacy of the world into resonant opposition to the adequacy of our hearts. If the object just reminds us that the world is not what we wish it to be, it tells us in different words what we already know at birth and re-learn in every dosage of journalism we absorb. Is this a romantic argument expressing an elitist nostalgia for modernism, the most academic of all art eras? No, it need not be; clearly good, accessible art can move the spectator yet need not decline to engage in political commentary and allegory: witness most of such recent popular films as "The Killing Fields" and "Brazil," or a documentary like Claude Lanzmann's "Shoah," or the paintings of Kitaj and the sculpture of George Segal, or Wallace Shawn's "Aunt Dan and Lemon" and other contemporary dramas produced at New York's Public Theater and the frequent Brechtian fare staged at the American Repertory Theater in Cambridge. Yet none of these examples insists that one accept the issues in the single position presented by a unified leftist collective or else consider oneself to be among the oppressors or, perhaps more disreputable, the unenlightened.

A genuine political culture may not exist anywhere except in those places in which the forces of oppression necessitate it from above, as in the Warsaw Pact nations, or from below, as in much of the Third World and especially Latin America. In its absence, the more avowedly political the work of art the more ephemeral will be its cultural and, consequently, its political impact. If the cultural producer aims for both cultural and political impact upon contemporary affairs, he or she will achieve neither in any enduring sense; yet, paradoxically, politics and culture cannot be separated in the creation of society without gravely stunting it. The crisis of art and society in America today revolves around this essential split between political life and cultural identity: forcing them together enhances neither in our current situation.

In contemporary America, if a cultural event depicts or refers to ongoing history in a fashion inviting direct explanation in the language of current affairs, its message will be easily deciphered and then assimilated as normal experience. Such art objects agree to

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their own disappearance potentially prior to the disappearance of the conditions that first provoked their creation. The price of such precision is power. The countervailing statement that the more inward-directed the object is the more it reflects outward and enables us to apprehend the totality of experience, probably is not true —despite the philosophic claims of Adorno's neo-theodicy of redemptive aesthetics. As Lukács and Marcuse have pointed out, such inwardness can sanction a benign neglect or a shoulder-shrugging resignation to the brutal realities of oppression and the unmet needs of those deprived of the capacity to help themselves. Nonetheless, such anxiously self-absorbed and necessarily self-criticizing works reach the centers of personal identity with a broad and compelling sweep. However, these works will lack precision regarding what action is to be taken and what thought is to be held by their audience. Yet, the thoughtful audience when presented with provocative possibilities for alignment with progressive forces will make the right choices time and again and will not simply march in one pageant or another until it passes or ceases to meet their psychological needs. These people will have a cultural identity and will rely upon it within the available means for progressive political life in society.

For an understanding of the capacities of cultural life as a force for political change, we should look to master portrayers and caricaturists of the darkest moments and impulses of humanity like Goya, Daumier, and Grosz, or a Melville, or even a Chaplin. The permanence of the power of their works resides in their formal embodiment and compression of an idea about human abasement, contempt, shallowness, and moral failure. Unlike the political messages of *Cultures in Contention*, this idea may not be merely explained and then forgotten through responsible or irresponsible reaction. The historical world these artists depicted has disappeared, yet the brutal idea they explored still reigns. Their images condemn our continuing failure to overcome their critical power. We may defeat them —or win on their behalf— only in the creation of a world no longer scourged by that idea.

The greatest works of art are most genuinely political by their insistence that we have no choice but to struggle to overcome the horrible experiences of our history. The power and necessity of cultural objects endure so long as our new creations fail to rid existence of this idea. Many tribes have come and gone and the Big Voices on the High Podium must now shout louder to drown out all the noise, but even those far from the High Podium prefer the steady military march of the Big Voices to the constantly changing tribal beat emanating from countless corners of the auditorium.

Marc Wortman

Timothy J. Lukes, *The Flight into Inwardness: An Exposition and Critique of Herbert Marcuse's Theory of Liberative Aesthetics.* Selinsgove, Penn.: Susquehanna University Press, 1985.
C. Fred Alford, *Science and the Revenge of Nature: Marcuse and Habermas.* Gainesville: University Presses of Florida, 1985.

The publication of Timothy J. Lukes's *The Flight into Inwardness* and C. Fred Alford's *Science and the Revenge of Nature* marks a new stage in the development of Marcuse studies. In the early eighties, four books attempted to explicate Marcuse's entire life's

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work.[1] To the extent that this formidable task was placed in a larger intellectual context, Marcuse's work was understood as part of the attempt to establish philosophical foundations for contemporary critical Marxism, particularly the critical Marxism of the Frankfurt School. Lukes and Alford adopt a new approach. Each author examines the genesis and implications of a single theme from Marcuse's work: Lukes looks at art and Alford at science. Moreover, both authors eschew the earlier preoccupation with Marcuse's place within critical Marxism. Lukes maintains that Marcuse needs a fresh perspective which is "unencumbered" by the Frankfurt School jargon of many previous studies. And Alford's study of science in the thought of Marcuse and Habermas compares their work with Anglo-American philosophy of science and Continental philosophy.

Marcuse's last major work, *The Aesthetic Dimension*, is the starting point of Lukes's analysis. Lukes's central thesis is that the later Marcuse's faith in the liberating potential of art is both dangerous and mistaken. As a bulwark against the administered state and society, Lukes contends that the aesthetic "flight into inwardness, . . . , is a barrier more like straw than brick" (p. 9). As a foundation for possible revolutionary practice, Lukes also finds art and aesthetics deficient. Here Lukes upholds the younger Marcuse's stance on the "affirmative character" of art against the later Marcuse; the most authentic, "liberative" art is more likely to engender a feeling of "restful contemplation" and acceptance of the status quo than it is to awaken a demand for the revolutionary transformation of society. This revolutionary transformation is, according to Lukes, a political goal which requires strictly political means. Rather than contributing to these political means, Marcuse's flight into aesthetic inwardness correlates with the retreat from the revolutionary politics of the sixties and seventies to the apolitical individualism of the eighties.

Lukes casts his analysis of Marcuse's aestheticism in four parts. The three chapters of part I outline the technological, psychological, and deterministic obstacles to liberation, always with hints of their possible aesthetic resolution. The second and third chapters are the least problematic. In chapter 2, Lukes undertakes a fairly conventional review of Marcuse's dispute with Freud about the possibilities for human libidinal emancipation. Here it is no surprise to read that the current form and content of instinctual repression are not the necessary price paid for the maintenance of human civilization per se, but are distorted and intensified by the surplus repression imposed by a particular, performance-based form of human civilization. Lukes points out that already in *Eros and Civilization* Marcuse looks towards aesthetic activity as a model for future, nonrepressive instinctual sublimation. In chapter 3, Lukes reviews Marcuse's criticisms of deterministic social theories. Lukes introduces an analytic distinction between "historical" and "social" determinisms. According to Lukes, "historical determinism (the theory of historical inevitability) holds that present societal relations are mostly inevitable and unavoidable results of past developments" (p. 52). The gamut of historical determinists ranges from some Hegelians to behavioral thinkers. Social determinism, on the other hand, "insists . . . that the individual, as opposed

1. These four books are: Vincent Geoghegan, *Reason and Eros: The Social Theory of Herbert Marcuse* (London: Pluto Press, 1981); Barry Kätz, *Herbert Marcuse and the Art of Liberation: An Intellectual Biography* (London: Verso Editions, 1982); Dougles Kellner, *Herbert Marcuse and the Crisis of Marxism* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984); and Morton Schoolman, *The Imaginary Witness: The Critical Theory of Herbert Marcuse* (New York: The Free Press, 1980). Paul Breines's review of Geoghegan appeared in *Telos*, no. 49 (1981), pp. 206-9, Kellner's review of Kätz in *Telos*, no. 56 (1983), pp. 223-29, Kätz's review of Kellner in *Telos*, no. 63 (1985), pp. 215-19, and my review of Schoolman and Kätz ("Two Books on Marcuse") in *Telos*, no. 56 (1983), pp. 213-23.

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to the social class, is unequipped to develop independently a subjective, autonomous consciousness" (p. 52). Social determinism, the chief flaw of Marxist theory, shares one crucial characteristic with historical determinism: both determinisms lock the individual into the historical present by precluding the possibility that human beings can engage in transcending, world-transforming types of political activity. Citing *The Aesthetic Dimension*, Lukes notes Marcuse's faith in the power of art to overcome determinism. It is the great works of art which transcend both historical and social determinism to depict the plight and aspirations of the individual as the plight and aspirations of "humanity as such."

In chapter 1, Lukes claims to analyze Marcuse's notion of technological rationality as another obstacle to liberation. But in fact this is less of an analysis of technological rationality (Alford's book pursues this theme more deeply) than it is of just one of its aspects: the contemporary propensity toward operational thinking. The major problems here, however, is not the partiality of this analysis, but the precipitous leap that Lukes makes from Marcuse's critique of philosophic operationalism to an alleged human "ontological drive," a "natural inclination" to universalize. In *One-Dimensional Man*, Marcuse engages in a methodological and epistemological critique of contemporary operational philosophies which confine their concepts to objective, verifiable referents. This practice is then compared to the great works of the philosophic tradition, whose universal concepts transcend any particular objective referent or referents. Lukes takes this epistemological critique and inflates it into evidence of Marcuse's belief in an ontological drive to universalize.

The interpretation of the Marcuse of *One-Dimensional Man* as a crypto-ontologist is not new. It pervades a number of the old, presumably "encumbered" studies of Marcuse as a member of the Frankfurt School.[2] But Lukes' version of this theme is far from convincing. On the one hand, he presents no biographical background to account for Marcuse's ontologizing tendency. There is a passing reference to Marcuse's "phenomenological mentors," but the reader is left to puzzle about who they were and what they taught him. But more importantly, Lukes's citations of Marcuse's epistemological critique of operationalism and Lukes's ontological gloss of these citations remain in stark contrast; the link between epistemology and ontology is presumed rather than explicitly theorized. As might be expected, art is presented as a possible means for overcoming the particularization of operationalism and therby satisfying the ontological need to universalize.

The single chapter of part II provides a first indication of Lukes's surprising and refreshing versatility. After exploring aspects of Marcuse's political theory in part I, part II is a patient, meticulous account of the foundation of Marcuse's aesthetics in Kantian philosophy. (Later chapters will abandon both political theory and philosophy for excursuses into Shakespeare's *King Lear* and the empirical history of art.)[3] While this exposition is instructive, it also points to the liabilities of the new tendency to abstract

2. See, for example, Wolfgang Fritz Haug, "Das Ganz und das ganze Andere: Zur Kritik der reinen revolutionären Transzendenz," in *Antworten auf Herbert Marcuse*, ed. Jürgen Habermas (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1968), and Paul Piccone and Alex Deflini, "Marcuse's Heideggerian Marxism," *Telos*, no. 6 (1970), pp. 36-46.

3. One can safely conclude that Lukes has avoided the pitfalls of scholarly over-specialization. According to the dust jacket of *The Flight into Inwardness*, "Lukes has published articles on such topics as Machiavelli's concept of *fortuna*, Christianity as a political took, using literary works in the teaching of political science, and the ramifications of living in the 'silicon valley.' " His current work is on "a book-length manuscript on Japanese Farming and Community Power in Santa Clara County, California: 1890-1950."

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Marcuse's thought from the Marxist tradition. In *Counterrevolution and Revolt*, Marcuse synthesizes the aesthetics of Kant and Schiller with a new interpretation of Marx's *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts*. Yet Marx's name does not appear in Lukes's chapter on Marcuse's aesthetics. Clearly it is this crucial omission, as much as the actual content of Marcuse's late aesthetics, that lends *prima facie* credibility to Lukes's thesis that Marcuse's late works constitute a thoroughly apolitical flight into inwardness.[4]

If the initial parts of *The Flight into Inwardness* are marked by a few weaknesses, part III is worth the price of the book in itself. The five chapters of part III construct Marcuse's "aesthetic taxonomy" in terms of the liberating potential of various types of artistic statements. Lukes performs an invaluable service for anyone who has tried to grapple with Marcuse's disjunct and apparently contradictory views on art.

According to Lukes, Marcuse delineates four inferior types of art in terms of their liberative potential. The first inferior type Lukes calls "scientific art." Scientific art has two subdivisions: Stalinist socialist realism and the instrumental art of Western societies. Both subdivisions are scientific because "these art forms try to subordinate artistic expression to the progress of 'science,' and thus lost all critical and transcendental capabilities" (p. 21). Lukes's account of socialist realism is thorough, while his treatment of Western instrumental art remains somewhat sketchy. The second inferior type is "affirmative art." By affirmative art, Marcuse means the great artistic achievements of the bourgeois tradition. Affirmative art has the virtue of providing an aesthetic transcendence of the status quo. But by confining this transcendence to the museum and the concert hall, affirmative art is also a conservative force: "the transcendence occurs without any significant opposition to the reality that is being transcended" (p. 22). The third inferior type is "anti-art." Anti-art movements, such as dadaism and surrealism, recognize the impotence of affirmative art and attempt to overcome the separation of aesthetics and reality. Through *Eros and Civilization*, Marcuse lauds this intent of anti-art. But in his later works, Marcuse comes to see anti-art as too dependent on the status quo that it wishes to transcend, and as too easily absorbed by capitalist market forces. The final inferior type is "critical art." By critical art, Lukes primarily means the artistic values of Adorno. Like anti-art, critical art rejects the aesthetic conformism of affirmative art. But unlike anti-art, critical art moves beyond mere opposition by providing an alternative structure or form. For Marcuse, the seriousness of critical art is its undoing. Critical art lacks the aesthetic playfulness that can only provide a genuine alternative to a society based upon performance in work.

The alternative to the inferior types is "liberative art." To a great extent, liberative art is the same as affirmative art. But in *The Aesthetic Dimension*, Marcuse has merely changed his evaluation of the liberating potential of the great works in the bourgeois tradition. In his late works, the transcendence embodied in the *form* of great art — i.e., the demand for individual happiness and fulfillment — outweighs its tendency to affirm the status quo. The crucial question is now to account for the unrevolutionary nature of most affirmative art most of the time. The answer, according to Lukes, is extrinsic to the art works themselves. "Liberative art," in Lukes's words, "is nothing more than affirmative art occurring in a more receptive environment" (p. 118). Under the proper political conditions, affirmative art will achieve its revolutionary potential. While these proper conditions have been sporadic in the past, they are persistent in the contemporary period. With the material abundance of the contemporary period, Mar-

4. For a useful corrective, see Andrew Feenberg, *Lukács, Marx and the Sources of Critical Theory* (Totowa, N.J.: Rowman and Littlefield, 1981), pp. 251-52.

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cuse believes that the demand for the happiness and fulfillment of the individual which characterized affirmative art in periods of material scarcity will cease to be confined to an impotent aesthetic sphere, and will instead become a real demand for real individual happiness and fulfillment in a real world of material abundance. In the transition from affirmative to liberative art, it is not art which changes, but society.

Having established the character of that art which Marcuse believes to be liberating, Lukes proceeds to his critique. The first chapter of part IV examines the notion of the possible political significance of playfulness. Lukes takes up Marcuse's claim, in *An Essay on Liberation*, that the "cynical defiance of the fool" can advance the cause of liberation. During the course of his analysis of the fool in *King Lear*, Lukes admits that the irony, detachment, and playfulness of the fool can lead to crucial political insights. At the same time, the impotence of the fool — or, worse, the fool's illusion of potency — renders him defenseless against the very real power of others. Lukes's clever analysis suggests the vulnerability of playfulness as a political force. But Marcuse's paeon to the fool in *An Essay of Liberation* does not exhaust the possible implications of playfulness, and the fate of Lear's fool does not seal the case against playfulness. This assault by Lukes on Marcuse's aestheticism is suggestive, but can hardly be accepted as a definitive refutation.

In the next chapter, Lukes criticizes Marcuse's notion that the revolutionary potential of art depends upon its social context. Here Lukes challenges Marcuse's claim that the aesthetic imagination flourishes during periods of revolutionary upheaval. Lukes gives Marcuse's assertions an empirical foundation. Lukes associates Marcus's claims about a correlation between artistic creation and revolution with Pitirim Sorokin's empirical work on the patterns of cultural ascendancy and decline. Lukes, on the other hand, correlates artistic creation with the periods of quiescence that follow political disturbances. And Lukes has his own favorite art historian, Vytautas Kavolis, to bolster his case. Ultimately, this surrogate battle of the art historians can cast some doubt about Marcuse's facile association of art and revolution, but can do no more. Lukes seems to realize this. He calls this chapter "An Empirical Diversion."

Enlightened by fools, diverted by art historians, we come to Lukes's conclusion. Alas, it is a disappointment. Even if Lukes' criticisms of playfulness and the association of art and revolution cannot be construed as decisive rebuttals of Marcuse's late position on the politics of art, they did point to important weaknesses. What is now needed is a clear indication of that politics which is necessary and sufficient for the cause of human liberation. But beyond an injunction to political sobriety, it is nowhere to be found. In the concluding chapter, we learn that politics is "a serious, *dutiful* preoccupation with 'material conditions' " (p. 162) that must be kept distinct from art, but little else. In the Preface, there are nostalgic references to the political activism of the mid-sixties, but there are few other hints as to the actual content of this non-aesthetic, emancipatory politics. In a book which pays careful attention to the nuances and problems of Marcuse's central concept of art, Lukes's own central concept, politics, remains curiously vacuous.

The Flight into Inwardness raises fundamental objections to the aesthetic tendency of Marcuse's later works. But Lukes shares enough common ground with Marcuse to keep his book remarkably free from acrimony. Lukes shares Marcuse's hopes for an emancipated human existence, and also Marcuse's belief that aesthetics will be an essential part of this emancipated human existence. "I do not attempt to deny that the aesthetic pursuit is a crucial requisite of a liberated environment; I only question the wisdom of turning so readily to the aesthetic dimension, the flight into inwardness, to

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assist in the realization of the liberated environment" (pp. 23-24). Whatever errors it may contain, this book can still be read with profit. Lukes's work on Marcuse's aesthetic taxonomy will doubtless be a starting point for future research on this topic.

C. Fred Alford's *Science and the Revenge of Nature* describes both Habermas's and Marcuse's perspectives on science as heirs to Horkheimer and Adorno's *Dialectic of Enlightenment.* Habermas's "stringently systematic" work "attempts to circumscribe the domain of science by means of the a priori determination of the limits of various types of knowledge vis-à-vis their objects" (p. 69). Following Horkheimer and Adorno, Habermas struggles against the dominating tendency of science as it is applied to human nature. Throughout the stages in the evolution of his thought, Habermas searches for the appropriate, non-dominating approach to the understanding of human nature. Alford's account of Marcuse's "often epigrammatic" work on science defies the accepted interpretation. According to Alford, Marcuse is an advocate of the complete conquest of external nature. It is this complete conquest which provides the necessary precondition for complete human freedom. From this perspective, Marcuse's echoes of Horkheimer and Adorno's call for reconciliation with external nature are merely "rhetoric," an "ideology." Marcuse's new science "grants an aura of reconciliation with nature to what is actually projected to be humanity's final victory over it" (p. 64).

In Alford's account, the general contours of the scientific dimension of Habermas's thought can be briefly summarized as follows. Habermas believes that the early critical theorists' goal of reconciliation with external nature is an example of an untenable eschatological utopianism. Reconciliation is utopian because the dominating instrumentalization of external nature is unavoidable. Hence, Habermas adopts a dualistic approach to science. He seeks one form of knowledge for nature and another for human relations. This objective unifies the two major phases of Habermas's research. Underlying both Habermas's early research on cognitive interest theory and his later work on the reconstruction of cognitive competencies is the desire to prevent the instrumentalization of human relations.

Alford agrees with the desirability of preventing the instrumentalization of human relations, but with little else. His primary criticism is that Habermas's position on external nature is too rigid and categorical. The problem with Habermas's dualism is that it precludes a priori the possibility of a new, non-dominating, non-instrumentalizing relation to nature. Alford supports his primary criticism by whittling away at Habermas's scientific credibility. Among other points, we learn that Habermas mistakes science for social theory (p. 74); that he is too subjective (p. 81); that his arguments are tautological (p. 102); that his terminology is loose (p. 108); that a central concept is ambiguous (p. 110); that he is systematically biased against political innovations (p. 114); that he is an elitist (p. 115); that reconstructive science is not empirical enough (p. 131); that his endorsement of Piaget and Kohlberg is jejeune (p. 134); and that he lacks imagination and openness to experience (p. 161). So much for one of the major figures in contemporary social theory. It seems that Habermas's "stringently systematic" perspective on science prompted Alford to a stringently systematic critique. If nothing else, *Science and the Revenge of Nature* can be read as a review of the critical literature on Habermas.

If in most respects Habermas is too rigid and categorical, at other times he is too flexible. Much of Alford's opposition can probably be ascribed to his frustration with Habermas's typical pattern of response to criticism. Rigidity is followed by flexibility,

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which in turn is followed by a return to the original rigidity. "(1) Habermas formulates special categories of knowledge, such as cognitivie interest theory, or reconstructions. (2) He is extraordinarily responsive to criticism, revising and modifying his original categories, often extensively . . . (3) However, he continues to make claims or draw conclusions — now frequently in a highly qualified or implicit fashion — which are supported only by the original distinctions, which Habermas has abandoned under criticism" (p. 130). Alford's Habermas is both a moving target and a master of disguise.

Half of *Science and the Revenge of Nature* is devoted to Alford's attempt to pin down and refute Habermas, but it is Marcuse's conception of science which is given the first and last word. Alford's interpretation of Marcuse is nothing if not unique. Perhaps perverse is a better word. Most readers will be surprised to find Marcuse's calls for reconciliation with nature (in *Eros and Civilization*, *An Essay on Liberation*, and *Counterrevolution and Revolt*) dismissed as mere rhetoric. Most will be even more surprised to find out that "Marcuse embraces the material achievements of modern science and technology more thoroughly than any theorist since the great utopian popularizers of science, Sir Thomas More and Francis Bacon" (p. 14; see also p. 45). To be sure, the rhetoric of reconciliation contradicts the dominating reality of science and technology, but Alford sees this contradiction as potentially fruitful. On the one hand, he believes that the complete victory of science and technology over nature is the precondition for complete human freedom. But on the other hand, the persistent rhetoric of reconciliation keeps open the possibility — in a way that Habermas's position does not — of a new attitude towards nature.

Alford's interpretation is provocative, but insubstantial. At its best, it merely emphasizes the fact that Marcuse's faith in material abundance as the foundation for human freedom is predicated upon the ability of modern science and technology to dominate external nature. Marcuse would admit this. Marcuse would, however, object to the split between reconciliation and domination as unmediated either-or alternatives. In my reading, Marcuse hardly merits a place in the pantheon of popularizers of science. The scientific-technological conquest of nature is viewed as regrettable in most respects. At the same time, this conquest is the precondition for human freedom in an era of material abundance *and* of human reconciliation with external nature. From this perspective, reconciliation and domination are not either-or alternatives, but dialectical possibilities which are inherent in the present stage of historical dvelopment. Alford's inclination to split Marcuse's position on reconciliation and domination into categorical alternatives can be traced to the new tendency to abstract Marcuse's thought from the Marxist tradition.

This abstraction from Marxism is readily apparent in both Alford's treatment of a key concept and in his selective interpretation of the evolution of Marcuse's views on science. At the conceptual level, Alford substitutes "critical negativism" for dialectics as the operative principle in Marcuse's thought. Alford's introductory definition of critical negativism retains a strong connection to the traditional definition of dialectics: "critical negativism subjects the existent to constant criticism while at the same time trying to discover progressive aspects of the existent, which might lead to its transformation" (p. 16). Here constant criticism share equal billing with the attempt to discover progressive aspects of the existent. But in practical application — as the fate of the artist (p. 23), as the philosophical legacy of Hegel and Heidegger (p. 63), as an uncompromising idealism (p. 172) — critical negativism becomes a persistent naysaying, an existential posture of opposition to the existing world. In the transition from

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the historical mediations of Marxist dialectics to the categorical alternatives of critical negativism, reconciliation and domination lose their character as simultaneous historical possibilities and become instead horns of an irresolvable dilemma.

Abstracting Marcuse from the Marxist tradition also vitiates Alford's interpretation of the evolution of Marcuse's views on science and reconciliation. Alford traces Marcuse's views on science and reconciliation from his doctoral dissertation on "Der deutsche Künstlerroman" (1922), through the essay "On the Philosophical Foundation of the Concept of Labor in Economics" (1933) written late in his period of study with Heidegger, to a thoroughly Marxless interpretation in *Eros and Civilization* (1955). To oversimplify, Alford goes from the neo-Kantian-neo-Hegelian dilemmas of Marcuse's dissertation, through the Heideggerian Marxism of the essay on labor, to an existential reading of *Eros and Civilization.* Absent here is anything but a passing reference to the possible scientific significance of the works which Marcuse wrote between 1933-42, the years of his direct association with the Frankfurt Institute of Social Research in exile. During these years, Marcuse contributed to the formulation of the Marxism of the Frankfurt School. Indeed, it is the still quite orthodox Marxism of the original Frankfurt School thinkers that has come under attack in the pages of this journal.[5] But Alford's Marcuse has no Marxist period, orthodox or otherwise. Instead, the proto-existential themes of "Der deutsche Künstlerroman" and the Heideggerianism of "On the Philosophical Foundation of the Concept of Labor in Economics" are read directly into *Eros and Civilization.* The latter work thus loses its distinctive character and is reduced to an exercise in the jargon of authenticity.

Although its subject is the fictional depiction of art and the artist, "Der deutsche Künstlerroman" establishes the Marcusean goal of reconciliation (here between the artist and society). The essay "On the Philosophic Foundation of the Concept of Labor in Economics," a synthetic product of Marcuse's early Heidegger studies and the then newly discovered *Economic and Philosophic Manuscipts* of Marx, establishes labor as the limitation on human freedom. Labor is an alienation of human existence in the sense that it entails conformity to the laws of the object. Hence, in Alford's interpretation, labor as alienated objectivity represents the essential limit on human freedom. Play, on the other hand, is the polar opposite of labor. In play objects conform to human purposes. Play, therefore, becomes the esssential realm of human freedom.[6]

These themes are brought together in Alford's interpretation of *Eros and Civilization.* While Alford admits that *Eros and Civilization* is a synthesis of Freud and the nevermentioned Marx, he also characterizes this understanding as "potentially misleading." Beneath "the Marxist concern with alienation from capitalist labor," beneath also "the Freudian left's concern with erotic freedom," is Marcuse's true "existentialist concern": the fact that "authentic human spontaneity" is shackled to a struggle for existence within a recalcitrant natural world (p. 38). In this reading of *Eros and Civilization*, true human freedom is playfulness in a laborless, abundant world. The abolition of labor and the creation of abundance are the products of the scientific-technological conquest of nature. The notion of reconciliation with nature, equally a major theme of *Eros and Civilization*, is thus relegated to the realm of rhetoric, an ideological contradic-

5. The paradigm for this criticism is Paul Piccone's essay "The Crisis of One-Dimensionality," *Telos*, no. 35 (1978), pp. 43-54.

6. Alford's treatment of alienation, labor, and objectification would shed its overly abstract character if it was more firmly grounded in the theoretical works of Hegel and Marx. For a useful discussion of these concepts, see Richard Schacht, *Alienation* (Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor Books, 1971), pp. 26-122.

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tion to the real need to conquer nature. As rhetoric and ideology, Alford endorses the contradictory idea of reconciliation because it leaves open the possibility of a new relationship with nature. Yet the chances for this new relationship range from slim to none. Alford maintains that this new relationship to nature is not only undeveloped and contentless in Marcuse, but it is also incapable of further theoretical development (p. 61). Ultimately, the rhetoric of reconciliation only lends pathos to the necessary and inevitable processes of scientific-technological conquest of nature.

In the final analysis, there is not much to choose between Alford's Marcuse and Alford's Habermas. The superiority of Marcuse's conception of science over Habermas's lies in the fact that Marcuse leaves open a contentless, rhetorical, contradictory, and ideological possibility for reconciliation with nature that Habermas forecloses. In practical terms, Alford seems to be saying: remove the catalytic converter, dump those pesticides into the river, but take the kids to see *Bambi* to keep the idea of reconciliation alive.

Alford's *Science and the Revenge of Nature* never really confronts the substance of the Frankfurt School's idea of reconciliation with nature.[7] If Habermas dismisses the idea of reconciliation out of hand, Alford confines it to the role of a possibly useful fiction. To my knowledge, only William Leiss's *The Domination of Nature*,[8] now fourteen years old, accepts the idea of reconciliation in order to explore its possible implications. Surely more work needs to be done on this.

Despite their common focus on Marcuse, the differences between *The Flight into Inwardness* and *Science and the Revenge of Nature* make generalizations about them difficult. Let me conclude with some broad observations. First, these books testify to the continued salience of Marcuse's ideas in the age of Reagan. Marcuse scholarship need not be confined to increasingly esoteric excursions into intellectual biography and the history of ideas (although these have their proper place), but can still use Marcuse's work to pose a significant challenge to accepted ideas and practices. Secondly, I believe that these new explorations of Marcuse's ideas must retain their connection to the Marxist theoretical tradition. To abstact Marcuse from Marxism is to impoverish his ideas. Marcuse's peculiar charm is what it always was: his critical dialogue with Marxism.

John Bokina

7. Alford takes a step towards such a confrontation in his recent essay on "Nature and Narcissism: The Frankfurt School," *New German Critique*, no. 36 (1985), pp. 174-92.
8. William Leiss, *The Domination of Nature* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1972).

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Julius Mader, *Dr.-Sorge-Report: Ein Dokumentarbericht ueber Kundschafter des Friedens, Mit Ausgewaehlten Artikeln von Richard Sorge*, Militaerverlag der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik, Berlin, 1984; paperback, 1985.

"Spy and Scholar." "Party Functionary and Social Scientist." The association of the professions or callings is surely intriguing because seemingly incongruous. In an age in which the two primary meanings of intelligence have been blurred in the persons and activities of certain individuals, however, the incongruity has been submerged in intrigue. But whereas the persons and activities of scholars and social scientists are not the stuff of myth, those of spies and party functionaries have attained mythic proportions. Richard Sorge was not posthumously made a "Hero of the Soviet Union" by the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on November 5, 1964 because he was a "scholar" and "social scientist" but because he was an "intelligence agent" and "party functionary," indeed the most famous Soviet spy in the Far East and arguably the most successful Soviet spy of all. To commemorate Sorge's initiation into the pantheon of Soviet "heroes," Julius Mader, together with Gerhard Stuchlik and Horst Pehnert, published *Dr. Sorge funkt aus Tokyo* (Dr. Sorge Transmits from Tokyo). The volume under review was published on the 40th anniversary of Sorge's execution by the Japanese on November 7, 1944, also the anniversary of the Russian October Revolution. Both the previous and the present volumes carry the same dedications to the "hero" Sorge, the Yugoslav Communist Branko Vukelić, and several "Japanese Patriots," the most important being Sorge's principal source of information in the Japanese government, Dr. Ozaki Hotsumi, who has himself become a "hero" to many in Japan. The relation between the two volumes does not end there. Both were issued by the Military Publishers of the German Democratic Republic, perhaps because Sorge's information was transmitted directly to Department Four (Intelligence) of the Red Army, although Ozaki supposedly thought he was working for the Communist International. Both have the same illustrations and diagrams, although the quality of the reproductions and paper is much superior in the previous volume. Most to be noted is that several chapters in the previous volume are included unchanged in the present volume, while other sections have been reworked and expanded. It is clear that Mader was the principal author of the previous volume and that the present volume is meant to be definitive.

There is a certain sense in which biographies of famous Communist political leaders, functionaries and/or spies tend to read like *Lives of the Saints*, and Mader's volume is no exception. Sorge is held up as a kind of role model for young Communists to follow. We even learn that he loved dogs, cats and children. Streets have been named after him and buildings in which he performed certain services have been memorialized. By paying homage to a Soviet "hero" of German extraction and German upbringing, Mader's book contributes to the ongoing and intensified goal of legitimizing a pro-Soviet Communist government on German soil. But the most important propaganda purpose of the volume is indicated in the sub-title: "A Documentary Report on an Intelligence Agent of Peace." Even at the end, Sorge maintained that he was no common spy. In his final words he said: "Normal espionage means searching for the weak point in a nation's structure. My aim, however, was to preserve peace between Japan and the Soviet Union. Therefore I do not consider that my

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activities were contrary to the national interests of Japan." The postwar effort of a group of Leftist Japanese to portray Ozaki as a martyr in the cause of peace has contributed to this myth. In 1956 a "Society for the Relief of Those Sacrificed in the Ozaki Case" raised funds in Tokyo for Sorge's gravestone, which is inscribed: "Here sleeps a brave warrior who devoted his life to opposing war, and to the struggle for the peace of the world."

Here is where reality and legend, "spy and scholar," "party functionary and social scientist" must be separated. Mader's characterization of Sorge is much more true of Ozaki, as Chalmers Johnson evidences in his book, *An Instance of Treason: Ozaki Hotsumi and the Sorge Spy Ring* (Stanford, 1964). Ozaki was a highly respected "semi-official" expert on China. After his arrest on October 15, 1941, he stated that as a graduate student in 1926 he had read the Japanese translation of Karl August Wittfogel's *Das erwachende China* (Awakening China) and that it had made a "deep impression" on him. One of Ozaki's many books has a title very similar to Wittfogel's 1931 opus, *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft Chinas* (Economy and Society in China), which was translated into Japanese immediately after its appearance. In Ozaki's memoirs, written while he was in prison and published after his death, he made the attempt to distance himself from Wittfogel's theory because Wittfogel had renounced communism after the Nazi-Soviet pact in 1939. Ozaki asserted that while China's external aspect was "Oriental despotism," its core and most decisive feature was "feudalism." His adherence to Stalin's position was consistent with his loyalty to the Communist International. Whatever his scholarly attributes, Osaki was a spy for the Soviet Union and hardly a "Japanese patriot," whatever the character of the Japanese government at the time.

There is no doubt that Ozaki was, as Johnson portrays him, both "spy and scholar." But Johnson's assertions that "both Ozaki and Sorge emerged most clearly as intellectual adventurers" and that "Sorge was an idealist who had virtually become a nihilist by the time World War II broke out" demonstrate that his view of Sorge is too much colored by his view of Ozaki. While Mader would certainly not accept Johnson's characterization of Sorge, his own is no less problematic with respect to Sorge's scholarly accomplishments. This is particularly evident in a curious, large-scale pamphlet Mader published in 1985, *Dr. Richard Sorge, Parteifunktionaer und Gesellschaftswissenschaftler: Festschrift zum 90. Geburtstag des Helden der Sowjetunion,* the first half of which consists of Mader's reconstruction of Sorge's participation with members and friends of the recently-founded Institute for Social Research in Frankfurt in two Marxist Study Weeks in 1922/23, plus a postscript on Sorge's relations with Wittfogel. The second half includes a short article by Peter Haferstroh praising Sorge's contribution to political economy in his 1921/22 pamphlet on Rosa Luxemburg's *Accumulation of Capital*, a short article by Werner Imig on "Richard Sorge's Analysis of German Imperialism and his Struggle against the Threat of War," and a short biography of Sorge in dates.

There is no denying Sorge's relation to the Frankfurt Institute in its beginnings. He was a friend of Felix Weil, the founder of the Institute, and, when he received his doctor's degree from the University of Hamburg in 1919, he was already an assistant to Kurt Albert Gerlach, who was slated to become the first director of the Institute. There is, however, some doubt about the number and dating of the Marxist Study Weeks Mader describes and some doubt about Sorge's role therein. Mader deserves credit for his reconstruction of the plans, programs and participants of two Marxist Study Weeks in the early 1920s, since most historians of the Institute have discussed only one, Martin Jay and myself included. Jay's informants date it in 1922, my informants, Wittfogel most prominent, date it in 1923. Since all the informants referred to a First Marxist

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Study Week (Erste Marxistische Arbeitswoche: EMA), it was always assumed that more than one had been planned. Mader clearly demonstrates that at least two were planned in some detail. But it is still not established that two Marxist Study Weeks actually took place, since neither Wittfogel nor any of the other informants remembered more than one.

To illustrate the confusion: Mader's list of participants for the 1922 Study Week includes a Japanese, Kazuo Fukumoto, whom Wittfogel doesn't remember, whereas Mader's list for 1923 includes all of those whom Wittfogel remembered and described to me years ago. In Mader's 1922 list, Wittfogel is listed as a "Sociologist and Sinologist," whereas in the 1923 list he is correctly described as a "Historian and Dramatist," since at that time he was still writing Marxist treaties on bourgeois society and Communist plays. Moreover, Mader has Wittfogel speaking in 1922 on "Theory of Chinese Development." But in 1922 Wittfogel had not yet formulated any theory about Chinese society or history. Mader also has both Georg Lukács and Karl Korsch discussing *History and Class Consciousness* in 1922, whereas Wittfogel remembers that in 1923 the discussion between Korsch and Lukács centered on Korsch's *Marxism and Philosophy.* Thus the mystery of these Marxist Study Weeks is still to be solved in memory and in history

Then there is the question of Sorge's role in these Marxist Study Weeks. It seems clear that he was involved in their planning and execution. It is equally clear that he had no intellectual imput, although Mader attempts to imply such by including a bibliography of Sorge's writings in the early 1920s. Mader even goes so far as to praise Sorge's pamphlet on Rosa Luxemburg's *Accumulation of Capital.* But he fails to mention that it was precisely this pamphlet that caused "Ika" (as Sorge was known to friends and associates) to be dubbed "der dumme Ika" (Ika the stupid) by members of the Institute because it revealed that he understood neither Marx nor Rosa Luxemburg. When the Institute was officially opened in 1924, Carl Gruenberg, who had accepted the post of director, quickly replaced "der dumme Ika" with Henryk Grossman. But whether or not Sorge understood Marx and Rosa Luxemburg, the characterization was certainly unfair. While Sorge was no "scholar" or "social scientist," he was certainly not "stupid." His talents and gifts lay in other areas of endeavor. Shortly after Gruenberg took over, Sorge left for Moscow to begin his career in Soviet espionage.

Finally, there is the question of Sorge's espionage activities and his relation to the Frankfurt Institute. In an article titled "The Frankfurt Marxists and the Columbia Liberals" (*Survey*, Vol. 25, No. 3, Summer 1980), Lewis S. Feuer portrays the "Frankfurt Marxists" as communist conspirators and the "Columbia Liberals" as well-meaning dupes for giving the Institute sanctuary during the Nazi period. In order to do this, he creates the fiction that the Institute in Frankfurt was already conspiratorial. He goes so far as to state that "the Institute moreover evidently became a recruiting ground for the Marx-Engels Institute in Moscow and indeed for the Soviet espionage service" because of Sorge's connection with the Frankfurt Institute. Both Martin Jay and I replied to Feuer's absurd and spurious assertions (*Survey*, Vol. 26, No. 2, Spring 1982). The Marx-Engels Institute in Moscow during the 1920s was nor more a recruiting ground for Soviet espionage than was the Frankfurt Institute. The fact that the Frankfurt Institute assisted the Moscow Institute in the publication of the *Marx-Engels Gesamtausgabe* (MEGA) and that the director of the Moscow Institute, David Riazanov, paid visits to the Frankfurt Institute was no more conspiratorial than the fact that members of the Frankfurt Institute published articles in the *Archiv fuer Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik* and that Emil Lederer, the editor of the Heidelberg journal, also paid visits to the

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Frankfurt Institute. None of these relations had anything to do with Sorge and his recruitment by Soviet Intelligence, which was accomplished only after he had been removed by Gruenberg. Sorge's recruitment also had nothing to do with Wittfogel, who was the most prominent Communist in the Institute.

It was Felix Weil who introduced Sorge to Wittfogel. When Weil asked Wittfogel's wife, a librarian, to establish a library for the Institute, it was Sorge who helped her set it up in 1923. During the year or more before Sorge left for Moscow, Wittfogel saw him from time to time in this capacity. Thereafter, the only time they met was in November 1929, when Sorge stopped over in Berlin en route from Moscow to the Far East. Without spelling out the purpose of his mission, he asked Wittfogel what associations he could establish in Germany in order to "look respectable" in China. Following Wittfogel's advice, and with Wittfogel's intercession, he was given membership in the prestigious China Institute in Frankfurt headed by Richard Wilhelm (Wilhelm was one of Wittfogel's teachers; Wittfogel had been a member of the China Institute since 1925). Also at Wittfogel's suggestion, Sorge concluded a contract with the agricultural newspaper *Getreide Zeitung*, to which he submitted articles presumably resulting from his study of Chinese agricultural conditions. Since Sorge knew little or nothing about Chinese agricultural conditions, and since Wittfogel was then the leading specialist on Chinese agriculture, Sorge was free to draw on Wittfogel's expertise. But it is clearly evident in the articles by Sorge reproduced in Mader's *Dr.-Sorge-Report* that Sorge was at best a political journalist, which better served his purposes in espionage.

The first book on Sorge in English and in any language, which brought the Sorge spy ring into the public eye, was *Shanghai Conspiracy* (1952) by General Douglas MacArthur's Intelligence Chief, General Charles A. Willoughby, based on Japanese government documents made up of surviving records of the interrogations and procedures of the investigation that followed the arrest of Sorge and his key associates in the Fall of 1941. The primary report on the Sorge case was first published in Tokyo in 1962 (*Gendaischi Shiryo, Zoruge Jiken*: Materials on Modern History, The Sorge Incident). Willoughby also used documents prepared in his own office, G-2 (Intelligence), Far East Command, Tokyo, for presentation to the Committee on Un-American Activities, titled "A Partial Documentation of the Sorge Espionage Case" and "Extracts from an Authentic Translation of Foreign Affairs Yearbook, 1943, Criminal Affairs Bureau, Ministry of Justice, Tokyo, Japan." Yet another G-2 study titled "The Sorge Spy Ring: A Case Study in International Espionage in the Far East" was reproduced in the *Congressional Record.* Willoughby's book which includes a translation of Sorge's "autobiography" written during his incarceration, describes how he first got wind of the Sorge espionage ring when, in October 1945, the American Occupation Authorities in Japan rescinded the Peace Preservation Laws under which political prisoners had been detained by the Japanese during the war. Among some five hundred men and women released from various prisons thoughout the country were eight connected with the Sorge case. According to Willoughby, the first clue came from a Japanese official. The rest, as they say, is history.

Since Willoughby's book first created a furor in the early 1950s, coinciding as it did with many now notorious espionage cases, numerous books and articles on Sorge and his spy ring have been published in many languages. The latest in English is *Target Tokyo: The Story of the Sorge Spy Ring* by the late Gordon W. Prange, professor of history at the University of Maryland, published posthumously with the assistance of Donald M. Goldstein and Katherine V. Dillon. Like Mader's book, *Target Tokyo* was issued in hardcover in 1984 and in paperback in 1985. In several ways, the books complement

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each other. Whereas Mader gives us a sanitized and sanctified Sorge, Prange gives us a romanticized and dramatized Sorge. Whereas Mader's text is more analytical, Prange's reads like a spy thriller. Whereas Mader's picture of Sorge is almost clean-cut, Prange paints a hard-drinking and womanizing adventurer. Being a political journalist with an intense interest, if not involvement in intelligence, Mader's affinity with Sorge leads him to focus on the technical aspects of Sorge's espionage activities. Being a historian devoted to uncovering the relations between Japan and the United States (*At Dawn We Slept: The Untold Story of Pearl Harbor*, 1981; *Miracle at Midway*, 1982), Prange provides the wider context of Sorge's activities. Both draw on heretofore unavailable or unpublished interviews and reminiscences, although not necessarily the same. Prange conducted many interviews and exchanged correspondence with many participants in the affair that were unknown to Mader. But Mader had access to documents and participants that were unavailable to Prange. Prange's assistants labored to document his text as fully possible, including a chronology of dates and bibliography. Mader includes a bibliography of publications by and about Sorge, short biographies of many of the principal figures in his narrative, and excerpts of Sorge-documents from the Moscow archives. Together, these books flesh out the personal life and professional activities of Sorge and probably give us as full a picture of the most famous Soviet spy as we are likely to have for some time to come.

Neither Prange's nor Mader's book entirely supersedes *The Case of Richard Sorge* (1966) by the journalists F.W. Deakin and G.R. Storry, which includes an epilogue "Legend and Reality," summarizing American, German, Japanese and Russian responses. The authors conclude by stating: "This recent Soviet portrait of Sorge has certain attributes of a patriotic cult. The figure has set in a rigid and adulatory mold; the personality already fixed in the selective attitude of a legend." This is certainly true of Mader's book. But Prange, no less than Mader, creates a legend of a different sort and, curiously, it is easier to separate the spy from the legend in Mader's account than it is in Prange's. The reason for this is probably that a trained historian or social scientist is better able to separate fact from fiction in the works of Soviet and other communist writers than to deal with history written like an Ian Fleming novel. Prange's "James Bond" may be more exciting. But Mader's "intelligence agent" is ultimately more serious. While Mader stresses the signficance of Sorge's intelligence reports from Japan in enabling Soviet forces to accomplish the first defeat of Hitler's armies in the battle for Moscow, he does, like Prange, acknowledge that in the Spring of 1941 Stalin ignored Sorge's reports of German intentions to invade the Soviet Union. The documents he reproduces indicate that, at the end of September 1941, Sorge informed Moscow that a Japanese attack in the Soviet Far East was imminent and that on October 4, shortly before his arrest, he sent another message stating that Japan would not attack the Soviet Union in 1941. Sorge had obviously learned that Japan would not advance north but south, that Japan would leave the Soviets to the Germans and attack United States forces in the Pacific. Once this was known in Moscow, Soviet forces in the Far East could be moved to European Russia to help repel the Germans.

Sorge was indeed a master spy, and Mader's text is rightly and primarily focused on both the method and the means of Sorge's espionage activities. Not only does he give detailed diagrams and descriptions of how Sorge turned raw data into finished intelligence through a process of collection, collation, comparison, examination, selection, analysis and forecasting, he includes a section on "Dr. Sorge's Style of Work." Whether Sorge's style and method were approriate only to his times, or whether they are of universal significance in the intelligence field today, is a question beyond the

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specific concerns of the historian and social scientist. But the role of Sorge's intelligence reports in the crucial years preceding the German invasion of the Soviet Union and its aftermath is part of modern history. So too is Sorge's life, since he was born near Baku and, in spite of his German background and upbringing, remained loyal to the Soviet Union and thoroughly indoctrinated with its goal. If the ideological content of *those goals has become less than compelling, the political and military content is even* more pressing. Intelligence remains a two-edged sword.

G.L. Ulmen

Waldemar A. Nielsen. *The Golden Donors.* (EP Dutton: N.Y., 1985) Robert F. Arnove (ed). *Philanthropy and Cultural Imperialism.* (Indiana University Press: Bloomington, 1980)

Nielsen, a former foundation officer and consultant, tells us that: "Some nonobsequious writing [on foundations] has begun to appear . . . (431)." Unfortunately, *The Golden Donors* is not of that genre. To be sure, this study of the thirty-six largest foundations is critical of many and hands out evaluations for each on the grounds of public policy activism (good) or conventionality (bad), and the behavior of trustees and staff. Nevertheless, the text is replete with the language of public relations — full of "shining examples," "innovative, philosophical and provocative speeches," "invigorating research" and even "constructive" conservatism. We are told that since the Tax Reform Act of 1969, which corrected the worst of foundation abuses, ". . . general confidence in the value of foundations both in Congress and across the nation has not only been restored but has now probably reached its highest point in history (17)."

Some foundations may fall short of the ideal, but there is no question in Nielsen's mind of their true mission: ". . . [T]hese strange and wonderful social inventions have a unique freedom from the dependency of other institutions on markets or constituencies that cripple their capacity to take the long view and to bring a competent and disinterested approach to the search for solutions to complex problems. They are not magical answer-giving machines, but they are instruments by which the best available intelligence, experience and specialized knowledge can be brought to bear in the least distorting and inhibiting circumstances on such problems" (425). The social activism of the Ford, Carnegie and R.W. Johnson Foundations sets the standard for all others. Social engineers, they can by being "above politics" find the correct solutions and use their network of connections to seek their adoption. As an example, in 1978 the city of Cleveland was threatened with bankruptcy. The Cleveland Foundation, "a vigorous, responsive and creative influence," ". . . [W]orking with local leaders both in and out of government, provided financing and guidance for a number of key actions to rehabilitate the city government and reestablish its solvency. A team of eighty-nine business leaders, the Operations Improvement Task Force, was created. They examined every city department during a three-month period and made hundreds of recommendations to improve efficiency, almost all of which were then implemented . . . . An

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analysis of tax policies performed by the foundation became the basis of a successful campaign for voter approval of a necessary tax increase" (250).

Despite a political atmosphere unfavorable to liberal activism, Nielsen sees the foundation mission being reinvigorated by the development of peak organizations in the foundation world, such as the Council on Foundations, Independent Sector and the Committee on Responsive Philanthropy (a donee group). These organizations are pervaded by the social engineering mentality, and the leading trade journal, *Foundation News*, attempts to corral all foundations to the activist point of view. Targeted especially are the burgeoning corporate foundations, which are increasingly turning away from local public relations-oriented charity work and joining with the liberal foundations in an attempt to save capitalism in general. One achievement of this coalition is the Martin Luther King, Jr. Center for Non-violent Social Change in Atlanta, established with grants from Atlantic Richfield, Amoco, Ford Motor Company, Mobil, Monsanto, and Morgan Guaranty Trust Foundations, among others. (Nielsen does not discuss these corporate foundations, or does he mention the "alternative" foundations such as Haymarket People's Fund, which support radical organizing.)

He gives no analysis of the power and danger of these conglomerates, representing billions to dispense at will, or of the general significance of the "third sector" (private non-profit) in American politics. We are told that there is now "serious and substantial research" on philanthropy, but all of the examples mentioned have the expected sponsorship. (*The Golden Donors* was supported by a grant from the MacArthur Foundation.)

Nielsen is careful to portray the Ford Foundation as full of weaknesses. Because of financial mismanagement, Ford's portfolio was only $3.6 billion in 1984. This had a happy result: "There was a time when the vast difference in size between Ford and all the other large foundations generated concern that by its sheer mass it distorted public understanding of philanthropy and created unnecessary fears of 'thought control' by foundations. That problem at least has now largely been resolved by the foundation's financial performance." (71) Franklin Thomas, the current director of Ford, and his staff, are also picked on. We are encouraged to feel that Ford is a weak pitiful giant, beleagured by left and right, disdained by Reaganism, and worthy of *our* charity as an underdog.

Nielsen does point out that during the Bundy Administration at Ford, numerous community organizations were created by the foundation. Many of these reported being controlled by their donor. In 1972, 77% of grants from all sources to organize citizen political action were bestowed by Ford. Thus does "pluralism" become an instrument of elite control. Presumably, those citizen organizations which were not so beknighted, (and were not violently repressed or disrupted by the FBI), were largely left, unfunded, to wither away.

Little is said about the international activities of Ford, or the other liberal foundations. The Trilateral Commission, Council on Foreign Relations and Overseas Development Council are not discussed as products of foundation sponsorship. The cooperation, as well as the "revolving door" for personnel, between the CIA and the liberal foundations is not mentioned.[1] Only one left-wing critique is cited, that of David Horowitz and David Kolodney.[2] Nielsen correctly quotes their statement accusing the foundation network, including the policy-planning organizations, of

1. For a discussion of this aspect, see Ben Whitaker, *The Foundations* (London: Methuen, 1974).

2. "The Foundations [Charity Begins at Home]." *Ramparts*, April 1969.

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shifting public opinion in the direction of the moderates and status quo. He then dismisses this by denying that foundations were conservative and reminding us how often they were branded as leftist during the McCarthy era (25).

Perhaps the greatest power of the large foundations is that of defining the intellectual universe and the place of foundations within it. They can ignore creatures from "outer space," hoping they will thereby shrivel up. Thus Nielsen nowhere mentions the most serious critical appraisal of the liberal foundations, the anthology edited by Robert Arnove. This book has been consigned to semi-obscurity, has not been reviewed anywhere for a general audience, and is unknown even to some in the academic world "seriously researching" the "third sector."

The thesis of the Arnove volume is: ". . . [F]oundations like Carnegie, Rockefeller and Ford have a corrosive influence on a democratic society; they represent relatively unregulated and unaccountable concentrations of power and wealth which buy talent, promote causes, and in effect, establish an agenda of what merits society's attention. They serve as "cooling-out" agencies, delaying and preventing more radical, structural change." (1) The foundations' belief that a technocratic elite can identify social problems and promote the appropriate social change is in itself considered imperialistic. In addition, the foundations are involved in imperialism in the more usual sense. One striking aspect of their activities is the extent to which similar techniques and goals underlie their "leadership training" and "rural development" programs in the Third World and in the inner cities of the United States. Foundation "people to people" programs overseas preceded and were often the models for later United States government operations (e.g., student exchanges, Peace Corps).

The essays, written mostly by scholars in sociology or education, are full of fascinating revelations. Their central concerns are public policy, especially educational and foreign, and the sociology of knowledge, a subject which has ominously gone out of style. (Perhaps it does not benefit from the largesse of foundations?)

The historical chapters, one by Barbara Howe and one by Sheila Slaughter and Edward Silva, show the crucial role of foundations in the development of capitalist hegemony during the early 20th century. The warnings against foundations by the Walsh Commission of 1915 evaporate in the transformed post-WWI atmosphere. How the name Rockefeller changes from a "devil" to "angel" connotation is in itself a sobering lesson.

Donald Fisher's contribution describes the major impact which the Rockefeller Foundation had on the London School of Economics; ironically, an institution founded for the purpose of training administrators of a future socialist society.

How the Ford Foundation defined and structured behavioralism in American political science is the subject of Peter Seybold's essay. Ford was seeking a doctrine that rooted social disorder in personal maladjustment rather than class conflict. Behavioralism would be the instrument by which they could tackle the agenda described in the Ford Foundation's 1949 Report: to legitimate democracy and abolish all threats to the system.

E. Richard Brown throws light on the seamy underside of Rockefeller medical philanthropy in China. Russell Marks shows how Carnegie-supported research into differences in intelligence is used to defend a stratified society of limited opportunity. The essays by Frank Darknell and David Weischadle show how Carnegie philanthropies have been at the origin of almost all major educational reforms in the United States. Generally, their emphasis has been on tracking, streaming and sorting students

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(as in the community college movement) "to consolidate and strengthen castelike tendencies within the corporate capitalist society itself (p. 387)."

James D. Anderson writes of the role of philanthropy in black higher education. Dennis Buss reveals school finance reform, a project of the Ford Foundation, to be elitist in conception and result. Typical of Progressive and foundation-sponsored reforms, movements for standardization, centralization and modernization remove control from localities — where the participation of ordinary citizens is sometimes possible — and transfer it to distant elites.

Edward Berman's chapters on educational colonialism in Africa and Arnove's on the transfer of knowledge abroad show the development of: ". . . an international community of scholars the philanthropic foundations (Ford, Rockefeller and Carnegie) have been instrumental in shaping . . . . [I]ndividuals become increasingly attached to viewing themselves in certain ways and conducting research which accords with Ford views of appropriate scholarship" (318).

Mary Anna Colwell writes of the connections between foundations, the corporate world, policy-planning organizations (e.g., Council on Foreign Relations, Brookings, Hoover, Overseas Development Council, Trilateral Commission) and "citizen" organizations (e.g., ACLU, Mexican-American Legal Defense and Education Fund, NAACP, Southern Regional Council). Her research raises many questions about the nature of American "pluralism" and the role of the non-profit sector in our society.

In 1915, the Walsh Commission (Congressional Commission on Industrial Relations) predicted that foundations might have a monumental influence on public policy. At that time, there was no national policy in many areas of education and welfare, and state resources and efforts were often meager. Foundation resources could and did fill the void — in nationalization of the legal system, development of the social work profession and ethic, reform of criminal justice, integration of minorities, standardization in education, and promulgation of the gospel of capitalism abroad, among many other endeavors.

Who could complain about such benevolence? The problems are several. First of all, reforms are never neutral, but benefit some interests at the expense of others. Big business was generally the beneficiary of foundation programs, at the expense of small business, labor, rural interests, etc. Secondly, one solution precludes others. The emphasis on guided individual adjustment, as in social case work, pre-empts collective and citizen-directed responses to social conflict. (I am not thinking only of revolution. Communal experiments in 19th Century America were not a refuge for maladjusted "drop-outs," but deliberately designed in response to social stresses emanating from wage labor, alcoholism, needs of the elderly, etc.). Third, no matter how benevolent, reforms imposed from above by an elite weaken democracy by mesmerizing citizens. Channels of citizen politics become irrelevant; major issues are decided in networks of elites via pilot projects or litigation techniques. Nevertheless, a considerable harvest of foundation-sponsored reform has now been incorporated into public policy.

Obviously, much useful work has been done through foundation efforts and much suffering alleviated. However, the price has been the transformation of democracy so that only the forms and rhetoric remain (for the sake of pacification and legitimation). Citizen-initiated policy making is seen by the foundation ideology to be motivated largely by ignorance, prejudice, and psychological maladjustment. Only foundation initiative can resolve national problems; they must not ". . . be abandoned to special-interest groups, government, and 'solution' by the horse trading of politics." (Nielsen,

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428). Never are the problems (e.g., in nuclear power plant safety) attributed to capitalism or to elite domination of policy making.

What brings the issue home most sharply is the realization of how thoroughly academic thought has been imperialized. First of all, textbooks of political science, supposedly about the study of power, rarely mention foundations. If you check the indexes of current works you will probably find more mentions of Betty Ford than the Ford Foundation. Invisibility and weakness alternate with selective puffery to convey the image foundations desire. Secondly, the foundation doctrine of democratic elitism is almost universally accepted, enforced through co-optation, pre-emption, ridicule and ignoring (non-funding) the dissenters.

The Carnegie creation of TIAA (Arnove, 366) began a long and steadfast alliance between big business and the academic world. Today professors enjoy both anointment as platonic guardians and the rather unplatonic comforts of affluence (and the non-ivied professoriat generally aspires to that status). "Adjustment" has proceeded smoothly; today's world of private higher education is one that has largely been created by the foundations and it sets the standard for all others. Unfortunately, the rogue elephants like the Arnove volume get buried in the mounds of foundation bull.

Joan Roelofs

John Rajchman and Cornel West, editors. *Post-Analytic Philosophy.* Columbia University Press. New York, 1985.

Post-Analytic Philosophy is a symptom of a certain discontent with the analytical heritage. This discontent is very heterogeneous, uneven, and frequently, depressingly timid. Partly at least, the aura of timidity which surrounds too much of this volume is a reflection of the very conservative, and inward-looking, "principles" of selection which the editors have adopted.

With its distinctively amero-centric orientation, this volume displays an unfortunate chauvinism that excludes the more radical post-analytical philosophies from the Continent. Most notably absent is the work of Ricoeur and Habermas, who have fused together the immanent critique of early analytical philosophy by later analytic thinkers (Austin, Toulmin, Searle, Winch) with other non-analytical traditions in which their thinking was formed (phenomenology; Critical Theory) or to which they have responded (psychoanalysis; structuralism; hermeneutics). Without the stimulus of these other, extrinsic traditions, post-analytical philosophy lacks a hard edge. It is not surprising, therefore, that the most interesting contributors to this "post analytic" phenomenon — Richard Rorty, Richard Bernstein and Thomas Kuhn — draw either on the alternative, native American philosophical tradition of pragmatism (as well as on hermeneutical and existential currents); or, in Kuhn's case, on the work of Alexandre Koyré. (*Etudes Galiliéennes*). The critiques that are more or less purely "from within" can at times be acidic, yet seem at the same time to re-affirm the spirit of the analytical project. Hilary Putnam can dish out a tongue lashing to A.J. Ayer ("After Empiricism") for Ayer's per-

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sistent preoccupation with sense-datum, yet Putnam's whole style of writing and thinking remains deeply rooted in the affection of analytic philosophy for rigor and detachment. It still epitomizes the "ideals" of technically fastidious, professionalized philosophy. By contrast, someone like Richard Bernstein (p. 51) takes seriously Dewey's insistence that philosophy should not be a rarified discipline exclusively preoccupied with technical problems, disinterested in wider public questions and obsessed with demaraction disputes with other disciplines. And only by neglecting such disciplinary imperatives is it possible to realize the breadth of understanding and cultivation that Bernstein does in his recent work *Beyond Relativism and Objectivism* which manages simultaneously to draw strands of fragmented, disparate philosophical debates together in a coherent and illuminating way, and to draw out convincingly their broader existential and public implications.

What then does post analytical philosophy amount to? Is there any common postulates that would define it as a coherent movement? Or is it simply a heterogeneous reaction against a hegemonic tradition? The latter assuredly, if this volume is in any sense representative of individuals who might identify themselves or be identified without absurdity as post-analytical philosophers. But this volume's claim to represent a distinctively post-analytic view-point must be questioned. For a start, some contributions collected here can be more properly characterised as "post-philosophical" rather than "post-analytic." The contemporary disenchantment with philosophical thinking *per se* — and the turn towards art and literature — is evident in this volume. The analytical insistence that ethical, practical and cultural concerns lay outside of philosophy produced what it could only produce: the irrelevance of philosophy. Bloom's comment is quite apposite: "religion and philosophy alike no longer inform our culture" (p. 110). It is teachers of literature, he suggests, rather than teachers of philosophy who today are the secular clergy of the West, while the originators of cultural identity (Bloom explores the contemporary Jewish cultural identity) are literary figures (e.g., Kafka) or those who can be assimilated to a literary tradition (e.g., Freud). In a somewhat more conventional vein, Stanely Cavell's contribution to this volume also reflects the disenchantment with philosophy by turning to literary allegories to explore the antagonism between language as "fate" or "frozen structure" and the "freedom" of language to repudiate its own structures and bonds and to be sceptical of the very names and categories which it "dictates." Whether the turn from "philosophy" to the "humanities" represents a repudiation of philosophy or whether it represents the invention of a new genre (criss-crossing the boundaries of literary/aesthetic/criticism/theory on the one hand and philosophy on the other) or whether it is the case that some philosophical concerns (and resulting aporias, antinomies, and paradoxes) defy treatment in commonplace philosophical language is unclear. One thing is clear, however: what Bloom, and to a certain extent Cavell, are doing is much more post-philosophical than post-analytical. And if we try and reduce this sort of impetus "beyond philosophy" towards literary and aesthetic concerns to something as recent and as tenuous as post analytical philosophy, we are liable to forget the powerful precedents for this project, especially in Adorno. Clearly the blurring of philosophical, literary and aesthetic boundaries — i.e., the distinctively *post-modern* — represents an impulse which may have indeed been *stimulated* by the aggressive degradation of philosophy by positivist and analytic currents (and also by early phenomenological currents with their equally strong "logical" program); yet, this blurring of the aesthetic, literary and philosophical did not (and does not) arise out of a critical engagement with the positivist — analytic tradition. That is the difference between Adorno and Haber-

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mas. Habermas takes the analytical school seriously; Adorno treated them with revulsion and disdain.

Much more puzzling, however, than the categorization of "post-philosophical" essays as "post-analytical" is the decision of Rajchman and West, as editors of this volume, to include pieces by Arthur Danto, Donald Davidson and Thomas Nagel, all of whom come out fighting — albeit often weighed down with all sorts of qualifications and reservations — on behalf of various analytical dogmas. These dogmas have their roots in the pivotal values of analysis — the *ideas* of rigor and detachment which provide, respectively, the guiding model of worthwhile action and the idea of the good for analytical philosophy. The analytic program is, essentially, one of the reduction of "complex" wholes, with their inherent ambiguity and indeterminacy, to "simple" elements that are determinate, precise, outside language and independent of human subjectivity and responsibility. Claims to truth, consequently, are portrayed as resting upon the correspondence of language with elementary terms (protocols, etc.) that are isomorphic with reality, while the meaning or intelligibility claims of polysemantic words rest upon their reduction to simple terms that can be ostensively defined (i.e., whose meanings are external referents which can be pointed out). Although the analytical program today has been stripped of its strident clarity, its central tenets none the less remain diffusely influential, as this volume, despite its claims to chart territory beyond analytical philosophy, amply demonstrates. There is the example of Danto whose contribution to this volume is a quirky, idiosyncratic defense of the reference theory of meaning. Danto acknowledges the difficulties of a (consistent) analytical semantics which must argue that the meaning of "Hamlet" or "Don Quixote" is what these literary characters "correspond to" or "refer to" in the external world. Yet, Danto then proceeds to argue that the meaning (= reference) of literary texts is the "I" that reads the texts. In doing so, Danto repudiates the deconstructionists much more fruitful ("horizontal") conception of meaning, which treats meaning as the relation (difference) between words, rather than as the signifiers' re-presentation of the signified (the "veritical" conception of meaning.) It is also ironic that the genuinely post-analytical theory of meaning, produced by Mary Hesse, which ties meanings to our acting in the world, is neglected by the editors of this volume in favor of the play of the analytical-deconstruction opposition.

Danto, however, is not alone in defending the analytical program. Davidson's contribution to this task is, on the one hand, to acknowledge the failure of the correspondence theory of truth, but then to seek to torpedo the paradigmatic conception of truth which Kuhn did so much to re-legitimize. The paradigmatic conception interprets truth as the congruence of statements with the relatively open frameworks of "complex" conceptual schemas rather than with the putatively "precise" and rigid regimes of "observation sentences." Davidson criticizes Kuhn's non-analytical theory of truth in a remarkably oblique manner, attributing (quite incorrectly) to Kuhn the view that when paradigm shifts occur the usage (= meaning) of concepts changes so much that persons cannot translate between the paradigms. Davidson points out (reasonably) that persons actually can cope quite well with other persons using words differently from the way they use them. We are charitable towards the practices of others and can shuffle back and forward between different usages. But as Davidson believes that the paradigm idea *necessarily* implies either the failure of, or radical difficulties in, translatability, therefore, concludes Davidson, the idea should be dismissed. Of course, whether the same everyday charitableness or 'give and take' in understanding others applies to a scientific (or even political) community in controversy about fundamentals

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is debatable. But the point is, in any case, Kuhn did not hold the view that meaning variance meant the impossibility of translation. Davidson attacks a straw figure of his own making to repudiate the paradigmatic conception of truth. Nagel, on the other hand, provides a strenuous, even chilling, defense of objectivism. The ideal of detachment is counterposed to the "egocentric distortion of a purely internal point of view." Detachment is represented as correcting "parochialism" and allowing us to see things "as they really are" and not merely relative to a point of view. To be involved, to be committed, to feel and to value, to have a point of view, is for Nagel necessarily partial and partiality is not corrected by moral critique or public reasoning or an "enlarged mentality" but rather by the alienation of the self — a process in which the subjects relation to the self and others becomes radically de-personalized and de-humanized.

Post-Analytic Philosophy is, in many respects, a misnomer. There is, in fact, remarkably little in this volume that unambiguously falls into the category of "post-analytic." *Post-Analytic Philosophy* may give some sort of profile of what is going on in American philosophy today — but it is hardly representative of a distinctive, post analytic, tendency. Why, to cite yet another example, anthologize Rawls, whose fusion of welfare economics and liberal Kantianism is neither analytic nor postanalytic? Rawls simply has not undertaken a confrontation with analytic philosophy. He has not bothered with it; so why include him? Much more appropriate would have been a selection from Alasdair MacIntyre's powerful criticism of emotivism in *After Virtue*; or from John Finnis' critique of Mackie, Nagel and Wiggins in *Fundamentals of Ethics*; or a selection from Alan Gewirth's less radical, though still interesting, efforts in *Reason and Morality* to circumvent the relativistic conclusions of the analytic movement and to crawl back toward something resembling an ethics. If there is nothing distinctive that unites the mélange of philosophies lumped together in this volume, does this mean, perhaps, that there is no such thing as post-analytic philosophy? Is it simply a figment of the imagination of the culture industry? I would hold back from drawing such a strong conclusion. Because, if we cut away the defenses of analytic philosophy (Danto, Davidson) and those who do not address themselves to the tradition (Bloom, Rawls) — i.e., if we get rid of the baggage — I think that it is possible to identify something that is distinctively post-analytic, i.e., which arises out of a serious critical engagement with analytic philosophy and yet offers something resembling an alternative program.

If there is one thing that characterizes post-analytic philosophy it is the refusal to countenance the analytic project of postulating a concept of truth "beyond language," in which "correspondence" to what lies outside of language defines *the true.* Post-analytic currents reject the analytical idealization of "the view from nowhere," emphasizing instead the theoretical, evaluative and metaphysical presuppositions of knowledge. A humanized perspectivism replaces the reified detachment that marked the analytic movement. The aspiration of the analytic movement to have a knowledge of the thing-in-itself seems, in retrospect, not only a vain, but also a ludicrous yearning. In place of this aspiration, post-analytic currents emphasize (in Hacking's terms) "styles of reasoning" which determine what counts as "objective." Truth or falsity have no existence independent of these "styles of reasoning." These "styles" (Kuhn's "paradigms") establish a preference for certain kinds of propositions; they mark out a range of possibilities. In other words, certain kinds of answers and certain kinds of propositions are aprior excluded by the "style" of reasoning. Hacking, in his contribution to this volume, draws an explicit parallel with Foucault's concepts of "episteme" and "discourse" and the notion that a discourse has its own field of "positivity" (or possibility). Discourses do not define the actual content of knowledge, but what it is

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possible to believe. The consequence of this is that there can be *both* disagreements *within* a "style" of reasoning and disagreements *between* "styles" of reasoning and in each case the arguments and the possibilities of resolving disagreements will be very different. Reasoning *within a paradigm* may be more or less coherent, more or less relevant, more or less comprehensive and more or less radical in uncovering and questioning presuppositions. But as soon as the "absolute presuppositions" (Collingwood) of a paradigm or "style" is questioned — i.e., when the "unquestionable" is questioned — a person then steps outside one "style" onto the terrain of some other "style." But irrespective of the degree of radicality of the questioning and answering, there can be no appeal to something "outside of language" (an external referent) to settle disagreements.

The post-analytic move to re-emphasize the importance of categorical frameworks, in deciding the acceptability of our explanations, decisively undercuts the primacy of observation statements/atomic facts in the analytic imagination. Categorical frameworks (paradigms, styles of reasoning, etc.) establish what counts as a good or acceptable form of explanation — and, thus, creates an anticipatory horizon for even the most apparently trivial of observations, for these are always (except, perhaps, in the contrived atmosphere of professionalized philosophy) answers to questions and the "logic" of questioning and answering always presupposes an explanatory framework in terms of which questions and answers can be posed. "Observation statements," "proper names," etc., cannot be neutral with respect to, but are dependent on, our patterns of explanation. Possibly the most devastating post-analytic argument for both the centrality *and* mutability of explanatory genres came from Kuhn. It was devastating precisely because it took issue with analytic philosophy and in particular its most aggressive and propagandistic wing (logical positivism) on the terrain where it had made its strongest and most bombastic claims — *viz* with respect to science. Kuhn deftly showed the manner in which physical objects and events — such as a heavy body swinging back and forth on a string — were observed, what experiments were performed on them (or indeed whether *any* experiments were performed), how observations were interpreted, what was paid attention to by the observer and what questions could be asked about the behavior of material bodies, depended upon, e.g., whether the scientist explained the motion of material bodies in terms of "action to a limit or resting place" (the Aristotelian paradigm) or whether physical events were cast in terms of the paradigm of "unlimited motion" (the Galilean — Newtonian paradigm). Whether the observer of the swinging body on the string "saw" arrested fall or "saw" a body that almost repeated the same motion over and over again, depended on the "absolute presupposition" that *either* in the absence of force, bodies would move to a place of rest *or* in the absence of resistance, motion would persist undiminished, indefinitely.

One of the important corollaries of the re-thinking of the idea of truth, particularly under the influence of Kuhn's illuminating and remarkable history of science, has been the move of post-analytic philosophy "beyond history" in the direction of revitalising a kind of historicism. This move is exemplified in the work of Richard Rorty and Ian Hacking. Suddenly, after the aggressive "logical" atemporalism of the analytic movement, there appears a history of reason. Or rather, the logical program of the analytical movement appears as a chapter, and a rather destructive one, in the history of reason. Counterposed to the rigidity and compulsiveness of the logical program, there is a fluidity and mutability of "styles" of reason. But while Rorty's insistence that there are no "permanent neutral frameworks" for knowledge and inquiry is both sensible and plausible, the parallel assumption that different frameworks of

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rationality can be neatly segmented along historically specific or culturally specific lines (or in Hacking's phrase that there is an historical "evolution" of different "styles" of reasoning) is much more dubious, at least in the case of modernity. Also questionable is the further inference of Rorty and Hacking that these frameworks are "beyond criticism." They take the view that Aristotle was *only* asking *different* questions, but not the *wrong* questions; that there is *no* a-historical notion of truth; and that a "style" of reasoning is not open for "independent" criticism because criticism is always from within a style and never from outside (there are only internal reasons, no external reasons). This view is underpinned by the (convenient but dubious) assumption that there is a neat, orderly, linear sequence of rationalitites through time, with one succeeding the other magnanimously and with each superceeded rationality retiring gracefully from the field of controversy.

To equate the impermanence or flux of categorical frameworks with historical change or differentiation — and thus to partition rationalities in a way so as to *plausibly* render them "beyond criticism" — is also to equate their validity with their historical specifity. This approach implicitly imputes a *positive* validity to the reason of each historical period, *while immunizing each historically specific reason against criticism and devalidation* by *competing* rationalities. Rorty and Hacking's program is, in fact, a revival of historicism. Historicism is characterized by a ready acceptance that there is indeed mobility and change on the field of reason. It repudiates any idea of an eternally identical reason, identifying instead a number of paradigmatic conceptions (of action and the good) that are sequentially ordered in time. In its efforts to discredit the notion of a supra-temporal reason, historicism points out, against the philosophical monist, how *new* centers, new pivots, new presuppositions of reason (and philosophy) arise *over time.* But in treating reason as historically variable and spurning any suggestion of *non-temporal* axioms or First Principles of reason, historicism does manage (albeit in contrast to Rorty and Hacking's self-understanding) to give a positive, if radically one-sided answer, to the question of the rationality of rationalities. The presumption of historicism is that different historical periods embody or possess their "own" rationalities and that *a* rationality is valid for *an* historical period. Of course, there can be variations on this theme. Mannheim, for example, argued that "temporally successive rationalities sights" of the old system were, in some way, integrated or incorporated into the new system of rationality, organized around a new center or pivot. Consequently, for Mannheim, comprehensiveness *as well as time* served as the supreme judge of rationality.

Rorty himself gives a spatializing twist to the traditional concerns of historicism, often veering his discussion away from classic historicism in the direction of anthropologism. Rorty, of course, argues solidly against the conception of an "a-historical human nature," i.e., the idea that philosophy provides us with an a-historical standpoint. But, Rorty is perhaps even more keen to criticize the notion of a *transcultural*, rather than a supra-temporal rationality. Rationalities, for Rorty, are localized. They have definite *spatial* boundaries. Rorty wants to persuade us against the idea that the procedures of justification of beliefs, the differentiating of true from false belief and so on, is something that is "natural" or transcultural. In fact, he argues, it is irreducibly local and that *nothing more* can be said about truth or rationality apart from the descriptions of the familiar procedures of justification which a given locality or society uses. Thus, Rorty answers the question of the rationality of rationalities this way: *a* rationality is valid for *a* culture. There is a fit or congruence between a local culture and a rationality and to demand a rationality which is "above" culture or locality is a vain and most probably a dangerous exhortation.

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I have called Rorty's view anthropologism, rather than strictly speaking historicism, because it really arises out of philosophical reflections on the work of anthropologists like Evans-Pritchard, Malinowski, Geertz and the questions that they raised implicitly, sometimes explicitly, about whether magic and myth, etc., was *per se* irrational, or whether it represented a culturally — specific form of rationality (of course, not historically specific, as the cultures they studied were contemporaneous with scientific, technological, industrial cultures which, officially at least, disdained myth and magic). But the question still remains: Is historicism or anthropologism good enough (even as an implicit) answer to question of the rationality of rationalities? There may be great reservations about making Time or Space the supreme criterion of rationalities. Certainly, there is no doubt that rationalities, and above all models of action (conceptions of good conduct), are historically and culturally variable, not least of all the analytical ideal of action as "rigor" and "precision." But, for all this, to judge competing rationalities in this way is completely inadequate when we are dealing with modernist or proto-modern societies. To justify or explain the rationality of rationalities in terms of historical or cultural specifity makes no sense in these societies. Because different rationalities and different arche-textural metaphors of action are not, in modernist societies, *hermetically separated in time and space.*

Different competing rationalities are contained *within* the same time and space. And, in the face of this, all conceptions of historically-specific validity or culturally-specific validity lose any value they might have. *Within* modernist societies, what you *do not* have is a simple world where there is *a* distinction between good and bad; or where there is one, hegemonic, arche-textural metaphor of action, which everybody agrees on even if they may understand it and employ it in different ways. Rather, what we have are fundamentally different conceptions of good conduct and the good, and thus rival conceptions of truth simultaneously vying for recognition on the *same* philosophical and social terrain. And in this circumstance, the different bearers of rationality — even the most pluralistic of such bearers — seek to reverse or subvert the distinctions and oppositions of reason promoted by each other. There is not, in "our" world, *a* center of rationality — whether "our" historical period, or "our" locality. Rather, there is a multiplicity of centers, with each attempting, sometimes aggressively, sometimes politely, *sometimes self-consciously, sometimes obliviously, to de-center the others . . . working* to upset all the other's carefully worked out distinctions and polarities of reason.

Now, to be fair about all of this, Rorty, for one, does not ignore the question of what happens when the bearers of different rationalities encounter one another. Indeed, Rorty argues that they should actively *search out* such encounters. Yet, he insists that in these encounters *questions of the validity of frameworks cannot be raised.* Frameworks are local and parochial and that is that. There is no "neutral permanent matrix" which such persons can appeal to — no obvious common ground — upon which they can adjudicate their respective knowledge claims. So what are these bearers of rationalities to do? Rorty suggests that in the first place they can agree to differ. They can be satisfied with each others' rationality. Secondly, they can enter into *conversation.* Conversation involves a Deweyian notion of *activity* — it is a *continuous* activity and it has *no goals outside of itself.* It does not, e.g., aim for truth as a goal of inquiry. At the heart of conversation lies the activity of redescribing ourselves. There are many vocabularies of description, which emerge out of different conceptions and polarities of rationality. Conversation is not concerned with how accurately or not we use a particular vocabulary. Within an Aristotelion, Hobbesian or Kantian framework we can make both true and false statements. But in a conversation we are not concerned about the truth or falsity of

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statements. Rather, our concern is to find and keep on finding new and "more interesting" ways of expressing ourselves. At the heart of conversation is the playful exploration of different genres of explanation. In conversation, we discover unfamiliar terms, new and "more fruitful" ways of talking and describing ourselves. The activity of conversation is focused on *ways* of saying, rather than on saying something about something. Rorty objects to the notion that there is "one right way of describing and explaining reality." Rather there are competing theories, ideas and vocabularies and he suggests, in essence, that we should take the chance to enrich ourselves by plunging into "the conversation of humankind."

I agree with Rorty in this much: to explore and learn about different vocabularies and different rationalities is indeed an end-in-itself. Beyond this, it also helps us to come to grips with the multiplicity of rationalities that permeate our life-world and thus to make sense of other peoples behavior and attitudes. But Rorty's idea of conversation does not help *when it comes to making a choice* of *what* rationalities to adopt or promote. What idea of good conduct or of the good should guide our feelings, thought and action? Rorty claims that there are no criteria and such judgements or adjudications are impossible. Yet some categorical frameworks, he acknowledges, are more "fruitful" and "interesting" than others. He seems ready to *implicitly* evaluate vocabularies. But he remains reluctant to render his value criteria explicit or else to explain what he might mean by a term like "fruitful." Individuals, in a pluralistic world, cannot embace all vocabularies without drowning in a lame-brained and incoherent eclecticism. Even if a person is familiar with different world views, that person cannot simultaneously be an Aristotelian, Hobbesian and Kierkegaardian. In a pluralistic world, we have to make choices between different world views or paradigms and to be able to justify these choices to others. And if we are to avoid making these choices blindly or arbitrarily, we need to be able call upon the very paradigm-independent criteria which Rorty repudiates.

What is more, Rorty's argument lacks a certain self-reflectiveness. For the *idea* of conversation is not neutral with respect to categorical presuppositions. Conversation represents an *idea* of the good (an axiomatic value premise). And it entails both a distinctive vocabulary and a paradigmatic conception of action. Rorty's "conversation" belongs alongside Derrida's "play of interpretation," and Barthes' "*jouissance* of reading," and Habermas' "discourses," as one of a cluster of human goods that are *participatory* or *performative*. Although it is not uncommon for these ideas of the good to be clustered (uncomfortably) under the sign of the liberal metaphors of (worthwhile) action *viz* "unbounded" or "unlimited" action — just as it is typical for Derrida, Barthes and Habermas to repudiate any idea of the good or of 'first philosophy,' either out of an unwarranted adherence to the liberal repudiation of Aristotelianism or out of the fear of a "complete" philosophy which would bring about the closure of philosophical thinking — it is, nonetheless, also true that Derrida *et al.* respect and indeed celebrate the *instrinsic* worthwhileness (and *jouissance*) of the activities of reading, interpreting and arguing. The point is: there is no escaping first philosophy. There is no philosophy without "absolute presuppositions," without an *idea* of (worthwhile) action. And, ironically, in the light of Rorty's neo-pragmatic affirmations, we find that Dewey himself came actually close to articulating the idea of a performative metaphysic. It is probably true that there is more than the occasional prefiguration in Dewey's pragmatism of an historicist program; but, although having very interesting things to say about the historicity of reason (a legacy, in part, of his early Hegelianism), Dewey was not an historicist and was never content to catalogue or periodize or simply eulogize

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the fact of different rationalities or world views. Instead, he insistently and forthrightly maintained a conception of worthwhile action that located the goodness of action in *continuing* processes (contrasted to completed or consummated action); in *present* activity (as opposed to future accomplishment) and in *travelling* (as opposed to arrival) — upon which he could develop a distinctively pragmatic rationality and distinctive philosophy. By the same token, it is true, as Bernstein points out (p. 51) that Dewey did aver the conception of a *final* truth. Yet, his willingness to criticize Aristotelian (or Hegelian) notions of *final* truth or a *complete* ethico-political conception of justice rested on premises which took *continuous participation* in activities (including the activities of inquiry and reform) rather than the completion of activities (or finalities) as the guiding metaphor of worthwhile action.

Yet, the question remains: even if we — like Dewey (explicitly) or Rorty *et al* (implictly)— tie ourselves to a performative metaphysics, i.e., if we identify rationality with participation — how do we deal with other antithetical rationalities? The modern world is not neatly and tidily partitioned along historical and cultural lines. Modernity, rather, is very messy. And radically different rationalities compete on the same social and political terrain. How do we behave in the face of this? To "converse" in Rorty's sense is no answer; nor is "discourse" in Habermas' sense — because both of them presuppose an image of good conduct, without showing how it might be *independently* justified *vis-à-vis* other, contradictory images of good conduct. The participatory goods of argumentation and conversation can provide no criteria which are *not* "paradigm — specific" to *judge between* rationalities.

To put it another way: *why* conversation? Why not educational dictatorship? Why not priestly terror? Why not cultural chauvinism? Why not ethnocentric insularity? It is not enough to say: conversation is "our" rationality, when any attempts, short of mythologizing, or to identify who "we" are will discover that "we" share the life-world with other persons who do not share "our" rationality. Rorty's conception of "provincial" or "ethnocentric" islands where conversation can be practised, by communities of common believers, is a chimera. There are no such islands of homogeneity. There are today only continents of division, where the bearers of antithetical rationalities make more or less desperate, more or less generous, more or less intelligent attempts to make sense of each other.

In light of this, if conversation and other ideas of the good, which 'fit' the performative model of (worthwhile) action, are not, in some sense rationally justifiable, how do they "stand up" in the political and social realm where they have to compete with other antithetical rationalities? If we cannot answer this question then we can offer no judgement against the barbaric rationalities that circulate through the arteries of modernity. We are forced to stand speechless before the consequences of these rationalities because they have been rendered "immune from judgement." They are merely world-views, each with the same entitlement to claim our hearts and minds. No matter that the administrative (systems theoretic) rationalities of the disciplinary society produces the ever-more dense and precise surveillance and regulation of action, drawing more and more social actors and events into a "logic" which ultimately produces concentration camps. No matter that strategic (game theoretic) rationalities pit actors against actors in competitive and deadly struggles for political supremacy, ethnic homogeneity and material spoils. None of this matters because we have declared ourselves incapable of judging. And the passion, committment and partiality for decency and practical reason required to be concerned to judge have been consumed by a culture of detachment. The "ideals" of bureaucratic detachment and laissez faire competitiveness may

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indeed by nothing more than the *irrationalization* and perversion of the enlightenment idea of freedom. But what possibly warrants this condemnatory judgement? What makes *these* images of action the antithesis of decency and civility? Why do they offend whatever shreds of practical reason are left to us?

These questions, in a crucial respect, can only be answered by stepping back from the concern with substantive values onto the terrain of formal reason. It is the principles of universality that Kant emphasized that still provide the most promising supports for our judgement of the irrational rationalities in modernity. Rationalities are irrational precisely because they engender or promote goods and images of worthwhile action which are implacably asymmetrical and incapable of universalization. Domination always presupposes the dominated; victory always presupposes the vanquished. Such "goods" are exclusive rather than inclusive and it is the Kantian partiality for a cosmopolitan impartiality and a comprehensive viewpoint that both warrants and epitomizes the rejection of such particularism. But, in entering the field of formal reason, we must be wary not to severe the relation with substantive value axioms (as T.M. Scanlon, for example, does in his otherwise interesting reformulation of the Kantian program in the "Contractualism and Utilitarianism"). Because formal reasoning can only *complement* substantive values, not substitute for them, formal reason functions only as an *independent* (inter-paradigmatic) justification of substantive images of good conduct and the good. And, accordingly, its pretensions to *replace* practical reason must be carefully deflated. Kant must, in other words, be reconciled with Aristotle. And Kant's own Doctrine of Virtue must be made to speak against Kant's otherwise excessive formalism, just as Aristotle's desire for a complete ethico-political conception of justice must be made to give way to Dewey's radically incomplete (performative) conception of justice. And Aristotle's idea of *energia* must be made to speak against his conception of *telos* and finality.

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